Banking in Iraq in relation to economic development by Ali, Abduljawad Naief
Durham E-Theses
Banking in Iraq in relation to economic development
Ali, Abduljawad Naief
How to cite:
Ali, Abduljawad Naief (1967) Banking in Iraq in relation to economic development, Durham theses,
Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/7993/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
A-
Banking i n I r a q i n R e l a t i o n to Economic Development 
The main o b j e c t of t h i s study i s to explore and examine some 
of the ways which might enable the banking i n s t i t u t i o n s i n 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n general, and i n I r a q i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
to p l a y a more e f f e c t i v e p a r t i n the promotion of economic 
development. I n the f i r s t chapter some important economic 
and s o c i a l a s p e c t s of I r a q a r e di s p l a y e d . I n the second 
chapter some examination of the experiences of the I r a q i 
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i s made. The banking i n s t i t u t i o n s i n 
I r a q , i . e . , the commercial and s p e c i a l i s e d banks, together 
with the c e n t r a l bank a r e d i s c u s s e d i n chapter three. I n 
t h i s chapter, the p o s s i b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n of the commercial 
banks i n the promotion of economic development by providing 
medium and long-term loans to a g r i c u l t u r e and i n d u s t r y i s 
di s c u s s e d . I n ad d i t i o n , the p o s s i b l e ways i n which some of 
the s p e c i a l i s e d banks might i n c r e a s e and improve t h e i r s e r v i c e s 
a r e presented. I n chapter four the device of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
i s a p p l i e d to a model which r e p r e s e n t s underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 
i n g e n e r a l . Chapter f i v e o f f e r s an a p p l i c a t i o n of the device 
of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g as shown i n the model, a d j u s t e d to s u i t the 
circumstances p r e v a i l i n g i n I r a q . Chapter s i x presents a 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the balance of advantage and disadvantage which 
may be thought to apply to the use of the device of d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g , e s p e c i a l l y when i t i s agreed t h a t one of the p o s s i b l e 
outcomes i s i n f l a t i o n . T h i s i s followed by chapter seven where 
the c o n c l u s i o n s and recommendations reached i n the l i g h t of the 
study a r e s e t out. We then have s i x appendices, i n c l u d i n g 
a s t a t i s t i c a l one. -
The main c o n c l u s i o n s a r e : 
1. I t may be worthwhile f o r monetary a u t h o r i t i e s to consider, 
very c a r e f u l l y , the p o s s i b i l i t y of us i n g the device of 
d e f i c i t f i nancing, under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and w i t h i n 
s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s . 
2. I n c a l c u l a t i n g changes i n p r i c e s the c a t e g o r i e s of the 
Quantity Theory of the Value of Money can be u s e f u l l y 
employed, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f an attempt i s made to introduce 
dynamic elements i n t o the F i s h e r framework, as i s done i n 
t h i s study. 
3. I t need not be h e l d t h a t moderate i n f l a t i o n must, n e c e s s a r i l y 
t u r n i n t o high and h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n . 
4. The commercial banks i n under developed c o u n t r i e s should 
g i v e favourable c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the making of medium and 
long-term loans to a g r i c u l t u r e and in d u s t r y . 
5. Under normal co n d i t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a d i n g , I r a q may be thought to be i n a more favoured 
p o s i t i o n to adopt the suggestions s e t out i n (1) and (4) 
above, than most other underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . These 
are perhaps a l l the more s i g n i f i c a n t f o r I r a q i n t h a t the 
n a t u r a l resource, o i l , which provides opportunity, i s a 
dimin i s h i n g or wasting a s s e t . 
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INTRODUCTION 
When an underdeveloped country wxshes to execute a programme 
of economic development, i t must c o n s i d e r :-
( a ) The nature and extent of the r e s o u r c e s , human, n a t u r a l , f i n a n c i a l ... 
e t c . , a t i t s command. 
(b) The extent of the minimal programme which xt w i l l be expedient as w e l l 
as d e s i r a b l e to_ _aim_at. 
( c ) The measures which are open to i t to mobxlise and u t x l i s e the 
r e s o u r c e s whxch a r e needed to c a r r y out the programme. I n thxs 
connectxon xt w x l l no doubt - f o r thxs w x l l be l x k e l y to hold good of 
even the l e a s t advanced countrxes whxch a r e s u f f x c x e n t l y developed 
and a l x v e to the problems of economic progress - use monetary d e v i c e ^ 
f o r a t t a i n x n g command over the r e a l r e s o u r c e s requxred. 
I t w x l l t h e r e f o r e be l i k e l y to consxder the quantxty of funds which w x l l be 
r e q u i r e d to execute the t o t a l p lan, and the proportxon of the funds 
requxred, l x k e l y to be made a v a x l a b l e through 
( 2 ) 
( a ) taxatxon (b) loans ( x ) i n t e r n a l ( n ) e x t e r n a l 
( c ) a i d ( d ) net e x p o r t s . I t may w e l l be t h a t the t o t a l of funds 
so thought l x k e l y to be a v a x l a b l e w x l l not equal the t o t a l f x n a n c i a l o u t l a y 
( 3 ) 
requxred f o r the programme as envisaged. The plannxng authorxty must 
then c o n s i d e r two a l t e r n a t i v e s :-
( a ) Cuttxng down the s x z e and q u a l x t y of x t s p r o p o s a l s . 
(b) Seeking seme means of supplementxng xn other ways the funds requxred. 
I f xt should be thought t h a t the programme cannot be cut down 
without bexng made i n e f f i c i e n t and inadequate, then a t t e n t i o n must 
( 1 ) I t may be suggested t h a t a s i m i l a r need f a c e s any one e n t e r i n g upon a 
dxscussxon of the s u b j e c t whxch xs presented xn thxs d x s s e r t a t x o n . J u s t as 
the developxng authorxty must know the f a c t s about the economy whxch i t 
xntends to a l t e r i n a sxgnxfxcant degree so the observer must know the 
f a c t s about the economy which i s the s u b j e c t of hxs c o n s x d e r a t i o n s . I t xs 
f o r thxs reason t h a t a good d e a l of space has been devoted i n "chapter one" 
of thxs d x s s e r t a t i o n to the s x g n x f i c a n t p h y s i c a l , economic and s o c x a l f a c t s 
of the I r a q x economy. 
( 2 ) I t w x l l be evxdent t h a t i n t e r n a l loans w x l l have a c l o s e r e l a t x o n to 
the volume of domestxc savxngs, though t h a t r e l a t i o n may w e l l be f a r from 
a simple one. 
( 3 ) I n addxtion, of course, to the funds requxred f o r normal 
budgetary purposes. 
be given to ( b ) . I t w i l l be seen t h a t (b) i s r e d u c i b l e to the 
planning a u t h o r i t y f i n a n c i n g the minimum r e q u i r e d increment of i t s 
needs by o b t a i n i n g c r e d i t from i t s c e n t r a l bank, i . e . by 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . I t i s thought t h a t these a r e the c o n d i t i o n s 
and circumstances which apply to I r a q , and i t i s the purpose of the 
forthcoming pages to examine the consequences of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
both g e n e r a l l y and as a p p l i e d to the s p e c i a l c ircumstances of I r a q . 
I t i s .advocated i n t h i s study t h a t the c e n t r a l bank should be the 
i n s t i t u t i o n to provide p a r t of the funds needed to c a r r y out 
development programmes. 
The commercial banks i n I r a q , f o l l o w i n g the B r i t i s h 
banking t r a d i t i o n s , do not provide, u s u a l l y , long term c r e d i t f o r 
a g r i c u l t u r a l or i n d u s t r i a l investment. T h e r e f o r e , p a r t of the 
purpose of t h i s study i s to examine the p o s s i b i l i t y of p r o v i d i n g 
long-term c r e d i t by commercial banks i n I r a q to promote i n d u s t r i a l 
and a g r i c u l t u r a l investment. The importance of t h i s p o i n t could 
be i l l u s t r a t e d i f we n o t i c e t h a t a t the end of 1962, t o t a l p r i v a t e 
s a v i n g s amounted to ( I . D 60.963 mn.) i n the form of s a v i n g s accounts 
and deposit accounts, which form more than 1/9 of the n a t i o n a l 
income of t h a t y e a r . ^ ^ I t may be suggested t h a t t h i s i s an i n d i c a t i o n 
t h a t the commercial banks might use a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of the 
funds p l a c e d a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l by d e p o s i t o r s without n e c e s s a r i l y 
i n f r i n g i n g the r u l e s of c a u t i o u s banking: i t might be s a i d t h a t 
e i t h e r the commercial banks are a c t i n g i n an e x c e s s i v e l y c a u t i o u s 
manner or th a t they are m i s s i n g an opportunity. Them, a f t e r 
d i s c u s s i n g the p o s s i b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n of the c e n t r a l and commerical 
banks i n the promotion of economic development; the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
a f u r t h e r and more e f f e c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of the s p e c i a l i s e d banks 
i n I r a q i s examined. The crux of the problem t h e r e f o r e i s to examine, 
c r i t i c a l l y , the extent and the methods through which the banking 
system might be a b l e to c o n t r i b u t e to the promotion of economic 
development i n I r a q . 
( 1 ) The C e n t r a l Bank of I r a q ( C . B . I . ) Q u a r t e r l y B u l l e t i n A p r i l - J u n e , 
1964, and page (48 ) of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
( x i i ) 
I t i s not the main aim of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n to concentrate 
the a n a l y s i s on the t h e o r e t i c a l or a l l the p r a c t i c a l a s p e c t s of 
the monetary and f i s c a l p o l i c i e s which may be i n v o l v e d . The main 
o b j e c t i s to examine whether i t seems p o s s i b l e or met f o r the 
banking system i n I r a q to c o n t r i b u t e to the economic development 
of I r a q : and i f i t does seem p o s s i b l e , which methods should be 
followed and what, broadly, the p o s s i b l e consequences of u s i n g these 
methods might be. Some c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l be given i n a d d i t i o n to 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p p l y i n g these methods, w i t h c e r t a i n adjustments 
to "underdeveloped" c o u n t r i e s , considered g e n e r a l l y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
the monetary p o l i c y i n I r a q i s touched upon m those p a r t s of the 
d i s s e r t a t i o n where the f u n c t i o n s of the c e n t r a l bank of I r a q a re 
d i s c u s s e d . I t i s through t h i s bank t h a t , whether m connection w i t h 
the f i n a n c i n g of development programmes or whether i n connection 
w i t h the more o r d i n a r y and g e n e r a l t r a n s a c t i o n s of the community, 
t h a t the general o v e r s i g h t and c o - o r d i n a t i o n of the monetary a f f a i r s 
of I r a q w i l l g e n e r a l l y be e f f e c t e d . 
I t may be s a f e to say t h a t , although a f a i r amount has been 
w r i t t e n about the I r a q i economy i n g e n e r a l and the monetary p o l i c y and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s m p a r t i c u l a r , no study has been made, as f a r as the 
present w r i t e r knows f o r the s o l e purpose of examining the p o s s i b l e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n , i f any, of the banking system i n the promotion of 
economic development. I r a q l i k e other underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , needs 
c a p i t a l funds i n order to c a r r y out development programmes, and 
t h e r e f o r e , i t i s of great importance, whether f o r I r a q or f o r other 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , to e x p l o i t and c o n s i d e r every p o s s i b l e way 
through which p a r t of the needed funds might be r a i s e d . Consequently, 
i f t h e r e i s a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the banking system might be a b l e to 
provide the r e q u i r e d funds through a p r o v i s i o n which e v e n t u a l l y 
r e c o g n i s a b l y emerges as d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , and the advantages of 
u s i n g t h i s method under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
outweighed the disadvantages, as t h i s study aims to show, i t may be 
w e l l to c o n s i d e r t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y to i t s utmost l i m i t . 
I 1 -( x i i x ) 
While emphasis i s p l a c e d upon t h i s aspect of banking 
i n the d i s s e r t a t i o n , and i s indeed one of i t s main concerns, the other 
and more r o u t i n e a s p e c t s of banking a c t i v i t y a r e not f o r g o t t e n . The 
banks of the banking system as a whole a r e recognised as conducting the 
u s u a l a c t i v i t i e s of banking - r e c e i v i n g d e p o s i t s , p r o v i d i n g cash to t h e i r 
customers as r e q u i r e d - making loans and the l i k e : these more u s u a l 
a c t i v i t i e s of banks have a c o n s t r u c t i v e a u x i l i a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n to make to 
the economy of a country: the emphasis which i s p l a c e d upon the p r o v i s i o n 
of c r e d i t by the c e n t r a l bank by way of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s e x p l a i n e d by 
the f a c t t h a t t h i s procedure i s i d e n t i f i e d i n the d i s s e r t a t i o n as a 
p a r t i c u l a r instrument by the use of which economic development 
programmes could c o n c e i v a b l y be helped along. The d e v i c e i s to be used 
under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and w i t h i n s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s . A model 
r e p r e s e n t i n g underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n g e n e r a l where t h i s d e v i c e i s 
used, i s p resented i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . I t i s suggested t h a t t h i s model 
could be a d j u s t e d to r e p r e s e n t any p a r t i c u l a r underdeveloped country. 
S i n c e t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s mainly concerned w i t h I r a q , the use of d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g m the l i g h t of the circumstances p r e v a i l i n g i n I r a q i s 
t h e r e f o r e examined. I f the I r a q i a u t h o r i t i e s should decide to use t h i s 
d e v i c e , then i t i s expected t h a t as a r e s u l t of the spending of funds 
provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g c e r t a i n changes w i l l tend to take 
p l a c e . D i s t r i b u t e d incomes w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e and i n t u r n , demand 
f o r domestic and i m p o r t e d ^ ^ consumer's goods, other t h i n g s remaining 
the same, w i l l tend to r i s e . I t i s expected, and the reasons f o r t h i s 
e x p e c t a t i o n a r e presented i n the model, t h a t producers of domestic goods 
w i l l t r y to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production to meet p a r t or a l l of the i n c r e a s e 
i n demand. I n t r y i n g to do so, i t i s argued i n the model, they w i l l 
labour 
have to t r a m more u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r e r s , or b i d ~ away from other 
s e c t o r s by e.g. o f f e r i n g higher wages. T h i s t r a i n of events i s expected 
to take p l a c e during the p e r i o d when the funds provided through d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g a r e being spent. Moreover, th e s e funds a r e to be spent on 
( 1 ) The i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r imported goods i n c l u d e s consumer's as w e l l 
as c a p i t a l goods, as i s shown l a t e r . 
Cxiv.) 
s e t t x n g up f a c t o r i e s ( c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s i n our model), and workers, 
managers and other personnel w i l l be needed to run these f a c t o r i e s . I t i s 
n e c e s s a r y , t h e r e f o r e , to have an adequately f u l l and c l e a r i d ea about 
important a s p e c t s of the I r a q i economy, a s p e c t s such a s , manufacturing 
i n d u s t r y , a g r i c u l t u r e , t r a n s p o r t , and the l i k e . Furthermore, i t i s even 
more important to know something about population, education, and h e a l t h 
c o n d i t i o n s i n order to make an assessment of an important f a c t o r of 
production i . e . l a bour. I n order to g i v e an idea about the s t r u c t u r e of 
the I r a q i economy, the purchasing power and the standard of l i v i n g of the 
I r a q i s , the n a t i o n a l income, r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h i s income, and 
n a t i o n a l income per c a p i t a a re d i s c u s s e d i n some d e t a i l . 
As a r e s u l t of the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g the p u b l i c debt i s 
expected t o , other t h i n g s remaining equal, i n c r e a s e . Therefore the s i z e of 
the I r a q i p u b l i c debt compared w i t h the p u b l i c debts of a developed country 
(e.g. the United Kingdom) and an underdeveloped country (e.g. Turkey) i s 
d i s c u s s e d . Demand f o r imported consumer and c a p i t a l goods i s expected to 
i n c r e a s e as a r e s u l t of the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , other t h i n g s 
remaining the same, and consequently the demand f o r f o r e i g n exchange w i l l 
tend to r i s e . The major source of f o r e i g n exchange i n I r a q i s o i l revenues, 
t h e r e f o r e , a good d e a l of a t t e n t i o n , mainly m the f i r s t chapter, i s g i v e n 
to the development of o i l production, the growth of the a s s o c i a t e d o i l 
revenues, and the confidence t h a t may be p l a c e d i n t h e i r c o n t i n u a t i o n . 
Moreover, under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s between money i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n and the supply of goods, a degree of i n f l a t i o n i s expected to 
emerge,^^as a r e s u l t of the spending of funds provided through d e f i c i t 
( 1 ) I t has to be r e c o g n i s e d t h a t the emergence of a measure of i n f l a t i o n 
i n t r o d u c e s the f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n of the appearance of a degree of " f o r c e d 
s a v i n g s " i n t o the s i t u a t i o n . I t i s indeed accepted t h a t t h i s i s so but i t 
i s not the i n t e n t i o n to enter i n t o the d i s c u s s i o n of a complex s u b j e c t and 
i t i s suggested t h a t i n the present context t h e r e i s perhaps no need to say 
more than t h a t i n f l a t i o n - induced by d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g - enables the 
planning a u t h o r i t y to reduce the consumption, i n r e a l terms, of income 
r e c e i v e r s below the l e v e l which they would v o l u n t a r i l y accept and t h a t the 
p o s s e s s i o n of the a d d i t i o n a l funds by the planning a u t h o r i t y enables i t to 
b i d away r e s o u r c e s from other uses which might c o n f l i c t w i t h the purposes 
of the p r o j e c t which has been planned. 
< (xv) 
financxng. T h i s degree of x n f l a t x o n might a f f e c t e xports, and the 
balance of payments. T h e r e f o r e , the I r a q x exports and x t s balance of 
payments a r e dxscussed xn the f x r s t chapter. 
I t xs argued xn the d x s s e r t a t i o n , however, t h a t a moderate 
degree of x n f l a t x o n need not, n e c e s s a r x l y , t u r n xnto hxgher degrees of 
x n f l a t x o n , but t h a t xt may be possxble to keep xt wxthin l x m i t s . I n 
order to achxeve thxs axm the monetary authorxtxes should have c e r t a x n 
q u a l x t x e s , such a s , sense of responsxbxlxty, fxrmness, knowledge and 
the l x k e ; and,even more xmportant,experxence. Consequently, some 
examxnatxon of the experxences of the Iraqx monetary authorxtxes i s made 
xn the second chapter and xn other p a r t s of the d x s s e r t a t x o n . The 
bankxng xnstxtutxons i n I r a q x.e. the commercxal and s p e c x a l i s e d banks, 
together wxth the c e n t r a l bank are dxscussed xn chapter t h r e e ; and xn 
thxs chapter consxderatxon xs given to the extent and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 
c e n t r a l bank c o n t r o l over the other p a r t s of the bankxng system. The 
possxble contrxbutxon of the commercial banks i n the promotion of 
economxc development by p r o v i d i n g medxum and long-term loans to 
a g r x c u l t u r e and xndustry xs dxscussed. Furthermore, the possxble ways xn 
whxch some of the s p e c x a l i s e d banks mxght i n c r e a s e and xmprove t h e i r 
s e r v x c e s are presented. 
I n chapter four the devxce of d e f x c i t fxnancxng xs a p p l i e d 
to a model whxch r e p r e s e n t s underdeveloped countrxes xn g e n e r a l . Chapter 
fxve p r e s e n t s an adjustment of the use of the devxce of d e f i c x t 
fxnancxng as x l l u s t r a t e d xn the model, to s u x t the cxrcumstances 
prevaxlxng xn I r a q . Thxs xs followed by a consxderatxon of the balance 
of advantage and disadvantage whxch may be thought to apply to the use 
of defxcxt fxnancxng xn thxs context, p a r t x c u l a r l y when xt xs 
accepted t h a t one of the outcomes xs l x k e l y to be x n f l a t x o n . F x n a l l y , 
xn chapter seven the conclusxons and the recommendatxons reached xn 
the l x g h t of the study a r e presented. We then have sxx appendxces. 
Appendxx one s e t s out the Anglo-Iraqx agreement of 1947 about the 
I r a q i s t e r l i n g a s s e t s . Appendxx two, p r e s e n t s changes xn the volume 
and composxtxon of I r a q x currency r e s e r v e s 1947-1960. I n Appendix 
t h r e e examples are gxven, drawn from the wrxtxngs of v a r i o u s economxsts, 
( x v i ) 
of the d i f f e r e n t senses xn which the term ' d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g ' has been 
used. Appendix four o f f e r s a b r i e f j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the use i n the 
model of the c a t e g o r i e s of the Quantity Theory of the Value of Money 
as an e x p o s i t o r y d e v i c e f o r i n d i c a t i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p s which e x i s t 
between money and goods i n an economy. I t i s thought t h a t a statement 
of t h i s s o r t i s c a l l e d f o r i n view of the c r i t i c i s m which, i n r e c e n t 
y e a r s , has been i n c r e a s i n g l y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the formulation of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l Q uantity Theory. I n Appendix f i v e , the nature of i n f l a t i o n 
and main types of i n f l a t i o n a re d i s c u s s e d . Appendix s i x , i s a 
s t a t i s t i c a l appendix. 
Throughout the d i s s e r t a t i o n however i t has been n e c e s s a r y to 
f a c e up to the d i f f i c u l t problem - a common problem c o n f r o n t i n g w r i t e r s 
on the economic a f f a i r s of underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s - of the complete 
l a c k of data on some asp e c t s of the s u b j e c t , inadequate data on o t h e r s , 
and the non-comparability of a good d e a l of s t a t i s t i c a l m a t e r i a l , even 
when, on the f a c e of t h i n g s , t h e r e would seem to be p l e n t y of i t . As 
s t a t e d above, no work, complete i n i t s e l f , has been w r i t t e n d e a l i n g w i t h 
the c o n t r i b u t i o n which the banking system i n I r a q might be a b l e to make 
i n the promotion of economic development, apart from b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n s 
about, and d e s c r i p t i o n of the I r a q i economy i n g e n e r a l and the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n of the monetary i n s t i t u t i o n s as p a r t of the economy i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . Consequently, a good d e a l of r e l i a n c e has had to be p l a c e d 
on such sources as annual r e p o r t s and b u l l e t i n s of the C e n t r a l Bank of 
I r a q , and other monetary i n s t i t u t i o n s , together w i t h , Laws, by-Laws, 
and r e g u l a t i o n s r e l a t i n g to Banking. There i s one s e c t i o n however which 
i s a n a l y t i c a l r a t h e r than d e s c r i p t i v e . T h i s i s the s e c t i o n which d e a l s 
w i t h the expected by-product of u s i n g d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , namely i n f l a t i o n . 
Here, the source m a t e r i a l s have, i n the nature of t h i n g s taken the form 
of books and a r t i c l e s . 
I am indebted to my S u p e r v i s o r P r o f e s s o r E. A l l e n 
who guided and encouraged me through every stage of the 
work. To him my g r a t i t u d e i s deeper than I can e x p r e s s . 
A.J.N. ALI 
The Graduate S o c i e t y , 
Durham. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SOME LEADING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF IRAQ 
IRAQ xs l o c a t e d i n the Middle E a s t , w i t h S y r i a and Jordan to the 
west, I r a n to the e a s t , Turkey to the north, and Saudi A r a b i a to 
the south. G e o g r a p h i c a l l y , I r a q i s l o c a t e d i n an important 
s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n , because i t forms a l a r g e p a r t of the bridge 
between the I n d i a n Ocean and the Mediterranean. The a r e a was known 
to Europeans, before the emergence of I r a q as a s e p a r a t e s t a t e , as 
Mesopotamia, or i n other words; the country between two r i v e r s . 
Land and P o p u l a t i o n : -
The a r e a i s (438.446) square k i l o m e t r e s ^ 1 ^ ; of which 
(2) 
47% i s c l a s s i f i e d as d e s e r t . The population i n the 1947 census 
was (4.82 mn.) and (6.5 mn.) i n the 1957 census; United Nations 
f i g u r e s suggest t h a t , on 31 December 1958, the I r a q population was 
(6.374 mn.) and r o s e to (7.004 mn.) i n 1964; g i v i n g an annual r a t e 
( 3 ) 
of i n c r e a s e of ( 1 . 7 % ) . An I r a q i Economist depending on the 
(Food and A g r i c u l t u r e O r g a n i s a t i o n (FA0)*s a d j u s t e d population 
f i g u r e s , g i v e s t h e annual r a t e of i n c r e a s e m population as ( 1 . 9 4 % ) . 
( 1 ) M i n i s t r y of P l a n n i n g , C e n t r a l Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , S e c t i o n of 
Research and P u b l i c i t y , S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t 1963, Government 
P r e s s 1964, P.39 
( 2 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement ( I r a q ) , 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i v i s i o n , Spencer House, 27 S t James! P l a c e , London, 
September 1964, P.4 
(3 ) The United Nations S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book 1965, Department of 
Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s ; New York, 1966, P.89 
( 4 ) Haseeb, K., The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-61, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , 1964, P.16 
There was another census i n 1965. But due to the m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s 
i n the north a t the time, the f i g u r e may not be a c c u r a t e enough, i t 
i s t h e r e f o r e not g i v e n . 
A 
( 2 ) 
However, i f the annual r a t e of growth of population i s ( 1 .7%) or 
( 1 . 9 4 % ) , i t i s high i n comparison w i t h Western c o u n t r i e s , such 
as I t a l y ( 0 . 7 % ) , Greece (0.7%) and Belgium ( 0 . 7 % ) ^ 1 \ Over (4 mn.) 
persons l i v e d i n r u r a l areas i n 1964. The labour f o r c e i . e . the 
persons aged between 15-55 was (3.023.770) according to the 1957 
( 2 ) 
census. At the end of 1960, an o f f i c i a l f i g u r e of (1.0760.000) 
l a b o u r e r s was given; w i t h a (23%) unemployed a t the end of 1959 and 
( 3 ) 
19% at the end of 1960 . P r i o r to J u l y 14th 1958, Iraq"was r u l e d -
by King F a i s a l I I , then on J u l y 14th 1958, the government was 
overthrown by a r e v o l u t i o n and a r e p u b l i c was proclaimed. The c h i e f 
language i s ( A r a b i c ) , and the s t a t e r e l i g i o n i s I s l a m . The country 
i s d i v i d e d i n t o (14) Liwas or p r o v i n c e s , w i t h t h r e e d e s e r t a r e a s . 
Each Liwa i s d i v i d e d i n t o (quadhas) ( 6 9 ) , and the (quadhas) are 
sub-divided i n t o (Nahiyas) ( 1 6 9 ) . The ( L i w a s ) vary g r e a t l y i n the 
standard of l i v i n g ; as i t i s shown m the r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
the N a t i o n a l Income (On page (53). The l a r g e s t p r o v i n c e 
i s Baghdad w i t h the h i g h e s t standard of l i v i n g ; K irkuk i s the 
(< 
major crude o i l producer, and to a s m a l l e r extent Mosul and Basrah 
The l a t t e r i s the only I r a q i p o r t; and the main dates producer and 
e x p o r t e r . 
( 1 ) The United Nations S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book 1965, Department of 
Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s , New York 1966; pp.92-93. 
( 2 ) T h i s f i g u r e was c a l c u l a t e d by the w r i t e r , from the Annual 
A b s t r a c t , Government P r e s s , 1964. P. 
( 3 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Three. Monthly Economic 
Review, Annual Supplement, August 1962, P.6 
( 4 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, ( I r a q ) 
August, 1965, P.16 
( 3 ) 
Educatxon and Health Conditxons :-
Educatxonal and h e a l t h condxtxons a re dxscussed here, 
because, as the labour f o r c e xn a country xs a factorc of productxon , 
xt xs xmportant to know to what extent the labour f o r c e xs h e a l t h y 
and l x t e r a t e ; i n order to decxde, roughly; the productxvxty of the 
workers xn d x f f e r e n t f x e l d s of productxon. Educatxonal f a c i l x t i e s 
xn I r a q , u n t i l the 1950's were f a r from s u f f x c x e n t or adequate. 
T h i s poxnt can be x l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t xn 1913, f o r xnstance, 
t h e r e were only (160) prxmary s c h o o l s xn I r a q run by the government 
wxth (6000) s t u d e n t s ; out of an estxmated populatxon of (2.824.000) 
xn l g a o / 1 ^ Thxs xs compared wxth (4.125) s c h o o l s and (914.121) 
students xn governmental, prxv a t e , and forexgn prxmary schools xn 
1962-1963. T a b l e ( 1 ) (Appendxx « ) / shows t h a t , the number of 
t e a c h e r s xn prxmary sc h o o l s xncreased by (82%) xn 1956-57, over 
1950-51, whxle the number of students more than doubled. Thxs means 
th a t every t e a c h e r has a l a r g e r number of s t u d e n t s , but xn 1962-63 
the number of t e a c h e r s r o s e by 177% whxle the number of students 
xncreased by 145%, whxch means t h a t the number of students per 
teacher has decreased. The t a b l e shows th a t the number of te a c h e r s 
xn secondary s c h o o l s more than doubled xn 1956-57 over 1950-51 whxle 
the number of students was l e s s than doubled durxng the same perxod. 
However, xn 1962-1963 the xncrease xn the number of students was 
hxgher than the xncrease xn the number of the t e a c h e r s xn the same 
perxod. I t xs evident t h a t , the number of students xn hxgher 
educatxon xn A r t c o l l e g e s and xnstxtutxons was four and a h a l f the 
number of the students xn Scxence c o l l e g e s xn 1950-1951; xn 
1956-57 xt was l e s s than one and a h a l f . Thxs xs a h e a l t h y sxgn, 
because, I r a q l i k e any other underdeveloped country, needs en g i n e e r s , 
doctors and s c x e n t x s t s , as much a s , xf not more than i t needs l a w y e r s . 
( 1 ) Langely, K.M. The I n d u s t r i a l x s a t x o n of I r a q ; Harvard Mxddle 
E a s t e r n Monograph Se r x e s , 1962, P.11 (Thxs xs the n e a r e s t 
a v a i l a b l e e s t i m a t e to 1913 perxod). 
( 2 ) The Annual S t a t i s t x c a l A b s t r a c t , Mxnxstry of Plannxng, 
Government P r e s s , 1964 
( 4 ) 
On the whole, xt may be s a f e to say t h a t t h i s t a b l e shows 
t h a t e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s i n I r a q between 1950 - 51 and 
1962 - 63 have i n c r e a s e d r a p i d l y i n a l l s t a g e s of 
educatxon. 
The f i r s t - s t a g e of a U n i v e r s i t y C i t y i n Baghdad 
has begun i n 1963, w i t h a t o t a l estimated c o s t of 
( I . D 30 mn„). One of the most important measures, as f a r 
as e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s a r e concerned, i s the percentage 
of i l l e t e r a c y among the p o p u l a t i o n i n a country. I n 1947 
over (91%) of the population was i l l i t e r a t e . i n 1957, 
t h i s percentage became (82.7) per c e n t . T h i s i s compared 
w i t h (73.7) per cent i n the United Arab Rep u b l i c (1960), 
(61.9) per cent i n Turkey (1960), and (13.3) per cent i n 
S p ain (1960). ' 
( 1 ) The Economist, I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement ( I r a q ) 
August, 1960. P.5 
(2) The United Nations S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book 1964, Department 
of Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s , New York 1965. PP 692-697. 
The f i g u r e f o r I r a q i n c l u d e s population 5 y e a r s of 
age and over. The f i g u r e f o r the U.A.R. excludes a l i e n 
p o p ulation (143 312 persons f o r a l l a g e s ) . The f i g u r e f o r 
Spain i n c l u d e s Centra and M e l i l l a , and data a r e based on a 
1 per cent sample of census r e t u r n s . 
( 5 ) 
T able 2 (Appendix 4) shows th a t between 1953 and 
1963, the number of h o s p i t a l s has i n c r e a s e d from (98) to ( 1 3 1 ) ; 
the number of d i s p e n s a r i e s from (498) to (8 0 1 ) ; and the number of 
h o s p i t a l beds from (6201) to (13669). 
The number o f - d e n t i s t s more than t r e b l e d , and the 
number of pharmacists more than doubled during the p e r i o d . The 
number of doctors i n c r e a s e d by (37%) i n 1958 over 1953, and by 
(19%) i n 1962 over 1958. The number of nurses and midwives rose 
from (1347) i n 1953 to (1691) m 1963, and h o s p i t a l s t a f f from 
(2266) to (3134). 
I t may be i n f e r r e d from t h i s t a b l e t h a t t h e r e was 
an improvement i n the h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s during the p e r i o d between 
1953 and 1963. The improvement i n h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s i s r e t a r d e d 
by the l a c k of piped-water, e l e c t r i c i t y , and poor housing c o n d i t i o n s . 
According to a survey conducted i n 1956, of (740.000) 
d w e l l i n g s , more than (500.000) were mud hut s , reed shacks and the 
l i k e ; (17.1%) had e l e c t r i c i t y , and only (21%) had i n t e r i o r piped 
water s u p p l i e s . 
Campaigns a g a i n s t M a l a r i a and t u b e r c u l o s i s were 
conducted during the l a s t few y e a r s . The work i n b u i l d i n g a medical 
c i t y m Baghdad was begun m 1963; a c o l l e g e f o r the t r a i n i n g of 
nurses was opened m 1962, and a new medical c o l l e g e was opened i n 
Mosul a l s o i n 1962. A measure which i s used to g i v e an i d e a about 
the h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n s i n a country, and to show how adequate h e a l t h 
f a c i l i t i e s a r e i n a country compared w i t h other c o u n t r i e s , other 
t h i n g s being equal, i s i n h a b i t a n t s per p h y s i c i a n . I n June 1962, 
t h e r e was one p h y s i c i a n f o r each (4900) persons i n I r a q , compared 
( 2 ) 
w i t h (670) i n A r g e n t i n a , (610) i n I t a l y , and (5700) i n Turkey. 
( 1 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, ( I r a q ) Dec. 
1963, P.4 
( 2 ) The United Nations S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book 1964, Department of 
Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s , New York, 1965. PP. 643-650. 
( 6 ) 
A g r i c u l t u r e :-
The A g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r i n I r a q i s very important, 
because, a g r i c u l t u r e i s the main occupation f o r more than two t h i r d s 
of the p o p u l a t i o n , w i t h an important c o n t r i b u t i o n to the n a t i o n a l 
income. Trade and i n d u s t r y depend to a c e r t a i n degree on these 
a g r i c u l t u r a l products. There a r e two regions i n I r a q ; as f a r as 
a g r i c u l t u r e i s concerned, the r a m - f e d zone i n the north, and the 
i r r i g a t e d a r e a i n the c e n t r e and the south of I r a q . The r a i n - f e d 
a r e a i n the north depends on the w i n t e r r a i n ; t h e r e f o r e , w i n t e r crops 
a r e grown i n t h i s a r e a such a s , b a r l e y , wheat, tobacco, and grapes. 
C i t r u s f r u i t i s grown m the D i y a l a V a l l e y i n e a s t - c e n t r a l I r a q . 
The s o u t h - c e n t r a l a r e a depends on i r r i g a t i o n from the T i g r i s and 
Euphrates and grows dates, r i c e , and cotton. U s u a l l y t h e r e i s a 
s u r p l u s of b a r l e y and sometimes wheat; t h i s depends on the r a i n f a l l . 
Dates a r e an important export crop and I r a q has been the world's 
p r i n c i p l e producer and exporter of dates f o r c e n t u r i e s . However, the 
most s t r i k i n g f a c t about a g r i c u l t u r e and the u t i l i z a t i o n of 
c u l t i v a b l e land i s t h a t , according to the a g r i c u l t u r a l census of 
1952-53 only (6.4 mn ha ) or a l i t t l e more than 1/7 of the t o t a l 
c u l t i v a b l e a r e a of (44.4 mn. ha) was a c t u a l l y s e t t l e d a g r i c u l t u r a l 
holdings w i t h i n the (14) Liwas, and another (12.1 mn. ha) of 
( 2 ) 
c u l t i v a b l e l a n d o u t s i d e these L i w a s . Furthermore, the average of 
c u l t i v a b l e l a n d per c a p i t a i s 3 to 3.5 a c r e s i n I r a q , w h i l e the 
(3) 
A s i a n average i s only (0.5) a c r e s per c a p i t a . 
( 1 ) As Mr.Simons has s a i d , " A g r i c u l t u r e - w i t h f i v e m i l l i o n out of a 
population of seven m i l l i o n -". Simons, J . L . A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Development i n I r a q , Planning and Management F a i l u r e s , The Middle 
E a s t J o u r n a l , s p r i n g 1965, Volume 19, No.2 P.130. 
( 2 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, I r a q , 
August 1965, P.11 
( 3 ) Langely, K.M., The I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n of I r a q , Harvard Middle 
E a s t e r n Monograph S e r i e s , Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19ff2. P.7 
( 7 ) 
The farmers xn I r a q , u s u a l l y , l e a v e h a l f of the wxnter 
crop zone unc u l t x v a t e d each year, as a means of r e s t o r x n g f e r t x l x t y , 
because l x t t l e f e r t x l x z e r xs applxed to the s o x l . 
Because of the poor and xnsuffxcxent draxnage, much of 
the f e r t x l e l a n d has g r a d u a l l y gone out of c u l t x v a t x o n as a r e s u l t 
of accumulatxon of s a l t s i n the s o x l , and the population prevxously 
sustaxned has moved elsewhere. 
A g r a r i a n Reform :-
Prxor to 1958 the c u l t i v a b l e land was l a r g e l y xn the 
hands of the absentee c x t y l a n d l o r d s or of t r i b a l Shexks, and the 
a c t u a l c u l t x v a t o r was u s u a l l y a sharecropper and o f t e n r e c e i v e d only 
30-40 per cent of the crop , I n 1957, the government t r i e d to 
d i s t r i b u t e the ( m i r i s i r f ) l a n d owned by the government and d i s t r i b u t e d 
a c t u a l l y (669.000) h e c t a r e s , i n 25-50 h e c t a r e p l o t s . B u t the r i c h 
and m f l u e n c i a l landowners r e s x s t e d and the programme f a x l e d . On 
September the 8th 1958, the Agrarxan Reform Law was enacted. 
Accordxng to thxs Law. the ownershxp of land xs l i m i t e d to 1,000 I r a q i 
( 2 ) 
dunums of i r r i g a t e d or 2,000 dunums of r a m - f e d l a n d . The r e s t of 
the c u l t i v a b l e land was to be d i s t r i b u t e d among the farmers i n areas 
of 7.5-15 h e c t a r s i r r i g a t e d or 15-30 h e c t a r s r a m - f e d . The l a n d l o r d s 
were compensated by bonds f o r (20) y e a r s and a 3 per cent i n t e r e s t 
r a t e . However, i n June 1963, the i n t e r e s t r a t e was reduced to ( 2 ) 
per cent, and the l a n d l o r d s compensation was d i v i d e d i n t o two p a r t s : 
( I ) h a l f of i t was made payable on demand i f l e s s than ( I . D 1000), i n 
twenty years i f more than t h a t , i . e . between ( I . D 1000 - 10.000) and 
over f o r t y y e a r s i f i t i s ( I . D 10.000) and over. 
( 1 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, ( I r a q and 
Arabian Pensula, J u l y 1959, P.8 (1 I r a q h e c t a r or meshar equals 
0.62 a c r e s . ) 
( 2 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, I r a q , 
August, 1965. P.11 
( 8 ) 
(11) The other h a l f was considered as a loa n to the A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Bank a g a i n s t bonds redeemable over twenty y e a r s . A M i n i s t r y 
c a l l e d the M i n i s t r y of A g r a r i a n Reform was s e t up i n 1958, to c a r r y 
out the land reform and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of l a n d . The t o t a l 
c u l t i v a b l e a r e a h e l d by l a n d l o r d s and s u b j e c t to the reform law 
( 2 ) 
amounted to (8.5 mn.) dunums. As-a r e s u l t of the r e l a t i v e l y 
l a r g e a r e a to be r e - d i s t r i b u t e d , changing of governments and 
t h e r e f o r e changing of the r e s p o n s i b l e M i n i s t e r f o r A g r a r i a n 
Reform, and consequent a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s , the t o t a l a r e a 
d i s t r i b u t e d among the farmers s i n c e the land reform began was only 
(2.1 mn. h e c t a r e s ) . I n a d d i t i o n to the d i s t r i b u t e d a r e a t h e r e a r e 
(1.66 mn. h e c t a r e s ) which were l e a s e d to the farmers but managed 
( 3 ) 
by the s t a t e on an i n t e r i m system. 
Mixed farming i s l i m i t e d , so the government e s t a b l i s h e d 
t h r e e animal husbandry s t a t i o n s , and v e t e r i n a r y h o s p i t a l s . F i v e 
s t a t e farms, wheat, cotton, r i c e , sugar beet, and medical herbs, 
were b u i l t and a long term p l a n to b u i l d 3,000 v i l l a g e s i n d i s t r i b u t i o n 
( 4 ) 
areas was adopted. Two major f l o o d c o n t r o l and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s 
( 1 ) I b i d P.11 
(2) Simmons, J . L . , A g r i c u l t u r a l Development i n I r a q , Planning and 
Management F a i l u r e s , The Middle E a s t J o u r n a l , Vol.19 No.2. 
Spri n g 1965, P.131 
(3) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, I r a q , 
September 1964, P.10 
(4) C r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s t o the farmers a r e d i s c u s s e d on (PP. 109-111); 
l o a n s to a g r i c u l t u r a l c o - o p e r a t i v e s a r e d i s c u s s e d on (P.121). 
( 9 ) 
were completed i n 1956, namely, the Tharthas on the T i g r i s 
and the Habbaniyah on the Euphrates, w i t h a t o t a l c o s t of 
( I . D 20.5 i n n ) . ^ 1 ^ Two l a r g e dams have a l r e a d y been completed 
the "Derbendi Khan", on the " D i y a l a " ( c a p a c i t y 3.250 mn. C.U.M.) 
and e l e c t r i c i t y which can be generated on the w a t e r f a l l s of t h i s 
dam i s (112.000 KwH), and the "Dokan" on the " l e s s e e Zab" 
( 2 ) 
( c a p a c i t y 6.800 mn. Cu.M.) gene r a t i n g (200.000 KwH), . I n 
Table ( 3 ) , (appendix 4) f i g u r e s a re g i v e n which show the 
production of the p r i n c i p l e crops m I r a q . The t a b l e shows sharp 
f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the q u a n t i t i e s of crops produced, mainly 
because of lower r a i n - f a l l which a f f e c t s , e s p e c i a l l y , t h e 
n orthern r a i n - f e d crop production a r e a . The q u a n t i t i e s of b a r l e y 
produced between 1957 and 1964, f l u c t u a t e d between (733 mn.tons) m 
1959 f o r example, to (1125 mn. t o n s ) i n 1962, and the f i g u r e s 
of wheat production show, roughly, the same tendency. However, 
the t a b l e shows t h a t date production has been r i s i n g during the 
p e r i o d between 1960 and 1963. 
( 1 ) Langely, K.M., The I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n of I r a q , Harvard Middle 
E a s t e r n Monograph S e r i e s , 1962. P.120 
(2) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, 
August 1965, P.14 
(10) 
The growth of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , and i t s c o n t rxbution to 
the n a t i o n a l income 
I n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t the d i f f e r e n t governments have 
spent more than ( I . D 100 mn.) i n terms of c o n s t r u c t i o n of dams, 
i r r i g a t i o n s , and s e t t i n g up a g r i c u l t u r a l c o-operative s o c i e t i e s , over 
the l a s t (10) y e a r s , the r e l a t i v e importance of a g r i c u l t u r e to the 
( 2 ) 
n a t i o n a l income i s d e c r e a s i n g . T h i s point can be i l l u s t r a t e d by the 
f a c t t h a t , i n 1953, the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r c o n t r i b u t e d to n a t i o n a l 
product by (29%) and (26.3) per cent i n 1962 a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s , and 
( 3 ) 
(32) per cent i n 1953, (22.5) per cent i n 1962 a t constant p r i c e s . 
Furthermore, the average compound r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
s e c t o r m the per i o d between 1953 and 1962, was a l i t t l e more than 
( 3 ) per cent a t constant p r i c e s , w h i l e the annual r a t e of i n c r e a s e f o r 
the n a t i o n a l income as a whole was f o r the same p e r i o d (7.5) per cent 
a t constant p r i c e s . 
Somebody might argue t h a t the reason f o r the d e c l i n e i n 
the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r to the n a t i o n a l income 
i s the land-reform, and the confusion which i t has l e d to as f a r as 
the r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n of land i s concerned. T h i s argument i s not 
wholly v a l i d f o r one important f a c t o r i n a g r i c u l t u r e , among other 
f a c t o r s , of course, i s the ar e a a c t u a l l y c u l t i v a t e d and the are a 
c u l t i v a t e d f o r 1963 crop was g r e a t e r than i n the y e a r s before 1958, 
when the land reform law was i n f a c t enacted. The c o n t r i b u t i o n of 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r to the n a t i o n a l income, however, dropped 
(4 ) 
from (32.6%) a t (1956) p r i c e s m 1953, to only (16.4%) m 1963, v 
or from an a b s o l u t e amount of ( I . D 85.700 mn.) out of ( I . D 262.8 mn.) 
( 1 ) See Table ( 4 ) (Appendix 6 ) . 
( 2 ) Haseeb, K., Mem, N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1962 and 1963, P . ( 4 ) . 
( 3 ) We excluded 1963, on the grounds t h a t , a g r i c u l t u r a l products 
grown i n r a i n fed areas i n the no r t h (mainly wheat and b a r l e y ) 
were badly h i t by the i r r e g u l a r r a i n f a l l i n t h i s y e a r . 
(4) See P. ( 55 )» 
(11) 
i n 1953, to ( I . D 80.410 mn) out of ( I . D 489.5 mn) i n 1963. T h i s drop 
may be e x p l a i n e d by the i r r e g u l a r r a i n f a l l , and the m i l i t a r y o p e r ations 
i n the North. T h e r e f o r e , the f i v e year p l a n 1965-1969 aims to maintain a 
percentage of growth of the n a t i o n a l income, of ( 8 % ) per annum, and 
i n c l u d e s the l a g g i n g s e c t o r (agriculture) as well. 
T r a n s p o r t : ~ 
The importance of an adequate and e f f i c i e n t t r a n s p o r t system i n a 
c o u n t r y n e e d h a r d l y be emphasised. An adequate and " e f f i c i e n t t r a n s p o r t 
system may f a c i l i t a t e the movement and expansion of i n t e r n a l t r a d e on the 
one hand, and exports on the o t h e r . The I r a q i Government r e a l i s e d t h a t , 
and, t h e r e f o r e , i n 1950 s t a r t e d a road development programme. I n that 
y e ar I r a q had (5000) m i l e s of roads of which (310 m i l e s ) were hard 
s u r f a c e d , and (1560 m i l e s ) were hard s u r f a c e d and macadamised. There was, 
a s i n g l e - l i n e t r a c k , which connected the northern a r e a s , the o i l f i e l d s 
a r e a i n K i r k u k and Khanagin, w i t h Baghdad and Basrah. The T i g r i s and 
Euphrates were used to a l i m i t e d extent as water t r a n s p o r t , e s p e c i a l l y 
between Baghdad and B a s r a h . I r a q i s connected w i t h Turkey through a 
standard-gauge l i n e which runs from Baghdad to Mosul then to the S y r i a n 
border, and continues through Turkey. A metre-gauge l i n e l i n k s Basrah 
w i t h Baghdad c a r r y i n g the major p a r t of I r a q ' s imports. T h i s l i n e has 
t h r e e branches : one to Kirkuk, another to A r b i l , and a t h i r d one to 
Khanagin; (near the I r a n i a n b o r d e r ) . A major work i s almost completed 
c o n s i s t i n g of the r e a l i g n i n g of the e x i s t i n g r a i l road which connects 
Baghdad and Basrah and i t s c o n v e r s i o n to standard gauge a t a c o s t of 
( I . D 29 mn.). A p l a n to connect I r a q w i t h Kuwait and Saudi A r a b i a i s 
being considered by the I r a q i Government. I n 1966, t h e r e was, roughly 
speaking, a t o t a l of (1631 Km.) of r a i l roads i n I r a q . The 
Government, r e a l i s i n g the importance of having an adequate t r a n s p o r t 
system, has a l l o c a t e d a t o t a l of ( I . D 39 mn.) to r a i l roads, and 
( I . D 42.9 mn.) f o r roads, under the f i v e year 1965-1969 programme. 
The l a t t e r amount was a l l o c a t e d t o complete the r e - c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
roads and b r i d g e s , the improvement of (1000 Km) of minor roads, the 
( 1 ) Langley, K.M., I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n of I r a q , Harvard Middle E a s t e r n 
Monograph S e r i e s , 1962, P. 114 
(12) 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of (400 Km.) of new roads. 
I n l a n d n a v i g a t i o n i s not without some importance : t h e r e 
i s an a c t i v e merchant f l e e t c o n s i s t i n g of two medium s i z e d v e s s e l s , 
and the b u i l d i n g of another ( 4 ) i s contemplated. I r a q ' s only port i s 
Basrah i n the south, and another port i s being b u i l t . There are 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r p o r t s i n Baghdad and Basrah. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e are 
c i v i l a i r p o r t s a t K i r k u k and Mosul, the I r a q Petroleum Company ( I P C ) 
has i t s own a i r p o r t a t Kirkuk. 
I n 1952, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and 
Development M i s s i o n reported t h a t , "The s t a t e r a i l w a y s which are the 
p r i n c i p l e means of t r a n s p o r t , are a l s o w e l l managed and have been 
( 2 ) 
f u l l y a b l e to meet t r a f f i c requirements". However, s i n c e I r a q i s 
a developing country, and i t s need f o r improving and expanding of the 
e x i s t i n g t r a n s p o r t system i s growing as i t s export-import t r a d e , and 
population are i n c r e a s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , i t may be suggested here t h a t 
the planning a u t h o r i t i e s would be w e l l a d v i s e d not to n e g l e c t the 
development and improvement of the t r a n s p o r t system. The evidence 
suggests t h a t the a u t h o r i t i e s are a l i v e to t h i s . 
I n the l i g h t of the above b r i e f account of the land and 
population of I r a q , i t may be s a f e to conclude t h a t , there has been a 
s i g n i f i c a n t improvement i n h e a l t h and education f a c i l i t i e s i n the l a s t 
decade or so. 
However, t h i s improvement mainly took p l a c e i n urban 
areas and c i t y c e n t r e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n Baghdad. I n r u r a l a r eas where 
t h e r e i s a g r e a t need f o r h e a l t h and education f a c i l i t i e s , t h e r e has 
not been a s i g n i f i c a n t improvement, a t l e a s t not to the same extent 
( 1 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement to the 
Q u a r t e r l y Economic Review, 1966. 
( 2 ) Report of a M i s s i o n organised by I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and Development, The Economic Development of I r a q , 
The John Hopkins P r e s s , 1952. P.44 
(13) 
as m the urban a r e a s . The p r e s e n t w r i t e r b e l i e v e s t h a t r u r a l a r e a s 
need more a t t e n t i o n than they have r e c e i v e d h i t h e r t o . T h i s i s 
because about two t h i r d s of the population l i v e i n these a r e a s , 
engaged i n a g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s which provide a major c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to the n a t i o n a l income. More a t t e n t i o n might be paid to d i r e c t the 
emphasis from a r t s s u b j e c t s to a g r i c u l t u r a l , i n d u s t r i a l t r a i n i n g , and 
s c i e n t i f i c s u b j e c t s . More a t t e n t i o n should be paid to the q u a l i t y 
of higher education students than to the q u a n t i t y as i s the case a t 
the moment. 
As f o r the t r a n s p o r t system, i t i s advocated here, t h a t , 
i n order to avoid the d u p l i c a t i o n i n standbys, spares and r e s e r v e s , 
the remaining metre l i n e s should be s t a n d a r d i s e d , and i n t h i s way 
I r a q might provide i t s e l f w i t h a u n i f i e d r a i l w a y system. 
(14) 
Manufacturing I n d u s t r y xn I r a q , 
The c o n t r i b u t i o n of manufacturing i n d u s t r y to the 
n a t i o n a l income of I r a q i s not yet l a r g e . Consequently the 
Government has been t r y i n g to develope and a s s i s t t h i s s e c t o r . 
T herefore, i t may be u s e f u l to touch upon the government's a c t i o n s 
to develope i n d u s t r y during the l e a s t four decades. These a c t i o n s 
may be d i v i d e d i n t o four stages :-
( 1 ) I n the f i r s t stage; the government's a c t i o n s were 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e only. I n 1931, a c a p i t a l works development scheme 
was s a n c t i o n e d . 
( 2 ) I n the second stage, the government e s t a b l i s h e d an i n d u s t r i a l 
bank as a s e p a r a t e u n i t , i . e . m 1946; which began to provide loans 
to i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
( 3 ) I n the t h i r d stage the government s e t up a "Development Board", 
i . e . i n 1951. T h i s Board s t a r t e d to s e t up i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s 
d i r e c t l y . 
( 4 ) The f o u r t h stage begins a f t e r the 1958 R e v o l u t i o n . I n t h i s s t a g e 
one of the d e c l a r e d economic p o l i c i e s of the Government has been 
" g r e a t e r i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n " . Then i n J u l y 1964, (27) r e l a t i v e l y 
( 2 ) 
l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s were n a t i o n a l i s e d . 
I n 1959, an I r a q i - S o v i e t economic agreement became 
e f f e c t i v e . According to t h i s agreement, the s o v i e t provided a 
loan of($137 mn.), then t h i s f i g u r e was r a i s e d to ($ 182.5 mn.). 
The S o v i e t a l s o undertook to provide the t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e which 
was needed to promote i n d u s t r y and the execution of the agreement. 
On the 14th of J u l y 1964, the government n a t i o n a l i s e d the r e l a t i v e l y 
( 3 ) 
b i g i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s m I r a q , . I n order to i l l u s t r a t e the s t a t e 
( 1 ) See t a b l e 5 (App.6) which shows value added i n i n d u s t r y 
1953-1961 and compare w i t h n a t i o n a l income f i g u r e s f o r the same 
peri o d on P. ( 4 8 ) . 
( 2 ) T h i s i s d i s c u s s e d i n a more d e t a i l e d way on P. ( 1 7 ) . 
( 3 ) D i s c u s s e d l a t e r : See P. ( 1 7 ) . 
(15) 
of manufacturing i n d u s t r y i n I r a q i n the 1950's a r e f e r e n c e to the 
i n d u s t r i a l census which took p l a c e m 1954, may not be out of p l a c e . 
Table 6 (Appendix 6.) shows t h a t , the t o t a l number of employees 
i n manufacturing i n d u s t r y ( e x c l u d i n g o i l companies employees)was a 
l i t t l e more than (90.000) i n 1954. The t o t a l number of employees, 
i n the o i l companies was (15.249) a t the same y e a r . 
T h e r e f o r e , the number of employees I n the i n d u s t r i a l 
s e c t o r a c c o r d i n g to the 1954 i n d u s t r i a l census was (105.540). 
According to the t a b l e i t may be s a f e to conclude t h a t most of the 
i n d u s t r i a l , e s t a b l i s h m e n t s i n I r a q i n 1954 were s m a l l f i r m s , s i n c e 
93% of the i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s employed not more than ( 5 ) employees 
each. 
I n d u s t r i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s employing more than (10) 
employees formed ( 2 ) per cent of the t o t a l number of f i r m s , but 
employed (4 9 % ) of n o n - o i l i n d u s t r i a l employees. 
I t i s n e c e s s a r y to point out t h a t , f i g u r e s f o r the 
1954 census may not be used as r e p r e s e n t i n g the exact i n d u s t r i a l 
s i t u a t i o n a t t h a t y e a r . These f i g u r e s may only be used as rough 
i n d i c a t o r s f o r the f o l l o w i n g reasons; -
(1 ) They do not r e p r e s e n t averages as i s the case w i t h 1962 f i g u r e s . 
( 2 ) The enumerators have not had enough time to do t h e i r job 
p r o p e r l y . According to Dr.Haseeb, t h e r e were (69) enumerators w i t h 
(499) hours per enumerator f o r i n t e r v i e w s to cover 1.309 
es t a b l i s h m e n t s , i . e . (23) minutes f o r each i n t e r v i e w . 
( 1 ) F or s p e c i f i e d c r i t i c i s m s of the 1954 i n d u s t r i a l census, see 
Haseeb, K., The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-1961, Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964, PP. 88-96. 
(16) 
I n Table ( 7 ) (Appendix 6 ) 
f i g u r e s a r e s e t out which provide a b a s i s f o r a comparison between the 
r e s u l t s of the i n d u s t r i a l census of 1954, and t h a t of 1962. According 
to the 1954 i n d u s t r i a l census the number of e s t a b l i s h s n e n t s l a r g e 
and s m a l l was (22.460), w h i l e i n 1962 i t was (21.373) i . e . a decrease 
of 5% i n the absolute number; but t h i s does not mean a t a l l t h a t the 
i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i s l e s s important xn 1962 than xt was xn 1954. I t 
means t h a t t h e r e was a s t r u c t u r a l change xn the x n d u s t r x a l s e c t o r . 
T h i s poxnt xs x l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t xn 1954, t h e r e were 
(727) e s t a b l i s h m e n t s employxng (10) persons and more each; w h i l e i n 
1962 t h e r e were (1186) such establxshments. 
Furthermore, xn 1954, the number of establxshments 
employxng l e s s than (10) persons each was (21.733), w h i l e i n 1962 
t h e r e were only (20.191) w i t h a ( 7 ) per cent d e c r e a s e . T h e number 
of employees rose by (34) per cent i n 1962 over 1954, and annual 
wages by (299) per cent. The value of m a t e r i a l s used i n production 
i n c r e a s e d by (326) per cent i n 1962 over 1954, whxle t o t a l revenue 
r o s e by (250) per ce n t . 
( 1 ) The fxgures f o r 1954 census which a r e mentxoned here a r e derxved 
from t a b l e ( 5 ) Appendix 6. The f i g u r e s f o r 1962 census a r e 
d e r i v e d from : 
M i n i s t r y of Planning, C e n t r a l Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , S e c t i o n of 
Research and p u b l i c i t y , S t a t i s t i c a l a b s t r a c t 1963, Government 
Pr e s s 1964, PP. 75-78; ( t h e percentages were c a l c u l a t e d by the 
w r i t e r ) . 
(17) 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ; 
On the 14th day of J u l y 1964, s e v e r a l s o c i a l i s t Laws were 
enacted. A l l non-state owned banks were n a t i o n a l i s e d and organised i n a 
"General O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Banks". "A g e n e r a l O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r I n s u r a n c e " 
to i n c l u d e n a t i o n a l i s e d i n s u r a n c e companies and a t h i r d o r g a n i s a t i o n 
c a l l e d the "Trade O r g a n i s a t i o n " to i n c l u d e export-import f i r m s were s e t up. 
A f o u r t h o r g a n i s a t i o n under the name of the " P u b l i c E s t a b l i s h m e n t f o r 
I n d u s t r y " to i n c l u d e the n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s was e s t a b l i s h e d a t 
the same time. P r o v i s i o n was a l s o made f o r o r g a n i s a t i o n s to be r e - o r g a n i s e d 
and c o n t r o l l e d by "A General Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n " . A t o t a l number of (27) 
i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s w i t h a c a p i t a l of over ( I . D 17 mn.) were n a t i o n a l i s e d . 
These f i r m s were i n : - Jute-weaving, carpet-manufacturing, tanning of 
l e a t h e r , vegetable o i l e x t r a c t i n g , soap-making, match making, foot-wear, 
cement and asbestos-cement, and c i g a r e t t e s . No more investment by the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r m the l a s t t h r e e i n d u s t r i e s was to be allowed. Then t h e r e 
was a change i n government, and a c c o r d i n g l y i n p o l i c y . The new government 
a b o l i s h e d the "General Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n " , and the four o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
c o n t r o l l e d by i t were at t a c h e d to competent m i n i s t r i e s . T h i s s t e p , m my 
view, i s i n the wrong d i r e c t i o n , because, whenever government changes, 
which i s not r a r e i n I r a q , the new m i n i s t e r s may f o l l o w a d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y . 
The t a b l e which shows va l u e added i n manufacturing i n d u s t r y f o r the y e a r s 
1953-1961 (Table 5) (Appendix 6 ) , i n d i c a t e s t h a t v a l u e added i n t h i s 
s e c t o r has been i n c r e a s i n g s t e a d i l y during the p e r i o d . I t rose from 
( I . D 16.751 mn.) i n 1953, to ( I . D 47.329 mn.) i n 1961, a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s , 
and from ( I . D 17.002 mn.) to ( I . D 44.396 mn.) a t constant p r i c e s f o r the 
same p e r i o d . 
The i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i n I r a q , has been growing a t a 
r e l a t i v e l y high r a t e , i n comparison w i t h other s e c t o r s of the economy. 
T h i s point can be i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t the net va l u e added i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r has i n c r e a s e d i n the p e r i o d 1953-1961, a t an average 
compound annual r a t e of (14) per cent a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s , (1961) (13 per 
cent m o i l r e f i n i n g ) , and a t f i x e d p r i c e s (1956) the r a t e of i n c r e a s e may 
be c a l c u l a t e d to be (13) per cent per annum (16% i n o i l r e f m m g ) . 
(1 ) Haseeb, K., The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-61, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , 1964, P.87 
(18) 
F o r e i g n Trade and The Balance of Payments 
I r a q , l i k e most i f not a l l of the underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s , depends almost e n t i r e l y on the exporting of primary 
products; and importing of manufactured c a p i t a l and consumer's 
goods. The main I r a q i e xports, e x c l u d i n g o i l , a r e : dates, b a r l e y , 
animal products and cement. These exports f i n a n c e something l i k e 
1/10 a t the best and 1/12 a t the worst of I r a q i imports depending 
on c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s and the v a r i a t i o n i n r a i n - f a l l . The r e s t 
of the I r a q i imports are f i n a n c e d by o i l revenues, as i s shown l a t e r . 
E xports :-
Due to the f a c t t h a t the I r a q i exports, apart from o i l 
and cement, c o n s i s t of a g r i c u l t u r a l products, t h e s e exports 
f l u c t u a t e s h a r p l y from year to year as Table 8 (Appendix 6 ) i n d i c a t e s . 
T h i s t a b l e shows t h a t , i n 1960, the value of dates exported was 
( I . D 4.05 mn.) f e l l to ( I . D 2.81 mn.) i n 1961, and r o s e to 
( I . D 7.05 inn.) i n 1962. The v a l u e of b a r l e y exported rose from 
( I . D 0.8 mn.) i n 1961, to ( I . D 6.07 mn.) i n 1962. The same point, 
i . e . f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the v a l u e of a s i n g l e item of exports from 
year to year, could be a p p l i e d to the t o t a l value of e x p o r t s . 
I n 1961, the t o t a l value of exports amounted to 
( I . D 7.2 mn.) w h i l e i n 1962 i t rose to a t o t a l of ( I D 18.44 mn.), 
e x c l u d i n g o i l , i . e . more than two and a h a l f times. The important 
reason was t h a t i n 1961, the i r r e g u l a r r a m - f a l l , e s p e c i a l l y i n the 
r a m - f e d a r e a i n the north, caused a c r o p - f a i l u r e , and only a 
n e g l i g i b l e amount of b a r l e y was exported. The amount of b a r l e y 
( 1 ) I t i s not w i t h i n the scope of the present study to g i v e an 
account of export and import p o l i c i e s , t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s 
merely a simple and b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the I r a q i f o r e i g n 
t r a d e and the Balance of Payments f o r the l a s t few y e a r s . 
(19) 
exported i n 1962, was, however, valued a t more than ( I . D 6 mn.) as 
the t a b l e d i s p l a y s . The t o t a l v alues of exports i n 1963 and 1964, 
were lower than the 1962 l e v e l f o r the same reason, i . e . i r r e g u l a r 
r a m - f a l l ; t h i s , and to a c e r t a i n e xtent, a l s o , the m i l i t a r y 
o p e r a tions i n the North ( t h e important g r a i n a r e a i n I r a q ) . The only 
manufactured commodity t h a t I r a q exports i s cement. The t a b l e shows 
tha t exports of cement have been i n c r e a s i n g s t e a d i l y ( i n a b s o l u t e 
v a l u e ) during the l a s t f i v e y e a r s . However, exports are the most 
important means of o b t a i n i n g the f o r e i g n exchange needed f o r the 
importation of c a p i t a l and consumer's goods. 
Th e r e f o r e , I r a q might be a b l e to o b t a i n more f o r e i g n 
exchange f o r i t s exports i f r a w-materials are turned i n t o , a t l e a s t , 
semi-manufactured goods whenever i t i s p o s s i b l e . For example, i n s t e a d 
of exporting d a t e s , i t might be more advantageous to export date-syrup 
or f o d d e r ^ \ T h i s might provide an i n d i c a t i o n of what might be done 
w i t h other products. F i n a l l y , i t may not be out of p l a c e to touch upon 
( 2 ) 
the geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n of I r a q i exports ( e x c l u d i n g o i l ) . The 
Arab league group i s the most important market f o r I r a q i e xports, as 
the t a b l e shows. I t i s followed by the S t e r l i n g Area c o u n t r i e s , 
t h i r d l y by the S o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , and f o u r t h l y by U.S.A. and Canada. 
Table 10 (Appendix 6) shows the geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n of o i l 
exports f o r the p e r i o d under review. T h i s t a b l e shows t h a t the (E.E.C.) 
c o u n t r i e s claimed the l a r g e s t share of the exported I r a q i o i l . T h i s 
group i s f ollowed by the S t e r l i n g Area C o u n t r i e s , and other c o u n t r i e s 
( i n c l u d i n g Japan, Spain, and o t h e r s ) . 
( 1 ) I r a q does, as a matter of f a c t , export date syrup or ( d a t e j u i c e ) 
and fodder, but only i n s m a l l q u a n t i t i e s . 
I n 1964, f o r example, a t o t a l amount of (282.684 t o n s ) of 
dates were exported, but only (4.183 t o n s ) , of date syrup 
were exported. 
The C.B.I. Q u a r t e r l y B u l l e t i n s , A p r i l - J u n e 1966, No.58, P.34. 
( 2 ) Table 9 (Appendix 6 ) . 
(20) 
Imports ;-
The v a l u e of the p r i n c i p l e imports of I r a q f o r the p e r i o d 
between 1960 and 1964 i s s e t out xn Table 11 (Appendix 6 ) . Thxs t a b l e 
shows t h a t xn 1960, the t o t a l v a l u e of xmported c a p i t a l goods and raw 
m a t e r i a l s amounted to ( 3 6 % ) , and the consumers goods to (49%) of t o t a l 
imports. However, the importation of c a p i t a l goods and raw m a t e r i a l s 
showed a tendency to r i s e i n 1962, when i t was almost equal to t h a t of the 
consumer's goods as the t a b l e shows, and the percentage was the same i n 
1963. I n 1964, t h e r e was a s l i g h t i n c r e a s e i n the v a l u e of the imported 
consumer's goods as a percentage of t o t a l imports, and a s l x g h t declxne 
xn t h a t of the c a p x t a l goods and raw m a t e r x a l s . Furthermore, the t a b l e 
shows t h a t imports of clothxng (pxece goods and t e x t i l e ) , t e a , sugar, and 
durable consumer's goods ( e-g.. radxos, T.V. s e t s , r e f r i g e r a t o r s ... ) 
a r e the most important xtems xn the imported consumers goods. As f o r the 
xmportatxon of c e r e a l s , xt depends on the domestic crop each year, x.e. 
when the h a r v e s t xs good, only a s m a l l quantxty xs imported, whxch xs the 
c a s e i n 1963, otherwxse, l a r g e quantxtxes a r e xmported as was the case xn 
1960 and 1964. 
Raw m a t e r i a l s , v e h x c l e s , and i r o n / s t e e l , a r e the most 
xmportant xtems among the xmported c a p x t a l goods. Where they come from i s 
xndicated xn Table 12 (Appendix 6 ) . The t a b l e shows t h a t the Unxted 
Kxngdom xs the most xmportant country of orxgxn f o r the imports of I r a q , 
though thxs importance i s d e c l i n i n g . The second s u p p l i e r xs "other 
s t e r l x n g a r e a countrxes", whxch c l a i m almost the same percentage of 
t o t a l I r a q xmports. E.E.C. countrxes, i s the second group of countrxes 
as a s u p p l i e r of I r a q ' s xmports. The U.S.A. and Canada a r e , together, the 
t h x r d xn xmportance, the s o c x a l x s t countrxes group i s the f o u r t h , and the 
"other c o u n t r x e s " group i s the f x f t h . 
( 1 ) As the t a b l e shows, the d i f f e r e n c e between the v a l u e of t o t a l 
xmports x.e. 100% and the t o t a l of imported consumer and 
c a p x t a l goods i s covered by an unexplained xtem, x.e. other 
commodxtxes. 
(21) 
The Balance of Payments : 
As w i t h a l l c o u n t r i e s i t i s p o s s i b l e to c a s t the 
d i f f e r e n t items which e n t e r i n t o the I r a q i balance of payments i n t o 
a conventional t a b u l a r form. When t h i s i s done i t i s c l e a r t h a t the 
I r a q i balance of payments i s dominated by one or two key i n f l u e n c e s 
even though, as again i s so oft e n found, i t may not be p o s s i b l e to 
g i v e a p r e c i s e e x p l a n a t i o n of each p a r t i c u l a r item t h a t e n t e r s i n t o 
the make-up_of the t a b u l a t i o n as a whole. For example, i t i s 
n o t i c a b l e t h a t the item ' E r r o r s and Omissions i n c r e a s e s from the low 
f i g u r e of ( I . D 3 mn.) m 1960 to the region of ( I . D 20.24 mn.) by 
1963/64, and no p r e c i s e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s v a r i a t i o n can be found. 
I f however, what i s a c c e p t a b l e i s not a d e t a i l e d 
and p r e c i s e e x p l a n a t i o n of each i n d i v i d u a l item but an i n d i c a t i o n of 
the main s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s i n the general p o s i t i o n , then these may 
be summarised as f o l l o w s :- the net exports i n the o i l s e c t o r cover 
a major p a r t i n gome y e a r s , and more than enough to cover i n other 
years ,the d e f i c i t on other items i n the export/import r e l a t i o n s , and 
a l s o to meet i n most y e a r s the i n t e r e s t and div i d e n d payments a r i s i n g 
from o i l o p e r a t i o n s . The b a l a n c i n g e f f e c t which t h i s b r i n g s out means 
t h a t the r e s t of the balance of payments t a b u l a t i o n c o n t a i n s items 
i n v o l v i n g only r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l monetary sums. From t h i s i t may not 
be i n j u d i c i o u s to conclude t h a t , as long as o i l exports are 
maintained, which on normal c o n s i d e r a t i o n s might be thought a 
reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y , then the I r a q balance of payments, i s , perhaps, 
i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n than t h a t of many of the underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s . Consequently, s i n c e i t i s argued i n l a t e r p a r t s of t h i s 
d i s s e r t a t i o n t h a t o i l e x ports, which r e p r e s e n t something between 
(2) 
92% - 94% of t o t a l e x p o r t s , a r e not l i k e l y to be a d v e r s e l y 
.affected by a moderate degree of i n c r e a s e i n domestic p r i c e s , d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g should not be expected to have a s e r i o u s e f f e c t on the 
I r a q balance of payments, i f such a procedure should, i n moderation, 
be adopted. 
( 1 ) Table A (P 22 ) . 
( 2 ) See P. (208 ) 
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The Petroleum I n d u s t r y : 
I r a q ' s export of crude o i l has always come from the 
operations of the ( I r a q Petroleum Company) IPC, and i t s two 
s u b s i d i a r i e s , ( t h e Basrah Petroleum Company) BPC, operating i n the 
south, and the (Mosul Petroleum Company) MPC, oper a t i n g i n the 
no r t h . I n 1928, the IPC sh a r e - h o l d i n g was given i t s present shape 
i . e . 5% P a r t i c i p a t i o n s and E x p l o r a t i o n s Corporation (Gulbenkian 
e s t a t e ) , and 23.75% each Compagnie F r a n c a i s e des P e t r o l e s , 
Royal D u t c h / S h e l l , Near E a s t Development Corporation, ( j o i n t 
J e r s e y Standard and Socony Mobil) and B r i t i s h Petroleum Company^ 1 \ 
An agreement between the I r a q i Government and the o i l companies 
was reached i n February 1952, to share the p r o f i t s e q u a l l y . T h i s 
agreement was r a t i f i e d by Law No.(4) of 1952, r e t r o a c t i v e to 
January of the previous y e a r . The p r o f i t s which are r e l e v a n t to 
t h i s agreement a re to be c a l c u l a t e d before the payment of f o r e i g n 
t a x e s , t a k i n g c o s t s of production as re t u r n e d , and on the b a s i s of 
( 2 ) 
constant v a l u e s . The important f a c t to be pointed out here i s 
t h a t a c c o r d i n g to the United Nations e x p e r t s , the o i l companies have 
had i n r e a l i t y more than 50% :- "...under the equal p r o f i t - s h a r i n g 
agreements concluded during 1950 - 1952 between the governments of 
o i l producing areas ( i n c l u d i n g I r a q ) and the conc e s s i o n a r y o i l 
companies, the parent companies of the l a t t e r were ab l e to o b t a i n 
petroleum a t a discount of 15% to 20% from the posted p r i c e s . Thus, 
( 1 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Q u a r t e r l y Economic Review, 
Annual Supplement, ( I r a q ) , August 1965, P.15 
( 2 ) E L - K a i s s i , F . , C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of the C e n t r a l Banking m I r a q , 
Unpublished Ph.D. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , August 
1957. P.64 
(24) 
p r o f i t s of the producing companies, and consequently the o i l 
revenues of the governments, were reduced"^ 1^. A f t e r n e g o t i a t i o n s 
between the I r a q i Government and the o i l companies, the l a t t e r 
agreed m 1955 to reduce the percentage discount to 2%. T h i s 
r e v i s i o n was back dated to 1954. A f t e r the 1958 R e v o l u t i o n the 
government r e - s t a r t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the O i l Companies. The 
major i s s u e s which were d i s c u s s e d were ;- share p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
r e l e a s e of u n - e x p l o i t e d a r e a s , and r e v i s i o n of the 50/50 formula. 
A f t e r prolonged n e g o t i a t i o n s no agreement was reached. 
Therefore, on December 11, 1961 the I r a q i Government 
i s s u e d Law No.80 of the same y e a r , r e s t r i c t i n g the companies' a r e a 
of operations to (1938 square km.) which r e p r e s e n t s 0.5% of t h e i r 
( 2 ) 
o r i g i n a l a r e a . I r a q i s a founder member of the O i l Producing 
and E x p o r t i n g Countries "OPEC" O r g a n i s a t i o n which was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
1960, and c o n s i s t s of the f o l l o w i n g c o u n t r i e s :- Kuwait, Saudi 
A r a b i a , I r a q , I r a n , L y b i a and Venezeula. I n 1964, the I r a q i N a t i o n a l 
O i l Company (IN0C) was s e t up, a c c o r d i n g to Law No.(11) of the same 
y e a r . T h i s company was empowered to engage i n e x p l o r a t i o n , 
production, d i s t r i b u t i o n and r e f i n i n g of o i l f o r export purpose, but 
not f o r the domestic market. I t s i n i t i a l c a p i t a l was ( I . D 25 mn.) to 
be p a i d by the Government. Furthermore, the (INOC) was given the 
r i g h t to r a i s e more c a p i t a l up to t h r e e times i t s i n i t i a l c a p i t a l , 
whether d o m e s t i c a l l y or abroad, whenever i t should be n e c e s s a r y . 
T h i s company was to be c o n t r o l l e d by a "Board of D i r e c t o r s " appointed 
by the Cabinet, made up of s i x f u l l - t i m e members. The (INOC) was to 
be a t t a c h e d to the O i l M i n i s t r y , and to have the r i g h t w i t h the 
approval of the c o u n c i l of m i n i s t e r s , to enter i n t o c o n t r a c t u a l 
( 1 ) U nited Nations, Department of Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s , 
Economic Development i n the Middle E a s t , 1954-1955, New York 
1956 P.66 
(2 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Q u a r t e r l y Economic Review, 
Annual Supplement, August 1965, P.15 
agreements w i t h other o r g a n i s a t i o n s concerned w i t h o i l , or to 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n o t h e r companies. The company i s to s h a r e i t s 
p r o f i t s w i t h the government 50/50, and n e i t h e r t h i s company's 
nor i t s wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r i e s p r o f i t s a r e to be s u b j e c t to 
income tax f o r f i v e y e ars from the date on which these p r o f i t s 
a r e made. The (INOC) has the r i g h t to operate i n any a r e a or 
a r e a s i n I r a q i t may choose, except those a l l o c a t e d to the o i l 
companies under Law No.(80) of 1961. I t may be too e a r l y to 
d i s c u s s the importance and the p o s s i b l e consequences of the 
l i k e l y o perations of t h i s company, on the I r a q i economy m 
gen e r a l and on the o i l i n d u s t r y i n p a r t i c u l a r . T h i s i s because, 
what counts i s not the i s s u a n c e of a Law, but the a c t u a l 
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t Law. 
( 1 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , 
Q u a r t e r l y Eoonomic Review, ( I r a q ) , March 1964, P.10 
(26) 
O i l R e f i n i n g : 
O i l r e f i n i n g , d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the domestic market, 
and s t o r a g e , i s c a r r i e d out by the Government O i l R e f i n e r i e s 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n which was e s t a b l i s h e d xn 1952. Thxs A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
was formed a f t e r the agreement between the Khanagin O i l Company 
(KOC) and the I r a q i Government i n December 1951. Under t h i s 
agreement the government bought the r e f i n e r y , (Alwand R e f i n e r y ) " w i t h 
an annual c a p a c i t y of (0.6 mn. tons) and gave the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
runnxng i t to (KOC) on a temporary b a s i s . 
The l a r g e s t o i l - r e f i n e r y i n I r a q i s the "Dura R e f i n e r y " 
near Baghdad, which was s e t up i n 1955, a t a c o s t of ( I . D 8 mn.) and 
an annual c a p a c i t y of (2.4 mn. t o n s ) . A t h i r d r e f i n e r y was 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n the Muftiya near Basrah xn 1952, w i t h an annual 
c a p a c i t y of (0.2 mn. t o n s ) . Always stater«owned the "Bitumen R e f i n e r y " 
a t Qaiyarah (near Mosul) w i t h an annual c a p a c i t y of (60.000 t o n s ) 
has been re-operated. 
The o p e r a t i o n of t h i s r e f i n e r y was stopped i n 1958. I n 
1964, the t o t a l annual output of r e f i n e d products was (2.7 mn.tons) 
which i s near to the I r a q maximum approximate r e f i n i n g c a p a c i t y of 
( 2 ) 
2.9 mn.tons). 
Table B, P. ( 2 8 ) shows t h a t between 1955 and 
1964, w i t h two e x c e p t i o n s , i n 1956 and 1957, crude o i l production has 
been i n c r e a s i n g s t e a d i l y : t h e r e was a s l i g h t decrease i n 1956 
followed by a sharp f a l l i n 1957 due to the Suez c r i s i s and the 
( 3 ) 
d e s t r u c t i o n of o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n S y r i a . There was only a very 
( 1 ) Haseeb, K., The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-1961, Oxford 
U n x v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964, P.103. 
( 2 ) The C e n t r a l Bank of I r a q Annual Report, 1964 ( i n E n g l i s h ) Zahra 
P r e s s , Baghdad, P.23. 
( 3 ) P i p e l i n e s and 3 pumping s t a t i o n s were a f f e c t e d , f o r f u r t h e r 
d i s c u s s i o n see p. ( 31), and (PP.32-34) 
(27) 
s l i g h t i n c r e a s e i n production i n 1962 over 1961, perhaps, as a 
r e s u l t of the i s s u a n c e of Law No.80 of 1961, which confined the 
O i l Companies concessions to about (0.5%) of t h e i r o r i g i n a l concession 
a r e a . However, I r a q ranks as the f o u r t h i n o i l production i n the 
Middle E a s t ; and the seventh among World producers, w i t h p u b l i s h e d 
proved r e s e r v e s of (7.5%) of the World t o t a l , i . e . (3.419 mn. m e t r i c 
t o n s ) a t the end of 1963. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s very important to 
r e a l i s e t h a t o i l - i s a wasting a s s e t and i t w i l l not l a s t f o r ever, 
and t h e r e f o r e , o i l revenues should not be wasted on un-productive 
p r o j e c t s . I t w i l l be w i s e to make the best use of t h i s wasting 
a s s e t ' s revenues.The t a b l e shows t h a t except, f o r the revenues of 
1956, 1957 and 1960, revenues have c o n s i s t e n t l y i n c r e a s e d . The 
d e c l i n e i n revenues i n these t h r e e y e a r s might be e x p l a i n e d by the 
same reason mentioned above, i . e . the d e c l i n e m production. A second 
r e f s o n i s the r e d u c t i o n i n crude o i l p r i c e s i n 1959.and 1 9 6 0 . ^ ^ 
The t a b l e shows t h a t the number of I r a q i s employed by > 
the o i l companies has decreased during the p e r i o d , apart from a 
s l i g h t i n c r e a s e i n 1956, 1958, and 1961. The number of f o r e i g n e r s 
employed by the o i l companies has i n c r e a s e d by ( 8 % ) i n 1956 over 
1955, then s t a r t e d to decrease throughout the p e r i o d . The t a b l e shows 
t h a t the number of f o r e i g n e r s employed by the o i l companies i n 1955 
was ( 8 6 0 ) ; t h i s f e l l to only 201 i n 1963, i . e . to l e s s than 25% of 
the number i n 1955. T h i s decrease may be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t t h a t , 
i n accordance w i t h the I r a q i Government order i s s u e d i n 1961, t h a t o i l 
companies stopped t h e i r e x p l o r a t i o n . I n order to t r a i n more I r a q i s 
to work m the o i l i n d u s t r y , an i n s t i t u t e w i t h the help of the U n i t e d 
Nations was s e t up i n 1965. T h i s i n s t i t u t e i s to t r a i n (100) 
graduate engineers each year i n a one year course on the e x p l o r a t i o n 
production, and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of o i l . 
( 1 ) AL-nasrawi, A., F i n a n c i n g Economic Development i n I r a q , 
The r o l e of o i l i n a Middle E a s t e r n Economy, F.A.Praeger, 
P u b l i s h e r s , 1967, P . ( 2 1 ) . 
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So far, only the production, exportation, and agreements between 
the O i l Companies operating i n Iraq, and the I r a q i Government have 
been discussed. Another important aspect of the subject i s the 
f i n a n c i a l and economic impact of o i l production and exportation on 
the I r a q i economy. This impact can be divided into two parts :-
(1) The revenue paid to the I r a q i Government i n the form of 
ro y a l t i e s and taxes. " 
(2) The employment of I r a q i s by the o i l companies, the payments for 
the use of port f a c i l i t i e s , the purchasing of building materials, and 
the outlays i n respect of freight charges. 
I t i s not necessary to develope any long and elaborate 
discussion of these matters but c e r t a i n points are of great importance 
and should be mentioned, even i f only b r i e f l y . 
(1) The I r a q i Government divides o i l revenues into two parts :-
(a) to make a contribution, in fact a major one^ 1^, to the 
financing of development programmes. 
(b) To contribute, each year, to the ordinary revenues of the 
budget. 
When a "Development Board" was established i n accordance with Law 
o i l 
No.23 of 1950, the tot a l amount of/vrevenues was allocated to the 
Board. Then t h i s p r i n c i p l e was changed shortly afterwards, and 30% 
of o i l revenues were allocated to the government to enable i t to 
(2 
carry out minor projects without r e f e r r i n g to the Development Board. 
(1) In discussing sources of Financing the Economic plan 1965-1969, 
i t was indicated that "Oil revenues may well amount to 
I.D 780.0 mi l l i o n and thus plan share thereof w i l l be a round 
I.D 390.0 million(0n the basis of 50% of tot a l revenues). 
The Central Bank of Iraq Annual Report 1964, Zahra Press, 
Baghdad ( i n English) P.57 
(2) Iversen, C , Monetary Policy i n Iraq, published by the National 
Bank of Iraq 1954, P.109 
(30) 
In accordance with Law No.74 of 1959, an Economic Planning Board was 
established replacing the Development Board, and i n the 1959/60 
budget the Board's share of o i l revenues was reduced to 50%. The 
I r a q i Government did not even keep the 50% provision because, "In 
1966 the Minister of Finance openly admitted that l e s s than 50 per 
cent of o i l revenues were being u t i l i s e d for development p r o j e c t s " ^ ^ \ 
A l l the same i t i s s t i l l safe to assert that o i l revenues are a 
decisive factor i n the financing of development programmes i n Iraq. 
The l a t e r percentage all o c a t i o n may be smaller but the absolute 
amount of funds available at the l a t e r years i s so much greater than 
at the beginning of the period the reduction i n the percentage 
figure might by i t s e l f e a s i l y give a wrong impression. 
Even so, the position w i l l need to be watched with 
caution. Any tendency on the part of the I r a q i Government, such as 
has been manifest in recent years, to reduce d r a s t i c a l l y the 
percentage of o i l revenues allocated to the service of development 
programmes, i s almost certain, other things being equal, to retard 
economic development i n Iraq. Furthermore, i t should not be 
forgotten that, as was said e a r l i e r , o i l i s a wasting asset : i t 
would seem to follow from t h i s that a large part of o i l revenues 
should be devoted to productive investment and not dissipated m 
immediate consumption or absorbed i n outlays of a non-productive 
nature. 
(2) The o i l companies operating i n Iraq employ a not i n s i g n i f i c a n t 
number of workers, r e l a t i v e l y to any i n d u s t r i a l firm i n Iraq, In 
1962, for example the number of I r a q i s employed by the O i l Companies 
t o t a l l e d (12.071), with t o t a l annual wages of (I.D 8.096.992). The 
I r a q i s employed by O i l Companies are trained, i n most cases, and they 
(1) The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review, 
Annual Supplement, 1966. P.10 
(31) 
become s k i l l e d or at l e a s t semx-skilled workers, and i n t h i s way 
the limited supply of s k i l l e d workers i s increased. As for the 
payments for using port f a c i l i t i e s , i . e . Basrah, purchasing of 
building materials and paying for freight charges there i s no 
available figure at the moment, showing the exact amount paid for 
these purposes, as far as the present writer knows. The preceding 
discussion shows the importance of o i l to the I r a q i economy as 
creating revenue on the one hand, and as a r e l a t i v e l y l arge -project 
to provide employment for a not i n s i g n i f i c a n t number of I r a q i s on 
the other. Another important aspect of the exportation of crude o i l 
i s that o i l revenues are the most important source of foreign 
exchange, without which i t becomes very d i f f i c u l t to carry out 
development programmes. 
Furthermore, o i l revenues help to a large extent i n 
ensuring the s t a b i l i t y of the rate of exchange of the domestic 
currency i n world f i n a n c i a l centres. Consequently, i t may be 
useful, indeed e s s e n t i a l , that consideration should be given to the 
question as to how far Iraq can look forward with confidence to the 
continuing provision of such revenues from the exportation of her 
o i l . 
The flow of Iraq o i l from i t s major f i e l d i n Kirkuk 
was stopped twice m the l a s t decade. The major part of the Iraq 
crude o i l exports goes through a pipeline between Kirkuk and Banias 
on the Mediterranean, passing through S y r i a . In 1956, when Egypt 
was attacked by France, England, and I s r a e l , the Syrian Army i n 
November of the same year blew up three pumping stations situated i n 
S y r i a , and part of the pipeline. This was done to prevent the flow 
of o i l from an Arab country, Iraq, to countries which were bombing 
Egypt at that time. After negotiation between the Iraq O i l Company 
(1) In 1956, the monthly rate of o i l revenue to I r a q i Government was 
nearly (£7 mn.) of which nearly (£6 mn.) was derived from o i l 
flowing from Kirkuk. (Further d e t a i l s about t h i s point i s 
mentioned on P. ( 3 2 ) of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n ) . 
The Economist November 10, 1956, P.514 
(32) 
and the Syrian Government the o i l flow was restored i n A p r i l 1958. 
Iraq l o s t a t o t a l amount of (£56 mn.) as a r e s u l t of the stoppage 
of o i l . ^ ^ I t i s perhaps possible to j u s t i f y the action taken by 
Syria, insofar as i t provided help, i n however small a way i t might 
be, to a Sister-Arab country which was being attacked by foreign 
countries. Then the flow of I r a q i o i l continued, after repairing the 
three damaged pumping stations, and the pipeline for (10) years 
aft e r that without any s i m i l a r stoppage. But i n December 1966, the 
Syrian Government took u n i l a t e r a l action, and seized properties 
belonging to the (IPC) after the break-down of negotiations with the 
(IPC). The purpose was to force (IPC) to pay a higher rate of 
t r a n s i t duty and to agree to a re-examination of the rates granted 
(2) 
to Syria under the 50/50 agreement of 1955. The Syrian Government 
informed the (IPC) that the loading of crude Iraq o i l at Banias 
would be stopped, u n t i l the company paid a t o t a l amount of (£3.7 mn.), 
which, i t was claimed, was owing by the company for the peridd 
between January and September 1966. 
The importance of t h i s to the I r a q i crude o i l exports 
could be i l l u s t r a t e d by the fact that, the Basrah o i l - f i e l d s were 
producing at an annual rate between (20-22 mn. tons) i . e . equivalent 
to 40% of t o t a l o i l revenues: the rest comes from the northern f i e l d s . 
After twelve weeks of negotiations, an agreement was reached i n the 
beginning of March 1967, and the pumping of o i l from the Kirkuk f i e l d 
was resumed. According to t h i s agreement the new t r a n s i t fees became 
5s.l0d/ton instead of 4s./ton, and loading fees 2s./ton instead of 
(4) 
Is.Id/ton under the 1955 agreement; i t was agreed to negotiate 
(1) The Economist, March 29, 1958, P.1152, and January 25, 1958. P.299. 
(2) According to this agreement the (IPC) i s to pay 50% of the p r o f i t s 
made by saving in the cost of transportation of o i l i f c arried i n 
another way. 
(3) The Fi n a n c i a l Times, Thursday January 26th 1967, No.24142. For 
figures of o i l production and revenues see table on P.(28 ) . 
(4) The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review, 
March 1967, P.4 
(33) 
with the Syrian Government about the additional amount which Syria 
claimed that the o i l companies owed from the period between 1955 and 
1966. I r a q i losses as a r e s u l t of t h i s (12) week stoppage of o i l flow 
from Kirkuk amounted to (£23^ mn.)^1^ Accordingly the spending on 
the development programme was temporarily stopped, and as the 
Economist Intelligence Unit has said : "No doubt the f i n a n c i a l 
problems a r i s i n g from the Syrian/IPC c r i s i s w i l l cause some 
embarrassment to the already over-strained I r a q i treasury by the end 
(2) 
of the f i r s t quarter of 1967". This b r i e f discussion of the 
stoppage of the flow of Iraq o i l twice i n (10) year*s time may cast 
some doubt on the r e l i a b i l i t y of o i l revenues for Iraq. I f the 
I r a q i Government wants to safeguard the most important source of 
revenue and foreign exchange, there are two ways, in my view, which 
might be followed :-
(1) To negotiate an agreement with the Syrian Government according to 
which Syria undertakes to consult the I r a q i Government before taking 
any step m a l l matters concerning the IPC pipeline. This way i s a 
weak course of action, and there i s a great p o s s i b i l i t y that Syria 
might not honour such an agreement. 
(2) The stronger and safer way would be, the construction of a 
pipeline between Kirkuk and Basrah and the taking of the necessary 
steps to improve port f a c i l i t i e s i n the Persian Gulf. The second 
suggestion i s reported to be under consideration by the (IPC). 
The Financial Times reported that, "IPC i s seriously 
considering building a Kirkuk-Basrah pipeline and may go ahead with 
the project there even i f i t s present c o n f l i c t with Syria i s s e t t l e d . 
They explained that the company i s already working on future plans 
(3) 
which would make i t independent of the Syrian pipeline". 
(1) The Economist, 4-10 March, 1967, P.854 
(2) The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review, 
March 1967, P.3 
(3) The F i n a n c i a l Times, Wednesday January 4th 1967, No. 24123. 
(34) 
I t has been estimated that the alternative pipeline between 
Kirkuk and Basrah would cost (£100 nm.)^^. The present writer advocates 
the I r a q i Government building or contributing to the building of such a 
(2) 
pipeline for the following reasons ;-
(1) O i l revenues to Iraq are too important m providing a major part for 
financing development programmes, and i n contributing to the ordinary 
budget each year, as was mentioned e a r l i e r . Consequently, the access for 
the I r a q i o i l for exports, i . e . the pipeline, i s too important to be 
l e f t at the mercy of another country, i . e . Syri a . 
(2) Syria, under the new t r a n s i t fees i s getting (£15 mn.) a year. This 
amount would be paid to the I r a q i Government instead, and would meet the 
cost of the alternative pipeline i n a few years. 
(3) Iraq has (3419 mn.)metric tons of proved o i l reserves as mentioned 
(3) 
e a r l i e r , and at the present annual rate of exploitation, i . e . a l i t t l e 
l e s s than (68 mn.tons a year) the Iraq o i l exports are expected to 
continue, other things remaining the same, for more than (50) years. 
Therefore, the guarantee of such a resource of revenue i s worth spending 
(£100 mn.) now, p a r t i c u l a r l y as the sum of (£15.mn) annually which i s 
now being paid to the Syrian Government could be diverted to service the 
c a p i t a l costs of providing alternative means, bearing i n mind that the 
construction that would be needed, would not only be the pipeline and i t s 
a n c i l l a r y equipments but also allocations to port i n s t a l l a t i o n s at Basrah 
(4) The building of such a pipeline would provide employment for I r a q i 
workers during the construction process, and to operate the pipeline 
a f t e r i t had been finished. These reasons, i n my view, are more than 
good enough to induce the I r a q i Government to build an alternative 
pipeline, and to make use of the important source of revenues, as the 
Economist has said : "Iraq o i l i s cheap and a t t r a c t i v e , the Kirkuk f i e l d 
i s among the most p r o l i f i c i n the world and much too good to r i s k 
l o s i n g " . ( 4 ) 
(1) The F i n a n c i a l Times, Friday January 27,1967, No.24143. 
(2) The arguments presented above i n favour of constructing an 
alternative pipeline are purely and e n t i r e l y based on economic 
considerations. But i t must be borne i n mind that sometimes govern-
ments make decisions depending on p o l i t i c a l reasons with l i t t l e or no 
regard to economic considerations. 
(3) See P.( 27 ) (4) The Economist 4-10 March 1967, P.854 
(35) 
The Public Debt 
In l a t e r parts of th i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , the method of 
d e f i c i t financing, under certain conditions and within certain 
l i m i t s i s advocated to provide part of the funds needed to 
finance development programmes i n underdeveloped countries. This 
method i s intended to be applicable, with some other 
modifications dependent on l o c a l circumstances, to any 
underdeveloped country, but i t i s more p a r t i c u l a r l y related 
here to Iraq. Consequently i f and when a country decides to 
use d e f i c i t financing the procedure w i l l be for the central 
bank of that country to make available additional credit to the 
planning and spending authorities i . e . to the government. I t i s 
expected, therefore, other things being equal, that the public 
debt w i l l increase. Accordingly, i t i s important to know whether 
that country has a large or small public debt. In order to make 
a judgement as to whether a country has a large or a small public 
debt, we should have some sort of measure, to enable us to make 
a sound judgement. To calculate the percentage of the national 
debt to the national income for several years i n two or three 
countries, and to make a comparison between the r a t i o and the 
increase or decrease of the percentages during the same period in 
these two or three countries may serve as a very rough measure. 
I t i s important to emphasise here, that, i f the comparison i s to 
be accurate the comparison should be made between countries which 
have passed through, roughly, s i m i l a r circumstances. The greater 
the s i m i l a r i t y , the more accurate the comparison becomes. However, 
since i t i s very d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible,to find two countries 
(1) I t i s not our concern here, to go into any great d e t a i l about 
the composition of the public debt; or the purposes for which 
the previous loans were used; our main concern i s the s i z e of 
the public debt as a percentage of the national income, together 
with such examination of the uses to which loan-based financed 
has been applied as may a s s i s t i n answering questions concerning 
the quality of the investments that have been made. 
(36) 
with e n t i r e l y s i m i l a r circumstances, i t may be useful to compare the 
I r a q i public debt with that of an underdeveloped country e.g. Turkey. 
Nevertheless, comparison with a developed country, e.g. the United 
Kingdom w i l l be made to show that even developed countries may have a 
large public debt, though the use of the borrowed funds i s e n t i r e l y 
d i f f e r e n t . When an underdeveloped country borrows, the loans are usually 
but not always,used to finance investment i . e . development programmes. 
But a developed country l i k e the United Kingdom accumulated a large public 
debt, as the analysis w i l l attempt to show, because i t had to finance 
two major wars. 
Table 13, (Appendix 6) shows the r a t i o of the Net National 
Debt (NND) to Net National Income (NNI) i n Iraq for the period between 
1959-1963. In 1959, the (NND) was 6.2% of the (NNI). In 1960, the (NND) 
rose by (35.2%), the (NNI) by (11.6%), and the r a t i o became (7.5). In 
1961, the (NND) increased by (16.7%), the (NNI) by (10.8%), and the r a t i o 
increased s l i g h t l y from (7.5) to (7.5). In the following year, the (NND) 
rose by (61.5%) the (NNI) by (8.7%), and the r a t i o became (11.2), which 
was r e l a t i v e l y high. 
There were two reasons for t h i s :-
(a) the increase of the Treasury B i l l s from (I.D 20 mn.) m 1961 to 
(I.D 33 mn.) i n 1962, i . e . by (65%). 
(b) the increase i n the amounts drawn upon the Soviet loan from 
(I.D 6.9 mn.) to (I.D 17.3 mn.) i . e . by ( 1 5 0 . 7 % ) ^ . As may be seen from 
the table which follows, these two changes had the effect of r a i s i n g the 
(NND) from approximately (I.D 36 mn) to approximately (I.D 59 mn). In 
1963, the (NND) rose by (35%) while the (NNI) decreased by a l i t t l e more 
than 2%. The r a t i o of the (NND) to (NNI) rose to (15.7). This r e l a t i v e l y 
high increase was due partly to the Kuwaiti loan of (I.D 30 mn) which 
was f u l l y paid to the I r a q i Government during the year under review, 
and partly because of the decrease of the (NNI), as mentioned e a r l i e r . 
(1) The C.B.I., Quarterly B u l l e t i n , July-September, 1965, 
Government Press, 1966. P.52 
(37) 
The above analysis has shown that the r a t i o of the (NND) to the (NNI) 
rose from (6.2) to (15.7) i n f i v e years only. This r e f l e c t s the 
Governments' policy a f t e r 1958, in issuing more loans i n t e r n a l l y , and 
to contract loans externally. 
Having said t h i s much about the percentages of change 
and the growth of the Net National debt as a r a t i o of the Net National 
income of Iraq the Net National debt of another underdeveloped country, 
i . e . Turkey w i l l be discussed i n the same way, m order to make a rough 
comparison. This i s done m Table 14 which shows "the" r a t i o of the Net 
National debt (NND) to Net National income (NNI) i n Turkey for the 
period between 1959-1963. The table shows that i n 1959, the r a t i o of 
the (NND) to (NNI) of Turkey was a l i t t l e more than 19%. The (NND) rate 
of increase during the period under review was higher than the rate of 
increase m the national income. Consequently the r a t i o of the (NND) to 
(NNI) rose from (19.1) i n 1959 to (29.8) i . e . almost double the r a t i o of 
the (NND) to the (NNI) of Iraq. However, i t i s not j u s t i f i a b l e for us to 
think that only underdeveloped countries have public debts. A developed 
country, such as the United Kingdom has even a larger public debt as the 
analysis w i l l show, but we must keep i n mind that the United Kingdom 
accumulated a large public debt, not because Ihe needed to borrow to 
finance development programmes but to finance two major wars which she 
had to f i g h t ^ Table 15 shows the r a t i o of the (NND) as of the (NNI) of 
the United Kingdom for the years between 1959 and 1963. This table shows 
that i n 1959, the (NND) was (1.4) times the (NNI) of the United Kingdom. 
In 1960, the (NND) rose by (1.3%), the (NNI) by (6.7%), and the r a t i o 
f e l l to 133. In 1961, the (NND) increased by (5.8%) the (NNI) by (6.9%) 
and the r a t i o became 127. In 1962 the (NND) rose by (4,1%), the (NNI) 
by (6.3%), and the r a t i o f e l l to (123.5). In 1963, the (NND) rose by 
(4.1%), the (NNI) by (6.3%) and the r a t i o became 120. Now, i f we make 
a comparison between the r a t i o of the (NND) and the 
(NNI) both m Iraq and the United Kingdom, we find that the 
(1) I t has, of course, been increased considerably in recent years as a 
r e s u l t of the nationalisation of various industries and s e r v i c e s . 
(38) 
(NND) of Iraq forms a r e l a t i v e l y small proportion of the national 
income (15,7%) i n 1963. While i n the United Kingdom the (NND) i s 
a large one, because i t i s even larger than the national income. A 
consideration of quite a different character i s that which i s 
concerned with the use made by a p a r t i c u l a r country of finance which 
i t has obtained by way of loan. I t may, at l e a s t , be safe to say 
that, i f a loan i s obtained for the purpose of promoting economic 
development i n an underdeveloped country, the project or projects . _ 
which are to be financed by t h i s loan, should y i e l d enough returns 
to cover the i n t e r e s t and the instalments of the loan. Otherwise 
the services of the loan or loans, together with part repayment of 
c a p i t a l , w i l l diminish, possibly i n a damaging manner, the resources 
which the country has at i t s disposal for i t s c a p i t a l development 
programme. Therefore, i t may be useful to touch upon the use of 
the loans obtained by the I r a q i Government i n the l a s t few years. 
Table(CT; shows the composition of the national debt of Iraq for the 
years 1959-1965. The variation m the t o t a l of I r a q i Government Bonds 
indicates a tendency to decrease between 1959-1964, i . e . i t f e l l 
from (I.D 11 mn.) to (I.D 6 mn.), but i t rose to (I.D 11 mn.) in 1965. 
The outstanding figure for the I r a q i Government Bonds represents a 
t o t a l of Bonds issued at different times for different purposes. 
In 1955 for example the Government issued Bonds with tot a l value of 
(I.D 4 mn.) for ten years at 3.5% in t e r e s t for the purpose of 
financing O i l r e f i n e r i e s . In 1956, the Government issued Bonds with 
a t o t a l amount of (I.D 2 mn.) for (15) years at 3.5% i n t e r e s t , 
and (I.D 1 mn.), bearing the same rate of i n t e r e s t and redemable m 
(2) 
(15) years. These two loans were issued on behalf of the 
(1) Table 'C' p.( ) 
(2) The C.B.I. Annual Report, 1963 Baghdad,1965 ( m Arabic) P.60 
(39) 
Baghdad Municipal A f f a i r s , to be used for the improvement i n 
public u t i l i t i e s . The major holders of Government Bonds are the 
Central Bank of Iraq (C.B. I . ) ^ ^ and Government and semi-
Government Departments. 
The second item in the internal debt consists of the 
Treasury B i l l s . These b i l l s are issued for a short time usually 
(3 months), to cover the current government expenditure, before 
the receipt of the quarterly o i l revenue instalments. The Central 
and the commercial banks hold the major part of the Treasury B i l l s , 
because the minimum value of a Treasury B i l l i s (I.D 10.000), 
(2) 
which i s beyond the reach of most I r a q i s . The table shows the 
remaining part of a loan granted by the o i l companies operating i n 
Iraq after the temporary stoppage of o i l exports due to the Suez 
(2) 
C r i s i s . This loan was repaid f u l l y by the end of 1960. In 1963, 
an i n t e r e s t free loan of (I.D 30 mn.) was granted to the I r a q i 
Government by Kuwait. This loan was made for two purposes : 
(1) To meet the increase in I r a q i Government expenditure. 
(4) 
(2) To increase foreign assets i . e . the currency cover, i n Iraq 
Therefore t h i s loan was not used for development 
purposes, but, nevertheless i t was used to s t a b i l i s e the exchange 
value of the I r a q i currency which i s an important aim by i t s e l f . 
The t h i r d item i n the table i s foreign loans for development. Under 
t h i s heading the table shows amounts drawn upon a Soviet loan. These 
amounts were drawn i n accordance with an Iraqi-Soviet economic 
agreement, which was signed i n 1959, involving a loan of 
(1) In 1963 the C.B.I, held 41% of t o t a l Government Bonds, 
Ibid P.61. 
(2) I b i d P.61. 
(3) The Economist Intelligence Unit, Annual Report, 1963, P.16. 
(4) The C.B.I. Annual Report, 1963, Baghdad 1965, P.62 ( i n Arabic). 
(40) 
(I.D 65.3 mn.) bearing an interest rate of 2%. In accordance with 
the agreement, Russia, i s to set up projects agreed upon with the 
I r a q i Government and to provide the know-how i n running the 
projects i n the beginning,and t r a m I r a q i s to take over afterwards. 
Some of these projects have started production, some have not yet 
been finished. I f the purpose of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n were different 
from what i t i s , namely the possible contribution of the banking 
system in Iraq to the promotion of economic development, i t would 
be both useful and necessary to go into d e t a i l s about each project, 
i t s productivity, and i t s l i k e l y influence on the I r a q i economy. 
As i t i s , i t may be enough to attempt to pass a more general 
judgement on the position. In 1963, there was a poor harvest m 
Iraq . Consequently, an agreement between Iraq and the U.S.A. was 
reached. Under t h i s agreement the l a t t e r i s to provide wheat and 
tobacco to a t o t a l value of (I.D 5.3 mn.) to be paid i n (19) 
yearly instalments. I t i s obvious that t h i s loan i s a loan for 
consumption purposes. 
Nevertheless, i t may be safe to say that, i t was 
necessary for Iraq to reach such an agreement because of the crop 
f a i l u r e . The l a s t item i n the foreign loans for development i s the 
Export-Import Bank loan to finance the instalment of an e l e c t r i c a l 
unit i n Baghdad at a t o t a l cost of (I.D 3.5 mn.) . In a developing 
country l i k e Iraq, and indeed i n developing countries generally, 
i t i s important that there should be at l e a s t a minimum provision 
of energy, whether i n the form of e l e c t r i c a l energy or any other 
s o r t . Energy i s the foundation of power and adequate a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of power i s a necessity i f development programmes are to be 
successfully executed. This b r i e f discussion of the composition of 
the I r a q i public debt shows that the I r a q i Government started from 
(41) 
1958 onwards, to borrow from different countries for 
different purposes. However, notwithstanding the fact 
that t o t a l public debt has increased from (I.D 24.673 mn.) 
at the end of 1959, to (I.D 131.791 mn.) at the end of 
1965, i t may be accepted as reasonable_to_suggest as a 
provisional assessment of the position, that, having 
regarded to the s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y small t o t a l of the 
debt^ 1^ and also to the s i g n i f i c a n t l y large contribution 
to public revenues originating i n o i l payments, the 
(2) 
I r a q i Government i s s t i l l i n a position which enables 
her to sustain an increase i n international debt, and 
also external loans, without necessarily incurring great 
danger to the s t a b i l i t y of her economy. 
(1) I t has to be remembered that not u n t i l very 
recently, that Iraq began the practice of 
accumulating a public debt: even so i t i s 
s t i l l necessary that regard should be paid to 
the purposes to which the loans are put. 
(2) I t i s also noteworthy that a good deal of the 
debt has been contracted at remarkably low 
rates of i n t e r e s t . 
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The National Income of Iraq. 
The f i r s t estimate of the national income of Iraq 
was made by the United Nations i n 1949. According to t h i s 
estimate Iraq's national income at that year was about 
(I.D. 150 ran.). This means,according to Professor Langely 
that, "the U.N. estimate suggested that per capita income was 
about $ 8 5 ; o r (I.D. 35) and th i s i s calculated at the 
devalued rate of the I r a q i dinar, i . e . ($2.8). Afterwards, three 
attempts to estimate the national income of Iraq were made; 
these f a l l in the period between 1956 and 1964. I t i s out of the 
scope of the present study to discuss the methods of 
calculating the national income accounts; and therefore, t h i s 
study w i l l be confined to introduction of the re s u l t s of these 
three attempts. The f i r s t attempt was conducted by 
Dr. K.G. Fenelon, who was, u n t i l the end of 1958, the 
s t a t i s t i c a l expert to the I r a q i Government. In 1958, Dr. Fenelon 
published his estimates for the national income of Iraq for the 
period between 1950 - 1956, i n which the national income was 
calculated from the expenditure side. His reason for choosing t h i s 
method was "....The National expenditure approach has been 
selected because fewer estimates are needed for those e a r l i e r years 
( 2 ) . 
than would be involved i n d i r e c t income cal c u l a t i o n s . " 
The second attempt was made i n 1961 by the Soviet 
s t a t i s t i c i a n V.Maniakin, at the request of the I r a q i Ministry of 
Planning. Maniakin used the production method, and applied 
(1) Langely, K.M., The i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n of Iraq, Harvard Middle 
Eastern Monograph Series, Harvard University Press, Second 
Printing 1962, P.177 and P.303. 
(2) Fenelon, K.G., Iraq, National Income and Expenditure 1950-1956, 
AJWlabita Press, Baghdad, 1958. 
(44) 
the marxist concept of national income. Therefore, he divides 
the national income into two large parts or sectors :- the 
productive sector, and non-productive sector. In the productive 
sector he includes, agriculture and livestock industry, o i l 
industry, trade, construction, and road transport. The non-
productive sector includes, passenger transport, finance, science 
research, health, and defence. But as a resul t of I r a q i Ministry of 
planning pressure, he included both the productive and the 
non-productive output i n h i s e s t i m a t e s . T h e t h i r d attempt was 
made by an I r a q i Economist, Dr.K. Haseeb, and his study and 
estimates were published i n a book e n t i t l e d 'The National Income 
of Iraq 1953-61*. On the 29th of May, 1964, the same author 
delivered a lecture to a Seminar arranged by the Economic Research 
I n s t i t u t e of the American University of Beirut. In his lecture, he 
gave the re s u l t s of the 1962 and 1963 estimates on the one hand, 
and introduced certain revisions of his previous estimates of the 
national income of Iraq for the period 1953-1961 on the other. The 
present study, w i l l confine i t s e l f to a display of Dr.Haseeb's 
estimates, for the following reasons :-
(1) Dr. Haseeb's attempt covers a longer period namely the period 
between 1953 - 1963. 
(2) As Dr.Haseeb has said, "In general I s h a l l follow the 
recommendations and rules l a i d down by the S t a t i s t i c a l Office 
of the United Nations i n t h e i r various publications on the 
(2) 
subject." This makes i t possible to make comparisons with 
other countries. 
(1) Maniakin, V., The National Income of Iraq, 1956-1960 ( i n Arabic) 
The Ministry of Planning, Central Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , Iraq. 
For c r i t i c i s m s of the estimates made by Dr.Fenelon and 
Mr. Maniakin see, Ashor, I . , National Income S t a t i s t i c s i n the 
Arab Countries, Arabic Economic Review (Beirut) June 1962, P.113, 
Arnest, J . , I r a q i National Income Accounts ( I r a q ) Economist 
Journal of I r a q i Economic Association A p r i l 1962 P.29, and 
Dr. Haseeb's book, which i s mentioned above. 
(2) Haseeb, K., National Income of Iraq, 1962 and 1963. Lecture 
delivered to a Seminar arranged by the Economic Research 
I n s t i t u t e of the American University of Beirut on the 29th May, 
1964. P. (1) 
(45) 
( 3 ) I n the l a s t chapter of h i s book, Dr. Haseeb g i v e s a t a b l e 
showing the "Margin of E r r o r " of the value added of each s e c t o r ; 
and f o r the n a t i o n a l income as a whole. For example, the margin of 
e r r o r f o r the n a t i o n a l income as a whole l i e s between (-7) and (+9) 
per cent f o r the y e a r s 1953-4, and 1958-61. For 1955 i t i s between 
(-7) and (+8) per cent, f o r 1956, between (-8) and (+9) per cent; 
and f o r 1957 between (-9) and (+10) per c e n t . ^ 1 ^ 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , a r e f e r e n c e to the e s t i m a t e s made by 
Dr.Fenelon, and Mr.Maniakin by way of comparison w i t h those of 
Dr.Haseeb's f o r the same p e r i o d , may be u s e f u l . The t a b l e which 
( 2 ) 
f o l l o w s , shows t h a t , Dr.Fenelon s estimate of the n a t i o n a l income 
of I r a q , f o r 1953, was ( 5 ) per cent more than Dr.Haseeb's f o r the 
same ye a r . 
However, Dr.Fenelon's estimate f o r 1956, which i s 
( I . D . 303 mn) i s (10) per cent lower than Dr.Haseeb's ( I . D . 337.6 mn). 
f o r the same ye a r . Furthermore, Dr.Fenelon's e s t i m a t e s g i v e a 
compound r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n the n a t i o n a l income between 1953-56 of 
(5.4) per cent per annum at c u r r e n t p r i c e s , and (3.3%) at constant 
(1956) p r i c e s . Dr.Haseeb's e s t i m a t e s g i v e (11.1%) per annum a t 
c u r r e n t p r i c e s ; and (8.4%) per annum at constant p r i c e s . As f o r 
Mr. Maniakin's e s t i m a t e s , t h e s e e s t i m a t e s , as f a r as the n a t i o n a l 
income as a whole i s concerned, are lower than Dr.Haseeb, w h i l e 
h i s f i g u r e s f o r the r a t e of growth a r e higher f o r the same p e r i o d . 
Maniakin's e s t i m a t e s f o r 1956 and 1960, a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s are 
(13.6%) and (4.2%) l e s s than Haseeb's. 
( 1 ) Haseeb, K., N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-1961, Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966. PP. 181 - 182. 
( 2 ) Table D (P. 46 ) 
(46) 
Maniakin*s e s t i m a t e s g i v e a compound r a t e of growth of over 
(10.2%) per annum, a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s , and about (9.7%) a t constant (1956) 
p r i c e s ; w h i l e Haseeb's esti m a t e s g i v e a compound r a t e of growth of 
(7.4%) per annum,at c u r r e n t p r i c e s , and (5.9%) a t constant p r i c e s . 
T able D 
Comparison of E s t i m a t e s of the N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , f o r the p e r i o d 
1950-1961 ( i n m i l l i o n s of I r a q i d i n a r s ) * 
Fenelon Maniakin Haseeb 
YEAR At c u r r e n t At 1956 At c u r r e n t At 1956 At c u r r e n t At 1956 
P r i c e s P r i c e s P r i c e s P r i c e s P r i c e s P r i c e s 
1950 158 165 - a. — 
1951 184 179 - - - -1952 217 199 - - - -
1953 259 276 - - 243.9 267.8 1954 268 291 - - 284.0 322.6 
1955 289 307 - - 289.3 299.0 
1956 303 303 291.7 291.7 334.8 334.8 
1957 - - 298.0 290.1 357.7 348.4 1958 - - 318.6 317.8 374.0 363.2 
1959 - - 379.8 373.3 391.6 368.6 
1960 - - 431.0 422.1 437.1 412.7 
1961 - - - - 484.2 468.6 1962 - - - 526.5 503.1 
1963 - - - - 515.4 489.5 
Source: L e c t u r e d e l i v e r e d by Dr.K.Haseeb to a Seminar arranged by the 
Economic Research I n s t i t u t e of the American U n i v e r s i t y of B e i r u t 
on the 29th May 1964, P.18 
(1) Haseeb, K., The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-1961. Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , 1964, P.30-32. 
I t may be u s e f u l to point out here, t h a t the comparison between 
Dr.Haseeb's e s t i m a t e s of the I r a q n a t i o n a l income and other e s t i m a t e s , 
e.g. Dr.Fenelon's, and Mr.Maniakm's may not be a b s o l u t e l y c o r r e c t i n 
s t r i c t terms. T h i s i s because, Dr.Haseeb's e s t i m a t e s a r e l i a b l e to a 
c e r t a i n margin of e r r o r , as he i n d i c a t e s , which make such a 
comparison c o r r e c t to a c e r t a i n l i m i t o n ly. T h i s i s not to imply t h a t 
Dr.Haseeb e s t i m a t e s are l e s s r e l i a b l e than the o t h e r s , i t 
(47) 
Thxs much having been s a i d about the d i f f e r e n t e s t i m a t e s of the 
n a t i o n a l income, a t t e n t i o n may^^e concentrated on Dr.Haseeb's 
e s t i m a t e s . The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e shows th a t the n a t i o n a l income of 
I r a q has been i n c r e a s i n g , a p a r t from a decrease i n 1955 and 1963 
at constant p r i c e s , and i n 1963 at c u r r e n t p r i c e s . The d e c l i n e i n 
the n a t i o n a l income i n 1955, was caused by the sharp decrease i n 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l output, as w i l l be shown l a t e r , when the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t s e c t o r s of the n a t i o n a l income i s 
d i s c u s s e d . As f o r the d e c l i n e i n the n a t i o n a l income m 1963, t h i s 
was caused p a r t l y by the decrease i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l output; and 
p a r t l y because of the m i l i t a r y operations a g a i n s t the Kurd i s h 
r e b e l s m the north of I r a q . The t a b l e shows t h a t the r a t e of 
growth i n the n a t i o n a l income from year to year i s f a r from being 
r e g u l a r . T h i s point could be i l l u s t r a t e d by the percentage of 
i n c r e a s e i n the n a t i o n a l income. The n a t i o n a l income has i n c r e a s e d 
by (21.6%) i n 1954 over 1953, w h i l e i t has i n c r e a s e d a t c u r r e n t 
p r i c e s only by (1,5%) m 1959; and t h i s i s one of the important 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the underdeveloped economies. Furthermore, the 
t a b l e shows t h a t the n a t i o n a l income has more than doubled during 
the period 1953-1963 a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s , and almost doubled a t 
constant (1956) p r i c e s . 
( 1 ) Table E (P. 48 ) . 
Footnote ( 1 ) continued from previous page 
i s r a t h e r t h a t Dr.Haseeb i s c a r e f u l to i n d i c a t e margins of e r r o r 
w h i l e the ot h e r s do not: y e t from t h e i r n a ture they must be l i a b l e 
to p o s s i b l e e r r o r e i t h e r way, and we a r e not provided w i t h any 
i n d i c a t i o n of the extent to which the margin of e r r o r may go. 
(48) 
TABLE 'E* 
N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q (1953 - 1963). 
( I.D. mn. ) 
At Current P r i c e s At 1956 P r i c e s I m p l i c i t ^ ^  
YEAR I.D. mn. Percentage 
of i n c r e a s e 
over the 
preceding 
y e a r . 
I.D. mn. Percentage 
of i n c r e a s e 
over the 
preceding 
y e a r . 
1956 = 100 
1953 244.0 - 262.8 - 92.8 
1954 284.0 16.4 322.6 22.8 88.0 
1955 289.3 1.9 299.0 -7.3 96.8 
1956 334.8 15.7 334.8 12.0 100.0 
1957 352.7 5.4 348.4 4.1 101.2 
1958 374.0 6.0 363.2 4.2 103.0 
1959 391.6 4.7 368.6 1.5 106.2 
1960 437.1 11.6 412.7 12.0 105.9 
1961 484.2 10.8 468.6 13.6 103.3 
1962 526.5 8.7 503.1 7.4 104.7 
1963 515.4 -2.1 489.5 -2.7 105.3 
Source: L e c t u r e d e l i v e r e d by Dr.K.Haseeb to a Seminar arranged by 
the Economic Research I n s t i t u t e of the American U n i v e r s i t y 
of B e i r u t , on the 29th of May, 1964, P.13. 
( l ) D r . Haseeb means by I m p l i c i t p r i c e s the f o l l o w i n g :- "Column 6 
of the t a b l e shows the i m p l i c i t p r i c e index of the n a t i o n a l 
income, w i t h 1956 as the base". 
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The N a t i o n a l Income Of I r a q , f o r the Years 
Between 1953-1963. At Current and 
Constant (1956) P r i c e s . 
(50) 
One of the important measures of economic development and the 
standard of l i v i n g m a country i s the n a t i o n a l income per c a p i t a . 
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to r e f e r t o the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e , which 
g i v e s the n a t i o n a l income per c a p i t a f o r the p e r i o d between 
1953 - 1963. 
TABLE 'F' 
Per C a p i t a N a t i o n a l Income 1953 - 1963. 
Na t i o n a l Income 
( I . D . mn. ) (1 ) 
Per C a p i t a Income 
Population At Current At 1956 
YEAR (000) 
P r i c e s P r i c e s 
At Current At % m c r e a s e % 
P r i c e s 1956 I.D. over I.D. i n c r e a s e 
P r i c e s preceding over 
y e a r . p r e c e d i n 
y e a r . 
1953 244.0 262.8 5832 41.8 - 45.1 -
1954 284.0 322.6 5945 47.8 14.4 54.3 20.4 
1955 289.3 299.0 6061 47.7 -0.2 49.3 -9.2 
1956 334.8 334.8 6180 54.2 13.6 54.2 9.9 
1957 352.7 348.4 6301 56.0 3.3 55.3 2.0 
1958 374.0 363.2 6423 58.2 3.9 56.5 2.2 
1959 391.6 368.6 6548 59.8 2.7 56.3 -0.4 
1960 437.1 412.7 6675 65.5 9.5 61.8 9.8 
1961 484 .2 468.6 6804 7^.2 8.7 68.9 11.5 
1962 526.5 503.1 6936 75.9 6.6 72.5 5.2 
1963 515.4 489.5 7071 72.9 -4.0 69.2 «4.6 
( 1 ) Table 'F' 
Source : Mem. by Dr.Haseeb, May 1964, P.14. 
The population f i g u r e s were i n t e r p o l a t e d from the a d j u s t e d 1947 and 
1957 censuses of popula t i o n . The FAO a d j u s t e d population f i g u r e s 
f o r 1947 were used ( s e e U.N.Food and A g r i c u l t u r e O r g a n i s a t i o n , 
Mediterranean Development P r o j e c t , I r a q County Report, Rome 1959, 
P.6 ) . g i v e s a t o t a l population of 5.2mn i n 1947 compared w i t h 
4.8 mn reported i n the census. The 1957 Census was a l s o a d j u s t e d 
to exclude the "estimated l a t e r e g i s t r a t i o n " a f t e r the date of the 
Census and to i n c l u d e the " a c t u a l l a t e r e g i s t r a t i o n " and to 
exclude a l s o I r a q i s l i v i n g abroad a t the time of the Census who 
were not covered by the 1947 Census. The 1957 Census gave 69.000 
as l i v i n g i n the d e s e r t s . T h i s was d i s t r i b u t e d between Mosul, 
(51) 
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The t a b l e on page (48) which shows the n a t i o n a l income per c a p i t a , 
i s of l i m i t e d use only; the reason i s t h a t , the n a t i o n a l income 
per c a p i t a i n each province or ( L i w a ) , d i f f e r s from the o t h e r s . 
Consequently, a r e f e r e n c e to the r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 
n a t i o n a l income may not only be u s e f u l but p o s s i b l y n e c e s s a r y f o r 
a c o r r e c t view of the people i n d i f f e r e n t r e g i o ns of the country, 
(1 ) 
The t a b l e which f o l l o w s shows the average per c a p i t a income, once 
i n c l u d i n g o i l revenues, and once e x c l u d i n g them f o r the year 1956. 
The f i r s t column g i v e s n a t i o n a l income generated i n each province 
i n c l u d i n g crude o i l revenues which accrue to the government; 
because, t h e s e revenues form a p a r t of the v a l u e added of the 
"Liwas", where crude o i l i s produced. These revenues have no d i r e c t 
e f f e c t on the o i l producing r e g i o n s , but they have i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s 
on the country as a whole; these revenues were t h e r e f o r e excluded 
i n column ( 3 ) . The column excludes o i l revenues i n the regions where 
(2 
o i l i s produced and/or the management or o i l - p i p e l i n e s a r e l o c a t e d 
but i t i n c l u d e s wages and s a l a r i e s p a i d by the o i l companies to 
employees l i v i n g i n the "Liwa " i t s e l f . T h i s t a b l e shows t h a t 
average per c a p i t a n a t i o n a l income ( e x c l u d i n g o i l ) v a r i e s to a l a r g e 
extent between d i f f e r e n t l i w a s . While i t i s ( I . D . 73.5 i n . ) i n 
Baghdad, i t i s only ( I . D . 21.9) m N a s s i s i y a h . 
( 1 ) Table Q (P. 53 ) . 
( 2 ) These L i w a s . are :-
Kirkuk, Bassah, Mosul, Baghdad and Ramadi. 
Footnote Continued from previous page : 
Dulaim, Diwaniyah and K e r b e l a m i n p r oportion to the r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n 
i n each of them. The 1957 a d j u s t e d f i g u r e i s 6.3 mn. On t h i s b a s i s 
the average compound r a t e of i n c r e a s e i s 1.94 per cent per annum. 
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I n order to gxve a b r i e f i d e a about the s t r u c t u r e of the I r a q i economy 
and the importance of each s e c t o r to the n a t i o n a l income as a whole,the 
t a b l e which f o l l o w s "Ogives percentages of each s e c t o r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to the n a t i o n a l income during the p e r i o d between 1953 and 1963. As the 
important s e c t o r s of the economy, such a s , a g r i c u l t u r e , manufacturing, 
crude o i l e x t r a c t i o n , a r e d i s c u s s e d i n e a r l i e r p a r t s of t h i s chapter, i n 
a n a l y s i n g t h i s t a b l e , the d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be t h e r e f o r e c o n f i n e d to an 
i n d i c a t i o n of the i n c r e a s e or the decrease of each s e c t o r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to the national-lncome-durmg the p e r i o d , without g i v i n g reasons f o r 
these changes. 
T h i s t a b l e shows t h a t the l a r g e s t c o n t r i b u t i o n i s made by 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , which i n c l u d e s f o r e s t r y and f i s h i n g , m 1953, 
t h i s beingabout (29) per cent of the n a t i o n a l i n c o m e . B u t t h i s 
importance has been d e c l i n i n g s t e a d i l y during the p e r i o d , w i t h the 
except i o n of 1962, when the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r s ' c o n t r i b u t i o n r o s e by a 
l i t t l e over than ( 2 ) per cent a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s and j u s t under ( 2 ) per 
cent a t constant p r i c e s . T h e r e f o r e , we f i n d t h a t , the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
s e c t o r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n has decreased from (29) to (20.7) per cent i n 1963 
a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s , and from (32.6) to only (16.4) per cent i n 1963 at 
constant p r i c e s . The second s e c t o r i n importance i s the crude o i l 
e x t r a c t i o n s e c t o r . T h i s s e c t o r c o n t r i b u t e d , a f t e r a d j u s t i n g the f i g u r e s 
to allow f o r the o i l companies share of p r o f i t s , a b o u t (26) per cent i n 
1953, and decreased to become a l i t t l e over (23) per cent i n 1963 at 
c u r r e n t p r i c e s . I t was (21) per cent i n 1953 and i n c r e a s e d t o become (29] 
per cent i n 1963, and so had taken f i r s t p l a c e m s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . 
O i l r e f i n i n g , which i s i n c l u d e d i n the t h i r d s e c t o r , 
namely, manufacturing does not make an important c o n t r i b u t i o n to the 
n a t i o n a l income. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n 1953 i t was (0.7) and rose to (1.5) 
per cent m 1963 at constant p r i c e s . The manufacturing s e c t o r 
as a whole c o n t r i b u t e d (7.2%) m 1953, and (11.3%) i n 1963. 
( 1 ) T a b l e H (P. 55 ) 
(2) I t might appear, a t f i r s t s i g h t , t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
between the statement here and the f i g u r e s i n the t a b l e . I t would seem 
from the l a t t e r t h a t crude o i l e x t r a c t i o n should have f i r s t p l a c e . 
S t r i c t l y t h i s i s not so f o r the c o n t r i b u t i o n ( n e t ) of crude o i l 
e x t r a c t i o n i s only seen when income payable abroad i n r e s p e c t of o i l 
dues has been deducted. 
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The c o n s t r u c t i o n s e c t o r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n f l u c t u a t e d during the 
p e r i o d ; i t was (4.5) i n 1953, rose to (6.5) per cent i n 1958, 
and f e l l to (3.1) per cent i n 1963. E l e c t r i c i t y and water 
s e c t o r s ' c o n t r i b u t i o n rose s t e a d i l y during the p e r i o d from 
(0.4) i n 1953 to ( 1 ) per cent i n 1962 and 1963. 
T r a n s p o r t , communications and storage s e c t o r , 
c o n t r i b u t e d (7.1) i n 1953 and f l u c t u a t e d during the p e r i o d to 
become (6.8) per cent i n 1963 a t constant p r i c e s ; and almost the 
same could be s a i d about the wholesale and r e t a i l t r a d e . T h i s 
s e c t o r c o n t r i b u t e d (7.1%) i n 1953 and (6.6%) i n 1963, a t constant 
p r i c e s . 
Banking, i n s u r a n c e and r e a l e s t a t e s e c t o r , c o n t r i b u t e d 
(1.2%) i n 1953, rose to (2.3%) i n 1958, and f e l l to (1.9%) m 
1963, a t constant p r i c e s . Ownership of d w e l l i n g s f e l l from (2.8%) 
i n 1953 to (1.9%) i n 1963, a t constant p r i c e s . P u b l i c 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and defence s e c t o r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n rose s t e a d i l y 
d u r i n g the p e r i o d from (8.6) i n 1953 to (12.6) per cent i n 1963 a t 
constant p r i c e s . The l a s t s e c t o r i s the p u b l i c s e r v i c e s s e c t o r . 
T h i s s e c t o r c o n t r i b u t e d , (7.5) i n 1953 and (9.0) per cent i n 1963. 
Having s a i d t h i s much about the c o n t r i b u t i o n of each s e c t o r i n the 
n a t i o n a l income, a b r i e f r e f e r e n c e to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
n a t i o n a l income by c u r r e n t f a c t o r incomes may be u s e f u l . The 
( 1 ) 
f o l l o w i n g t a b l e shows t h a t a g r i c u l t u r a l income, as a percentage of 
t o t a l incomes r e c e i v e d by f a c t o r s of production during the p e r i o d , 
has been d e c l i n i n g s t e a d i l y . I t f e l l from (28.6%) i n 1953 to 
(21.5%) i n 1960, w h i l e wages and s a l a r i e s have been i n c r e a s i n g 
s t e a d i l y during the p e r i o d . They r o s e from (22.6%) i n 1953, to 
(32.2%) i n 1960. 
The t h i r d element i s r e n t , which has been d e c r e a s i n g 
during the p e r i o d . I t f e l l from (5.2%) m 1953 to (3.8%) i n 1960. 
I n t e r e s t r e presented (1.2%) i n 1953, rose to (2.0%) i n 1956, and 
f e l l to only (0.8%) i n 1960. The l a s t element i s p r o f i t s . T h i s 
element has the l a r g e s t share of the c u r r e n t f a c t o r incomes. I t was 
(42.4%) i n 1953, f e l l to (40.7%) m 1956, and rose to (41.7%) i n 
1960. 
(1 ) T a ble ' I ' (P. 57 ) 
(57) 
TABLE ' I ' 
D i s t rxbutxon of N a t i o n a l Income by Current F a c t o r 
Incomes, 1953, 1956, and 1960. 
1953 1956 1960 
I.D. mn. % I.D. mn % I ,D. mn % 
A g r i c u l t u r a l incomes* 70.6 28.6 88.1 26.1 96.5 21.5 
Wages and s a l a r i e s 55.4 22.6 90.1 26.7 145.6 32.2 
Rent 12.7 5.2 15.3 4.5 17.1 3.8 
I n t e r e s t 2.8 1.2 6.6 2.0 3.8 0.8 
P r o f i t s + 104.4 42.4 137.5 40.7 186.7 41.7 
T o t a l 245.9 100.0 337.6 100.0 449.7 100.0 
* I n c l u d i n g a l l types of f a c t o r incomes. 
+ I n c l u d i n g earnings of the self-employed. 
P r o f i t s a r e estimated before the deduction of income tax, and a l s o 
u n d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s and the share of Government and o i l companies i n 
p r o f i t s from crude o i l e x t r a c t i o n . 
Source: Haseeb, K., The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-61, Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964, P.24 
Although the prime concern of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s t o d e a l w i t h the 
monetary system and i n s t i t u t i o n s , a r e f e r e n c e to the non-monetary, or the 
s u b s i s t e n c e n a t i o n a l income may not be out of p l a c e . The t a b l e which 
f o l l o w s ^ ^ s h o w s the s u b s i s t e n c e n a t i o n a l income f o r the p e r i o d between 
1953 and 1956, a t c u r r e n t and constant p r i c e s . The t a b l e shows t h a t the 
important c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the t o t a l s u b s i s t e n c e output were made by 
a g r i c u l t u r e . I n the manufacturing and the c o n s t r u c t i o n s e c t o r s , 
s u b s i s t e n c e c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e not s i g n i f i c a n t . The other, r e l a t i v e l y , 
important c o n t r i b u t i o n i s made i n the ownership of d w e l l i n g s . The t a b l e 
shows t h a t , s u b s i s t e n c e n a t i o n a l income during the p e r i o d as a percentage 
of the n a t i o n a l income as a whole d i d not exceed (9.9%) a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s 
and (12.2%) a t constant p r i c e s . 
( 1 ) T a b l e J (P. 59) 
(58) 
These figures:may s u r p r i s e economists who have s t u d i e d the 
I r a q i economy; as Dr.Haseeb has s a i d , "These r e s u l t s may s u r p r i s e many 
economists who have d e a l t w i t h the economy of I r a q , and who have; tended 
to exaggerate the importance of the s u b s i s t e n c e economy". 
The foregoing d i s c u s s i o n has d e a l t w i t h v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of the 
I r a q i economy m c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l . Consequently i t i s long and very 
f a c t u a l . A j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s form of treatment i s suggested b r i e f l y 
on page ( i ) of the I n t r o d u c t i o n : footnote ( 1 ) . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the 
f a c t s presented, considered more g e n e r a l l y i s t h a t the I r a q i economy i s 
shown as having many of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an underdeveloped economy, 
such a s , low n a t i o n a l income per c a p i t a , a r e l a t i v e l y very s m a l l 
i n d u s t r i a l (manufacturing) s e c t o r , a very l a r g e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r and 
r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e development m the f i e l d s of h e a l t h , education and other 
s o c i a l a m e n i t i e s . T h i s i s by no means the whole s t o r y however. The I r a q i 
economy i s not without p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r p o s s i b l y c o n s i d e r a b l e 
development. There i s a p l e n t i f u l supply of c u l t i v a b l e and f e r t i l e l a n d : 
the T i g r i s and Euphrates, m a d d i t i o n to r a i n f a l l , provide I r a q w i t h a 
good opportunity f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l development, both as a b a s i s f o r export 
and f o r ma i n t a i n i n g a growing i n d u s t r i a l p o p u l a t i o n : high though the 
n a t u r a l r a t e of i n c r e a s e of population i t i s may s t i l l be thought t h a t 
I r a q f a c e s no problem of overpopulation. I n a d d i t i o n I r a q has a very 
c o n s i d e r a b l e source of economic s t r e n g t h i n i t s o i l s u p p l i e s . O i l p r o vides 
l a r g e amounts of f o r e i g n exchange and a source of raw m a t e r i a l s and 
energy. I r a q has had no s e r i o u s d e f i c i t s i n i t s balance of payments, and 
i s f r e e from a c r i p p l i n g l a r g e p u b l i c debt. A l l the same t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n 
elements i n the s i t u a t i o n which could produce d i f f i c u l t y and d i s l o c a t i o n . 
A g r i c u l t u r a l output i s , to an important degree, dependent upon r a i n f a l l : 
and t h e r e can be d i s t u r b i n g v a r i a t i o n s between one year and another: some 
of the d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n i n the body of the chapter i s intended to 
b r i n g out t h i s degree of v a r i a b i l i t y . I n a d d i t i o n the c o n t i n u a t i o n of 
revenue from o i l d e l i v e r i e s can be threatened by p o l i t i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e s . 
I n some degree t h e r e f o r e , I r a q must be regarded as both p o t e n t i a l l y 
( 2 ) 
favoured and y e t of some time v u l n e r a b l e . I r a q has a r e a l and urgent 
need f o r t h a t degree of s t a b i l i t y , whether n a t u r a l or i n s t i t u t i o n a l , on 
which any economy must depend i f i t i s to progress and develop. 
Footnotes ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) on page 59. 
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TABLE ' J ' 
S u b s i s t e n c e N a t i o n a l Income, 1953-6. 
( I.D. mn). 
At Current P r i c e s At 1956 P r i c e s 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1953 1954 1955 1956 
A g r i c u l t u r e : 
F i e l d crops 10.08 12.03 9.77 14.90 13.36 21.39 10.62 14. 9C 
Vegetables 1.23 1.40 0.80 1.41 1.51 2.06 0.82 1.41 
F r u i t and Dates 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.67 0.73 0.91 0.71 0.67 
L i v e s t o c k 6.81 8.69 6.74 8.95 7.72 9.60 7.05 8.95 
F o r e s t r y 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 
F i s h i n g 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 
T o t a l a g r i c u l t u r e 19.05 23.09 18.33 26.23 23.79 34.25 19.50 26.23 
Manufacturing 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61 
Ownership of Dwelling s 4.38 4.49 4.60 4.68 4.36 4.46 4.56 4.68 
NI 
T o t a l S u b s i s t e n c e 24.21 28.37 23.73 31.72 28.93 39.50 24.86 31.72 
N I 245.8 285.84 29L22 337.64 265.22 322.55 301.44 337.64 
S u b s i s t e n c e NI as 
% of t o t a l NI 9.8 9.9 8.1 9.4 10.9 12.2 8.2 9.4 
S u b s i s t e n c e value 
added i n a g r i c u l t u r e 
as % of t o t a l value 
added i n a g r i c u l t u r e . 27.0 27.6 28.5 29.8 27.8 30.1 28.5 29.8 
Source : Haseeb, K. The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953 - 1961. 
Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964, P.27 
Footnotes ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) from previous page : 
( 1 ) Haseeb, K., The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-1961. Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964. P.27 
( 2 ) The g r e a t e s t d i s l o c a t i o n experienced by the I r a q i economy i n 
r e c e n t y e a r s occurred i n 1967. For reasons which i t i s hoped 
may be obvious no s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e to t h i s i s made i n t h i s 
d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
V 
CHAPTER TWO 
(60) 
'THE EXPERIENCESOF THE IRAQI MONETARY AUTHORITIES 1930-1965 
WITH SOME CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS THESE HAVE IN RELATION 
TO THE QUESTION OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE AUTHORITIES . 
The mam o b j e c t of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s to 
an a l y s e the c o n t r i b u t i o n which banking systems i n underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s i n g e neral and i n I r a q i n p a r t i c u l a r , might be a b l e to make 
i n promotion of economic development. One of the means, the important 
one i n f a c t , so f a r as the argument of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s concerned, 
i s d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . I n l a t e r p a r t s of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n a model of an 
underdeveloped country where d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s used to f i l l a gap 
between a v a i l a b l e and minimum f i n a n c i a l requirements f o r a f i v e year 
development programme i s presented. 
T h i s i s a dev i c e which should be used only i n s p e c i f i e d 
c o n d i t i o n s and w i t h i n s p e c i f i a b l e l i m i t s . However, i t i s assumed,, 
and the a n a l y s i s throughout the model shows, t h a t a moderate degree of 
i n f l a t i o n i s expected to be brought about as one of the outcomes of 
us i n g d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . I t i s argued i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n t h a t i t 
i s not always the cas e t h a t what begins as a moderate i n f l a t i o n w i l l 
tend to get out of hand and t u r n i n t o hyper i n f l a t i o n , as the 
e x p l o s i v e theory of i n f l a t i o n s u g g e s t s . I t i s p o s s i b l e to keep 
moderate i n f l a t i o n under c o n t r o l and w i t h i n l i m i t s . However, one of 
the most important f a c t o r s i n doing so, i s the presence of e f f i c i e n t 
and experienced monetary a u t h o r i t i e s . The devi c e of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
i s adopted and a d j u s t e d i n l a t e r p a r t s of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n t o s u i t 
the circumstances i n I r a q , T h e r e f o r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to examine the 
ext e n t to which the r e l e v a n t monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i n I r a q may be 
judged to be e f f i c i e n t and r e s p o n s i b l e enough to c o n t r o l the expected 
i n f l a t i o n . To l e a d up to such an assessment, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o 
d i s c u s s , b r i e f l y , theformation and o r g a n i s a t i o n of monetary 
a u t h o r i t i e s i n I r a q . Furthermore, i t i s n e c e s s a r y to d i s c u s s the 
s i t u a t i o n s which t h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s have had to face i n the l a s t thapg© 
decades or so, and to examine d e c i s i o n s taken i n important monetary 
matters ^ niLe^eJVvt^-BiakeG jiKlg>S3tt&ate>as t o whether t h e s e d e c i s i o n s were 
(61) 
the best p o s s i b l e ; d e c i s i o n s , such as e s t a b l i s h i n g a currency board 
and not a C e n t r a l Bank i n 1932, becoming a member of the s t e r l i n g a r e a 
i n 1941, imposing of f o r e i g n exchange c o n t r o l during World War I I , 
i s s u i n g i n t e r n a l loans among other means to curb i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s 
i n 1944 and 1948, e s t a b l i s h i n g a c e n t r a l bank to r e p l a c e the Currency 
Board m 1947, l e a v i n g the s t e r l i n g a r e a i n 1959, n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of 
commercial banks acco r d i n g to Law No. (100) of 1964, which gave the 
C e n t r a l Bank a wide power to c o n t r o l these banks, and f i n a l l y the 
d e c i s i o n to modify these powers according to Law No. (166) of 1965. 
The f i r s t d e c i s i o n i . e . to e s t a b l i s h a currency board and 
not a C e n t r a l Bank was taken i n 1931, when I r a q was accepted as a 
member of the League of Nations as an independent s t a t e and i s s u e d i t s 
own monetary u n i t , i . e . the I r a q i Dinar i n the f o l l o w i n g year. The 
currency law No. (44) of 1931, decreed t h a t the I r a q i Dinar was to be 
i s s u e d on the b u l l i o n exchange standard and to be equal to (7.3223 grams) 
of f i n e g o l d , ^ ^ and a Currency Board to be e s t a b l i s h e d to a d m i n i s t e r 
a l l matters concerning the c u r r e n c y . But because the United Kingdom 
abandoned the gold standard, t h i s law was amended by Law No. (101) of 
1931. T h i s amendment decreed t h a t I r a q i Dinars should be i s s u e d on the 
S t e r l i n g Exchange Standard. According to a second amendment the date of 
i s s u e was postponed from 1 s t A p r i l 1931, to A p r i l 1932. The currency 
was a c t u a l l y i s s u e d and put i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n at the l a t t e r date. The 
currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n u n t i l the i s s u i n g of the I r a q i N a t i o n a l Currency 
was the I n d i a n rupee which was on the S t e r l i n g Exchange Standard. 
T h e r e f o r e , the I r a q i D i n a r s were i s s u e d a g a i n s t the e q u i v a l e n t rupees 
or s t e r l i n g v a l u e . 
( 1 ) The I r a q i Dinar a t p r e s e n t i s equal to (2.8828 grams) of f i n e gold. 
Aooording to -the Currency Act No.(42) of 1947 the value of the d i n a r 
was f i x e d a t (3.58134 grammes) of pure gold. I n 1949, however, i t was 
d e p r e c i a t e d to i t s p r e sent v a l u e f o l l o w i n g the d e v a l u a t i o n of the 
pound s t e r l i n g . 
(62) 
E s t a b l i s h m e n t and Composition of the Currency Board :-
I n accordance w i t h A r t i c l e (13) of Law 
No.(44) of 1931, and i t s amendments of the same year ( t h e 
Currencu Law) i t was enacted t h a t a Currency Board should be 
e s t a b l i s h e d , and t h a t t h i s Board should r e p r e s e n t the I r a q i 
Government i n a l l matters concerning the I r a q i N a t i o n a l 
Currency. The d e c i s i o n to e s t a b l i s h a Currency Board and 
not a C e n t r a l Bank, as some I r a q i p o l i t i c i a n s suggested was, 
i n my view a r i g h t d e c i s i o n . T h i s i s because, i f a C e n t r a l 
Bank was to be s e t up i n I r a q a t t h a t time, i t would have to 
be run by f o r e i g n personnel and w i t h f o r e i g n c a p i t a l ; I r a q 
c ould not a f f o r d e i t h e r of t h e s e . 
The Currency Board however, was, c l e a r l y , 
not regarded as a permanent s u b s t i t u t e f o r a C e n t r a l Bank, 
because, A r t i c l e (24) of the Currency Law No.(44) of 1931, and 
i t s amendments of the same year i n d i c a t e d t h a t :-
i f a C e n t r a l Bank, or any other Bank w i t h a u t h o r i t y f o r i s s u i n g 
currency, should be e s t a b l i s h e d m I r a q , the Currency Board's 
powers and d u t i e s should cease and the C e n t r a l Bank should 
take them over. 
(63) 
Composxtxon of The Currency Board. 
A r t i c l e (14) of the Currency Law of 1931, provided as 
f o l l o w s :- A Currency Board i s t o be s e t up by a Royal Decree. T h i s 
Board s h a l l be composed of : 
( a ) Two members to be chosen by the I r a q i Government. 
(b ) Two members to be chosen by the E a s t e r n Bank, the Ottoman Bank,_ _ 
and the B r i t i s h Bank f o r I r a n and the Middle E a s t , as long as these 
banks were op e r a t i n g i n I r a q . 
I t was intended t h a t these t h r e e banks should agree 
among them to choose two members; i f they could not reach an 
agreement, each of the f i r s t two banks should choose one member, then 
the second and the t h i r d bank should choose one member each, and so on 
T h i s arrangement was to be followed u n t i l the banks 
reached an agreement among themselves. I t was f u r t h e r intended t h a t 
one member should be chosen e i t h e r by the Bank of England or the 
League of Nations' F i n a n c i a l Committee a t the I r a q i Government's 
r e q u e s t . The I r a q i Government was gi v e n the power to choose one of 
the members to be a Chairman of the Board. Each member should be 
a 
appointed f o r th r e e year term, and each could be reappointed on 
f u t u r e o c c a s i o n s without any l i m i t being s e t to t h e i r number. 
The M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e was to decide the remuneration 
to be p a i d to each member of the Board. T h i s i s the way i n which the 
Currency Board was intended to be composed according to the Currency 
Law; but what a c t u a l l y happened was r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t . Regarding the 
f i r s t two members of the Board, the I r a q i Government u s u a l l y 
appointed a B r i t i s h person w i t h knowledge and experience i n economics 
and f i n a n c i a l matters as one of them. The second member was u s u a l l y 
the I r a q i General Consul m London, i . e . a p o l i t i c i a n w i t h l i t t l e or 
no knowledge of economics or banking. The t h r e e banks then o p e r a t i n g 
i n I r a q , i . e . the E a s t e r n Bank, the Ottoman Bank, and the B r i t i s h 
Bank f o r I r a n and the Middle E a s t , were branches of B r i t i s h owned 
banks. T h e r e f o r e , these t h r e e banks agreed among them upon two 
(64) 
members to r e p r e s e n t them on the Currency Board. As f o r the f i f t h 
member, thxs member was to be chosen e i t h e r by the league of 
Nations' F i n a n c i a l Committee or by the Bank of England. However the 
B r i t i s h Government(expressed the Bank of England's r e a d i n e s s to 
choose a member as i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on the Currency Board, and the 
I r a q i Government agreed to t h a t r e q u e s t . T h e I r a q i Government 
had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the Currency Board's a c t i v i t i e s and th e s e 
a c t i v i t i e s were answerable to Parliament through the M i n i s t e r of 
F i n a n c e . But n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s l i n k of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the 
I r a q i Government was l e f t without r i g h t to r e f u s e the members chosen 
by the commercial banks and the Bank of England. The I r a q i Government 
was r e p r e s e n t e d on the Currency Board by one I r a q i member only, 
because the other member to be chosen by the government has been 
always B r i t i s h w i t h knowledge of economics and banking. While t h i s 
may seem to l e a v e the I r a q i Government, as the s o v e r e i g n power so to 
say, merely on the f r i n g e of c o n t r o l , i t r e f l e c t s two t h i n g s :-
( a ) the dependence of I r a q on f o r e i g n experts a t th a t time. 
(b) I n so f a r as the I r a q Government accepted t h i s arrangement and 
showed i t s e l f ready to allow the Bank of England to nominate the r i g h t 
people to take charge of matters concerning the I r a q i Currency, t h i s 
shows the dependence of I r a q i a u t h o r i t y on the B r i t i s h Monetary 
A u t h o r i t i e s a t t h a t time. B e a r i n g i n mind th a t I r a q was an emerging 
country which took i t s dependence r e c e n t l y , w i t h no great knowledge 
of how to a d m i n i s t e r a n a t i o n a l currency problem, i t may be s a f e to 
Say, the I r a q Government had had>not much choice but to accept t h i s 
arrangement, which may r e f l e c t sound sense, as f a r as the f i n a n c i a l 
and economic s i d e of the matter i s concerned. 
( 1 ) EL. K a i s s i , F., C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
Un-published Ph.D. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
1957, PP. (109 - 111). 
(65) 
Tasks and powers of the Currency Board : 
A r t i c l e 16 of the Currency Law of 1931, i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t the Currency Board's d u t i e s were as f o l l o w s :-
( a ) The Currency Board's mam r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was to be, i n 
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the I r a q i Government, to provide f o r and to c o n t r o l 
the supply of currency, and to ensure i t s s t a b i l i t y . 
(b) The Currency Board to be, i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the I r a q i 
Government, r e s p o n s i b l e f o r making a l l n e c e s s a r y arrangements f o r 
the i s s u i n g , or r e - i s s u i n g , of paper money and minting and 
supplyi n g of co i n s and paper money. 
( c ) The Board to be regarded as a u t h o r i s e d to i s s u e , r e - i s s u e and 
cancel paper money withdrawn from f u r t h e r c i r c u l a t i o n , f o r the 
d e s t r u c t i o n of such paper money, and to keep records f o r the i s s u e , 
c a n c e l l a t i o n , and r e - i s s u e of c a n c e l l e d paper money. The Board to 
be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r keeping un-issued but minted money, and to 
provide the n e c e s s a r y equipment f o r keeping un-issued but minted 
money, and to provide the n e c e s s a r y equipment f o r minting, keeping, 
and c a n c e l l i n g the currency. 
(d) The Board was r e q u i r e d to e s t a b l i s h a "Currency Reserve Fund", 
and to keep t h i s r e s e r v e i n such a way as to ensure the exchange of 
the currency a c c o r d i n g to Law. 
( e ) The Board's income r e s u l t i n g from the s a l e of co i n s and paper 
money to be a l l o c a t e d - a f t e r d i s c o u n t i n g the expenditure and the 
I r a q i Government's share - to the Currency Reserve Fund's balance. 
( f ) The Board was r e q u i r e d to i n v e s t i t s a s s e t s i n s e c u r i t i e s o f /or 
guaranteed b y , s t a t e s , w i t h a currency c o n v e r t i b l e d i r e c t l y i n t o gold 
or pounds s t e r l i n g , and to keep a monetary r e s e r v e , s u f f i c i e n t f o r 
the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of the currency whenever n e c e s s a r y . 
(g) The Board was r e q u i r e d to make the n e c e s s a r y arrangements f o r 
choosing a s u i t a b l e p l a c e to keep i t s s e c u r i t i e s s u b j e c t to any 
d i r e c t i o n s of the I r a q i Government. 
(66) 
The Indxan rupee which was i n c i r c u l a t i o n p r i o r to 
the i s s u a n c e of the I r a q i N a t i o n a l Currency was abandoned by the 
p u b l i c g r a d u a l l y , and was completely forbidden by Law i n 1933. 
A r t i c l e ( 2 ) of Law No.(4) of 1933 forbade the p u b l i c to accept 
I n d i a n rupees as means of payment. The Board was empowered to 
e s t a b l i s h a Currency Reserve Fund i n order to be a b l e to exchange or 
demand the I r a q i currency e q u i v a l e n t to the value of sums of pounds 
s t e r l i n g p a i d to the Board m London. Accordxng to A r t i c l e 1 9 - o f — t h e — 
Currency Law of 1931, the Board was r e q u i r e d to maintain a monetary 
r e s e r v e of not l e s s than 100% of notes and c o i n s i n c i r c u l a t i o n , and 
a s p e c i a l r e s e r v e a g a i n s t unexpected d e c l i n e s i n the p r i c e s of 
s e c u r i t i e s c o n s t i t u t i n g the monetary r e s e r v e fund. The Board may pay 
p a r t or the whole of i t s p r o f i t s to the I r a q i T r e a s u r y . Thus the 
Board had the c h o i c e of whether to pay or not, and what amount was to 
be p a i d to the I r a q i T r e a s u r y . The Board was r e q u i r e d to use x t s 
earnxngs to strengthen x t s r e s e r v e s as long as x t mxght be n e c e s s a r y 
to do so. Accordingly, the Board durxng the f x r s t two y e a r s of 
operatxon 1932-1933 and 1933-1934 kept x t s p r o f x t s and used them xn 
strengthenxng i t s r e s e r v e funds. But from 1935 u n t i l the beginning of 
World War I I , the Board p a i d v a r i o u s sums to the T r e a s u r y amounting 
i n a l l to ( I . D . 306.000). S i n c e the beginning of World War I I , and 
u n t i l the establishment of the c e n t r a l bank of I r a q i n 1947, the 
Board p a i d to the T r e a s u r y a f i x e d amount of ( I . D 60.000) each y e a r 1 ^ . 
A r t i c l e 20 of t h i s law d e a l s w i t h the Board's accounting and 
a u d i t i n g d u t i e s as f o l l o w s : 
The Board was r e q u i r e d to submit to the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e a 
h a l f - y e a r l y statement of the p o s i t i o n of the Currency Reserve Fund 
on the l a s t day of each s i x months i n c l u d i n g a statement of 
s e c u r i t i e s and the amount of coinage and notes i n c i r c u l a t i o n . 
( 1 ) E L . K a i s s i , F., C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of the C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
Unpublished Ph.D.Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
August 1957, P.114 
(67) 
A copy of the statement was to be sent to the Comptroller and 
A u d i t o r General who i n t u r n submits i t to P a r l i a m e n t . The Board was 
r e q u i r e d furthermore, to submit to the M i n i s t e r of Finance an 
annual statement of i t s t r a n s a c t i o n s during the preceding y e a r . I n 
t h i s way the government was r e s p o n s i b l e to Parliament f o r the 
Currency Board's a c t i v i t i e s . 
A r t i c l e (21) of the Currency Law i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
The Board was r e q u i r e d to make up and p u b l i s h i n the o f f i c i a l 
G azette a monthly a b s t r a c t , showing the whole amount of the coinage 
and notes i n c i r c u l a t i o n on the l a s t day of each month, and the 
t o t a l amount of the Currency Reserve Fund on the s a i d days. T h i s was 
i n a d d i t i o n to a h a l f - y e a r l y a b s t r a c t showing the nominal value, 
p r i c e paid, and l a t e s t known market p r i c e of the s e c u r i t i e s forming 
the investment p o s i t i o n of the Reserve Fund. These monthly and 
h a l f - y e a r l y a b s t r a c t s i n d i c a t i n g the money i n c i r c u l a t i o n and the 
Reserve Fund's s e c u r i t i e s p r i c e s which the currency Board had to 
p u b l i s h , according to the above a r t i c l e , gave to a c e r t a i n extent 
a c l e a r i d e a about the currency p o s i t i o n i n I r a q a t the time of t h e i r 
i s s u a n c e . 
A r t i c l e 23 s t a t e s t h a t :-
( a ) The Board i s empowered to appoint o f f i c e r s f o r the d i s c h a r g e of 
d u t i e s i n connection w i t h currency a c c o r d i n g to t h i s Law. 
( b ) The Board appoint these o f f i c e r s a t such r a t e s of s a l a r y as the 
Board t h i n k s s u i t a b l e , s u b j e c t to the approval of the I r a q i 
Government. 
The Board i s r e q u i r e d to choose one or more banks 
ope r a t i n g i n I r a q as i t s agent i n I r a q . Consequently, the Board 
appointed an o f f i c i a l i n Baghdad to c a r r y out t r a n s a c t i o n s such as 
i s s u i n g , r e - i s s u i n g , c a n c e l l i n g and keeping accounts of the currency 
i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n I r a q . The Board appointed another o f f i c i a l i n 
London as the currency agent, to be i n charge of keeping the 
unissued currency. The E a s t e r n Bank's branch o p e r a t i n g i n I r a q was 
chosen by the Currency Board as i t s agent i n Baghdad. The Board chose 
London as i t s head o f f i c e , and appointed the c u r r e n c y o f f i c e r as i t s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n I r a q . 
( 6 8 ) 
Notes i s s u e d and the Reserve :-
The pound s t e r l i n g was c o n v e r t i b l e to gold b u l l i o n , thus the I r a q i 
Dinar was, i n d i r e c t l y , c o n v e r t i b l e to gold b u l l i o n . But before 
the i s s u a n c e of the I r a q i currency which was delayed to A p r i l 1932 
England had abandoned the gold b u l l i o n standard, and t h i s s t e p was 
followed by I r a q , as mentioned e a r l i e r , and the Currency Law No.44 
of 1931 was amended by Law No. 101 of the same ye a r . T h i s law 
removed the gold b u l l i o n standard and adopted the s t e r l i n g exchange 
standard i t s e l f . The Currency Board was empowered to i s s u e an 
e q u i v a l e n t v a l u e of I r a q Dinars a g a i n s t the pounds s t e r l i n g which i t 
r e c e i v e d . Thus n e i t h e r the I r a q i Government nor the Board could 
i n c r e a s e the supply of currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n u n l e s s the Board 
r e c e i v e d an e q u i v a l e n t amount of pounds s t e r l i n g . 
Reserve requirements: 
According to a r t i c l e 19 of the Currency Law of 1931, and i t s 
amendments, the Currency Board was r e q u i r e d to keep a minimum r a t i o 
of 100 between the v a l u e of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n and i t s r e s e r v e . 
There was no upper l i m i t f o r t h i s r a t i o , i t could r e a c h even 200%. 
S e c t i o n 2 of a r t i c l e 16 of the same law i n d i c a t e s t h a t the 
Board was r e q u i r e d to i n v e s t i t s a s s e t s m ' s e c u r i t i e s of or 
guaranteed by s t a t e s w i t h a currency c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o gold or pound 
s t e r l i n g ' , as mentioned above. 
The r e s e r v e , as such, was mainly composed of s t e r l i n g 
s e c u r i t i e s and a s m a l l percentage of l i q u i d a s s e t s and s i l v e r . 
T h i s a r t i c l e excluded the I r a q i Government's s e c u r i t i e s from c u r r e n c y 
cover which was l i m i t e d to gold and f o r e i g n s e c u r i t i e s i n theory, and 
to B r i t i s h and B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l s e c u r i t i e s i n p r a c t i c e . T h i s gave 
the B r i t i s h Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s the power to c o n t r o l I r a q ' s payment 
f o r her exports and any other i n t e r n a t i o n a l payments. T h i s was 
because, I r a q c ould o b t a i n f o r e i g n exchange, e x c l u d i n g a t e r l i n g , only 
through the B r i t i s h Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s . Furthermore, the I r a q i 
(69) 
Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s were not put i n a p o s i t i o n which enabled them 
to use open market operations even i n a l i m i t e d way, as i t may have 
been, as an instrument f o r i n f l u e n c i n g the t o t a l money supply i n 
I r a q . The Currency Board, according to t h i s a r t i c l e , had no c h o i c e 
but to i n v e s t currency cover i n s e c u r i t i e s of the B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s , 
i n s t e a d of i n v e s t i n g i t i n I r a q i Government s e c u r i t i e s , which would 
have been more advantageous to I r a q . I n a d d i t i o n , the Currency 
Board was r e q u i r e d to hold a p r o p o r t i o n of i t s r e s e r v e s i n c a s h form, 
i n order to be able to meet the demand f o r c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of I r a q i 
D inars to S t e r l i n g and v i c e v e r s a , without being f o r c e d to s e l l p a r t 
of i t s s e c u r i t i e s a t p o s s i b l y unfavourable p r i c e s . T h e r e f o r e the 
Board's mam f u n c t i o n was to a d m i n i s t e r the currency, and to change 
on demand pounds s t e r l i n g to I r a q i D i n a r s , and v i c e v e r s a . An 
important c r i t i c i s m which may be pointed out here i s t h a t the Board 
was not i n a p o s i t i o n to i n c r e a s e or decrease money i n c i r c u l a t i o n 
c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h the g e n e r a l economic s i t u a t i o n i n I r a q , as should 
have been the c a s e . ^ ^ 
The Currency Board's a c t i v i t i e s may be b e s t 
examined i f they are d i v i d e d i n t o two p e r i o d s ; the f i r s t p e r i o d 
s t a r t i n g from i t s e s t a blishment i n 1932 and u n t i l the beginning of 
World War I I . The second p e r i o d s t a r t s from the beginning of World War 
I I , and ends i n 1947, w i t h the establishment of the N a t i o n a l Bank of 
I r a q to which the Currency Board's d u t i e s and power were g i v e n . 
According to the Currency Law No.(44) of 1931,and i t s amendments, the 
I r a q i N a t i o n a l Currency was to be i s s u e d and put i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n i n 
A p r i l 1931:but because of the 1929 c r i s i s , t h e Board a d v i s e d the 
Government to delay the i s s u a n c e of the new currency. T h e r e f o r e , t h e 
currency was actually issued a year a f t e r the date o r i g i n a l l y mtendsd,i.e. i n 
A p r i l 1932. At t h i s date the new currency was minted i n London and 
( 1 ) T h i s point i s d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r on PP.74.75 ) . See a l s o , 
Shehab, F., Oxford I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s B u l l e t i n . 
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , V o l . 21, 1959, PP.( 295-296). 
(70) 
shxpped from London to Baghdad, and was kept a t the Board's agent's 
buxldxng i n Baghdad, i . e . the E a s t e r n Bank. The new currency was 
d i s t r i b u t e d among the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and sub - T r e a s u r e r s of 
the Government. The new currency was accepted, w i t h some 
r e s e r v a t i o n s , by the p u b l i c as a replacement f o r the I n d i a n rupees 
which were i n c i r c u l a t i o n before the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the I r a q i 
N a t i o n a l Currency. The new currency s t a r t e d to r e p l a c e the I n d i a n 
rupees, and the I r a q i Government s t a r t e d to export the I n d i a n rupees 
to I n d i a , a t an exchange r a t e of 75 f i l s f o r each rupee. 
I n June 1932, f o r i n s t a n c e , the amount of exported 
I n d i a n rupees t o t a l l e d (32.909.864 rupees) i . e . ( I . D . 4 6 8 . 2 3 6 ) ^ . 
Then i n 1933, the c i r c u l a t i o n of the I n d i a n rupees as means of 
payment was forbidden. The I r a q i currency should, according to the 
Currency Law of 1931, and i t s amendments, be backed by a t l e a s t 100% 
as a minimum r a t i o between the currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n and i t s 
r e s e r v e . The Currency Board was r e q u i r e d to i n v e s t these a s s e t s i n 
s e c u r i t i e s of or guaranteed by s t a t e s w i t h a currency c o n v e r t i b l e 
d i r e c t l y i n t o gold or pound s t e r l i n g . Consequently, the r e s e r v e was 
composed mainly of s t e r l i n g s e c u r i t i e s w i t h a s m a l l percentage of 
l i q u i d a s s e t s and s i l v e r . The t a b l e which f o l l o w s shows th a t the 
r e s e r v e r a t i o tomoney i n c i r c u l a t i o n was always 100% or more. T h i s 
i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t , i n 1933, i . e . a year a f t e r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the 
new currency m I r a q , currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n amounted to ( I . D . 2.363 
mn.). 
I n 1934, i t became ( I . D . 3.174 mn) i . e . an i n c r e a s e of 
(33.8%) over the preceding y e a r . I n 1935 currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n 
r o s e by 14%, i n 1936, by 6%, and i n 1937 money i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e d 
by a f u r t h e r 30%. T h i s i n c r e a s e i n the c i r c u l a t i o n of the I r a q i 
D i n a r s a f t e r 1933, i s of course the more e m p h a t i c a l l y r e v e a l e d i n the 
f i g u r e s because the Law of 1933 had forbidden the c i r c u l a t i o n of 
I n d i a n rupees. 
( 1 ) J a l i l i , A., Monetary System of I r a q , C a i r o : Methba at Nehthat 
M i s i r , 1946. &n A r a b i c ) , P.138, and 
E L - K a i s s i , F . , C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
Un-published Ph.D. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
1957, P.120. 
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The domestic c i r c u l a t i o n had t h e r e f o r e to c o n s i s t wholly of I r a q i 
D i n a r s . 
The second reason may l i e i n the i n c r e a s e i n the value 
and p r i c e s of exports, e s p e c i a l l y c e r e a l s , due to favou r a b l e c l i m a t i c 
c o n d i t i o n s i n the s e y e a r s . 
I n 1938 the amount of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n f e l l by 10% 
below 1937. T h i s was due to the f a i l u r e of the h a r v e s t i n t h a t y e a r . 
I n 1939, money i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e d by about 6% but the ab s o l u t e 
f i g u r e s were s t i l l below 1937,as the t a b l e shows. 
Table "K" 
Currency l i a b i l i t i e s and r e s e r v e of 
I r a q Currency Board, 1933 - 1939. 
( i n thousand I r a q i D i n a r s ) 
Currency Percentage of Reserve r a t i o 
l i a b i l i t i e s i n c r e a s e over Reserve to currency 
preceding year l i a b i l i t i e s % 
1933 2.363 a . 2.898 122 
1934 3.174 33.8 3.199 101 
1935 3.714 14 3.308 102 
1936 3.938 6 4.104 104 
1937 5.113 30 5.172 100.2 
1938 4.628 -10 4.845 105 
1939 4.883 6 4.956 102 
The Percentages of i n c r e a s e ( t h i r d column) were c a l c u l a t e d by the 
w r i t e r . 
* - Currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n and r e s e r v e s as a t June 30th of each y e a r . 
Source: E l - K a i s s i , C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , Un-
publi s h e d PhD T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , 1957, P.124 
(72) 
The Currency Board's a c t i v i t i e s between 1940 and 1947 ;-
I r a q , l i k e a l l other c o u n t r i e s , s u f f e r e d , during 
World War I I , from i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s . The t a b l e which f o l l o w s 
shows t h a t i n 1939, currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n I r a q t o t a l l e d 
( I . D . 4.956.234). I f you c o n s i d e r t h i s f i g u r e as a base i . e . (100) i n 
order to measure the changes i n the q u a n t i t y of money i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n , we f i n d t h a t i n 1940, t h i s amount had i n c r e a s e d by 31%. 
I n 1941, c u r r e n c y ~ i h c i r c u l a t i o n rose by a f u r t h e r 26%. T h i s i n c r e a s e 
could be explained by the r i s i n g p r i c e s of imports which c o n s i s t e d of 
manufactured goods, because the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s d i v e r t e d 
t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e apparatus, to a l a r g e extent, to produce c e r t a i n 
goods f o r war. The r i s i n g c o s t of f r e i g h t played i t s p a r t a l s o m 
the r i s e of the p r i c e s of imported manufactured goods. T h e r e f o r e , the 
i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s during 1940 was not sharp, as compared w i t h most 
other i n s t a n c e s of i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s under the i n f l u e n c e of 
f o r c e s r e l e a s e d by major wars, and because of World War I I , i t 
should not be regarded as unusual: indeed I r a q may perhaps be 
regarded as having been a f f e c t e d by i t only s l i g h t l y , f o r i t d i d 
not a f f e c t I r a q d i r e c t l y , u n t i l the end of 1941. At the end of 1941 
and the beginning of 1942, the a l l i e d f o r c e s s t a r t e d to be 
s t a t i o n e d i n I r a q i n l a r g e and i n c r e a s i n g numbers. I n order to meet 
the expenditure of these f o r c e s the B r i t i s h Government, whenever i t 
needed I r a q i d i n a r s , gave the Currency Board i n London B r i t i s h 
Government s e c u r i t i e s and took I r a q i d i n a r s i n r e t u r n . 
I n the y e a r s 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944, the 
expenditure of the a l l i e d f o r c e s s t a t i o n e d i n I r a q amounted to 
8.1, 15.4, 30.0, and 10.4 m i l l i o n pounds s t e r l i n g r e s p e c t i v e l y . ^ 1 ^ 
T h i s expenditure amounted to a t o t a l of (£63.9mn.) i n four y e a r s , 
which r a i s e d the Currency Board's s t e r l i n g a s s e t s to (£43.5 mn.) a t 
the end of 1945, i n a d d i t i o n to a s s e t s of f i r m s , concerns and 
( 1 ) U n i t e d Nations, Economic Con d i t i o n s i n the Middle E a s t , 1950 
(New York, 1951). P.77 
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commercial banks at an estimated sum of (£26 mn.), which brought 
I r a q ' s t o t a l a s s e t s to about (£70 mn.)^ 1^. Consequently, the t a b l e 
shows t h a t , currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n rose by 73% i n 1942, and as much 
as 116% i n 1943. T h i s was due to the l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n demand which 
was not met by a p a r a l l e l and corresponding i n c r e a s e i n production, 
f o r I r a q , as an underdeveloped country, l a c k e d the n e c e s s a r y s k i l l e d 
labour, c a p i t a l and e n t r e p r e n e u r s . 
The only a l t e r n a t i v e way was to i n c r e a s e imports. But 
the s e c u r i t i e s which were h e l d by the Currency Board i n London were 
blocked by the B r i t i s h Government because of the war. Consequently, 
I r a q could not i n c r e a s e i t s imports i n any case, and was not allowed 
to import more than a l i m i t e d amount, i n order to r e s t r i c t the 
spending of s c a r c e f o r e i g n exchange. The I r a q i Government, i n order 
to absorb p a r t of the purchasing power from c i r c u l a t i o n , i s s u e d i n 
1944 a twenty-year l o t t e r y loan, and an o r d i n a r y t h r e e year bond loan, 
which were e a s i l y absorbed by the p u b l i c . 
T herefore, the currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n 1945 rose by 
1% only and even f e l l by 1% i n 1946. I n 1947, owing to a crop f a i l u r e 
and i n c r e a s i n g imports of manufactured goods the i n f l a t i o n a r y 
(2 
p r e s s u r e s continued i n s p i t e of the government s d e f l a t i o n a r y measures 
and money i n c i r c u l a t i o n decreased by only 5%. I n 1948, the 
Government f l o a t e d bond loans amounting to ( I . D . 5 mn.) and a l a r g e 
p a r t of t h i s loan was taken up by the commercial banks o p e r a t i n g i n 
I r a q , and by the Currency Board. At the end of 1948, the Currency i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n f e l l by 10%. I n t h i s year the A r a b - I s r a e l i war broke out, 
and as a consequence there was a sharp cut i n p r i v a t e investment, thus, 
i n the absence of other o f f s e t t i n g f o r c e s , demand decreased 
( 3 ) 
c o n s i d e r a b l y and p r i c e s s t a r t e d a downward movement . The t a b l e which 
( 1 ) B e l l , W., The S t e r l i n g Area, Clarendon P r e s s , 1958, P.22 
(2) See P. ( 75 ) . 
(3 ) EL. K a i s s i , C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
un-published Ph.D. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
1957, P.130 
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f o l l o w s a l s o d i s p l a y s the w h o l e s a l e p r i c e s , and changes i n them during 
the period i n q u estion, but i t should perhaps be noted th a t i n 
i n f l a t i o n , p r i c e s do not r i s e i n the same degree f o r a l l goods, 
t h e r e f o r e u s i n g them as i n d i c a t o r i n an i n f l a t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n i s 
o n ly of l i m i t e d v a l u e . The t a b l e shows t h a t i f the p r i c e s were 100, 
i n 1939, i n 1940 they rose by 38% and continued to r i s e u n t i l they 
reached as high as (534) a t the end of World War I I , i . e . 1944, where 
the p r i c e s were more than f i v e times what they were i n 1939. P r i c e s , 
then s t a r t e d a downward movement; the government's measures began to 
take e f f e c t , and the war came to an end. Then i n 1947, p r i c e s s t a r t e d 
to r i s e again, and t h i s upward movement continued during 1948. I n 
1949, p r i c e s resumed t h e i r downward movement. As f o r the t h i r d 
measure, i . e . the co s t of l i v i n g , t h e r e a r e no data a v a i l a b l e f o r the 
y e a r s 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944. Then i n 1945, the 
P r i n c i p l e Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s s t a r t e d to p u b l i s h a c o s t of l i v i n g 
, ( 1 ) index. 
The t a b l e dasjrjiosffs t h a t i f the p r i c e - i n d e x i n 1939 i s 
100, then i n 1945, i t became 584, i . e . about s i x times g r e a t e r . I n 
1946, t h e r e was a s l i g h t d e c l i n e , to be followed by a r i s e from (567) 
i n 1945, to (601) i n 1946 and to (673) i n 1948. I n 1949, p r i c e s 
d e c l i n e d s l i g h t l y to 540, i . e . to about f i v e and a h a l f times what 
they had been m 1939. The Government had t r i e d to c o n t r o l p r i c e s by 
means of p r i c e c e i l i n g s , s u b s i d i e s , and i n c r e a s e d t a x e s . These 
measures were only of l i m i t e d use, because of the l a c k of q u a l i f i e d 
and a b l e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e personnel, i l l i t e r a c y among the p u b l i c , and 
the shortage of supply of goods. 
The absence of a monetary a u t h o r i t y , i . e . a C e n t r a l Bank, 
which, had i t been i n e x i s t e n c e , would have helped to a great extent 
i n a p plying the Government's monetary p o l i c y , made the p o s i t i o n even 
more d i f f i c u l t f o r the government i n i t s aim of c o n t r o l l i n g p r i c e s 
e f f e c t i v e l y . The point of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n about the Currency Board's 
a c t i v i t i e s during World War I I , and the f u r t h e r p e r i o d of th r e e years 
a f t e r w a r d s , i s t h a t the Board i s seen to have no a u t h o r i t y whatsoever 
( 1 ) I b i d , P.125 . a l s o s e e Table L (P.76) of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n 
over the c o n t r o l of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n ; the Board acted 
as a l e n d i n g body to the B r i t i s h Government without regard 
f o r the domestic I r a q i economic s i t u a t i o n which, i n f a c t , 
s u f f e r e d a g r e a t d e a l from the sharp i n f l a t i o n which 
developed. 
I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the I r a q i Government 
i s to be noted as u s i n g r i g h t l y , an i n t e r n a l loans p o l i c y 
f o r the f i r s t time i n 1944, to c o n t r o l an i n f l a t i o n : and 
even more s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t may be thought to have 
achieved a c e r t a i n amount of s u c c e s s , r e l a t i v e l y c o n s i dered, 
i f a l l circumstances are taken f u l l y i n t o account. T h i s i s 
an aspect of the s i t u a t i o n t h a t may perhaps seem to have 
a c e r t a i n amount of r e l e v a n c e when, l a t e r i n t h i s 
d i s s e r t a t i o n , c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s given to the way i n which 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g may l e a d to i n f l a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e may 
b r i n g forward the q u e s t i o n of how such i n f l a t i o n may be kept 
under c o n t r o l . 
(76) 
T a b l e " L " 
Volume of Currency i n C i r c u l a t i o n and I n d i c e s of Cost of 
L i v i n g and Wholesale P r i c e s m I r a q , 1940 - 1949. 
Year Currency i n % of i n c r e a s e Cost of Wholesale 
c i r c u l a t i o n over preceding l i v i n g P r i c e s . 
I.D. mn. Year. 
1939 4.883 — 100 100 
1940 6.413 31 n.a 138 
1941 7.993 25 n.a 179 
1942 13.933 73 n.a 383 
1943 30.041 116 n.a 590 
1944 41.306 38 n.a 534 
1945+ 41.906 1 584 503 
1946x 41.401 -1 567 482 
1947 39.066 -5 601 527 
1948 35.112 -10 673 558 
1949 n.a n.a (1) 540 463 
Source : 
A t a b l e compiled from E L . K a i s s i , F . , C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l 
Banking i n I r a q , unpublished Ph.D. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern 
C a l i f o r n i a , 1957 P.131, and the percentages of i n c r e a s e ( t h i r d 
column) and cu r r e n c y i n c i r c u l a t i o n between 1939-1945 were d e r i v e d 
from, D r . J a l i l i ' s book, Monetary System of I r a q , ( C a i r o : Netba' a t 
Nehthat M i s i r , 1946), P.216. From 1946 to 1949 f i g u r e s were 
c a l c u l a t e d by the w r i t e r according to f i g u r e s of currency r e s e r v e and 
percentages given i n the E L . K a i s s i t h e s i s mentioned above. 
+ Year ending June 30. 
x Year ending March 31. 
(1) n.a. = not a v a i l a b l e . 
(77) 
I r a q ' s formal entry i n t o the S t e r l x n g Area. 
With the est a b l i s h m e n t of a wholly I r a q i ( D i n a r ) currency 
i n A p r i l 1932, m t e r c o n v e r t i b i l i t y between the I r a q i Dinar and the 
pound s t e r l i n g was r e t a i n e d ; i n a d d i t i o n , as was mentioned e a r l i e r , 
the Currency Board was r e q u i r e d to r e s t r i c t the investment of i t s 
h oldings of currency r e s e r v e a s s e t s to s t e r l i n g s e c u r i t i e s to be 
kept i n London. Consequently, I r a q was p r a c t i c a l l y a member of what 
was known l a t e r as the s t e r l i n g b l ock or the s t e r l i n g a r e a . T h i s i s 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what A.R.Conan has s a i d , i n g e n e r a l terms about the 
s t e r l i n g a r e a : "An a s s o c i a t i o n of the United Kingdom w i t h c e r t a i n 
c o u n t r i e s whose trade i s f i n a n c e d mainly i n s t e r l i n g , and whose 
r e s e r v e s a r e mainly h e l d i n s t e r l i n g " . O n December 22nd 1941, the 
I r a q i M i n i s t e r of Finance d e c l a r e d t h a t I r a q would become a member of 
(2 ) " the s t e r l i n g a r e a . I t may be pointed out t h a t , each country 
before World War I I was f r e e to adopt the s t e r l i n g exchange standard 
or not to do so. Then at the outbreak of World War I I , and f o r the 
purpose of exchange c o n t r o l the B r i t i s h Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s made a 
s e r i e s of re-shapings i n the s t e r l i n g a r e a . I t was composed of the 
B e l g i a n Congo, I c e l a n d , P a l a s t i n e , Jordan, Egypt, I r a q , The f r e e 
French T e r r i t o r i e s and the c o u n t r i e s of the B r i t i s h Empire a t th a t 
( 3 ) 
time, ( e x c l u d i n g Hong Kong, New Foundland, and Canada). 
The d e c i s i o n of the I r a q i Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s , i . e . 
M i n i s t e r of Finance, to become, f o r m a l l y , a member of the s t e r l i n g 
a r e a may be judged i n the l i g h t t h a t I r a q was p r a c t i c a l l y a member of 
the a r e a , and t h i s d e c i s i o n only made i t formal. So t h i s d e c i s i o n , 
and the consequences which followed as a r e s u l t of I r a q 's 
membership i n the a r e a , as d i s c u s s e d b r i e f l y l a t e r on. was, on 
(1) Conan, A.R., The S t e r l i n g Area, Macmillan & Co. L t d . , 1952, i n 
the I n t r o d u c t i o n , P . V I I I . 
( 2 ) AL-Waquayia' A M r a q i y a , No. 1983 Dec. 22nd of 1941, D e c l a r a t i o n 
of I r a q ' s Entrance i n the S t e r l i n g Area, Baghdad, The 
Government's P r e s s , 1941. 
(3 ) E L - K a i s s i , F., C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
un-published Ph.D. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
August 1957, P.134-135. 
(78) 
balance, l e s s advantageous to the I r a q ' s x n t e r e s t s . T h i s i s 
because, I r a q had had to s u f f e r i n f l a t i o n , among other t h i n g s , j u s t 
because the B r i t i s h Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s p a i d f o r a l l i e d troops 
s t a t i o n e d m I r a q B r i t i s h Government S e c u r i t i e s i n exchange f o r 
I r a q i D i n a r s . The Currency Board was compelled to a c t i n t h i s matter 
as a l e n d i n g agency to the B r i t i s h Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s , r e g a r d l e s s 
of the s i t u a t i o n developing i n I r a q a t t h a t t i m e . ^ 1 ^ However, p r i o r 
to 1939, the r e were no r e s t r i c t i o n s on f o r e i g n exchange d e a l i n g s 
between c o u n t r i e s on the s t e r l i n g standard and other c o u n t r i e s . 
I n 1939, such r e s t r i c t i o n s were imposed a c c o r d i n g to 
agreement between the B r i t i s h Government and the r e l e v a n t c o u n t r i e s . 
I n 1941, I r a q was excluded from the S t e r l i n g Area, due to 
misunderstanding between the United Kingdom and I r a q , and 
consequently the B r i t i s h T r e a s u r y d e c l a r e d the Bank of England to be 
the only a u t h o r i t y , as f a r as any t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h I r a q were 
concerned. T h i s s i t u a t i o n l a s t e d f o r a few weeks only, then the 
normal r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s were r e s t o r e d ; I r a q was 
re-admitted to the S t e r l i n g Area, and her f r o z e n a s s e t s a c c o r d i n g l y 
f r e e d / 2 ) 
The I r a q i Government had the a u t h o r i t y under F o r e i g n 
Exchange Control Law No.71 of 1941, to e x e r c i s e exchange c o n t r o l , 
s t a r t i n g Novermber 24th, 1941. For the purpose of exe c u t i n g F o r e i g n 
Exchange C o n t r o l as r e q u i r e d by the law, i t was decided to s e t up a 
committee, under the name of the "Foreign Exchange Committee". The 
composition of t h i s committee has a c e r t a i n amount of r e l e v a n c e and 
i n f l u e n c e i n r e l a t i o n to the q u e s t i o n of how f a r the I r a q i 
a u t h o r i t i e s were i n a p o s i t i o n where they might be l i k e l y t o g a i n an 
experience and knowledge of monetary a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The committee 
( 1 ) These p o i n t s a r e d i s c u s s e d i n a f a i r l y d e t a i l e d way. See PE 73-75) 
( 2 ) The Times, May 6th 1941, . and a l s o , May 8th,1941, 96, the 
Economist May 17th 1941, P.662, and : 
Shehab, F., Oxford U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s B u l l e t i n , 
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , V o l . 21, 1959, P.295. 
(79) 
was to c o n s i s t of ( 4 ) members, i n c l u d i n g the chairman. One member 
was to r e p r e s e n t the l i c e n s e d d e a l e r s i n f o r e i g n exchange, i . e . the 
commercial banks then o p e r a t i n g i n I r a q , and t h i s member was to be 
appointed by the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the 
commercial banks. A second member was to be appointed by the 
M i n i s t e r of Finance to r e p r e s e n t the M i n i s t r y of F i n a n c e : a t h i r d 
member was to be appointed by the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e i n c o n s u l t a t i o n 
withr the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce to r e p r e s e n t the chamber : as f o r 
the f o u r t h and chairman, he was to be appointed by the C o u n c i l of 
M i n i s t e r s . F u l l a u t h o r i t y i n matters concerning f o r e i g n exchange was 
v e s t e d m t h i s Committee;^^the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e was given the 
duty of d e f i n i n g which, from time to time, should be the s t e r l i n g 
a r e a from the I r a q i point of view, of d e c i d i n g the value of export 
trade so f a r a s , i n p r a c t i c e , t h i s could be done, and f i n a l l y of 
i n d i c a t i n g the bodies which would be regarded as ' l i c e n s e d ' under the 
( 2 ) 
Act D e t a i l e d r u l e s and p r o v i s i o n s were l a i d down w i t h regard to the 
( 1 ) Law No. 71 of 1941. 
( 2 ) A r t i c l e (1) S e c t i o n ( 2 ) of t h i s law d e f i n e s f o r e i g n exchange as :-
"The payment of any currency, b i l l , c r e d i t , or account through any 
currency medium d i f f e r e n t from the I r a q i d i n a r , or pound s t e r l i n g , or 
any other s t e r l i n g a r e a currency, as d e f i n e d by the M i n i s t e r of 
F i n a n c e " . 
A r t i c l e ( 3 ) S e c t i o n ( 1 ) of t h i s law i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
" i t i s p r o h i b i t e d to buy or s e l l or borrow, or donate any of the a s s e t s 
mentioned i n A r t i c l e ( 1 ) s e c t i o n ( 2 ) of t h i s law, u n l e s s to or from a 
l i c e n s e d person by the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e " . 
The A r t i c l e ( 1 ) s e c t i o n ( 3 ) d e f i n e s a l i c e n s e d person as 
"A l i c e n s e d person i s , any person to whom the M i n i s t e r of Finance 
d e l e g a t e s the power to deal i n F o r e i g n exchange." 
A r t i c l e ( 5 ) of t h i s law decrees t h a t remittances might be 
r e q u i r e d f o r :-
(A) payments f o r any form of trade or t r a n s a c t i o n s performed i n I r a q , 
such as p r o f i t , f r e i g h t , and revenues. 
(80) 
footnote continued : 
(B) Capxtal r e m i t t a n c e s , which were permitted i n e x c e p t i o n a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , or before the i s s u a n c e of t h i s Law. 
(C) T r a v e l l i n g expenses, and p e t t y p r i v a t e r e m i t t a n c e s . 
Furthermore A r t i c l e ( 8 ) of t h i s law i n d i c a t e s t h a t :-
Export t r a n s a c t i o n s should be executed a c c o r d i n g ± O L , the c o n d i t i o n s 
and the requirements imposed by the f o r e i g n exchange Committee. 
The F o r e i g n Exchange Law No. (71) of 1941 was amended by Law No. (30) 
of 1942 : 
The amendment i n d i c a t e s t h a t :-
"The M i n i s t e r of Finance i s a u t h o r i s e d to ask a l l those 
who have r e m i t t a n c e s - except the l i c e n s e d bodies - to s e l l him 
t h e i r holdings of f o r e i g n exchange a t the p r i c e which he p u b l i s h e s 
a c c o r d i n g l y , e x c l u d i n g f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s of c o u n t r i e s w i t h s i m i l a r 
currency r e g u l a t i o n s " . 
(81) 
conduct of t r a n s a c t i o n s , the handling of t h e i r proceeds, and, i n due 
course, f o r the c o n t r o l and s u p p r e s s i o n of s p e c u l a t i v e t r a n s a c t i o n s 
i n c l u d i n g the p o s s i b l e f l i g h t of c a p i t a l from the country. 
As the World War continued, other s p e c i a l arrangements 
were put i n t o p r a c t i c e . According to these arrangements, each 
n o n - s t e r l i n g _ a r e a country had a s p e c i a l account, from which payments 
could be made to any other s t e r l i n g a r e a member country, or from 
one person to another provided t h a t the two were r e s i d e n t s i n one 
country; but payments could not be made to n o n - s t e r l i n g a r e a 
c o u n t r i e s . I n post war y e a r s , the United Kingdom has had to f a c e two 
problems :-
(1) The War debts r e p r e s e n t e d by the i n c r e a s e of other s t e r l i n g a r e a 
members' s t e r l i n g a s s e t s from j u s t under (£500 mn.) i n August 1939, 
to (£3500 mn.) m e a r l y 1 9 4 7 . ^ 
(2 ) The problem of d o l l a r shortage. 
Regarding I r a q , I r a q ' s s t e r l i n g a s s e t s r o s e from 
(£4.79 mn.) a t the end of 1939, to (£70 mn.) i n 1945, i n c l u d i n g the 
(2) 
accumulated a s s e t s of f i r m s and commercial banks. During p a r t of 
the post war p e r i o d , the United Kingdom blocked the s t e r l i n g a s s e t s 
of overseas members of the s t e r l i n g a r e a , and the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of 
the pound to hard c u r r e n c i e s , such as U.S. d o l l a r s , was forbidden. 
To overcome the d o l l a r shortage, the United S t a t e s granted the U n i t e d 
( 3 ) 
Kingdom a l o a n of ($3,750,000,000) to be r e p a i d i n f i f t y y e a r s . 
( 1 ) Crump, N., The A.B.C. of F o r e i g n Exchange, Macmillan and Co. L t d . , 
13th Ed., 1963, pp.222-24. 
(2) Shehab, F., Oxford U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s B u l l e t i n , 
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , V o l . 21, 1959, PP. 295 -
(3) Crump, N., The A.B.C. of F o r e i g n Exchange, Macmillan and Co. L t d . , 
13th Ed., 1963, PP.296 - 297. 
(82) 
According to t h i s Anglo-American lo a n agreement, i t 
was proposed t h a t a c e r t a i n p r o p o r t i o n of the blocked balances 
of the overseas members of the S t e r l i n g a r e a should be a t once 
a v a i l a b l e f o r the c u r r e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s of these members, and he 
c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o american d o l l a r s one year a f t e r the agreement. 
Thus, the B r i t i s h Government began to n e g o t i a t e w i t h overseas 
s t e r l i n g a r e a member c o u n t r i e s f o r the r e l e a s e of the balance of 
blocked a s s e t s . 
Regarding I r a q , an agreement between I r a q and the 
United Kingdom was reached on August 13, 1947, to r e l e a s e some of 
(2) 
her blocked s t e r l i n g a s s e t s to be e f f e c t i v e from J u l y 15, 1947. 
T h i s agreement was s i m i l a r to those concluded w i t h other s t e r l i n g 
a r e a member c o u n t r i e s . Under t h i s agreement two accounts were s e t 
up, to be c a l l e d N o . ( l ) and No.(2) accounts. N o . ( l ) account was to 
r e p r e s e n t the f r e e d balances :- a l l c u r r e n t expenditure was to be 
s u b s t r a c t e d from i t , and a l l c u r r e n t earnings were to be added to i t . 
No.(2) account was to r e p r e s e n t the blocked account. 
The No.(2) (blocked) account was d e a l t w i t h i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l : 
( 3 ) 
The d e t a i l s a r e s e t out i n the Appendix. The immediate consequence 
of the agreement was t h a t I r a q was put i n a p o s i t i o n where she was 
a b l e to use her earnings of s t e r l i n g from c u r r e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s 
t a k i n g p l a c e on or a f t e r the date of the agreement ( J u l y 15th,1947), 
f o r a wide range of u s e s . The amounts were to be t r a n s f e r r e d to 
Account N o . ( l ) and I r a q was regarded as e n t i t l e d to import from any 
curr e n c y a r e a , even i n c l u d i n g the hard currency a r e a . A c t u a l l y the 
1947 agreement was never put i n t o p r a c t i c e . The c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of 
the s t e r l i n g was suspended on August 20th of the same year : the 
A n g l o - I r a q i agreement of J u l y 1947 had had h a r d l y time to come 
a l i v e , some a l t e r n a t i v e arrangement was c l e a r l y n e c e s s a r y . 
( 1 ) E L . K a i s s i , F . , C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
1957, PP. (149-150). 
( 2 ) I b i d . P.150 
( 3 ) Appendix N o . ( l ) . 
(83) 
Consequently, i n November 1947, a temporary agreement between I r a q 
and the U n i t e d Kingdom was reached. According to t h i s agreement the 
c o n v e r t i b l i t y of the s t e r l i n g i n N o . ( l ) account was suspended and 
the maximum sum which I r a q could withdraw from t h a t account, to be 
used to f i n a n c e day-to-day t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h the hard currency area 
c o u n t r i e s , i . e . the U.S.A., Netherlands, Belgium and S w i t z e r l a n d , 
was f i x e d ^ Th"is~ligreement -was""to be e f f e c t i v e f o r the p e r i o d 
between J u l y 15, 1947, to June 30, 1948, but a c t u a l l y i t was 
renewed t h r e e times a f t e r 1948. 
(1 ) 
The t a b l e which f o l l o w s shows t h a t at the day on which 
the Anglo I r a q i Agreement was to be e f f e c t i v e , i . e . J u l y 14, 1947, 
the t o t a l s t e r l i n g a s s e t s h e l d by the N a t i o n a l Bank of I r a q 
( e s t a b l i s h e d i n the same y e a r ) and commercial banks op e r a t i n g i n 
I r a q was (£57.904 ran.). 
The volume of s t e r l i n g a s s e t s h e l d by I r a q i 
i n s t i t u t i o n s v a r i e d a good d e a l i n subsequent y e a r s . Some 
v a r i a t i o n s a r e to be e x p l a i n e d by the outbreak of war (e.g. the 
A r a b - I s r a e l i war i n 1948) ( o r again of d i s t u r b a n c e caused by the 
Suez c r i s i s i n 1956); some are to be e x p l a i n e d by crop f a i l u r e s , or 
i n c r e a s e d imports which may or may not be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h crop 
f a i l u r e , but u s u a l l y a r e . A new element was introduced, however, on 
1951 when I r a q i c u rrency r e s e r v e s were h e l d f o r the f i r s t time i n 
a s s e t s other than s t e r l i n g : the amount of f o r e i g n a s s e t s was s m a l l 
and d i d not i n c r e a s e by very much i n subsequent y e a r s : a f u r t h e r 
new element was introduced i n 1955 when as a r e s u l t of a new 
agreement between the N a t i o n a l Bank of I r a q and the B r i t i s h monetary 
a u t h o r i t i e s , a p a r t of the I r a q i r e s e r v e was, f o r the f i r s t time, 
h e l d i n gold. Reserve i n the form of n o n - B r i t i s h a s s e t s and of gold 
d i d not i n c r e a s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y u n t i l 1958. There w e r e _ c l e a r l y 
c o m p l i c a t i o n s developing i n the r e l a t i o n s between I r a q and the U.K. 
and these^became e x p l i c i t i n June 1959, when I r a q withdrew from the 
S t e r l i n g Area. The d e c i s i o n of I r a q to withdraw from membership of 
the s t e r l i n g a r e a was c l e a r l y of major s i g n i f i c a n c e . An attempt 
(1 ) Table *M' Page.(86) 
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to a s s e s s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r withdrawal may perhaps provide a 
good opportunity of f i n d i n g a p o i n t e r to the l a r g e r q u e s t i o n i n 
the back-ground as t o whether the I r a q i monetary a u t h o r i t i e s may 
be judged to have ac t e d i n a r e s p o n s i b l e and knowledgable way i n 
t h e i r conduct of I r a q ' s monetary a f f a i r s s i n c e 1945. I n some ways 
I r a q may be thought to have been unfortunate; f o r example, a very 
favourable monetary agreement reached i n J u l y 1947, was rendered 
n u l l and v o i d so f a r as I r a q was concerned, not because of any 
weakness i n her own p o s i t i o n but because of the weakness of the 
B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n , ending i n d e v a l u a t i o n of the pound 
s t e r l i n g and the r e - i n t r o d u c t i o n of monetary s t r i n g e n c y not only 
f o r B r i t a i n h e r s e l f but a l s o f o r her p a r t n e r s i n the s t e r l i n g c l u b . 
These events which l e d up to the withdrawal of I r a q from 
membership of the S t e r l i n g a r e a i n e v i t a b l y p resent the q u e s t i o n 
whether t h i s d e c i s i o n was wi s e or not. Reference i s f r e q u e n t l y made 
i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n to the importance of attempting to make some 
assessment of the e f f i c i e n c y and sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the 
I r a q i monetary a u t h o r i t i e s . I f d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , w i t h i t s 
concomitant i n f l a t i o n , i s to be used then i t i s important t h a t the 
monetary and other a u t h o r i t i e s should, by t h e i r i n t e g r i t y and 
competence, command general r e s p e c t . An assessment of the wisdom or 
otherwise of the d e c i s i o n to withdraw from the s t e r l i n g a r e a i s 
c l e a r l y very r e l e v a n t to the wider q u e s t i o n . An assessment of t h i s 
s o r t however cannot be made adequately w i t h i n the space of a b r i e f 
paragraph or two. Yet to d e a l w i t h the q u e s t i o n adequately would 
e n t a i l the r i s k of breaking the sequence between the ex p e r i e n c e s of 
the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s , a l r e a d y d e a l t w i t h , and the account of the 
development of other monetary i n s t i t u t i o n s , e.g. the Commercial Banks 
and the s p e c i a l i s e d banks, which f o l l o w s . There i s an awkward 
problem of ch o i c e which has to be faced here'.perhaps an a c c e p t a b l e , 
i f not n e c e s s a r i l y i d e a l s o l u t i o n , would be to i n d i c a t e b r i e f l y here 
what the broad l i n e s of such an assessment would be and to introduce 
the more d e t a i l e d p r e s e n t a t i o n of the assessment i n some more 
(85) 
convenient p l a c e l a t e r on. But such an e x p e d i e n t - might s t i l l 
have the disadvantage of r e q u i r i n g a f a i r l y long statement f o r 
i f a judgement was expressed i t might be thought n e c e s s a r y t h a t 
the judgement should have some supporting argument. Thus the 
sequence might be broken and, i n a d d i t i o n , l e a v e the important 
q u e s t i o n s t i l l unsolved of where the extended treatment might 
most reasonably be presented. I f i t i s c l e a r l y r e c o g n i s e d t h a t 
_ t h e r e s t i l l remains to be presented- d e t a i l e d and f a i r l y long 
account of the development of v a r i o u s banking i n s t i t u t i o n s then 
p o s s i b l y the more ap p r o p r i a t e s o l u t i o n would be to d e a l w i t h 
the q u e s t i o n of assessment completely a t t h i s p o i n t , i f only 
on the grounds t h a t i t i s b e t t e r to b r i n g i t i n once and d e a l 
w i t h i t comprehensively, r a t h e r than be compelled to b r i n g i t i n 
tw i c e , and on the f i r s t o c c a s i o n avdswedly in c o m p l e t e l y . 
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A p p r a i s a l of the a c t i o n of I r a q i n withdrawing from membership-
of the s t e r l i n g a r e a :-
I n order to a s s e s s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the changes 
which have taken p l a c e s i n c e the second World War, as f a r as the 
s t e r l i n g a r e a i s concerned, i t i s n e c e s s a r y to c o n s i d e r the 
United Kingdom's p o s i t i o n as a major f i n a n c i a l and economic power 
before the war and the d e c l i n e of t h i s power a f t e r the war. T h i s 
i s because what i s or was advantageous to a country a t a given 
time and i n p a r t i c u l a r c ircumstances might become l e s s advantageous 
or even harmful f o r the same country under d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
and a t a d i f f e r e n t time. I t f o l l o w s t h a t the u s e f u l n e s s to any 
p a r t i c u l a r country, of being a member of the s t e r l i n g area i s 
bound to depend upon circumstances :- circumstances can change, and 
so, a c c o r d i n g l y , could the u s e f u l n e s s of membership. 
( 1 ) Changes i n Great B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n and importance i n the world :-
Great B r i t a i n , was, u n t i l the outbreak of the second World War, the 
major power i n the World, w i t h London as the most important 
f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e . England was a l a r g e c r e d i t o r i n world t r a n s a c t i o n s ; 
and the pound s t e r l i n g was accepted as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l means of 
payment. I n a s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s , s m a l l e r and newly independent 
c o u n t r i e s o v e r s e a s , found i t advantageous to have s t r o n g f i n a n c i a l 
and t r a d i n g t i e s w i t h Great B r i t a i n . For primary producing c o u n t r i e s 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t was an advantage to be a b l e to export t h e i r 
products to B r i t a i n ' s l a r g e and growing market, to meet t h e i r needs 
of manufactured goods, whether consumer's or c a p i t a l goods; by 
importing from B r i t a i n , to use the B r i t i s h Banking and money market 
systems, by adopting a S t e r l i n g Exchange Standard a t the beginning 
and becoming f u l l members of the s t e r l i n g a r e a a t the end. 
(1 ) Or to each other's market. 
(88) 
( 2 ) At the beginning of World War I I , r e s t r i c t i o n s were imposed on 
the f o r e i g n exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s of members. A c a p i t a l I s s u e s 
Committee was s e t up i n London whose permis s i o n was n e c e s s a r y 
before c a p i t a l i s s u e s could be presented on the London c a p i t a l 
market. The expenditure of the B r i t i s h and the a l l i e d troops 
s t a t i o n e d m any country which was a member of the s t e r l i n g a r e a , 
had been met by B r i t i s h Government T r e a s u r y B i l l s . A f t e r the war 
the s i t u a t i o n was very d i f f e r e n t . Great B r i t a i n had accumulated a 
l a r g e short-term debt: P a r i s and New York, p a r t i c u l a r l y the l a t t e r , 
had i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y i n s t r e n g t h as i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l 
c e n t r e s . The a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the B r i t i s h market diminished under 
the c o m p e t i t i v e f o r c e s t a r t e d by a l a r g e and growing American 
market. The s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s have, a f t e r the war, a l t e r n a t i v e s , 
and the advantageousness of membership became to some c o u n t r i e s a t 
l e a s t more q u e s t i o n a b l e . One of the arguments i n favour of 
membership i n the s t e r l i n g a r e a was,that overseas member c o u n t r i e s 
had f r e e a c c e s s to London money and c a p i t a l markets. The reason 
i s t h a t , the argument goes, the B r i t i s h Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s had 
h i t h e r t o put no r e s t r i c t i o n s over c a p i t a l movements from B r i t a i n to 
o verseas s t e r l i n g a r e a member c o u n t r i e s . B u t l a t t e r l y 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on f o r e i g n i s s u e s on the London c a p i t a l market have been 
imposed, and a c t u a l l y used. I n 1949, the Union of South A f r i c a , was 
forbidden to borrow from the London c a p i t a l market, u n t i l a gold 
(2 ) 
agreement between B r i t a i n and the Union was reached . During the 
second World War, c a p i t a l i s s u e was forbidden without approval of 
the C a p i t a l Issues Committee, to prevent any borrowing not i n the 
U nited Kingdom's i n t e r e s t s . T h e r e f o r e , England had used the weapon 
of g i v i n g p e r m i s s i o n to a member of the s t e r l i n g a r e a , namely, the 
Union of South A f r i c a , to r a i s e c a p i t a l funds i n the London c a p i t a l 
( 1 ) B e l l , P.W., The S t e r l i n g Area i n the Post War World, the 
Clarendon P r e s s , 1958. P.26. 
(2) I b i d , P.27 
(89) 
market to brxng p r e s s u r e upon t h a t country to s i g n an agreement. 
There i s no guarantee, whatsoever, t h a t s i m i l a r r e s t r i c t i o n s might 
not be imposed on any other member, whenever Great B r i t a i n wants 
to b r i n g p r e s s u r e upon t h a t member i n order to make her do what i s 
b est f o r England's i n t e r e s t s . Furthermore, membership m the 
s t e r l i n g a r e a by i t s e l f i s not n e c e s s a r i l y enough to enable any 
member to borrow from the London c a p i t a l market; the soundness of 
any member's economy i s , a t l e a s t , a s important. I n a d d i t i o n to 
t h i s , c o u n t r i e s which a r e not members i n the are a may be allowed to 
borrow from the London c a p i t a l market. The second argument i n 
favour of the membership i n the s t e r l i n g a r e a i s t h a t , members of 
the a r e a a r e able to make payments to other c o u n t r i e s by u s i n g 
B r i t i s h banking f a c i l i t i e s . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e r e i s no need f o r any 
member of the are a to have s p e c i a l payments agreements w i t h other 
c o u n t r i e s . 
T h i s advantage, i n my view, i s of a very l i m i t e d use 
only because t h e r e i s no reason why I r a q , o r any other member i n the 
a r e a , should not have s p e c i a l payments agreements w i t h any country, 
when i t i s n e c e s s a r y . Another argument which could be brought about 
i n favour of membership i n the a r e a i s t h a t , as t h e r e i s a f i x e d 
r a t e of exchange between the pound s t e r l i n g , and other s t e r l i n g a r e a 
member's c u r r e n c i e s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t the f o r e i g n t r a d e between 
Great B r i t a i n and other members w i l l be f a c i l i t a t e d and s t a b i l i s e d . 
T h i s i s because there w i l l be no f l u c t u a t i o n s i n f o r e i g n exchange 
r a t e s w i t h i n the a r e a . Another point which could be adduced i n 
favour of t h i s argument i s t h a t , England was a member of t h e s e 
European Payments Union, and has continued as a member i n the l a t e r 
evolved forms which monetary a s s o c i a t i o n i n Western Europe has 
taken; t h e r e f o r e the S t e r l i n g Area i s a l s o a member of these 
a s s o c i a t i o n s . T h i s g i v e s the overseas member c o u n t r i e s the 
advantage of u s i n g S t e r l i n g to pay f o r t h e i r imports from any 
European member c o u n t r i e s ; i . e . a wider range of c o u n t r i e s w i t h which 
to c a r r y out f o r e i g n t r a d e . T h e argument w i l l hold t r u e , i f a l l 
( 1 ) E i . K a i s s i , F., C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
unpublished Ph.D T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1957. 
P. 285 
(90) 
f o r e i g n trade t r a n s a c t i o n s of the members i n the S t e r l i n g Area a r e 
c a r r i e d out among themselves and/or w i t h the member c o u n t r i e s of the 
European Payments Agreement. But suppose t h a t a member of the a r e a , 
I r a q f o r i n s t a n c e , wanted to import c e r t a i n c a p i t a l goods needed f o r 
a c e r t a i n p r o j e c t . C o n s i d e r i n g the p r i c e s and the q u a l i t y of both 
American and other c o u n t r i e s ' goods of t h a t type, I r a q found i t more 
advantageous to import the Japanese goods. Japan i s n e i t h e r a 
member of the S t e r l i n g Area nor the European agreement on payments, and 
t h e r e f o r e t h e r e i s no f i x e d exchange r a t e between the Yen and the 
S t e r l i n g or the I r a q i D i nar. 
But the exchange r a t e i s decided i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e s f r e e l y . T h e r e f o r e , i t may not be as u s e f u l as i t 
seems to be, to have a f i x e d r a t e of exchange between S t e r l i n g 
and the Dinar or any other member's currency, when f o r e i g n t r a d e 
t r a n s a c t i o n s a r e c a r r i e d out between a member on the one hand and a 
non-member on the other. Furthermore, i f the B r i t i s h Monetary 
A u t h o r i t i e s decided to devalue the pound s t e r l i n g , f o r reasons 
concerning the B r i t i s h economy only, a l l other c u r r e n c i e s which a r e 
l i n k e d to i t w i l l s u f f e r the consequences of such an a c t i o n ; and 
the purchasing power of these c u r r e n c i e s r e l a t i v e l y to non-member's 
c u r r e n c i e s w i l l be reduced. T h i s i s not an imaginary assumption, 
because, the d e v a l u a t i o n of s t e r l i n g i n 1949 may s e r v e as an 
example. When, on September 18th of t h a t y e a r , the B r i t i s h Monetary 
A u t h o r i t i e s decided to devalue the pound, to become equal to 
($2.8 d o l l a r s ) i n s t e a d of ($4.03 d o l l a r s ) , i . e . by 30%, the 
purchasing power of s t e r l i n g a s s e t s h e l d by members of the a r e a was 
reduced by the same percentage. Consequently, i t may not be 
unreasonable to conclude t h a t , membership m the s t e r l i n g a r e a i s not, 
n e c e s s a r i l y , an e f f e c t i v e way i n h e l p i n g to r e a l i s e s t a b i l i s a t i o n i n 
member's economies; as P r o f e s s o r A.C.Day has s a i d , "the s t e r l i n g a r e a 
i s not l i k e l y t o be as s a t i s f a c t o r y an instrument f o r i n t r o d u c i n g a 
hi g h e r degree of s t a b i l i t y i n t o the economies of i t s members as i t 
was m the t h i r t i e s " . A n o t h e r argument which c o u l d be brought 
( 1 ) Day, A.C.L., The F u t u r e of S t e r l i n g , Oxford, The Clarendon P r e s s , 
1954, P.95 
(91) 
a g a i n s t membership i n the a r e a i s the ^ t d r o u l a t i o n th&t: jave-rseas members 
of the a r e a should keep most or a l l of t h e i r currency r e s e r v e s i n s t e r l i n g 
a s s e t s , and i n London. Consequently, the B r i t i s h Monetary 
a u t h o r i t i e s have the power to block the s t e r l i n g a s s e t s of any 
member of the a r e a , and f o r any reason, whether p o l i t i c a l or 
economic. T h i s was a c t u a l l y done i n the post war p e r i o d , when the 
s t e r l i n g a s s e t s h e l d by some of the s t e r l i n g a r e a member c o u n t r i e s 
were blocked. I n 1950, the I r a n i a n s t e r l i n g a s s e t s h e l d i n London 
were blocked, because I r a n n a t i o n a l i s e d the A n g l o - I r a n i a n O i l 
Company. I n J u l y 1955, the Egyptian S t e r l i n g a s s e t s were blocked, 
a f t e r the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the Suez Canal Company^\ Regarding 
I r a q , her s t e r l i n g a s s e t s were blocked t h r e e times. The f i r s t time 
was m May 1941, f o l l o w i n g a misunderstanding between the United 
Kingdom and I r a q , which l a s t e d f o r a few weeks only. The second time 
was m the post war p e r i o d , w i t h other members, such a s , I n d i a , 
( 2 ) 
P a k i s t a n and Ceylon. The t h i r d time was i n J u l y 1958, f o r 
p o l i t i c a l reasons, i . e . a f t e r the 14th of J u l y 1958 R e v o l u t i o n , and 
( 3 ) 
t h i s l a s t e d f o r t h r e e days only. 
Conclusions :-
The g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n which seems to emerge from these 
circumstances i s t h a t before the Second World War i t was r e l a t i v e l y 
more advantageous f o r s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s to be members of the S t e r l i n g 
Area than i t was a f t e r the war. I n keeping t h e i r currency r e s e r v e s 
i n London and i n a c c e p t i n g a s i t u a t i o n m which i t was n e c e s s a r y to 
ask f o r p e r m i s s i o n to be granted by the B r i t i s h A u t h o r i t i e s i n order 
to r a i s e loans i n the London money market, overseas members of the 
S t e r l i n g Area gave the United Kingdom a powerful weapon, which could 
( 1 ) E l . K a i s s i , F., C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
Unpublished Ph.D T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
August 1957, P.279. 
( 2 ) B e l l , P.W., The S t e r l i n g Area i n the Post War P e r i o d , The 
Clarendon P r e s s 1958, PP.22-23. 
( 3 ) Shehab, F., Oxford U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e of S t a t i s t i c s B u l l e t i n , 
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l Oxford P u b l i s h e r . V o l . 21, 1959. P.306 
(92) 
be used and, as was mentioned e a r l i e r , a c t u a l l y was used, to b r i n g 
p r e s s u r e to bear upon them. N e v e r t h e l e s s , because of the absence of 
more u s e f u l a l t e r n a t i v e s , overseas members have, i n g e n e r a l , 
maintained t h e i r membership i n the a r e a ; the export of these primary 
products to a l a r g e and growing B r i t i s h market, together w i t h the 
opportunity to use B r i t i s h banking f a c i l i t i e s has provided inducements 
of s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h to c o u n t e r a c t the f o r c e s which otherwise might 
have induced withdrawal. 
I t i s a q u e s t i o n of where the balance of marginal 
advantage might be judged to l i e . As A.C.Day has s a i d , " t h e r e i s no 
longer 'unquestionable j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s l a v i s h l y f o l l o w i n g s t e r l i n g ^ 
F or one thing,the circumstances of the United Kingdom have changed a 
good d e a l i n the post war p e r i o d : Great B r i t a i n has become a debtor 
country, on s h o r t p e r i o d account a t any r a t e : the attempt to maintain 
the s t a b i l i t y of s t e r l i n g as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l medium has i n v o l v e d 
the United Kingdom i n g r eat d i f f i c u l t y ; s t e r l i n g a s s e t s of some of 
the members have at times been blocked; her p o s i t i o n as a major 
power, both p o l i t i c a l l y and f i n a n c i a l l y , has been challe n g e d by the 
growing s t r e n g t h of R u s s i a and America. So f a r as I r a q i s concerned 
the balance might be reasonably thought to be j u s t on the other s i d e 
of the margin and i f economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s support such an 
assessment the p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i n the more i n t e n s e l y 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n a t i o n a l i s m of the period.supply a re-inforcement of 
any i n c l i n a t i o n t h e r e might be to c o n s i d e r withdrawal. I r a q has 
evolved monetary mechanisamis more capable of d e a l i n g w i t h the 
contemporary t a s k s of c o n t r o l than her e a r l i e r mechanisms were : 
her o i l r e s o u r c e s , d i s r e g a r d i n g , f o r the moment, the s p e c i a l t h r e a t 
( 2 ) 
which a r i s e s , or might a r i s e , from the a t t i t u d e of S y r i a , provide 
I r a q w i t h a means of c o v e r i n g import c o s t s and safe-guarding the 
s t a b i l i t y of the v a l u e of the "Dinar" i n the f o r e i g n exchange market 
which puts her i n a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n as compared w i t h other s m a l l 
c o u n t r i e s of the S t e r l i n g Area. To be o u t s i d e the S t e r l i n g Area 
( 1 ) Day, A.C.L., The F u t u r e of S t e r l i n g , Oxford, The Clarendon 
P r e s s , 1954, P.77 
( 2 ) Or from other causes of a p o l i t i c a l nature. 
(93) 
may be l i k e l y to y i e l d a freedom of manoevre which membership would 
tend to l i m i t , possibly adversely : the a b i l i t y to obtain ample 
supplies of foreign exchange through the sal e of o i l may provide 
a means of maintaining monetary command over r e a l resources to a 
great extent than membership might be l i k e l y to assure. 
(94) 
CHAPTER THREE 
BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN IRAQ 
The Commercxal Banks xn Iraq :-
Prxor to July 1964, there were eleven commercxal 
banks operating i n Iraq wxth (88) branches xncludxng head offxces. 
Three of these were wholly Iraqx banks, ^ two of them had a 
majorxty Iraqx shareholding, the others were the l o c a l branches of 
f i v e forexgn banks. In additxon there were a number of s a r r a f s 
(2) 
(Indxvxdual money lenders and exchanges). In July, 1964, a law 
concernxng the natxonalxsatxon of the commercial banks, the 
r e l a t i v e l y large industrxal establishments, big export-import firms, 
and insurance companies was enacted. In accordance with t h i s law 
(No.100 of 1964), an organisation c a l l e d the "Public Organisation 
for Banks" was established, to re-organise and control the 
nationalised commercial banks. In August 1964, i t was announced 
(3) 
that a l l nationalised banks would be amalgamated into four groups 
The Baghdad Bank group, I r a q i Credit Bank group, 
Commercial Bank group, and Rasheed Bank group. 
(1) One of them i s the always state-owned Rafidain Bank. 
(2) There were (19) sarrafs i n 1959. Their t o t a l paid up c a p i t a l 
and reserves i n December 1963, was (I.D. 0.722 mn.) 
Source : The Central Bank of Iraq annual report 1959. P.13 and 
the Quarterly B u l l e t i n July-September 1964, No.51. 
P.18. 
(3) The always state-owned Rafidain Bank i s not included i n these 
groups. 
(95) 
The commercial banks i n Iraq perform a l l the usual services offered by 
s i m i l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s i n other countries. They discount b i l l s for 
exporters, open l e t t e r s of credit for importers, provide remittance 
f a c i l i t i e s within Iraq, and from i t , to the f i n a n c i a l centres outside, 
make loans against acceptable security; and accept deposits. The 
commercial banks i n Iraq r e s t r i c t themselves, usually, to short-term 
assets: as a student of the problem has said j_ _ " l n keeping with the 
B r i t i s h custom i n banking practice, they r e s t r i c t themselves to short 
term assets and s e l f - l i q u i d a t i n g loans. " ^ " ^ I t may be that t h i s leaves 
a gap i n credit or c a p i t a l provision which should be f i l l e d . This i s a 
question which i t would be d i f f i c u l t to discuss here without intruding 
into the sequence of what i s intended at the moment to be simply a 
description of the relevant banking i n s t i t u t i o n s in Iraq. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of providing long-term cr e d i t to agriculture and industry, 
by the commercial banks, i s discussed l a t e r . According to a r t i c l e (11) of 
Law No.100 of 1964, The Central Bank of Iraq was empowered to appoint 
and/or remove the managers, general managers, delegated and deputed to 
the Banks attached to the organisation, and to determine t h e i r power and 
duties. The Central Bank may r e l i e v e the President and a l l or some of 
the members of the Board of Directors of t h e i r duties and may appoint a 
provisional Board. This a r t i c l e enables the Central Bank to control the 
commercial banks i n a d i r e c t and potentially e f f e c t i v e way. The 
commercial banks, therefore, have no choice but to carry out the 
instructions of the Central Bank, within the l i n e s of the monetary 
policy which the Central Bank thinks i s best for the country's 
i n t e r e s t s . The Central Bank, before nationalisation, had l i t t l e or no 
power over the l o c a l branches of foreign banks. These foreign banks had 
the largest share of the banking a c t i v i t i e s i n Iraq; as Dr.EL.Kaissi has 
s a i d , "...the branches of B r i t i s h banks are the largest, most predominant 
(2) 
and the oldest i n operation". This was because, the f i v e l o c a l 
(1) EL.Kaissi,F., C r i t i c a l Analysis of Central Banking i n Iraq, 
un-published Ph.D. t h e s i s , University of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1957, 
P. 68 
(2) Ibid P.67 
(96) 
branches of foreign banks operating i n Iraq, used, naturally, to 
take orders from the i r head o f f i c e s , and to ask for help whenever i t 
was necessary. They did not go to the Central Bank of Iraq as the 
lender of l a s t r e s o r t . However, as the Government changed, Law No.100 
was ammended by Law No.166 for the year 1965. The "Public Organisation 
for Banks" (POB) was changed into the Public Establishment for Banks 
(PEB). This establishment was attached to the Ministry of Finance 
instead of the Economic Organisation which, under the new law,was — 
abolished. 
The Law No.166 of 1965, weakened the control of the Central 
Bank over the commercial banks to a ce r t a i n extent. Nevertheless, i t 
may be safe to say that, the Central Bank s t i l l has the power to control 
the commercial banks* a c t i v i t i e s , i n a more effective way compared with 
i t s power before the nationalisation of the commercial banks. This i s 
because the Central Bank has the power to supervise and inspect the 
commercial banks: as i s explained i n the I n d u s t r i a l i s t :- "The r e l a t i o n 
of the Central Bank with these banks i s confined to supervision and 
inspection of some of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y those dealings with 
(2) 
foreign exchange and credit policy" . This i s l e s s rigourous and 
d i r e c t , i n the sense that the Central Bank's power of removal of 
commercial bank o f f i c i a l s has gone : but the areas of commercial bank 
a c t i v i t y over which the Central Bank has powers of supervision and 
inspection are c l e a r l y of considerable importance where control of the 
monetary position of the economy i s concerned. 
(1) Ibid P.64 
(2) The I r a q i Federation of Industries, the I n d u s t r i a l i s t , No.4, 
6th year, Dec.1965, P.39 (the English Section). 
(97) 
Distribution of Assets :-
The commercial banks i n Iraq follow the B r i t i s h banking traditions 
m holding a high percentage of t h e i r assets i n l i q u i d form.^^These assets, 
namely, cash, deposits of commercial banks with the Central Bank, gold, and 
short term investments of various s o r t s , including Treasury B i l l s amounted 
to 30% of the l i a b i l i t i e s i n December 1961, excluding c a p i t a l reserves and 
(2) (3) per contra items. However, t h i s percentage f e l l to 23% i n December 1964. 
There were spec i a l reasons for t h i s f a l l and at a l a t e r date, i . e . December 
(4) 
.19.65, the percentage .reached. 25% _ ._Disregarding-the -abnormal movement-of 
December 1964 and considering only the general l e v e l at which the percentage 
seems to move i t may s t i l l be thought that the degree of l i q u i d i t y tends to 
be high. Other writers have commented upon th i s feature of the banking 
position i n Ir a q : for example Professor C. Iversen, i n his book "Monetary 
Policy i n I r a q " (1954) said "The most conspicuous c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
(5) 
position of the commercial banks i s t h e i r high degree of l i q u i d i t y " . I f we 
add to t h i s point the fact that i n December 1964, currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n 
( 6 ) 
formed (61.5%) of the money supply,we can reasonably conclude that the 
I r a q i economy i s to a large extent a cash economy. The banks have a r e l a t i v e -
l y high percentage of thei r holdings m l i q u i d assets because the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a large scale withdrawal of cash i n such an economy may be 
(1) Professor R.S.Sayers defines l i q u i d i t y as: "the word that the banker 
uses to describe his a b i l i t y to s a t i s f y demands for cash in exchange for 
deposits". 
Sayers, R.S., Modern Banking, s i x t h edition, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 
1964, P.(177). In the same book, P.(38) Professor Sayers indicates that :"... 
'the l i q u i d assets, defined to include 'cash*, money at c a l l , and ' b i l l s 
discounted* i n the comprehensive senses described above, should not i n the 
monthly statements f a l l below 28 per cent". 
(2) The Central Bank of Iraq, Quarterly B u l l e t i n , No.47, 1963, P.(20). 
(3) See P.(132) 
(4) The Central Bank of Iraq, Quarterly B u l l e t i n No.58, 1966, (P.18). 
(5) Iversen, C , Monetary Policy i n Iraq, published by the National Bank of 
Iraq in 1954, P.(28). 
(6) Table "N" on Page (102) shows that currency m c i r c u l a t i o n at the end 
of December 1964 was (I.D. 98.8 mn.) out of a t o t a l amount of 
(I.D. 161.7 mn.) i . e . (61.5%). 
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probable than xt xs i n other countries, where the use of cheques i s 
more general. Nevertheless, t h i s tendency of the commercxal banks xn 
Iraq to keep a high percentage of t h e i r holdings i n l i q u i d assets 
should be kept within certain l i m i t s . This i s because the commercial 
banks may play an important part i n the promotion of economic 
development i n Iraq. This could be done, as i s discussed l a t e r , by 
granting medium and long-term credit to industry, which means that the 
bank's assets w i l l tend to be l e s s l i q u i d . The consolidated statement 
of commercial bank's of Iraq, shows that, the t o t a l of fixed 
l i a b i l i t x e s , namely, the paxd-up capxtal, reserves, and un-distributed 
p r o f i t s ' xncreased steadxly between 1961 and 1964. Thxs means 
that the banks abxlxty to meet unexpected withdrawal was gettxng better, 
other thxngs being equal. The t o t a l deposxts (Government and clxents 
x.e. 8 + 9 + 11 + 12 + 13 xn the table) amounted to (I.D 65.9 mn.) xn 
1961 and rose to (I.D 72.4 mn.) xn 1962. 
The increase took place 'in spxte of the decrease xn the 
government's deposxts (8 + 9 ) . There was an xncrease i n 
customer's deposits which covered the decrease i n the governments' 
deposits. In 1963, the governments' deposits rose by (5.6), while 
customers' deposits f e l l by (9.5%), and the t o t a l deposit by 6%. 
The table shows that customers' current accounts f e l l by (-9.3%), 
and time deposits by (11.2%). This was a r e s u l t of the p o l i t i c a l 
changes which took place i n the year under review. However, savings 
accounts rose by (9.5%) i n 1963 over 1962. There were two reasons 
for that :-
(a) the increase i n the i n t e r e s t rate to 4%. 
(b) the negligible effect of the 1963 p o l i t i c a l changes on the small 
(1) • savers. In 1964, the governments deposits at the commercial 
banks rose by (14.5%), customers' deposits by (1%) and the t o t a l by 
(2.4%). The table shows that on the assets side, the deposits and 
investment abroad f e l l by (-5.7%) i n 1962 over 1961, while they rose 
(1) The C.B.I. Annual Report 1963, Baghdad 1965, P.34 
(99) 
by (8%) m 1963. This could be explained again by the uncertainty 
which followed the 1963 revolutionwhieh caused the banks* investment 
abroad to increase. In 1964, investment and deposits payable abroad 
f e l l by (-13%) as a r e s u l t of the nationalisation of the commercial 
banks i n mid 1964, as mentioned e a r l i e r . The t o t a l of the discounted 
b i l l s , guaranteed and non-guaranteed advances ( 13 + 14 + 15 ) which 
represent investment i n the private sector, i s the most important 
credit a c t i v i t y provided by the commercial banks i n Ir a q . The tota l 
of discounted b i l l s guaranteed and non-guaranteed increased by (3.3%) 
i n 1962 over 1961, and by (3.3%) m 1963 over 1962, and by (5.4%) m 
1964 over 1963. 
The table shows that the amount of I r a q i Treasury b i l l s 
held by the commercial banks had a tendency to f a l l , and the same i s 
true about the I r a q i Government Bonds. 
The amount of other loans and advances extended to 
Government and semi-Government departments, showed a tendency to 
increase stead i l y between 1961 and 1963, then there was a sharp 
increase by (193%) i n 1964. Having said t h i s much about the 
l i a b i l i t i e s and assets of the Commercial banks i n Iraq for the l a s t 
four years, i t may be useful to discuss the supply of money i n 
Iraq between 1960 and 1965, 
(100) 
Money Supply between 1960 - 1965. 
In discussing money supply i n Iraq, i t may be 
useful to point out that, the (C.B.I.) in i t s quarterly bul l e t i n s 
and annual reports includes time deposits and saving accounts as part 
of the t o t a l supply of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n . The (C.B.I,) does not 
explain onrnvhat grounds these items are included. The present writer 
does not agree with t h i s practice. This i s because one of the main 
functions of money i s i t s use as a medium of exchange. The question 
therefore i s : i s i t possible to consider time deposits and savings 
accounts as a medium of exchange ? Or i n other words i s i t possible 
for (A) to pay (B) for a commodity by giving him a cheque on his time 
deposit account 9 The answer to th i s question i s , of course, no. 
This i s because i t i s possible to draw on a time deposit account only 
aft e r giving a fixed notice, or by asking for the bank's permission at 
the cost of losing some part of int e r e s t due to the deposition or after 
the elapse of a certain time.^"^ The same may be applied to saving 
accounts. Therefore these two accounts may be ca l l e d quasi-money, as 
T.W.Newlyn has said, "Broadly speaking, however, current accounts 
(2) 
have the status of money and deposit account that of quasi-money. 
I t may be worth mentioning here that there i s one I r a q i economist 
also wh& does not include deposit and saving accounts when he 
defines money : as he has said, "The term money means coins and bank 
(3) 
notes and demand deposits with the commercial banks". 
I t i s advocated m this study, that the (C.B.I.) 
should not include deposit and savings accounts in i t s d e f i n i t i o n of 
money supply. Now,using the (C.B.I.) concept of money, the table 
which follows shows money supply in Iraq for the period between 
(1) Newlyn, W.T., Theory of Money, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. P.(7) 
(2) I b i d P.8 
(3) E l . K a i s s i - C r i t i c a l Analysis of Central Banking i n Iraq, 
un-published Ph.D the s i s , University of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1957, 
P. (254). 
(101) 
1960 and 1965. This table shows that, the t o t a l money supply has 
increased from (I.D 130.3 mn.) m 1960 to (I.D 182.9 mn.) i n 1965, 
i . e . by (40.8%), while foreign assets and gold reserves held by 
the (C.B.I.) and the commercial banks rose from (I.D 106.2 mn.) in 
1960 to (I.D 116.1 mn.) i n 1965, i . e . by (9.4%). This means that 
the expansion i n money supply was not matched to the same extent by 
an increase i n the holdings of foreign assets. The increase i n t o t a l 
supply of money during the period under review was due to a large 
extent to the increase i n the currency i n c i r c u l a t i o n . 
There was a r e l a t i v e l y large increase m savings 
deposits during the period and this increase i s the second i n 
importance after the increase m c i r c u l a t i o n , as the table shows. 
However, there was a r e l a t i v e l y large drop i n current and time 
deposits i n 1963, compared with 1962, due to p o l i t i c a l changes i n 
that year. Nevertheless the amount of savings rose by 7% i n 1963 
over 1962; p o l i t i c a l changes which took place i n that year, did not 
have the effect of weakening small savers confidence; and t h i s 
tendency for saving to r i s e continued i n 1964 and 1965. Having said 
t h i s much about the ordinary services which the commercial banks i n 
Iraq provide, and the supply and cover of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n , i t 
may be useful to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of commercial banks 
contributing to the promotion of economic development i n Iraq, and 
with necessary adjustments i n any underdeveloped country. For t h i s 
purpose, the methods which the German banks followed i n the 
nineteenth and twentieth century may serve as a guide. These methods 
are discussed very b r i e f l y i n the next section. 
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The possible contribution of the commercial banks to the promotion 
of economic development i n Irag;-
The organised c a p i t a l markets m the developed countries, have 
been the most important, i f not the only, source of providing long-term 
loans for fixed investment i n industry, though i t has to be recognised 
that i n recent years companies and i n the U.K., some nationalised 
industries, have b u i l t up a proportion of t h e i r own c a p i t a l funds out of 
current revenue.~The^ lack of such organise^_ajid_developed c a p i t a l markets" 
i n underdeveloped countries makes i t d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible,for 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s to s a t i s f y t h e i r needs for long-term credit for expansion 
and for improving t h e i r firms. Commercial banks i n underdeveloped x 
countries are the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s through which savings, i n the \ 
form of deposits, are kept. But, these banks i n most, i f not a l l of the 
underdeveloped countries which follow the B r i t i s h banking traditions, 
usually confine t h e i r loans to short-term loans only: and Iraq i s one 
of these countries. Commercial banks i n underdeveloped countries could \ 
and should play a more positive part i n the promotion of economic 
development in these countries, such as the part played by commercial 
banks i n European countries i n general (except the United Kingdom) and i n 
Germany i n p a r t i c u l a r i n the nineteenth and twentieth century. P.B.Whale 
points out that there are important differences between commercial banking 
i n European countries and the United Kingdom, " i n the main these 
differences may be defined by saying that the continental banks are l e s s 
s p e c i a l i s e d , and combine with short loan other functions, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the equipment of undertakings with permanent capital".^^Commercial 
banks i n underdeveloped countries might well be encouraged to consider 
s h i f t i n g t h e i r emphasis from mainly financing foreign trade to the 
financing of domestic and probably more productive transactions such 
as granting medium and long-term loans to i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and farmers. 
Such banks, i n underdeveloped countries, es p e c i a l l y where they are 
state-owned, as i s the case i n Iraq, should not consider making higher 
(1) Whale, P.B. Joint Stock Banking m Germany, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 
1930 P . ( l ) m the Introduction. 
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pr o f i t s as the main object, but should aim to contribute as far as ( 
possible m a s s i s t i n g economic development. In countries such as I 
Germany, commercial banks played an important role i n promoting 
industry m the beginning of the i n d u s t r i a l development by providing 
long-term credit for these industries, i n a way that, according to 
S.N.Ghosal,-and M.D.Sharma, "..^ scarcely a single important company 
has been found without the collaboration of a bank . .."^^ 
Therefore, i t may be useful to make a br i e f assessment of the German 
banking experience and methods of financing and a s s i s t i n g industry 
during the nineteenth and the twentieth century. In the f i r s t half 
of the nineteenth century, Germany was a comparatively poor country, 
depending, mainly, on agriculture, with l i t t l e c a p i t a l invested i n 
(2) 
manufacturing industry. The lack of c a p i t a l which was badly needed 
by i n d u s t r i a l firms was the major problem which the German 
(3) 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t had had to face. The small savers were thi n l y spread 
a l l over the country, and had no experience i n i n d u s t r i a l investment. 
At t h i s time a number of j o i n t stock banks were established i n 
(4) 
different parts of Germany. 
(1) Ghosal, S.N., and Sharma, M.D., Economic Growth and Commercial 
Banking i n a Developing Economy, India a case study, S c i e n t i f i c 
Book Agency, Calcutta, 1965. P.5 
(2) Bruck, W.F., Social and Economic History of Germany from William I I 
to H i t l e r 1888-1938. A comparative study, Oxford University Press, 
1938, P.81 
(3) I b i d . 
(4) They were the "Bankversein of A. Schaaffhausen" i n Cologne i n 1848, 
the Bank "fur Handle and Industrie i n " Darmstadt i n 1853 the 
"Berliner Handles-Gesellschaft" i n 1856, and the Dishonlogesellschaft 
i n 1851; 
Encyclopedia of Social Science Volume I I , the Macmillan Company, 
A p r i l , 1931, P.436. 
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I n d u s t r i a l i s t s , due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s m obtaining the needed 
funds to finance expansion, and/or improve t h e i r firms, asked the 
commercial banks to provide these funds. Therefore, German bankers 
started to provide funds for i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , either by granting 
them long term loans or by the issue of shares and bonds under a 
leading banker's name. This was to assure the public of the soundness 
of t h e i r investment; i f a leading bank was seen to be participating 
i n financing that investment, then—confidence might b e - m s t i l l e d . 
However, the bankers used to conduct a thorough investigation about 
any i n d u s t r i a l i s t who applied for a loan. After s a t i s f y i n g themselves 
completely about the soundness of the investment i n that p a r t i c u l a r 
project, they would grant the loan. 
In opening a current account, or granting a loan for 
an i n d u s t r i a l i s t , a bank used to have a certain degree of influence 
on the establishment owned by that i n d u s t r i a l i s t . As Dr. Jeidels has 
said, "The i n d u s t r a i l current account i s the pivot of a l l transactions 
between bank and industry} promotion and issue transactions, direct 
participation i n i n d u s t r i a l undertakings, and co-operation i n 
management through Boards of supervisors, these stand i n very many cases 
i n a close causal sequence with bank c r e d i t " . W h e n a customer 
wanted to open an account with a bank and the provision of credit by the 
bank was envisaged as a normal part of the relationship which was being 
established he was asked to signify his approval that the bank had the 
right to manage the current account involving, possibly, the purchasing 
and s e l l i n g of s e c u r i t i e s as well as the making and receiving of 
payments. Furthermore the bank advised i t s customers about the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of investing i n various sorts of c a p i t a l - using projects. 
I f an i n d u s t r i a l firm borrowed from a bank, the bank reserved the right of 
having a representative on the "Board of Supervisors" of that firm, 
and to demand, when necessary, the issue of new c a p i t a l , or, in 
extreme cases, the change of the i n d u s t r i a l firm into a j o i n t stock 
(1) Whale, P.B., Joint Stock Banking in Germany, Macmillan and Co., 
Ltd., 1930, P.52. (This quotation was taken by Whale from 
Dr. Jeidels Book : Das Verhaltnis, der deutschen Crossbanken zur 
Industrie, P.50. 
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company as a way of liquidating i t s assets. When the Reichsbank 
was established i . e . after the Franco-Prussian War, with the task 
of supervising and co-ordinating the credit form system i n i t s 
banking credit form, i t started to discount i n d u s t r i a l b i l l s as well 
and came to be c a l l e d the " i n d u s t r i a l i s t banker's bank"^1^. The 
German banks, before World War I , used to charge in t e r e s t at 1% 
higher than bank rate (provided that a minimum of 5% waskept) when 
the customer was i n debt, and give i n t e r e s t between 1 - l J l e s s than 
the bank rate when the c l i e n t was i n c r e d i t . Therefore, the 
German Bank followed a different method than that followed by the 
B r i t i s h banks; as W.FBruck has said, "Unlike the deposit banks i n 
B r i t a i n , German banks ( m addition to the i r regular banking business) 
(2) 
have been the main financiers of ind u s t r i e s " . However, the 
expansion of long-term i n d u s t r i a l loans has been c r i t i c i s e d on 
the grounds that the deposits m such a case may be endangered. But 
the many decades of banking experience in Germany proved that the 
r i s k i n granting long-term i n d u s t r i a l loans i s not much more than 
the r i s k i n granting ordinary short-term loans. Because of that, 
several European countries . followed the German model, and even 
an Asian country i . e . Japan, did so. Because of the lack of a c a p i t a l 
market i n Iraq, individual small savers, are not able, even i f they 
want to^olnvest their savings in i n d u s t r i a l investments. Instead, they 
deposit the i r money with commercial banks i n the form of savings in 
fixed and current accounts. These banks use the major part of their 
(4) 
resources i n financing foreign trade transactions. In December 
( 1 ) Bruck, W.F., Social and Economic History of Germany, 1888-1938, 
Oxford University Press 1938, P.88 
(2) I b i d , P.89 (3) In so far as they use them. 
( 4 ) E l . K a i s s i , C r i t i c a l Analysis of Central Banking i n Iraq -
Unpublished Ph.D t h e s i s , University of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
1957, P. ( 7 0 ) 
(107) 
1963, the t o t a l amount of depositsi.e. fixed and current customer's 
deposits (excluding Government and semi-Government deposits) was 
(I.D 58.971 mn,)^\ This figure represented a l i t t l e more than 
(8.7%) of the net national income of that year. In the year under 
review the l i q u i d i t y r a t i o of the commercial banks was 28%, which i s 
a high percentage. However, i f the monetary authorities i n Iraq, 
decide to adopt the German methods, broadly speaking, m allowing the 
commercial banks to contribute i n a more effective way i n financing 
industry, these methods should be studied c a r e f u l l y , and the necessary 
adjustments should be introduced. I t i s not in the l e a s t advocated 
here that the monetary authorities i n Iraq should copy, l i t e r a l l y , 
what has been done i n another country. Nevertheless, these authorities 
may r e a l i s e the great p o t e n t i a l i t i e s which may be explored i n using 
commercial banks more e f f e c t i v e l y i n a s s i s t i n g economic development; 
as S.N.Ghosal and M.D.Sharma have said, with regard to India, " i n 
f a c t , from the e a r l i e s t i t was r e a l i s e d that unless the banking 
system was geared to the task of development i t would not be possible 
(2) 
to carry through the work of economic planning". 
(1) The Central Bank of Iraq, Quarterly B u l l e t i n , October-December, 
1965, No.56, Government Press 1966, P.21. A t o t a l amount of 
(I.D 5 mn.) which represents c l i e n t ' s deposits with s a r r a f s and Post 
Office Savings deposits i s not included i n the figure i n the text, on 
the grounds that we are discussing the p o s s i b i l i t y that commercial 
banks may provide more long-term loans to industry; and not with the 
Post Office Saving System or Sarrafs. (Sarrafs licences were 
cancelled anyway after nationalisation of commercial banks). 
(2) Ghosal, S.N., and Sharma, M.D., Economic Growth and Commercial 
Banking m a developing Economy, India a case study, S c i e n t i f i c 
Book Agency, Calcutta, 1965. (Preface). 
(108) 
The Non-Commercial Banks :-
The non-commercial or s p e c i a l i s e d banks i n Iraq provide medium 
and long term loans; they are, and always were, state-owned banks. 
These banks accept deposits from the public and the Government. In 1963, 
they had a t o t a l amount of Government and Quasi Government Deposits of 
(I.D 9.161 mn.), and the r e l a t i v e l y very small amount of (I.D 0.309 mn) 
as customer's current and savings a c c o u n t s . I n the same year, these 
banks had a t o t a l paid-up c a p i t a l and reserves (including p r o f i t and 
(2) 
l o s s account of (I.D 32 mn.), and (61) branches a l l over Iraq. 
These banks are :-
I n d u s t r i a l , A g r i c u l t u r a l , Mortgage ( r e a l e s t a t e ) , Mortgage (moveable 
property), and Co-operative Banks. 
(1) The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank ;-
I n accordance with Law No.(51) of 1935, the Government established an 
Ag r i c u l t u r a l and I n d u s t r i a l Bank. This Bank was entrusted with a two 
fold task : the assistance of both agriculture and industry. After a 
short time i t was r e a l i s e d that i t would be better to separate the two 
functions of the Bank. Consequently, i n 1940 there was a law dividing 
t h i s bank into two parts :- the Agricultural Bank, and the I n d u s t r i a l 
Bank. But, because of the Second World War, the actual operating 
separation took place s i x years l a t e r , i . e . m 1946. 
The Administration of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank :-
The Agricultural Bank i s governed by a "Board of Directors" which 
consists of seven members, including the General Director of the Bank. 
The Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Land Reform, Economics, Labour 
(3) 
and Social A f f a i r s , have each a representative. Two members represent 
(1) See table No.( 19) which shows the Consolidated Statement of the 
specialised Banks. Appendix 6. 
(2) The Central Bank of Iraq, Annual Report, 1963, Baghdad 1965, VA2^ 
(3) With the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank, as with other s p e c i a l i s e d banks 
mentioned l a t e r , one of the appointed members w i l l be nominated 
to serve as General Director. 
(109) 
the farmers : t h e r e a r e two r e s e r v e members. The General Dxrector and 
a l l members a r e appointed f o r terms of four y e a r s , h a l f of the members 
r e t i r i n g every two y e a r s . 
C a p i t a l S t r u c t u r e 
The c a p i t a l of the A g r i c u l t u r a l - I n d u s t r i a l Bank when i t s t a r t e d 
o p e r a tions i n 1936 was ( I . D 150.000). The nominal and the paid-up 
c a p i t a l , a f t e r the s e p a r a t i o n of the two f u n c t i o n s of the 
A g r i c u l t u r a l - I n d u s t r i a l Bank, were i n c r e a s e d many times, u n t i l i n 1963 
the nominal c a p i t a l had been r a i s e d to ( I . D 10 mn.) and paid-up c a p i t a l 
(2) 
to ( I . D 6.403 mn.) v . 
The f u n c t i o n s of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank :-
According to the Laws of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank the o b j e c t of the 
Bank i s "to a s s i s t a g r i c u l t u r i s t s and to promote and improve 
( 3 ) 
a g r i c u l t u r e " . I n f u l f i l l i n g t h e s e f u n c t i o n s the Bank i s a c t i v e m ;-
g r a n t i n g medium and long-term loans to farmers, s e l l i n g on d e f e r r e d 
payments implements or manure, c a t t l e , seeds, s e l l i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l 
products on b e h a l f of farmers, and h i r i n g out a g r i c u l t u r a l equipment 
f o r the use of the farmers. Furthermore, the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank was 
e n t r u s t e d w i t h the t a s k s of h e l p i n g i n s e t t i n g up c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s 
f o r farmers, e s t a b l i s h i n g and d i r e c t i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s f o r the grading 
and c l e a n i n g of a g r i c u l t u r a l products, and s t o r e s and warehouses f o r 
the s t o r a g e of these products. The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank has the t a s k of 
promoting a g r i c u l t u r a l developments by, f o r example, making advances 
t o such s o r t s of p r o c e s s i n g , or marketing a c t i v i t y as may be l i k e l y to 
extend and co-ordinate the s a l e of farm products. The a g r i c u l t u r a l bank 
g r a n t s loans f o r g e n e r a l a g r i c u l t u r a l purposes up to ( I . D 1000) and to 
( 1 ) E L - K a i s s i , F., C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
un-published Ph.D T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
1957, PP. 79-80 
( 2 ) T h i s amount i n c l u d e s the sum of ( I . D 2.976 mn.) which was a l l o c a t e d 
f o r making advances to farmers f o r the w i n t e r season of the 
f i n a n c i a l y e ar 1959/1960. 
( 3 ) The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank, Annual Report, 1962-1963, Baghdad 1963, 
P.9 ( E n g l i s h S e c t i o n ) . 
(110) 
( I . D 1200) f o r the purchase of a g r i c u l t u r a l machines and implements. The 
Bank charges 5% i n t e r e s t on i t s l o a n s . I t i s suggested t h a t the Bank 
should d i s t i n g u i s h between loans f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes, as was the c a s e 
u n t i l 1960, when the Bank used to charge 5% i n t e r e s t f o r v a r i o u s 
a g r i c u l t u r a l l o a n s , 4% on loans to cotton merchants, and 3% on loans 
guaranteed by the G o v e r n m e n t . T h e p o l i c y of charging d i f f e r e n t r a t e s 
of i n t e r e s t f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes i s advocated here because, sometimes^ 
i t i s n e c e s s a r y to induce c e r t a i n group of farmers to grow a c e r t a i n 
crop, and t h i s could be done by g r a n t i n g them loans b e a r i n g lower r a t e s 
of i n t e r e s t on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t the loans should be used f o r growing 
t h a t p a r t i c u l a r crop. The farmer who a p p l i e s f o r a loan i s r e q u i r e d to 
o f f e r s e c u r i t y to safeguard the p o s i t i o n of the Bank. The loans a r e 
r e q u i r e d by the laws under which the Bank operates to be secured, and 
normally they a r e , by c l a i m s on a g r i c u l t u r a l products, machines and 
implements, immovable p r o p e r t i e s , s h a r e s and bonds, guarantees of the 
Higher Body of the A g r a r i a n Reform, and p r o p e r t i e s of a g r i c u l t u r a l 
( 2 ) 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . 
The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank's r e p o r t s do not g i v e any f i g u r e s f o r 
bad debts; they only show i n the balance sheet a f i g u r e r e p r e s e n t i n g 
( 3 ) 
the doubtful debts. T h i s f i g u r e was ( I . D 9.000) m 1964/65. I n the 
same year the outstanding f i g u r e f o r loans extended by the A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Bank was (0.878 mn.). I n other words the p r o v i s i o n f o r doubtful debts 
r e p r e s e n t e d a l i t t l e more than 1%, which i s not, by any means, a high 
percentage. However, i t i s suggested here t h a t the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank 
should g i v e f i g u r e s f o r bad debts f o r each year, keep an eye on the 
development of bad debts, and take the n e c e s s a r y measures, such as 
a s k i n g f o r b e t t e r s e c u r i t i e s before g r a n t i n g any new l o a n s , when the 
( 1 ) The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank Annual Report, f o r the y e a r s 1959, 1960 and 
1961, Baghdad, 1961, P.22 
( 2 ) I b i d , PP.8-9 
(3) The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank Annual Report. 
( I l l ) 
percentage of bad debts to outstanding loans i n c r e a s e s . Farmers borrow 
from the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank f o r the purpose of improvements i n b u i l d i n g s , 
buying machines, execution of s m a l l i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s on the one hand, 
to buy seeds, f e r t i l i z e r s , and c a t t l e on the other. I n the l a t t e r case the 
loans may be r e p a i d i n a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t time. I n the former c a s e , 
however, the p e r i o d f o r repayment which i s a t present 10 y e a r s might w e l l 
be extended to (12) or (15) years as might be thought n e c e s s a r y . The t a b l e 
which f o l l o w s d i s c l o s e s the number of farmers who borrowed from the 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank and the t o t a l amounts of advances i n v o l v e d . T h i s t a b l e 
shows t h a t t h e r e were l a r g e i n c r e a s e s both m the number of t r a n s a c t i o n s 
and i n the amount of advances between the date of establishment of the 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank and the present time. The t a b l e d i s c l o s e s t h a t i n 1946-
47 the number of advances i n c r e a s e d by (107.4%) over 1941-42, w h i l e the 
amount of the advances r o s e by a l i t t l e more than 482% f o r the same pe r i o d . 
T h e r e f o r e , i t may be s a f e to say t h a t t h i s r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t the 
tendency was f o r the r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n the number of borrowers to be much 
l e s s than the r a t e of i n c r e a s e i n the sums borrowed. I n 1960-61, the number 
of advances rose by (135.6%) over 1956-57, but the amount of advances f e l l 
by more than 25%. T h i s may be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t t h a t the Bank followed 
( 2 ) 
the p o l i c y of g r a n t i n g s m a l l e r loans to a l a r g e r number of farmers 
Furthermore, the t a b l e shows t h a t i n 1960-61 the number of advances was 
only ( 2 3 9 0 ) . A p o s s i b l e i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s f i g u r e i s t h a t , the Bank 
f a i l e d to r e a c h a l a r g e number of farmers who presumably needed the Bank's 
( 3 ) 
help. T h i s i s i n accordance w i t h other evidence . The s o l u t i o n may l i e 
i n the i n c r e a s e of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank's c a p i t a l , and the opening of more 
branches throughout the country ( i . e . more than one branch i n l a r g e 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o v i n c e s i . e . i n the n o r t h ) . 
( 1 ) F i g u r e s i n the t a b l e a r e chosen by the w r i t e r to g i v e an i d e a about 
the number of farmers and advances i n v o l v e d during the p e r i o d between 
1936-37 and 1960-61 f o r every f i f t h y e ar and not f o r each y e a r . 
( 2 ) The number of s m a l l borrowers as a percentage of the t o t a l number of 
borrowers, r o s e from 73% m 1956-57 to (90%) i n 1960-61. The A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Bank Annual Report, 1959,1960 and 1961, Baghdad 1961. P.26 
( 3 ) Such as the admission of the Bank i n one of i t s r e p o r t s , which 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t one of the d i f f i c u l t i e s which the farmers have to cope w i t h 
i s the long procedure which has to be followed by a p p l i c a n t s f o r g r a n t s , 
and the o t h e r i s the i n s u f f i c i e n t number of branches i n the l i w a s . 
The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank's Annual Report 1959, 1960, 1961, Baghdad 1961, 
The A r a b i c S e c t i o n P.16 
(112) 
The I n d u s t r i a l Bank ;-
T h i s Bank was e s t a b l i s h e d , as a s e p a r a t e u n i t m 1940, but because of 
the Second World War, d i d not s t a r t o perations u n t i l 1946. 
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Bank :-
The I n d u s t r i a l Bank i s governed by a "Board of D i r e c t o r s " c o n s i s t i n g of 
s i x members, i n c l u d i n g the General D i r e c t o r of the Bank as Chairman. 
One member of the Board has to be an i n d u s t r i a l i s t , a second one a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the merchants, and the other four members,drawn from 
p a r t i c u l a r M i n i s t r i e s , a r e e l e c t e d i n a manner s i m i l a r to t h a t employed 
i n the case of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank. 
C a p i t a l S t r u c t u r e ;•» 
The Bank had a nominal c a p i t a l of ( I . D 3 mn.) and paid-up c a p i t a l of 
( I . D 2.3 mn.) i n 1954.^"''^ I n a d d i t i o n the Bank has the power of 
borrowing from the p u b l i c , banks, government, and semi-government 
ag e n c i e s . I n 1961, the nominal c a p i t a l was r a i s e d to ( I . D 8 mn.), the 
paid-up c a p i t a l to ( I . D 4.750 mn.). 
The o b j e c t s of the Bank ;-
The I n d u s t r i a l Bank has many f u n c t i o n s . I n general terms the Bank was 
e n t r u s t e d w i t h the t a s k of developing and a s s i s t i n g i n d u s t r y , and of 
(2 ) 
c a r r y i n g on banking b u s i n e s s r e l a t e d to t h i s purpose. 
The Bank was permitted to :-
(1 ) e s t a b l i s h i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s d i r e c t l y on i t s own account. 
(2 ) sponsor and s u b s c r i b e to p u b l i c and p r i v a t e companies. 
( 3 ) make loans to i n d u s t r i a l i s t s who wished to s e t up new f a c t o r i e s , 
expand, or improve t h e i r e x i s t i n g ones. 
(1 ) I v e r s e n , C., Monetary P o l i c y i n I r a q , P u b l i s h e d by the C e n t r a l 
Bank of I r a q , 1954. P.33 
(2) The I n d u s t r i a l Bank, Annual Report f o r the y e a r s 1959-60 / 
1960-1961, I n A r a b i c P . ( l ) 
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( 4 ) make advances a g a i n s t imported raw m a t e r i a l s and exported products. 
( 5 ) a c t as an agent f o r the i mportation of machinery, t o o l s and the l i k e . 
(6) grant loans to f a c t o r y owners, f o r the purchase of machinery and raw 
m a t e r i a l s . 
( 7 ) engage m a l l banking a c t i v i t i e s t h a t would f a c i l i t a t e i n d u s t r i a l 
( 1 ) 
t rtins etc"t x ons 
Moreover, the I n d u s t r i a l Bank provides ( f o r a s m a l l 
f e e ) an a d v i s o r y s e r v i c e to : 
( a ) the management of any p r o j e c t f a c i n g f i n a n c i a l or t e c h n i c a l prohlems. 
(b) I n d i v i d u a l s who want to e s t a b l i s h new p l a n t or p l a n t s . I n a d d i t i o n , 
the bank i n s p e c t s the p r o j e c t s to which i t has provided l o a n s , to s e c u r e 
the good use of the l o a n s , and to a d v i s e the management of the p r o j e c t or 
p r o j e c t s , when i t i s thought ne c e s s a r y , to adopt more e f f i c i e n t methods of 
managing t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e s 
The Bank charges 4% i n t e r e s t on i t s l o a n s . One of the important as p e c t s of 
the Bank's operations i n the repayment by borrowers of i t s l o a n s . However, 
the I n d u s t r i a l Bank i n i t s r e p o r t , does not g i v e f i g u r e s f o r bad debts. I t 
only g i v e s f i g u r e s r e p r e s e n t i n g a c t u a l payments of loans as a percentage of 
due i n s t a l m e n t s . Then i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t some of the borrowers were gi v e n an 
e x t e n s i o n f o r the p e r i o d during which they should pay t h e i r debts to the 
I n d u s t r i a l Bank, because of d i f f i c u l t i e s . I t i s advocated here t h a t the 
I n d u s t r i a l Bank should g i v e f i g u r e s f o r bad debts each year, and these 
f i g u r e s should be kept i n c l o s e check, i n order to make the n e c e s s a r y 
arrangements to reduce t h e i r amount when i t s t a r t s to r i s e i n an alarming 
way. I n 1962, the Bank had s h a r e s i n (16) p r o j e c t s , namely :- I r a q Cement, 
Vegetable o i l e x t r a c t i o n , the n a t i o n a l l e a t h e r i n d u s t r y , the I r a q i Marble 
i n d u s t r y , R i v e r dredging and r e c l a m a t i o n , N a t i o n a l I n s u r a n c e , the I r a q i 
J u t e i n d u s t r y , the Date i n d u s t r y , the Baghdad Bakery, The E s t a t e I n d u s t r y , 
I r a q Gypsum, the l i g h t i n d u s t r y s e c t o r , Re-Insurance, I r a q s p i n n i n g and 
( 3 ) 
weaving, G r a i n Trading and M i l l i n g , and "Imara" I n d u s t r i e s . The 
I n d u s t r i a l Bank p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n these I n d u s t r i e s and p r o j e c t s has been 
very s u c c e s s f u l . I t does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t the Bank caused t h e i r 
s u c c e s s but i t may w e l l have strengthened them s u f f i c i e n t l y 
so as to be capable of going ahead and making a 
( 1 ) E L - K a i s s i , F., C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , Un-
p u b l i s h e d Ph.D T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1957, PP.86-87. 
( 2 ) S a i d , W.A., The C r e d i t System m I r a q , Un-published B . l i t t . T h e s i s , 
U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford, 1964. 
( 3 ) I b i d , P.83 
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s u c c e s s of themselves i n a way which might otherwise not have been 
p o s s i b l e . The notion t h a t the i n d u s t r i a l Bank's p a r t i c i p a t i o n m 
i n d u s t r i e s has been very s u c c e s s f u l could be i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t 
t h a t , w h i l e the t o t a l amount of loans granted by the I n d u s t r i a l Bank 
between 1947/48 - 1960/61 was ( I . D 8.5 mn.) the t o t a l amount of 
accumulated p r o f i t s was ( I . D 1.831 mn.) i . e . 21% p r o f i t . Furthermore, 
t h i s h i gh percentage of p r o f i t may i n d i c a t e t h a t i n d u s t r i a l investment 
m I r a q i s a p r o f i t a b l e f i e l d f o r i n v e s t o r s . However, i t must be 
remembered t h a t the " i n d u s t r i a l Bank" was e s t a b l i s h e d f o r the purpose 
of a s s i s t i n g i n d u s t r y and not f o r the purpose of making high p r o f i t s . 
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s suggested t h a t the I n d u s t r i a l Bank should help s m a l l 
s c a l e i n d u s t r i e s more e f f e c t i v e l y even i f the opportunity f o r making 
p r o f i t s should f o r t h a t reason become l e s s . The I n d u s t r i a l Bank should 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n d u s t r i e s which help the economy as a whole even i f 
t h e s e i n d u s t r i e s make no p r o f i t s i n the beginning, or even l o s s e s . The 
I n d u s t r i a l Bank should extend i t s s e r v i c e s by opening more branches 
throughout the country. Be t h a t as i t may, i t may be more u s e f u l at 
t h i s p o i n t to d i s c u s s the t o t a l amount of loans granted by the Bank i n 
the l a s t few y e a r s . I n the t a b l e which f o l l o w s f i g u r e s a r e s e t out 
f o r a l l the s p e c i a l i s e d banks : the f i g u r e s f o r the loans extended by 
the I n d u s t r i a l Bank, may be p i c k e d out r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y . The t a b l e 
shows t h a t , a f t e r an i n c r e a s e of (23.4%) of the t o t a l loans extended 
by the I n d u s t r i a l Bank m 1962 over 1961, t h i s t o t a l s t a r t e d to f a l l . 
I t f e l l by 24.7% i n 1963, r o s e s l i g h t l y i n 1964, and f e l l a g a i n by 
(12.5%) m 1965. The decrease i n the loans extended by the I n d u s t r i a l 
Bank i n 1965 may be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t t h a t some of the p r o j e c t s i n 
which the Bank had s h a r e s were n a t i o n a l i s e d and the Bank was not then 
compensated f o r i t s s h a r e s i n the n a t i o n a l i s e d e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . I t i s 
suggested here, t h a t the a u t h o r i t i e s should compensate the Bank as soon 
as p o s s i b l e , i n order to enable i t to grant loans to i n d u s t r y a t the 
same r a t e or, b e t t e r , perhaps, a t a higher r a t e than before 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . 
( 1 ) T a b l e No.( 2 0 ) The loans extended by s p e c i a l i s e d banks Appendix 6. 
(115) 
( 3 ) The Mortgage Bank ( r e a l e s t a t e ) :-
The Mortgage Bank was e s t a b l i s h e d by the Government i n 1948 under 
Law No.(18) of the same year, but s t a r t e d o p e r a t i o n s i n 1950. 
The Bank's A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;-
The Mortgage Bank i s managed by a "Board of D i r e c t o r s " c o n s i s t i n g of 
f i v e members i n c l u d i n g the General D i r e c t o r , appointed by the M i n i s t e r 
of F i n a n c e . One of the members r e p r e s e n t s the M i n i s t r y of Housing 
and Works, two r e p r e s e n t the M i n i s t r y of F i n a n c e , and the remaining 
two a r e appointed on the b a s i s t h a t they have experience i n r e a l 
e s t a t e and c o n s t r u c t i o n t r a n s a c t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n to the f i v e 
o r i g i n a l members t h e r e a r e t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l or r e s e r v e members. These 
members are appointed f o r a p e r i o d of t h r e e y e a r s . The Board of 
D i r e c t o r s has the power of determining, from time to time, the r a t e 
of i n t e r e s t , i s s u a n c e and s a l e of debentures, opening of branches, 
w r i t i n g - o f f bad debts, i f t h e r e a r e any, and a l l matters concerning the 
o f f i c i a l s working f o r the Bank. The M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e i s a u t h o r i s e d 
to o b j e c t t o any d e c i s i o n taken by the Board of D i r e c t o r s w i t h i n a 
week's time of the making of the d e c i s i o n . I f the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e 
and the Board of D i r e c t o r s do not agree upon any matter, the matter 
should be submitted to the C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s whose d e c i s i o n i s 
f i n a l . According to Law No.(80) of 1956, a l l d e c i s i o n s made by the 
Board of D i r e c t o r s should be submitted to the M i n i s t e r of Finance whose 
approval i s n e c e s s a r y to c a r r y out these d e c i s i o n s . 
The C a p i t a l S t r u c t u r e ;-
According to Law No.(18) of 1948, the nominal c a p i t a l of the Bank was 
( I . D 1 mn.) to be provided by the government as an i n t e r e s t f r e e loan, 
but the paid-up c a p i t a l was only ( I . D 1500). However, the Bank 
(1) E s t a t e Bank, Annual Report 1959-1960, AL-Hassan P r e s s , Baghdad, P.6 
( m A r a b i c ) . 
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borrowed a t o t a l amount of ( I . D 250.000) from the N a t i o n a l Bank a t 3% 
i n t e r e s t . I n 1952, the nominal c a p i t a l was r a i s e d to ( I . D 2 mn.) which 
was f u l l y p a i d . Furthermore, i n 1956, the Bank obtained a loan of 
( I . D 5 mn.) from the "Development Board". H i t h e r t o the Bank was to pay 
75% of i t s net p r o f i t s to the Government but i n 1956 and according to 
Law No.(80) of the same ye a r , t h i s percentage was reduced to 25% 
and the remaining p a r t of i t s p r o f i t s , i f any, was to be added to i t s 
c a p i t a l , u n t i l such time when i t s paid-up c a p i t a l e q u a l l e d i t s 
nominal c a p i t a l . When t h a t happens, then 50% of net p r o f i t s i s to be 
C 
p a i d to the government and the remaining 50% i s to be h e l d as r e s e r v e s . 
However, i n 1960, and under Law No.(18) of the same ye a r , the 
nominal c a p i t a l was r a i s e d to ( I . D 15 mn.) and was f u l l y p a i d up by 
i n c l u d i n g the Development Board lo a n as p a r t of the c a p i t a l . I n 1965, 
the nominal c a p i t a l was r a i s e d again to ( I . D 20 mn.) and the p a i d up 
( 2 ) 
c a p i t a l to ( I . D 16.854 mn.). I n a d d i t i o n the Bank has borrowed from 
d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s , such a s , the p o s t a l s a v i n g system, the C e n t r a l and 
Commercial Banks, a t o t a l amount of ( I . D 9.130 mn.) which was what i t 
stood a t i n 1965. The Bank ac c e p t s time d e p o s i t s which, i n the same 
y e a r , amounted t o ( I . D 7.944 mn.). 
The Bank's o b j e c t s and o p e r a t i o n s ;-
The Bank was e s t a b l i s h e d i n the f i r s t p l a c e to provide owners of 
d w e l l i n g houses who have obtained loans a t a high i n t e r e s t r a t e , w i t h 
l o a n s b e a r i n g lower i n t e r e s t r a t e . I n 1952, and 1953, the Bank's Law 
was amended and new t a s k s were added; these t a s k s a r e :-
( 1 ) b u i l d i n g on i t s own,modern d w e l l i n g houses and s e l l i n g them or 
( 3 ) 
r e n t i n g them to government o f f i c i a l s . 
( 1 ) E s t a t e Bank, S t a t i s t i c a l Report f o r the p e r i o d between 1949-50/ 
1959-60, l o c a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n P r e s s , 1962, P.10 ( i n A r a b i c ) . 
( 2 ) E s t a t e Bank, The Annual Report, 1964-1965, l o c a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
P r e s s , P.7 (The A r a b i c S e c t i o n ) . 
( 3 ) I n f u l f i l l i n g t h i s t a s k the E s t a t e Bank s t a r t e d to b u i l d and s e l l 
houses to low-income groups of the community, w i t h a t o t a l number of 
(1500) houses i n 1961. These houses were s o l d , a t c o s t p r i c e , to be 
p a i d i n annual ira^alments over (25) y e a r s a t ( 2 % ) i n t e r e s t r a t e . 
S a i d , W.A., C r e d i t System i n I r a q , un-published B . l i t t . T h e s i s , 
U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford, 1964. 
(117) 
( 2 ) e s t a b l i s h i n g c o - o p e r a t i v e mortgage on b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s , or 
companies f o r the s a l e and purchase of immovable p r o p e r t i e s , and the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of houses, and other b u i l d i n g s . 
( 3 ) advancing loans on s e c u r i t y of f i x e d property, and encouraging new 
b u i l d i n g a c t i v i t i e s on the p a r t of p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s . The Bank 
charges (4.5%) i n t e r e s t f o r loans not exceeding ( I . D 500), (5.5%) f o r 
loans not exceeding ( I . D 1000), and ( 6 % ) ~ f o r loans exceeding ( I . D 1000). 
Loans should be r e p a i d i n (12) y e a r s , and a maximum amount of 
( I . D 1500) was f i x e d f o r each b o r r o w e r . I n i t s annual r e p o r t of 
1964/65 ( L o s s and P r o f i t Account) the E s t a t e Bank d i d not r e t u r n any 
(2) 
bad debts f o r t h a t y e a r . T h i s might seem to g i v e support to the 
notion t h a t borrowers have been paying back t h e i r loans s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . 
However, i t must be born i n mind t h a t the Bank sometimes, according 
to i t s r e g u l a t i o n s , extends the p e r i o d of repayment when the 
borrower cannot pay the due i n s t a l m e n t s on time. I t would be r a s h 
t h e r e f o r e to assume t h a t the absence of "bad d e b t s " i n d i c a t e s a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y r a t e of repayment by borrowers. That a s t r i c t l y c a u t i o u s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n should be a p p l i e d i s suggested, by the f a c t t h a t i n 
( 3 ) 
1963/64 the r a t i o of r e c e i v e d loans t o overdue loans was ( 8 0 % ) . 
The E s t a t e Bank i s an important f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n i n I r a q , whose 
ope r a t i o n s may have an important impact on the I r a q i economy as a whole. 
T h i s importance may be i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t i n 1965 f o r example, 
of 
the t o t a l * l o a n s granted by t h i s Bank was ( I . D 9.998 mn.) out of a 
t o t a l amount of ( I . D 23.498 mn.) granted by the A g r i c u l t u r a l , 
( 4 ) 
I n d u s t r i a l , Mortgage ( f o r movables) and Co-operative Banks , or 
( 1 ) E s t a t e Bank, Annual Report 1963-1964, L o c a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n P r e s s 
1965, P.14 ( t h e A r a b i c S e c t i o n ) . 
( 2 ) E s t a t e Bank, Annual Report, 1964-65, L o c a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n P r e s s 
P.31 ( i n A r a b i c ) , 
( 3 ) E s t a t e Bank, Annual Report, 1963-1964, L o c a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n P r e s s 
1965 P.6 ( t h e E n g l i s h S e c t i o n ) . 
( 4 ) The ( C . B . I . ) Q u a r t e r l y B u l l e t i n , July-September 1966, (No.59) P.20 
(118) 
( 4 2 . 5 % ) . T h e r e f o r e the Bank's operations should be d i r e c t e d not as 
a s e p a r a t e u n i t , but w i t h i n the broad l i n e s of the monetary p o l i c y , 
i n a way which s e r v e s the whole economy and not only the Bank. 
Furthermore, t h i s Bank should extend i t s o p e r a t i o n s to a l l p a r t s of 
the country, and to lower-income groups i n the s o c i e t y . T h i s i s 
because lower - income groups i n I r a q l i v e i n houses which could 
not be considered as meeting the b a s i c requirements of a house. 
The C r e d i t M o b i l i e r i s a mortgage bank p r o v i d i n g c r e d i t a g a i n s t 
moveable p r o p e r t i e s . T h i s Bank was e s t a b l i s h e d by the Government i n 
1951, and s t a r t e d o p e r a t i o n s i n the same ye a r . 
The Bank A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;-
T h i s Bank i s managed by a Board of D i r e c t o r s c o n s i s t i n g of f i v e 
o r i g i n a l , i n c l u d i n g the General D i r e c t o r , and two a d d i t i o n a l or 
r e s e r v e members. The General D i r e c t o r and the members a r e appointed 
by the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e , f o r terms of four y e a r s , h a l f of the 
( 2 ) 
members r e t i r i n g every two y e a r s . 
C a p i t a l S t r u c t u r e :-
According to S e c t i o n (A) of A r t i c l e (2) of Law No.(14) of 1951, and 
i t s amendments, the nominal c a p i t a l of t h i s bank was ( I . D 1 mn.). At 
the beginning of 1954, the paid-up c a p i t a l was ( I . D 0.6 mn.), r a i s e d 
( 3 ) 
to ( I . D 1 mn.) a t the end of the same ye a r . I n 1958, and 
a c c o r d i n g to Law No.(32) of the same year, the nominal c a p i t a l was 
r a i s e d to (I.D 2.5 mn.) and paid-up c a p i t a l to ( I . D 1.25 mn.), 
i n c r e a s e d to ( I . D 1.5 mn.) i n 1963. I n a d d i t i o n the Bank obtained 
( 1 ) T h i s point i s d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r , s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s . See 
PP ( 133 - 134 ) . 
( 2 ) The Mortgage Bank (Moveable p r o p e r t y ) Annual Report 1959-60, 
1960-61, under the heading "Board of D i r e c t o r s " ( i n A r a b i c ) . 
( 4 ) The C r e d i t M o b i l i e r ' [jrhe Mortgage (moveable p r o p e r t y ) 5 Bank 
( 3 ) The Mortgage Bank (Moveable p r o p e r t y ) Annual Report 1954-55, 
Government P r e s s 1955, P.4 ( i n A r a b i c ) . 
(119) 
l o a n s from v a r i o u s governmental bodies, e.g. from the ( C . B . I . ) and 
the R a f i d a i n Bank. I n 1963, these loans amounted to ( I . D . 1.2 mn.). 
The t h i r d source of funds f o r t h i s bank i s the d e p o s i t s of the 
government and semi-government i n s t i t u t i o n s . These d e p o s i t s amounted 
to ( I . D . 2.58 mn.) at the end of l g e s / 1 ^ 
The F u n c t i o n s of the Bank :-
The C r e d i t M o b i l i e r Bank was e s t a b l i s h e d f o r the purpose of p r o v i d i n g 
loans a g a i n s t moveable property, e.g. pr e c i o u s metals, to any s u i t a b l e 
a p p l i c a n t . However, the Government employees and o f f i c i a l s a r e able 
to o b t a i n loans from t h i s Bank a g a i n s t p e r s o n a l guarantee of another 
government o f f i c i a l or employee who has been i n the Government's 
s e r v i c e f o r some y e a r s . I n 1952, the maximum amount of each loan 
i n c r e a s e d from one hundred to one thousand I r a q i D i n a r s , and the r a t e 
( 2 ) 
of i n t e r e s t was reduced from 4% to 3% per annum. A s t a r t l i n g 
f a c t about the C r e d i t M o b i l i e r i s t h a t , t h i s Bank made l o s s e s during 
the y e a r s 1959, 1960 and 1961. These l o s s e s were met by reducing 
the c a p i t a l r e s e r v e s . I n 1959, the c a p i t a l r e s e r v e s were 
( I . D . 1 0 7 . 0 7 6 ) , f e l l to ( I . D 93.309) i . e . a l o s s of ( I . D 13.767), and 
to ( I . D 87.164) i n 1961, i . e . a l o s s of ( I . D 6.145). I n 1962, the 
(3) 
Bank made a p r o f i t of ( I . D 18.708). S i n c e the Bank, i n i t s r e p o r t s , 
does not g i v e any f i g u r e s f o r bad debts, t h e r e f o r e , a p o s s i b l e 
e x p l a n a t i o n of the l o s s e s i n 1959, 1960 and 1961, i s t h a t the Bank 
pays a higher i n t e r e s t r a t e f o r the loans i t o b t a i n s , and does not 
(1) The Mortgage Bank (Moveable p r o p e r t y ) Annual Report 1961-62, 
1962-63, AL Jamhoria P r e s s , PP.15-16 ( i n A r a b i c ) . 
( 2 ) E L - K a i s s i , F., C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
Un-published Ph.D T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 
1957, P.96 
( 3 ) C r e d i t M o b i l i e r Bank, Annual Report, AL-Jamhoria P r e s s , 1961-62 
and 1962-63, ( i n A r a b i c ) . The d i f f e r e n c e s i n c a p i t a l r e s e r v e s , 
not i n d i c a t e d s e p a r a t e l y by the Bank i n i t s r e p o r t , have been 
c a l c u l a t e d by the w r i t e r . 
(120) 
charge high enough i n t e r e s t r a t e s to i t s debtors to cover i t s expenditure 
and the payment of i n t e r e s t to i t s c r e d i t o r s . However, i t i s advocated here 
t h a t the Bank should g i v e f i g u r e s of bad debts each y e a r . Furthermore, 
s i n c e t h i s Bank pr o v i d e s loans f o r consumption purposes i . e . u n l i k e the 
A g r i c u l t u r a l , I n d u s t r i a l and E s t a t e Banks, t h e r e f o r e , i t may be suggested 
t h a t t h i s Bank i s not j u s t i f i e d i n making l o s s e s , and t h a t i t should condud 
i t s operations i n a more c a u t i o u s way. 
(5) The Co-Operative Bank; 
The Co-Operative Bank was e s t a b l i s h e d by the government i n 
1956, according to Law No.(65) of the same y e a r . T h i s Bank was e n t r u s t e d , 
at f i r s t , w i t h two t a s k s ; to provide the c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s w i t h c r e d i t ; 
and to c a r r y out t h e i r banking b u s i n e s s . I n 1959, and according to Law No. 
(163) of the same ye a r , the Co-Operative Bank was e n t r u s t e d w i t h t h r e e more 
t a s k s ; these were; ( 1 ) to provide the c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s w i t h f i n a n c i a l 
and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , and encourage the es t a b l i s h m e n t of more co-
o p e r a t i v e s , ( 2 ) to supply these s o c i e t i e s w i t h warehouses f o r the st o r a g e 
of t h e i r goods and products, and ( 3 ) to take p a r t i n the p r o j e c t s s e t up by 
them. 
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Bank; 
The Co-operative Bank i s managedby a "Board of D i r e c t o r s " c o n s i s t i n g of 
f i v e members i n c l u d i n g the General D i r e c t o r of the Bank. Two members of the 
Board have to be members of c o - o p e r a t i v e s which d e a l w i t h the Bank. There 
a r e four r e s e r v e members. The General D i r e c t o r and a l l members a r e appointee 
f o r terms of t h r e e y e a r s . 
The C a p i t a l S t r u c t u r e ; 
The nominal c a p i t a l of the Co-operative Bank was ( I . D 0.250 mn.), 49% of 
whiclwas to be provided by the co - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s , and the remaining 
51% by the government. The paid-up c a p i t a l , however, was only (I.D.0.040 mn, 
a l l provided by the g o v e r n m e n t . I n 1959, the nominal c a p i t a l was r a i s e d 
to ( I . D . 1 mn.). I n 1961, the co - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s s u b s c r i b e d , f o r the 
f i r s t time, to the amount of ( I . D . 0.027 mn.), out of a paid-up c a p i t a l of 
( I . D . 0.425 mn.). I n a d d i t i o n , the c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s deposited a t o t a l 
amount of ( I . D . 0.020 mn.) a t the end of the same y e a r . 
The Bank's Operations; 
The Co-Operative Bank's a c t i v i t i e s a r e not confin e d t o any p a r t i c u l a r type 
of c o - o p e r a t i v e . The Bank d e a l s w i t h , b u i l d i n g , a g r i c u l t u r e and 
( 1 ) The c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e m the c a p i t a l of the 
Co-Operative Bank as they should do a c c o r d i n g to Co-Operative Bank Law, 
^ t £ ^ g a 8 ? 4 a ¥ f o ^ n e B » . t h e y P a r t i c i * a t e d ^ l e s s t h a n 5 % ° f t h e 
(121) 
consumers c o - o p e r a t i v e s ; as shown i n the t a b l e below. T h i s 
t a b l e d i s c l o s e s t h a t the b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s c l a i m the l a r g e s t share 
of the loans provided by t h i s bank, followed by the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
then consumer c o - o p e r a t i v e s . The Co-dperative Bank does not 
f o l l o w any s p e c i f i c r u l e s about i n t e r e s t r a t e to be charged, or 
the term or s i z e of bank l o a n s . Such d e c i s i o n s about each case 
a r e made a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the c a s e . 
Table ( 0 ) Amount and D i s t r i b u t i o n 
of loans by the Co-Operative Bank 
(a s a t the end of 1 9 6 1 ) v . 
T o t a l Value of Loan 
( I . D ) . 
Percent of T o t a l 
A g r i c u l t u r a l 74.185 15.8 
Consumer 22.700 4.8 
B u i l d i n g 373.012 79.4 
469.895 100.0 
Source : S a i d , W.A., The C r e d i t System i n I r a q , un-published 
B . l i t t . T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford, 1964. 
(1) F i g u r e s r e p r e s e n t loans extended to these s o c i e t i e s by the 
Co-operative Bank s i n c e i t s e stablishment u n t i l end of 1961. 
( 2 ) T i t l e by p r e s e n t w r i t e r . 
(122) 
The Co-operative Bank's a c t i v i t i e s r e f l e c t e d i n i t s o utstanding 
loans have been i n c r e a s i n g s h a r p l y . Table No. ( 20 ) Appendix 6. 
which shows the loans extended by the s p e c i a l i s e d banks r e v e a l s 
t h a t the amount of loans extended by the Co-operative Bank rose 
by (123%) i n 1962 over 1961, then a f t e r a s l i g h t i n c r e a s e i n 
1963 over 1962, and no i n c r e a s e i n 1964 over 1963, i t r o s e by 
about (146%) i n 1965 over 1964, which was a very sharp i n c r e a s e 
indeed. Furthermore, the t a b l e shows t h a t , the t o t a l amount of 
outstanding loans extended by the Co-operative Bank i n 1965 was 
f i v e times the amount i n 1961, and t h i s i n c r e a s e i s higher than 
any to be found among the other s p e c i a l i s e d banks. The 
Co-o p e r a t i v e Bank i s l i k e the other banks whose p o s i t i o n has been 
reviewed i n not d i s c l o s i n g the amount of "bad debts". Again i t 
i s advocated t h a t i t would be d e s i r a b l e f o r such d i s c l o s u r e to 
be made. I f t h i s i s done then the community g e n e r a l l y may be 
a b l e to a s s e s s more f i r m l y the outcome of the banking operations 
which are t a k i n g p l a c e . These i n c r e a s e s may r e f l e c t the n o t i o n 
t h a t the a u t h o r i t i e s r e a l i s e the importance of the r o l e which 
the Co-operative Bank may be able to p l a y i n the promoting of the 
e x i s t i n g c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s , and the s e t t i n g up of new ones, 
e s p e c i a l l y the a g r i c u l t u r a l c o - o p e r a t i v e s . T h i s i s because, a 
l a r g e number of the p r e v i o u s l y wage-earning or share-cropping 
farmers now have t h e i r own l a n d , but are not a b l e to provide the 
c a p i t a l needed. Therefore, the a g r i c u l t u r a l c o - o p e r a t i v e s may 
prove to be very u s e f u l m meeting t h i s shortage, even i f i t s 
e x t e n t may be l i m i t e d . 
(123) 
Having s a i d t h i s much about each of the s p e c i a l i s e d banks i n I r a q , 
i t may be u s e f u l to d i s c u s s the e f f e c t s of the o p e rations of t h e s e 
banks as a whole on the I r a q i economy. 
The t a b l e which f o l l o w s ^ " ^ p r e s e n t s the c o n s o l i d a t e d statement 
of s p e c i a l i s e d banks i n I r a q . The t a b l e shows t h a t the c a p i t a l and 
r e s e r v e s of t h e s e banks have been i n c r e a s i n g s t e a d i l y . They r o s e from 
( I . D 24.093) mn. i n 1961 to ( I . D 33.078 mn.) i n 1965. The p r o f i t s of 
the s p e c i a l i s e d banks show a steady i n c r e a s e between 1961-1964 w i t h 
a s l i g h t decrease i n 1965. I t i s evident t h a t the Government and 
quasi-Government d e p o s i t s have been i n c r e a s i n g s t e a d i l y . They r o s e 
from ( I . D 7.129 mn.) i n 1961, to ( I . D 13.081 mn.) i n 1965. A l s o t h a t 
the c u r r e n t and s a v i n g accounts and time d e p o s i t s a r e , r e l a t i v e l y 
speaking, not important. Other d e p o s i t s showed a tendency to f a l l 
between 1961 and 1963, then they s t a r t e d to r i s e i n 1964 and 1965. 
T able No.( 2 0 ) d i s c l o s e s the loans extended by s p e c i a l i s e d banks 
between 1961 and 1965. T h i s t a b l e shows t h a t , the E s t a t e Bank loans 
almost doubled between 1961 and 1965, w i t h a decrease of (21.2%) xn 
1962 over 1961. The loans extended by the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank f e l l by 
almost a t h i r d (32.8%) i n 1963 below 1962, and more than a t h i r d 
(34.3%) i n 1965 over 1964. T h i s may be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t t h a t 
the t o t a l amount of repayments i n 1963 f e l l to ( I . D 298.703) a g a i n s t 
a t o t a l amount of ( I . D 376.104) i n 1962. T h i s was due to the 
postponement of the i n s t a l m e n t s to be r e p a i d by farmers to the 
( 2 ) 
bank. As f o r the I n d u s t r i a l Bank s l o a n s , the t a b l e shows t h a t , the 
t o t a l amount tended t o r i s e i n 1962 over 1961 but f e l l i n 1963 over 
1962. T h e n , a f t e r a s l i g h t i n c r e a s e i . e . ( 2 % ) i n 1964, i t f e l l a g ain 
by (12.5%) i n 1965. T h i s could be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t t h a t the 
( 1 ) Table No. ( 1 9 ) c o n s o l i d a t e d statement of s p e c i a l i s e d Banks 
Appendix 6. 
( 2 ) The A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank annual Report, 1963, Baghdad 1963, E n g l i s h 
S e c t i o n P.8 
(124) 
i n d u s t r i a l Bank's operations were a f f e c t e d by the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of 
the b i g i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s i n which the Bank had s h a r e s , and has not 
been compensated f o r even y e t . The t a b l e shows t h a t the Mortgage 
Bank's loans i n c r e a s e d s t e a d i l y but moderatly throughout the 
p e r i o d . The loans extended by the c o - o p e r a t i v e bank r o s e s h a r p l y 
m 1962 over 1961 (123%) and very moderately m 1963 over 1962. 
I n 1964 t h e r e was no change, then a v e r y sharp i n c r e a s e (145.6%) m 
1965 over 1964. T h i s sharp r i s e may be e x p l a i n e d by the Government's 
d e s i r e to encourage the c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t i e s among farmers as an 
e f f e c t i v e method of r a i s i n g production i n a g r i c u l t u r e . The t a b l e shows 
t h a t the t o t a l loans extended by s p e c i a l i s e d Banks i n I r a q , r o s e 
s t e a d i l y but moestly between 1961 and 1963, then t h e r e was a sharp 
i n c r e a s e of (33.3%) i n 1964 over 1963, and again a modest i n c r e a s e i n 
1965 over 1964. I t i s suggested here t h a t the f i v e s p e c i a l i s e d banks, 
due to the important impact of t h e i r l e n d i n g operations on the I r a q i 
economy, should p r e s e n t a greater degree of c o - o r d i n a t i o n among 
themselves as a group. Furthermore, each bank should c a l c u l a t e 
c a r e f u l l y the d i f f e r e n c e between the amounts which i t lends during a 
c e r t a i n p e r i o d , a year f o r example, and the amount i t r e c e i v e s . T h i s 
i s because i f the bank lends more than i t r e c e i v e s as payments of 
i n s t a l m e n t s - by borrowers, t h e r e w i l l be, other t h i n g s being equal, a 
net i n c r e a s e i n d i s t r i b u t e d incomes and e f f e c t i v e demand. T h i s may 
not be d e s i r a b l e i f the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s a re t r y i n g to l i m i t 
( 1 ) 
c r e d i t a t a p a r t i c u l a r time, and m a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , 
r 
( 1 ) The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s p e c i a l i s e d banks and ( C . B . I . ) 
i s d i s c u s s e d on PP( 133-134 ) 
(125) 
The Central Bank of I r a q (C.B.I.) ; 
The (C.B.I.) i s the c e n t r a l xnstrument of c o n t r o l of the 
monetary a u t h o r x t i e s xn I r a q and must be counted as i t s e l f an xmportant 
p a r t of the t o t a l p a t t e r n of authorxtxes. But before discussing thxs 
xmportant x n s t x t u t x o n , x t may be u s e f u l t o outlxne broadly, the 
requx s i t e s f o r completely successful a c t i o n xn c o n t r o l . These requxsxtes 
are : 
(1) Knowledge (the technxque). 
(2) the xnstruments of c o n t r o l . 
(3) some experience i n working the xnstruments. 
(4) a strong sense of responsxbxlxty which would be l x k e l y t o promote 
s w x f t , c a r e f u l , but fxrm actxon as against a c t i o n t h a t was delayed from 
lazxness or xndxfference, or a c t i o n t h a t was not c a r e f u l l y thought out, 
or a c t i o n t h a t was feeble xn x t s applxcatxon. 
Dxscussion of the (C.B.I.) may make c l e a r how f a r the above 
requxsxtes could be regarded as e x x s t i n g i n I r a q . The establxshment of a 
Currency Board xn 1931 was not on a permanent basxs, as was mentxoned 
e a r l i e r . Therefore, i n 1947, the Law No.(43) of the same year was 
passed, accordxng t o which the Na t i o n a l Bank of I r a q was set up. But 
the Bank dxd not s t a r t operatxons u n t i l 1949. The txme between the 
passing of the Law and the a c t u a l establxshment of the Bank was spent 
on the preparatxon of buxldxng and personnel. Thxs Bank took over the 
dutxes and powers of the Currency Board whxch was abolxshed. However, 
xn 1956, the Law No.(72) of the same year was enacted, and the name 
of the Na t i o n a l Bank was changed t o the Central Bank of I r a q (C.B.I.). 
The Admxnxstratxon of the C.B.I. 
According t o A r t x c l e (5) of Law No.(72) of 1956, the (C.B.I.) 
xs managed by a Board of Dxrectors consxstxng of nxne members includxng 
the Governor and Deputy Governor. The Governor, xs appoxnted by the 
Councxl of Mxnisters f o r a perxod of f i v e years. Members of the Board 
(126) 
of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n are appointed by the c o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s f o r a p e r i o d 
of f o u r years, and t h i s Council chooses the Deputy Governor from among the 
members of the Board of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Bank. The Governor, Deputy 
Governor, and Members of the Board are e l i g i b l e f o r re-appointment f o r an 
u n l i m i t e d number of times, and are not removable d u r i n g t h e i r term of 
o f f i c e , unless any of the persons mentioned above should be convicted by a 
competent c o u r t . Each member i s r e q u i r e d t o have a proven f i n a n c i a l 
experience and s p e c i a l i s e d knowledge of economics; and i s not an o f f i c i a l 
or manager of a bank. ^ ^ H a l f of the Members of the Board of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
are due t o r e t i r e every two years. I n a d d i t i o n t o the nine o r i g i n a l 
members, paragraph ( f ) of A r t i c l e (5) of Law No.72 of 1956 decrees t h a t : 
"Five a d d i t i o n a l members s h a l l be appointed t o the Board of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
by d e c i s i o n of the Council of M i n i s t e r s f o r a p e r i o d of f o u r years. They 
s h a l l be summoned f o r the purpose of c o n s t i t u t i n g a quorum f o r the 
„ (2) 
meetings . The I r a q i l e g i s l a t i o n d i d not neglect the importance of 
the co-operation of the Central Bank and banks o p e r a t i n g i n I r a q . 
Therefore, according t o A r t i c l e ( 7) an Advisory Council was t o be 
esta b l i s h e d . The chairman of t h i s Council should be the Governor of the 
Central Bank, and i t s members should be the re p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Banks 
operating m I r a q . I n accordance w i t h A r t i c l e (8) of Law No.72 of 1956, 
the Board of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Central Bank i s f r e e t o make decisions 
i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and f i n a n c i a l matters, and i n accordance w i t h t h i s Law 
and Regulations. I f the Governor of the Bank and the Board of 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n disagree upon any p o l i c y matters, the M i n i s t e r of Finance 
may adj u d i c a t e i n the di s p u t e . I f the M i n i s t e r of Finance does not 
agree w i t h the Governor's view about the matter, he may submit the 
dispute t o the Council of M i n i s t e r s whose judgement i s f i n a l . I f the 
(1) This r e s t r i c t i o n has only a p p l i e d since 1956. Up t o t h a t date 
personnel of s u f f i c i e n t s k i l l and experience were not e a s i l y t o be 
found and bank o f f i c i a l s or managers were not excluded. Even though a 
case could be made out f o r t h i s p r a c t i c e , based on necessity, i t was 
s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i s e d by Iversen i n h i s r e p o r t of 1954 and i t was 
subsequently dropped. 
(2) Central Bank of I r a q , Laws, Regulations and Ordinances, Baghdad, 1965. 
P.14 
(127) 
Board of Admxnistratxon and the Mxnister of Fxnance disagree upon any 
matter, the dispute may be submitted t o the Council of Mxnxsters, whxch 
has the f i n a l decxsxon xn a l l matters except two. These exceptions 
are f i r s t , the applxcatxon of Regulations f o r s e r v i c e i n the (C.B.I.) 
and second the"Exchange Control Law",xn whxch the Board of 
Admxnistratxon has the f i n a l decxsxon. 
Capxtal S t r u c t u r e of the C.B.I. :-
The orxgxnal nominal c a p i t a l of the C.B.I, was (I.D 5 mn.) 
and the paid - up capxtal (I.D 2.5 mn.). I n 1956, the authorxsed 
c a p x t a l was r a i s e d t o (I.D 15 mn.), and the paid-up c a p x t a l t o 
(I.D 4.2 mn.). The dxfference between the authorised and the paxd-up 
c a p i t a l xs guaranteed by the Iraqx Treasury u n t x l such time as the 
nominal c a p x t a l of the Bank xs f u l l y paxd-up. Accordxng t o A r t x c l e (3) 
of Law No.72 of 1956, 50% of the net p r o f x t s of the Bank are t o be 
paxd t o the Government, provided t h a t thxs amount does not exceed 
(I . D 1 mn.). The remaxnder of net p r o f i t i s t o be added t o the paid-up 
c a p x t a l u n t x l the dxfference between t h i s and the nomxnal c a p x t a l xs 
elxmxnated. 
The Organisatxon of the (C.B.I.) :~ 
The C.B.I, xs made up of three departments :-
(1) The Chief Cashier's Department, whxch i s d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r 
D i r e c t o r i e s :- the Issue, the V a u l t , the Bankxng, and Forexgn Exchange. 
(2) The Department of S t a t x s t i c s and Research, whxch has three sectxons 
the S t a t x s t i c a l , the Foreign R e l a t i o n s , and the Research. 
(3) The Department of Control of Bankxng. 
Havxng s a i d t h i s much about the Board of Admxnistratxon, c a p x t a l 
s t r u c t u r e , and organxsatxon of the (C.B.I.), a reference t o x ts 
functxons may, perhaps, be judged necessary. 
(128) 
Functions of the (C.B.I.) 
Accordxng t o A r t i c l e (4) of the Central Bank of I r a q Law No.(72) of 
1956 "The objects of the Bank s h a l l be t o manage the currency and 
ensure i t s s t a b i l i t y , t o i n f l u e n c e the c r e d i t s i t u a t i o n t o the 
country's advantage, t o act as banker t o the Government, and t o 
t t 
f a c i l i t a t e i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l payments ... I n the process of 
a t t a i n i n g the objects set out i n the Law the (C.B.I.) : 
(a) i s placed i n a p o s i t i o n which enables i t t o supervise and c o n t r o l 
the commercial banks operating m I r a q . (b) i s e n t r u s t e d w i t h the 
c o n t r o l of the f o r e i g n exchange s i t u a t i o n through i t s f u n c t i o n of 
f a c i l i t a t i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g e x t e r n a l payments, and ( c ) acts as the 
responsible agent f o r c a r r y i n g out o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g from 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements concerned w i t h f i n a n c i a l and economic matters. 
The process of supe r v i s i o n and c o n t r o l i s f u r t h e r strengthened by 
reason of the (C.B.I*s) f u n c t i o n i n keeping Government and semi 
government accounts, and a c t i n g g e n e r a l l y as the Government's f i n a n c i a l 
agent. Furthermore, the (C.B.I.) i s r e q u i r e d t o advise the Government 
on such matters as may i n f l u e n c e the s t a b i l i t y of the I r a q currency. 
I n order t o e l u c i d a t e the p o s i t i o n and importance of the (C.B.I.) i t s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the f o l l o w i n g bodies and a c t i v i t i e s w i l l be 
discussed :-
(2) 
(1) the (C.B.I.) as c o n t r o l l e r of the commercial banks 
(2) the (C.B.I.) as c o n t r o l l e r of the s p e c i a l i s e d banks. 
(3) the (C.B.I.) as c o n t r o l l e r of f o r e i g n exchange. 
(4) the I r a q i Government. 
(5) the possible c o n t r i b u t i o n of the (C.B.I.) i n the promotion of 
economic development, by p r o v i d i n g p a r t of the c a p i t a l funds needed f o r 
economic development, i . e . from the government p o i n t of view, d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g . 
(1) The Central Bank of I r a q , Laws, Regulations, And Ordinances, Baghdad 
1965, PP. 12-14. 
(2) The Sarraf's a c t i v i t i e s are not included here, because of t h e i r 
minor importance. See p.( 94 ) . 
(129) 
(1) The (C.B.I.) as c o n t r o l l e r of the commercial banks xn I r a q :-
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the (C.B.I.) and the commercial banks 
op e r a t i n g i n I r a q , may be considered i n r e l a t i o n t o two d i s t i n c t periods :-
(a) The f i r s t p e r i o d between 1949 (when the (C.B.I.) s t a r t e d operations) 
and mid-1964 (when commercial banks were n a t i o n a l i s e d ) . 
(b) between mid-1964 and the present time a f t e r the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n Law 
had been amended. 
(a) The f i r s t p e r i o d , 1949 - mid-1964 :-
Since the discussion of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the (C.B.I.) w i t h the 
commercial banks i n the f i r s t p e r i o d i s u s e f u l only as a back-ground t o the 
present s i t u a t i o n , i t w i l l not be necessary t o discuss i t other than 
b r i e f l y . I n accordance w i t h A r t i c l e ( I V ) , Section (5) of the Law of the 
Central Bank of I r a q No.72 of 1956 :- "the C.B.I, i s given the power t o 
c o n t r o l banks and s a r r a f s and co-ordinate t h e i r o perations". Consequently, 
the C.B.I, should have been i n a p o s i t i o n which enabled i t , l e g a l l y and 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y , t o c o n t r o l the commercial banks and s a r r a f s operating i n 
I r a q . But what happened i n p r a c t i c e was d i f f e r e n t . This i s because, the 
(C.B.I.) had not been able t o use the instruments normally used by Central 
Banks i n an e f f e c t i v e way. One of the instruments, f o r example, i s 
v a r i a t i o n s i n Bank Rate. The (C.B.I.) could not use t h i s instrument 
e f f e c t i v e l y d uring the p e r i o d i n question, because, commercial banks 
op e r a t i n g i n I r a q were, and s t i l l are, i n a h i g h l y l i q u i d p o s i t i o n . 
Therefore, whenever they needed cash, these banks u t i l i s e d t h e i r l i q u i d 
reserves w i t h o u t going t o the Central Bank. Furthermore, the f i v e l o c a l 
branches of f o r e i g n banks could borrow from t h e i r head-offices whenever 
they needed t o . This p o i n t could be i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t , d u r i n g 
the p e r i o d 1949-1955 the (C.B.I.) n e i t h e r made loans t o commercial banks 
nor discounted commercial p a p e r . A s f o r the use of the other 
(1) EL-Kaissi, F., C r i t i c a l A nalysis of Central Banking i n I r a q , un-
published Ph.D Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1957, P.229. 
However, m 1960 the commercial banks used the (C.B.I.) as a lender of l a s t 
r e s o r t when t h e i r l i q u i d i t y r a t i o f e l l from (59.4%) i n December 1959 t o 
(50.3%) i n J u l y 1960, t h i s decrease i n l i q u i d i t y r a t i o w o r r i e d the 
commercial banks. The (C.B.I.) i n an attempt t o a t t r a c t the commercial bank! 
t o borrow from i t , r a i s e d the maximum percentage of ( e l i g i b l e ) b i l l s which 
each bank i s allowed t o re-discount at the (C.B.I.) from (15%) t o (20%) 
f o o t n o t e continued :-
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instruments, such as open market operations, they were also of l i m i t e d 
use. This was due t o the l a c k of a well-developed and organised c a p i t a l 
market i n I r a q : and the existence of such a market i s of v i t a l 
importance f o r the use of t h i s instrument. A t h i r d weapon t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
a v a i l a b l e t o the (C.B.I.) i s " V a r i a t i o n of Reserve Ratios". Again, as w i l l 
be seen from the d e t a i l e d discussion given below, t h i s instrument was not, 
i n p r a c t i c e , of great use. Each commercial bank o p e r a t i n g i n I r a q was 
r e q u i r e d t o keep at the (C.B.I.) a minimum reserve of (15%) of the t o t a l 
amount of f i x e d and demand deposits excluding those of the I r a q i 
Government. Of t h i s reserve 2/3rds at l e a s t was r e q u i r e d t o be i n the form 
of I r a q i notes and coins, and the remaining p a r t i n the form of I r a q i 
Government s e c u r i t i e s and Treasury b i l l s . The (C.B.I.) power as f a r as 
v a r i a t i o n of t h i s reserve r a t i o went, was confined t o being able t o vary 
the r a t i o between (15%) and (10%) a f t e r g i v i n g n o t i c e t o the commercial 
banks, at l e a s t two months ahead. I t seems t o be the case t h a t the margin 
of v a r i a t i o n between 10% and 15% d i d not give the c e n t r a l bank a great 
power t o manoevre, judging by the f a c t t h a t t h i s range was increased a f t e r 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , ^ ^ w h i c h means t h a t the I r a q i monetary a u t h o r i t i e s wanted 
to have a l a r g e r range of reserve minimum and maximum v a r i a t i o n . As f o r th< 
l a s t instrument, i . e . "moral suasion and d i r e c t i o n s " , t h i s method was not 
very e f f e c t i v e e i t h e r . I t was not e f f e c t i v e because f i v e of the commercial 
banks operating i n I r a q c l a i m i n g the l a r g e s t share of banking a c t i v i t i e s 
were l o c a l branches of f o r e i g n banks, which n a t u r a l l y enough, paid more 
a t t e n t i o n t o making p r o f i t s than t o f o l l o w i n g , v o l u n t a r i l y , a p o l i c y 
which was best i n the i n t e r e s t s of I r a q . From t h i s b r i e f examination i t 
may be safe t o conclude t h a t the (C.B.I.) i n the f i r s t p e r i o d , i . e . 
between the time i t s t a r t e d operations i n 1949, and mid 1964, had had no 
e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l over the commercial banks o p e r a t i n g i n I r a q . 
(1) See p.(131) 
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of bank's deposit l i a b i l i t i e s on the one hand, and lowered i t s discount 
r a t e from 3 t o 2|% on the other. The commercial banks reacted favourably. 
The advances granted t o commercial banks against government s e c u r i t i e s and 
other papers, a f t e r the d e c l a r a t i o n of the measures amounted t o ( I . D . 0.4 
mn.), rose t o ( I . D . 5.5 mn.) dur i n g 1960. However, i t may s t i l l be safe t o 
say t h a t the (C.B.I.) discount r a t e has not had much e f f e c t on rates 
charged by the commercial banks: as W.A.Said has s a i d ; "the r a t e s of 
i n t e r e s t charged by the banks on various t r a n s a c t i o n s have no r e l a t i o n 
whatsoever t o the discount r a t e of the (C.B.I.)". 
Said,W.A., The C r e d i t System i n I r a q , Un-published B . l i t t . T h e s i s , 
U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford. 1964. 
(131) 
(b) The second p e r i o d ; mid 1964 - t o the present time ;-
I n J u l y , 1964, Law No.(100) of the same year concerning the 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the commercial banks oper a t i n g i n I r a q was enacted. 
The n a t i o n a l i s e d banks were amalgamated i n t o f o u r banks^^. An 
o r g a n i s a t i o n c a l l e d the P u b l i c Organisation f o r Banks (POB) was 
e s t a b l i s h e d . The (G.B.I.) was given s t r o n g c o n t r o l over t h i s 
_ o r g a n i s a t i o n . This p o i n t could be i l l u s t r a t e d by A r t i c l e (11) of Law 
No.(100) of 1964, which lays i t down t h a t :- "The C e n t r a l Bank of I r a q 
s h a l l appoint and/or remove the managers, general managers, delegated 
and deputed t o the Banks attached t o the o r g a n i s a t i o n , and s h a l l 
determine t h e i r power and d u t i e s . The Central Bank may r e l i e v e the 
President and a l l or some of the members of the Board of D i r e c t o r s of 
t h e i r d u t i e s and may appoint a p r o v i s i o n a l Board". This a r t i c l e gives 
the (C.B.I.) a t i g h t c o n t r o l over the commercial banks, may be more 
power than most, i f not a l l , of the c e n t r a l Banks i n the non-communist 
c o u n t r i e s . Therefore, i t may be safe t o say t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the (C.B.I.) and the commercial banks i s a r e v e r s a l of t h a t 
which p r e v a i l e d before the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the commercial banks. 
According t o A r t i c l e (5) of Law No.100 of 1964; the (POB) was t o be 
c o n t r o l l e d by a "Board of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n " , t h i s "Board" t o c o n s i s t of 
the Governor of the (C.B.I.) as an e x - o f f i c i o p r e s i d e n t , h i s Deputy and 
D i r e c t o r s General of n a t i o n a l i s e d banks as members. The (C.B.I.) has 
t h e a u t h o r i t y according t o "Banking Cont r o l Law" No.(97) of 1964, t o 
f i x the amount of a l l or some of the assets t o be held by each bank, 
s a r r a f , or a group of banks or s a r r a f s , or a l l banks or s a r r a f s , as 
cover f o r t h e i r d e p o s i t s , expressed as a p r o p o r t i o n or p r o p o r t i o n s of 
t o t a l deposits by r e g u l a t i o n , w i t h o u t the l a t t e r having t o be r e f e r r e d 
on each occasion t o the l e g i s l a t u r e . Furthermore, the new Law, u n l i k e 
the abrogated Law No.(34) of 1950, empowered the (C.B.I.) t o s p e c i f y 
the percentages of assets which each bank or s a r r a f should deposit w i t h 
the (C.B.I.). This percentage was r a i s e d from 15% t o 20%. The l a t t e r 
percentage i s t o c o n s i s t of 10% as money t o be deposited w i t h the 
(1) See P.( 94 ) 
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(C.B.I.) by each bank or s a r r a f , 5% i n the form of Treasury B i l l s , and 
the remaining 5% i n the form of other monetary a s s e t s . I t i s not 
w i t h o u t s i g n i f i c a n c e t o note t h a t the (C.B.I.) used t h i s instrument i n 
1964. I t used i t s powers i n a d i s c r e e t and d i s c r e t i o n a r y way. A f t e r 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n depositors w i t h the commercial banks grew a l i t t l e more 
caut i o u s , perhaps even suspicious of t h e i r banks, and as a r e s u l t 
tended t o increase the r a t e of encashment of deposits. The r e s u l t of 
t h i s upon the reserves of the commercial banks was t o reduce t h e i r 
l i q u i d i t y r a t i o from 28% at the beginning of 1964, i . e . before 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n t o 20% immediately a f t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . I f the 
government had r e q u i r e d the commercial banks t o place a sum equal t o 
20% of t h e i r deposit l i a b i l i t i e s w i t h the (C.B.I.) then t h i s would 
have subjected the commercial banks t o a s t r a i n at both ends of t h e i r 
accounts, so t o say. The t i g h t e n i n g of t h e i r p o s i t i o n would have been 
very c l e a r l y evident and t h i s might w e l l have i n t e n s i f i e d the 
sensitiveness of the p u b l i c i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the banks. I n 
these circumstances the (C.B.I.) reduced the reserve requirement from 
(20%) t o (15%) and m t h i s way gained two things at the same time. I n 
the f i r s t place i t r e l i e v e d the immediate cash st r i n g e n c y f o r the 
commercial banks and i n the second place i t showed the p u b l i c g e n e r a l l y 
i n s o f a r as they might be disposed t o n o t i c e such t h i n g s , t h a t the 
government and (C.B.I.) were watching the monetary s i t u a t i o n c l o s e l y 
and were prepared t o act w i t h o u t too much regard t o r i g i d requirements 
i f circumstances might seem t o c a l l f o r a more f l e x i b l e treatment. 
This r e l a x a t i o n continued f o r two months as from the 2nd of September 
1964, and was extended l a t e r t i l l May 3rd, 1965. With regard t o other 
instruments of c o n t r o l there was no change. The discount r a t e f o r 
example, was kept the same, i . e . (4%) : as also the l i m i t of discount 
at (15%) of deposits, m accordance w i t h the Law. The commercial banks 
(1) The (C.B.I.) Annual Report 1964, Zahra Press, Baghdad, 
PP. 322-33 ( i n E n g l i s h ) . 
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ope r a t i n g i n I r a q have the l i b e r t y t o go t o the (C.B.I.) and may 
re-discount Treasury B i l l s , t o any amount, a t whatever may be the 
prescribed r a t e p r e v a i l i n g a t the time. I n 1964, the r a t e was ( 3 j % ) . 
Moreover, the (C.B.I.) holds i t s e l f ready t o grant advances t o 
commercial banks on the s e c u r i t y of long term bonds, valued at market 
ra t e s or nominal r a t e , whichever i s the l e s s , charging a r a t e of 
i n t e r e s t f o r the p r o v i s i o n . In"1964, the rate" was 5%^ 1\ 1 " ~~ 
(2) 
(2) The (C.B.I.) r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Specialised banks ;-
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s p e c i a l i s e d banks and the (C.B.I.) 
i s r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t from t h a t between the commercial banks and the 
(C.B.I.). Subject t o the approval of the M i n i s t e r of Finance, the Boards 
of D i r e c t o r s of the s p e c i a l i s e d banks decide the r a t e s of i n t e r e s t t o 
be charged t o borrowers from time t o time. They then inform the (C.B.I.) 
of t h e i r d e c i s i o n : but the (C.B.I.) has no power t o a f f e c t r a t e s o f 
(3) 
i n t e r e s t charged by the s p e c i a l i s e d banks, unless these exceed (7%) . 
However, the (C.B.I.) might be able t o l i m i t t o t a l amounts l e n t by the 
s p e c i a l i s e d banks i n one case only i . e . when these banks want t o 
borrow from the (C.B.I.) i n order t o expand t h e i r l e n d i n g operations. 
Otherwise these banks can expand t h e i r l ending operations t o the extent 
(4) 
they want, the only l i m i t a t i o n being a v a i l a b l e resources. This means 
(1) I b i d P.(33) and P.(38). 
(2) So f a r as the present w r i t e r i s aware no p u b l i c a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e which 
deals w i t h t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . Some of the p o i n t s mentioned above are 
based on correspondence which the w r i t e r has had w i t h the D i r e c t o r of 
the research and S t a t i s t i c s Department of the (C.B.I.) 
(3) EL.Kaissi F., C r i t i c a l Analysis of Central Banking m I r a q , un-
published Ph.D Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1 9 5 7 . P.78 
(4) This does not mean however t h a t the s p e c i a l i s e d banks are able t o 
conduct t h e i r operations w i t h o u t any outside c o n t r o l whatsoever. They 
are subject t o the o v e r - r i d i n g approval and s u p e r v i s i o n of the M i n i s t e r 
of Finance. So f a r as the M i n i s t e r of Finance i s i n close co-operation 
and c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the (C.B.I.), i t f o l l o w s t h a t the (C.B.I.) i s 
able t o make i t s e l f aware of the circumstances m which the 
s p e c i a l i s e d banks are oper a t i n g and i t would, presumably, make i t s 
i n f l u e n c e f e l t i n d i r e c t l y , through advice and opinions which i t might 
conceivably express t o the M i n i s t e r . 
(134) 
t h a t provided they work w i t h i n these l i m i t s , the (C.B.I.) i s not able t o 
c o n t r o l them f o r i t has no power t o t e l l them what not t o do. The 
s p e c i a l i s e d banks i n I r a q are i n a p o s i t i o n which enables them t o expand 
t h e i r t o t a l loans t o the p u b l i c , and the (C.B.I.) has no d i r e c t power t o 
t e l l them not t o do t h a t . I t i s advocated here however t h a t , although 
there i s t h i s i n d i r e c t safeguard provided, c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be given 
t o the d e s i r a b i l i t y of making the i n f l u e n c e of the (C.B.I.) over the 
s p e c i a l i s e d banks more e x p l i c i t and d i r e c t i n the matter of i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s and lending operations. Furthermore, the s p e c i a l i s e d banks, u s u a l l y 
lend during any given p e r i o d , a year f o r example, more than r e t u r n s from 
outstanding loans. This expansion takes place w i t h o u t much co n s i d e r a t i o n 
being given t o the general economic s i t u a t i o n a t the time, though t h i s 
might p o s s i b l y r e q u i r e l i m i t i n g t o t a l c r e d i t granted by these banks. The 
f a c t o r s taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n are, as a general r u l e , the a v a i l a b l e 
resources of a s p e c i a l i s e d bank, and the number of borrowers at any 
p a r t i c u l a r time. I t i s advocated here, t h a t a "Board of D i r e c t o r s " 
c o n s i s t i n g of the "General Managers" of the s p e c i a l i s e d banks and a 
chairman representing the (C.B.I.) should be set up. This Board should 
meet r e g u l a r l y , say once a month, or whenever necessary. 
I t could serve two purposes : 
(1) The c o - o r d i n a t i o n of the s p e c i a l i s e d b a n k s ' a c t i v i t i e s as a whole i n 
r e l a t i o n t o the I r a q i economy i n general. 
(2) The conducting of the a c t i v i t i e s of the s p e c i a l i s e d banks w i t h i n the 
broad l i n e s of the monetary p o l i c y which the (C.B.I.) i s f o l l o w i n g a t a 
p a r t i c u l a r time. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the (C.B.I.) being chairman,should 
be able t o give a c l e a r p i c t u r e t o the General Directojs of the s p e c i a l i s e d 
banks, i . e . the members of the Board, whether they should expand, l i m i t , 
or keep the same amount of loans granted by them d u r i n g the r e l e v a n t 
p e r i o d . 
(3) The (C.B.I.) as c o n t r o l l e r of f o r e i g n exchange :-
Before discussing the c o n t r o l of f o r e i g n exchange i n I r a q , i t may be 
u s e f u l t o d e f i n e the term " f o r e i g n exchange c o n t r o l " . P.Einzig defines 
exchange and f o r e i g n c o n t r o l as : "Exchange c o n t r o l i s every form of 
(135) 
i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h the tendencies a f f e c t i n g exchange r a t e s " . T h e 
Law No.(71) of 1941, was the f i r s t Law which introduced f o r e i g n 
exchange c o n t r o l i n I r a q . At f i r s t a committee c a l l e d the "Exchange 
Control Committee" was i n charge of the execution of the exchange 
c o n t r o l . Then i n May 1950, the (C.B.I.) was given the power and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of applying the Exchange Control Law: and i n 
p r a c t i c e , the d u t i e s were exercised through the D i r e c t o r a t e of Foreign 
Exchange. A l l f o r e i g n exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s had~to go through l i c e n s e d 
dealers and persons e s p e c i a l l y authorised by the (D.B.I.). During 1958 
and 1959 l i c e n s i n g was extended t o include a l l imports. The i m p o r t a t i o n 
of some items was p r o h i b i t e d , i n order t o encourage and p r o t e c t domestic 
i n d u s t r y . Importers were required t o be members of a Chamber of Commerce 
and import li c e n c e s were given t o importers i n accordance w i t h t h e i r 
f i n a n c i a l standing and previous t r a n s a c t i o n s . As a r e s u l t of I r a q 's 
withdrawal from the s t e r l i n g area, a new Exchange Control Law was enacted 
i n 1961. A r t i c l e ( 8) of t h i s Law o u t l i n e s the (C.B.I.'s) p o l i c y regarding 
f o r e i g n exchange. I t i n d i c a t e s t h a t ; "The Board of the (C.B.I.) s h a l l 
a l l o c a t e the f o r e i g n exchange r e q u i r e d f o r payments a r i s i n g out of import 
and other t r a n s a c t i o n s , i n accordance w i t h the monetary reserve p o s i t i o n 
and i n conformity w i t h the development o f the n a t i o n a l economy". I n 1963 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on the impo r t i n g of 132 a r t i c l e s were l i f t e d among them drugs, 
f e r t i l i z e r s , and a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery, subject t o the approval of the 
competent r e l e v a n t m i n i s t r y . A l i s t c o n t a i n i n g (67) of p r o h i b i t e d items 
(2) 
was, however, issued, and the l i s t was extended t o (85) items i n 1965. 
Thus exchange c o n t r o l was introduced and developed not simply t o 
administer the a v a i l a b l e resources of f o r e i g n exchange but also t o a s s i s t 
i n the p r o v i d i n g o f p r o t e c t i o n t o c e r t a i n domestic i n d u s t r i e s which were 
thought t o need i t . 
( 4 ) The r e l a t i o n s h i p of the (C.B.I.) w i t h the I r a q i Government and (5) 
the possible c o n t r i b u t i o n of the (C.B.I.) m the promotion of economic 
development: 
For reasons which w i l l be c l e a r from what i s s a i d below 
these two sets of r e l a t i o n s h i p s may be taken together. 
( 1 ) E i n z i g , P., Exchange C o n t r o l , London, Macmillan and Co., 1934, PP. 
(9-10). 
(2) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, ( I r a q ) , 1966, 
P.(31). 
(136) 
As the Law now stands the government xs not e n t i t l e d t o borrow from the 
(C.B.I.) except f o r the purpose of covering temporary and sh o r t - r u n 
shortages of funds. Thxs i s lax d down xn A r t x c l e (4) Sectxon (V) of Law 
No.(72) of 1956| advances should not exceed a t o t a l amount of 10% of 
revenue xn the budget of any ore p a r t i c u l a r year and repayment of each 
advance should normally be made a t the end of the f i n a n c i a l year xn whxch 
the loan had been taken up. Thxs a r t x c l e was designed xn t h i s way i n 
order t o prevent the government from fxnancihg l a r g e defxcxts i n 
o r d i n a r y expenditure on a permanent basxs. This l i m i t a t i o n has an obvious 
bearing upon the power of the Government t o take up funds from the (C.B.I.) 
by way of a d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g arrangement i n order t o use the resources 
of the bank t o provide p a r t of the funds needed f o r a c a p i t a l development 
programme. I f funds, by way of d e f i c x t financxng on thxs long term basis 
were t o be provided by the (C.B.I.) then x t would seem t h a t s p e c i a l 
provxsxon would have t o be made under the Law xn order t o l e g a l i z e the 
s i t u a t x o n . Thxs xs a matter whxch i s given f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n l a t e r 
i n thxs d x s s e r t a t i o n where the p o s s x b i l x t y of using the (C.B.I.) f o r the 
sp e c x f i c purpose of provxding a p a r t of the funds needed f o r c a p i t a l 
development xs examxned i n more d e t a x l . F i n a l l y , a reference t o the assets 
and l i a b x l i t i e s of the (C.B.I.) f o r the l a s t f o u r years may be u s e f u l 
xn rounding o f f the dxscussxon. 
The t a b l e which f o l l o w s shows the assets and l i a b x l x t x e s of the 
(C.B.I.) between 1962 and 1965. The t a b l e shows t h a t the l i a b i l i t i e s o f 
the issue department represented i n issued currency have had a tendency 
t o r i s e d u r i n g the per i o d under review. This increase was r e l a t i v e l y h i gh 
i n some years (20%) i n 1962 over 1963 over 1962, and low i n other years 
(2%) i n 1964 over 1963. The t a b l e shows somewhat sharp changes i n f o r e i g n 
assets and I r a q Government s e c u r i t i e s , and r e l a t x v e l y m i l d changes xn 
gold b u l l i o n h o l d i n g s . Paid-up c a p i t a l shows a tendency t o r i s e d u r i n g the 
perxod, x t rose from (I.D 10.5 mn.) i n 1962 t o (I.D 14 mn.) i n 1965, but 
the reserve maxntaxned i t s l e v e l durxng the perxod. Current accounts 
f l u c t u a t e d durxng the perxod up and down, but other accounts showed a 
tendency t o r i s e . On the assets sxde of the bankxng department, forexgn 
assets showed a very sharp xncrease i n 1963 over 1962, and a sharp f a l l 
(137) 
down xn 1964 over 1963. I r a q Government bonds f e l l from (I.D 10.601 mn.) 
xn 1962 t o n x l i n 1963, then rose t o (I.D 4.963 mn.) i n 1964. The t a b l e 
shows t h a t xn 1964, the (C.B.I.) f o l l o w e d an easier c r e d i t polxcy whxch 
caused an increase of (40%) of loans and advances xn 1964 over 1963. 
Re-discounts and advances showed a tendency t o rxse durxng the perxod. 
I t xs a not unreasonable inference from the course these fxgures take 
t o suggest t h a t the commercxal banks began t o go t o the (C.B.I.) _more 
than, a t e a r l i e r dates, they had been i n the h a b i t of doxng. The (C.B.I.) 
publxshes a "Quarterly B u l l e t i n " t o dxsplay xts actxvxtxes on the one 
hand, and the general economxc sxtuatxon on the other, together wxth 
annual r e p o r t s f o r the same purpose. I t xs suggested here t h a t the 
(C.B.I.) might make more of these r e p o r t s , e.g. by expandxng thexr 
scope and r o l e , x n the enlxghtenment of the general publxc on domestxc 
economxc matters. Furthermore, more e f f o r t s mxght be made t o narrow 
the time-lag between the p u b l i c a t x o n of a r e p o r t and the perxod i t 
deals w i t h ^ 1 ^ . The research department xn the Bank should be 
strengthened by a c q u i r i n g more economists i n d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s xn order 
t o be able t o c o n t r i b u t e towards the elucxdatxon of some of the more 
pressxng economxc problems xn I r a q . 
(1) The 1964 Annual Report,for example, was publxshed at the end 
of 1966. 
CHAPTER SOUR ( 1 3 8 ) 
DEFICIT FINANCING AS MEANS OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN 
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY. 
The main object of t h i s study i s t o discuss the banking 
system m I r a q , the ordinary services which i t provides, the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of improving these s e r v i c e s , and t o examine the c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t the 
banking system might be able t o make t o the economic development of 
I r a q . The banking system, the o r d i n a r y services i t provides, and the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of improving them, were discussed m the l a s t chapter . The 
present chapter deals w i t h the c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t p a r t , indeed an 
important p a r t , of the banking system i . e . the Central Bank, might be 
able t o make t o the promotion of economic development. One of the main 
obstacles i n the way of the promotion of economic development i n 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i s the l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t c a p i t a l funds 
needed t o finance development programmes ; as E.M.Bernstein has s a i d , 
"the i n a b i l i t y t o finance the necessary l e v e l of investment - i s the 
p r i n c i p l e economic l i m i t a t i o n on the r a t e of development"^ 1^. 
The c a p i t a l funds needed f o r economic development can be 
(2) 
provided i n a v a r i e t y of ways . One way i s through the use of the 
banking system and d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , the means being the p r o v i s i o n 
of bank c r e d i t t o the developing a u t h o r i t y , and t h i s i n t u r n may be 
recognised as meaning t h a t investment, other t h i n g s being equal, i s 
being taken beyond the l i m i t i n d i c a t e d by the t o t a l r e a l savings i n 
the community as determined by the p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
This process of f i n a n c i n g through the expansion of bank c r e d i t 
w h i l e s e r v i c e a b l e , w i t h i n l i m i t s , i s not w i t h o u t i t s dangers. 
Under c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s between money i n c i r c u l a t i o n and 
(1) Bernstein, E.M., F i n a n c i a l Problems of Underdeveloped Countries, 
General Problems of Financing Development Programmes, The Journal 
of Finance, Vol. X I I , 1957, Edited by Harold G. Frame and 
Carl A. Dauten, The American Finance A s s o c i a t i o n , P.167 
(2) These ways are discussed s h o r t l y afterwards on PP.( 147-149 ) 
(139) 
the supply of domestic and imported goods and s e r v i c e s , and i n the l i g h t 
o f the e x i s t i n g p r o p e n s i t i e s t o consume, an increase i n the p r i c e l e v e l 
might be engendered and t h i s must be recognised as i n f l a t i o n . I n f l a t i o n , 
i f i t i s not checked and c o n t r o l l e d by the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s , could 
t u r n i n t o h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n w i t h harmful e f f e c t s on the economy. I t f o l l o w s 
t h a t the expansion of bank c r e d i t should be conducted w i t h due regard t o 
the need f o r observing responsibly cautious l i m i t s . These l i m i t s should 
be defined as c a r e f u l l y as possible by the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s ; m other 
words, the aim should be a moderate degree of i n f l a t i o n and no more. I n 
t h i s chapter, t h e r e f o r e , the p o s s i b i l i t y of using d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g as 
a contributes) i n f i n a n c i n g economic development i s discussed, f i r s t , m 
general terms. Since I r a q i s an example of an underdeveloped country i t 
w i l l then be the aim t o examine the p o s i t i o n i n Iyaq. The term 
" p o s s i b i l i t y " i s used d e l i b e r a t e l y , because, each country has i t s 
s p e c i a l circumstances, and what i s possible and / or u s e f u l t o country 
(A) i n i t s s p e c i a l circumstances, might be impossible and / or harmful 
t o country (B) w i t h i t s d i f f e r e n t circumstances. The term 
" c o n t r i b u t o r " i s s i m i l a r l y used d e l i b e r a t e l y : i t i s not the 
i n t e n t i o n t o suggest t h a t d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g should be the sole means 
of f i n a n c i n g economic development : as suggested l a t e r ^ ^ , there are 
various ways i n which finance might, and indeed should, be provided; 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s only one amongst several means. The planning 
a u t h o r i t i e s w i l l be allowed i n t h i s study t o use d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
a t the expense of c r e a t i n g a c o n t r o l l e d degree of i n f l a t i o n , among 
other means of r a i s i n g c a p i t a l funds needed t o finance economic 
development. The discussion of the device of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s 
l i m i t e d t o "underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s " because the use of expansion 
of bank c r e d i t t o r a i s e c a p i t a l funds c e r t a i n l y has advantages, but 
s u r e l y has also disadvantages and i t i s i n underdeveloped co u n t r i e s 
(1) See Pi> ( 147 - 149) 
(140) 
i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t the disadvantages might be l i k e l y t o present 
themselves more s t r o n g l y . Nevertheless, underdeveloped countries, 
because of the s c a r c i t y o f , and t h e i r great need f o r , c a p i t a l funds 
t o finance development programmes, might w e l l consider the p o s s i b l i t y o 
r a i s i n g p a r t of -the funds needed through expansion of bank c r e d i t 
and i t s concomitant d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . This i s because these 
countries might f i n d themselves f a c i n g a s i t u a t i o n m which they have 
t o chose between h o l d i n g back from a p a r t i c u l a r development p r o j e c t 
because of the l a c k of c a p i t a l funds, or using d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i n 
s p i t e of i t s disadvantages. Developed co u n t r i e s can, however, 
look forward w i t h greater assurance t o the c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e i r 
economic growth because they have passed through a stage d u r i n g 
which a s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g mechanism has been evolved, and they have 
reached a s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g growth stage i n t h e i r economies. 
Consequently, developed co u n t r i e s are not forced t o use a method xn 
r a i s i n g c a p i t a l funds which involves such i n f l a t i o n a r y r i s k s . This 
i s not t o say, though, t h a t these methods do n o t , from time t o time, 
take a form which does i n v o l v e the r i s k of i n f l a t i o n . I t a l l depends 
on the degree of development which they are contemplating and the 
flow of saving, together w i t h the degree of t a x a t i o n , which these 
communities w i l l t o l e r a t e . 
Furthermore, most of the developed c o u n t r i e s , are c a p i t a l 
e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s , which means, considered g e n e r a l l y , t h a t they 
have more than t h e i r c u r r e n t needs of c a p i t a l funds, w h i l e i t i s 
extremely d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, f o r underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 
t o provide enough c a p i t a l funds t o finance development programmes. 
As Professors Bernstein and Patel have s a i d : "Whatever other measures 
the underdeveloped co u n t r i e s could and should undertake, they w i l l be 
(1) Rostow's phrases are used here, and elsewhere i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n 
(see PP. 142,143 and 145), f o r convenience of p r e s e n t a t i o n , but i t 
i s not t o be understood from t h e i r usage t h a t the Rostow 
hypothesis i s n e c e s s a r i l y accepted as v a l i d i n a l l respects. 
(141) 
unable to provxde themselves w i t h adequate r e s o u r c e s f o r development out 
of t h e i r own s a v i n g s . T h e i r r e a l l e v e l of income i s low and t h e i r need 
f o r investment i s too great t o enable them to meet i n f u l l t h e i r own 
c a p i t a l r e q u i r e m e n t s " ^ 1 ^ , ( u n d e r l i n i n g not m the o r i g i n a l ) . I n t h i s 
study, a model i n which d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s used as a c o n t r i b u t o r i n 
f i n a n c i n g a f i v e year development programme i n an underdeveloped country 
i s s e t out i n the f o u r t h chapter. Reference w i l l a l s o be made to the 
adjustments which might need to be made i n the model i n order to s u i t 
some p a r t i c u l a r underdeveloped country e.g. e s p e c i a l l y I r a q , and t h i s i s 
done i n the f i f t h c h a p t e r . 
As a r e s u l t of u s i n g t h i s method, i . e . d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , 
a degree of i n f l a t i o n i s expected to emerge, as the a n a l y s i s w i l l 
attempt to show. Th e r e f o r e , a b r i e f i d e a of d i f f e r e n t approaches 
to the d e f i n i t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n f l a t i o n , i s given i n the 
appendix. Furthermore, i t may be wis e to d i s c u s s the advantages and 
disadvantages of i n f l a t i o n , or to be more p r e c i s e , the advantages and 
disadvantages of moderate i n f l a t i o n , and t h i s i s c a r r i e d out i n the 
s i x t h chapter, under the t i t l e , d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g and ths degree o f , a r j f l a t i o i 
? I t may be w i s e to end t h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y note on the use of 
expansion of bank c r e d i t as a means of p a r t - f i n a n c i n g of economic 
development, i n v o l v i n g as i t does not merely the p o s s i b i l i t y but the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of i n f l a t i o n by admitting openly t h a t the m a j o r i t y of 
economists hold views which a r e opposed to such methods because of 
t h e i r i n f l a t i o n a r y outcome. As P . E m z i g has s a i d : "the major p a r t 
of post war l i t e r a t u r e i s c h a r a e t e r i s e d by an a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y b i a s 
(2 ) 
as s t r o n g as the e a r l i e r a n t i - d e f l a t i o n a r y b i a s had been". 
(1) B e r n s t e i n , E.M., and P a t e l , I.G., I n f l a t i o n m R e l a t i o n to 
Economic Development, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund S t a f f 
papers, V o l . I I , 1951-52, PP. 397-398. 
(2) E i n z i g , P., I n f l a t i o n , Chatto and Windus, London, 1952, 
P.81 
(142) 
A MODEL OF AN UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMY WHERE DEFICIT FINANCING 
I S USED AS A CONTRIBUTOR IN FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. 
One of the b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e s between developed and 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i s t h a t developed c o u n t r i e s have passed 
through a stage during which a s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g mechanism w i l l have 
come i n t o e x i s t e n c e i n t h e i r economies, w h i l e underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s have n o t . ~ ~ P r o f e s s o r W. Rostow's theory of development i s , 
of course, the one which expresses t h i s n o t i o n i n i t s most r i g i d 
form. We a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y bound to accept the f u l l r i g o u r of h i s 
argument,^^ nor indeed need we accept h i s s uggestion of n e c e s s i t y 
( 2 ) 
i n connection w i t h a country s passage through the v a r i o u s s t a g e s . 
The process of economic development i n a country i s a much more 
f l e x i b l e t h i n g than Rostow suggests. A l l the same there i s a broad 
element of t r u t h i n h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n and some of the i n s i g h t s which 
he expresses command r e s p e c t : f o r example the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 
have not yet b u i l t i n t o t h e i r economic mechanism those p r o p e n s i t i e s 
and tendencies which,once e s t a b l i s h e d , s e r v e to provide momentum 
(1) C r i t i c i s m s of Rostow's theory of the s t a g e s of development, can 
be found xn a book by G.M.M&ier, e n t x t l e d "Leadxng I s s u e s xn 
Development Economxcs", S e l e c t e d M a t e r i a l s and Commentary, New 
York / Oxford Unxversxty P r e s s 1964, PP. 23-41. And 
G.L.S. S h a c k l e , The Nature of Economxc Thought, Cambridge, At 
the Unxversxty P r e s s 1966. PP. 291-295. 
(2) That xt xs not, n e c e s s a r x l y the case t h a t every under-developed 
country should pass through a t a k e - o f f stage i s w e l l x l l u s t r a t e d 
by the f a c t t h a t some countrxes, such as Canada and A u s t r a l x a , 
have entered the stage of hxgh consumptxon before r e a c h i n g 
m a t u r i t y . 
W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s 8 t h P r i n t i n g 1963, The Chart i n the P r e f a c e . 
(143) 
i n the growth pro c e s s ; secondly xt i s indeed t r u e t h a t a country 
needs to be xn a p o s i t i o n to provide a s x g n i f x c a n t flow of savxngs 
from x t s own income stream, i n order to s u s t a x n progress on the 
b a s i s of x t s own r e s o u r c e s : t h i s much may w e l l be accepted, and 
t h e r e xs a rough r u l e of thumb v a l x d i t y , when r a t e s of population 
growth a r e taken i n t o account, about hxs statement t h a t one of the 
xmportant r e q u i s x t e s f o r the t a k e - o f f stage, among o t h e r s , i s t h a t 
a minimum of 10% of net natxonal income should be xnvested each 
year i f we t h i n k of such a country developxng x t s own power to 
s u s t a x n growth, then i t f o l l o w s t h a t sooner or l a t e r the country w i l l 
need to provxde a flow of savxngs equal to 10% of x t s natxonal 
income, 
(1 ) On the b a s i s of a statement by P r o f e s s o r Rostow when 
he g i v e s the f i g u r e 3 : 1 to 3,5 : 1 to r e p r e s e n t the 
average c a p i t a l / output r a t i o i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , 
i f n a t i o n a l income per c a p i t a i s to i n c r e a s e , then 
the r a t e of population growth per annum should be l e s s 
than ( 2 . 9 % ) , T h i s i s because i f i t were (2.9%) then 
2.9 x 3.5 = 10.15% of net n a t i o n a l income i n a country 
should be i n v e s t e d each year j u s t to keep the e x i s t i n g 
l e v e l of natxonal income per capxta constant, other thxngs 
remaxning the same. But i f the r a t e of growth of 
population i s , say, (1.6%) per annum, then only 
3 , 5 x 1 . 6 = 5.5% of net natxonal xncome should be 
i n v e s t e d each year to keep the e x i s t i n g l e v e l ; and the 
n a t i o n a l xncome per c a p i t a w i l l tend to r i s e by 
4.4 * 3.5 = 1.25% each year xf 10% of net natxonal 
income i s xnvested. I t must be borne i n mind t h a t most 
of the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s have annual r a t e s of 
populatxon growth of more than (1.6%) 
Rostow, W.W., The Stages of Economic Growth, Ninth 
P r i n t i n g , Cambrxdge U n x v e r s i t y P r e s s , 
1963, P.37 
(144) 
I t i s now our i n t e n t i o n to s e t up a model f o r an underdeveloped 
country, which, though i t does not r e p r e s e n t any p a r t i c u l a r country, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , i t s i n t e r - r e l a t e d p a r t s may be thought to behave and 
f u n c t i o n i n a way which does not d i f f e r i n any s i g n i f i c a n t r e s p e c t from 
c o u n t r i e s which could be d e s c r i b e d i n s p e c i f i c r e a l terms, and one 
of them might be I r a q . 
Now l e t us assume t h a t the p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s i n an 
underdeveloped country ( l e t us c a l l i t E r a ) want to c a r r y out i t s 
f i r s t development programme. L e t us furt h e r * assume t h a t i t i s due 
to s t a r t next y e a r , say year ( n ) , and t h a t i t i s envisaged as a 
l i v e year programme. I f i t s economy, w i t h i t s i n t e r - r e l a t e d p a r t s , 
i s thought of as a model then i t i s n e c e s s a r y to b u i l d c e r t a i n 
v a l u e s i n t o the model i n i t i a l l y : some of the v a r i a b l e s which a r e 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n the working of the model must be presented m 
q u a n t i t a t i v e forms : the n e c e s s a r y assumptions a r e as f o l l o w s 
1. The net n a t i o n a l income a t the end of year (n-1) i s (800 mn.) i n 
money terms. 
2. Money i n c i r c u l a t i o n a t the end of year (n-1) i s (400 mn.). Thus 
the income v e l o c i t y of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n i s 800 t 400 = 2. 
3. At the end of year ( n - 1 ) , the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l (P) i s 
i n d i c a t e d by the index 100. 
4. With regard to consumer's goods, the marginal p r o p e n s i t y to import 
i s entered as 1/5 and i s assumed to remain so f o r the next 4 y e a r s , 
u n t i l the domestic economy i s i t s e l f capable of producing a q u a n t i t y 
of consumer's goods, p r e v i o u s l y imported. 
(1 ) I t should be s t a t e d t h a t w h i l e , on r e a l i s t i c grounds, an 
underdeveloped economy a t the rudimentary l e v e l which i s suggested, 
would be l i k e l y to c o n t a i n a s u b s i s t e n c e s e c t o r , the 
q u a n t i t a t i v e assumptions which a r e given apply only to the 
non-subsistence s e c t o r . 
(145) 
5. The average p r o p e n s i t y and marginal p r o p e n s i t y to consume, a re 
both 9/10, and the average p r o p e n s i t y to save and the marginal 
p r o p e n s i t y to save, a r e t h e r e f o r e 1/10, and are assumed to remain 
so, during the p e r i o d of the programme. 
6. I t i s accepted t h a t a l i t t l e manufacturing i n d u s t r y i s i n 
e x i s t e n c e . 
7. The economy i s i n e q u i l i b r i u m , t h a t i s s a v i n g s = investment 
(S = 1) a t the end of year ( n - 1 ) . 
8. The population i n c r e a s e s by (2.9%) per annum. 
9. The average c a p i t a l : output r a t i o i n the d i f f e r e n t s e c t o r s of 
(2) 
the economy and throughout the next f i v e y e a r s i s 3.5 : 1 
(1 ) There are underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s w i t h a higher r a t e of i n c r e a s e 
m population, such a s , S y r i a ( 3 . 2 % ) , per annum, and Venezuela 
(3.4%) per annum. Meanwhile, t h e r e a r e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 
w i t h a lower r a t e of i n c r e a s e , such as I r a q (1.7%) per annum, 
and Argentina (1.6%) per annum. Thus, the f i g u r e (2.9%) has 
been chosen i n our model to r e p r e s e n t , very roughly, an average 
r a t e of population growth i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . 
Source: The Unit e d Nations S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book, 1965, New York 
1966, P.87-91 where the above f i g u r e s r e p r e s e n t Annual r a t e of 
i n c r e a s e 1958-1963. 
( 2 ) P r o f e s s o r Rostow maintains t h a t , a r a t i o of 3 : 1 to 3.5 : 1 
f o r incremental c a p i t a l / o u t p u t r a t i o seems r e a l i s t i c as a 
rough bench-mark u n t i l we have l e a r n e d more about c a p i t a l / o u t p u t 
r a t i o on a s e c t o r a l b a s i s . 
W.W.Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Ninth P r i n t i n g , 
Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963. P.37 
(146) 
I n order to maintain the e x i s t i n g n a t i o n a l income per c a p i t a , a 
t o t a l amount of 3.5 x 2.9 = 10.15 or 10% of the net n a t i o n a l 
income should be spent on investment every y e a r . However, the goal 
of the development programme envisaged i s to r a i s e r e a l n a t i o n a l 
income per c a p i t a by ( 4 % ) a y e a r . T h e r e f o r e , t o a c h i e v e t h i s t a r g e t , 
(24%) of "the net n a t i o n a l "income, i . e . 3.5 x 2.9 + 3.5 x 4 
= 1 0 + 1 4 = 24% should be i n v e s t e d each year, under the 
c o n d i t i o n s and circumstances p r e v a i l i n g a t t h a t time. I n other 
words 800 x 24 = (192 ran.) i n money terms, should be i n v e s t e d . 
100 
On such a b a s i s the s i t u a t i o n , other t h i n g s being equal, would be 
one i n which the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l remained the same. The 
p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s , however, have adopted the view t h a t the g e n e r a l 
l e v e l of p r i c e s may be l i k e l y to r i s e and they have, t h e r e f o r e , allowed 
f o r some degree of r i s e i n t h e i r f i g u r e s f o r the amounts to be spent 
during each year of the p r o g r a m m e . T h e y assume t h a t p r i c e s may 
r i s e by 1% a n n u a l l y and they t h e r e f o r e p l a n t h a t i f (192 mn.) i s to 
be spent during the f i r s t y e ar, then (192 + 1.92) = 193.92 ( s a y 
194 mn.) should be a l l o c a t e d as investment spending i n the second 
y e a r . Applying the same percentage r i s e they a l l o w f o r (196 mn.) 
i . e . (194 + (194 + 1 ) ) i n the t h i r d year of the development 
100 
programme. The problem t h a t now p r e s e n t s i t s e l f i s how to r a i s e a 
t o t a l of (980 mn.) i n monetary terms to be spent during the f i v e 
y e a r s of the programme 
( 1 ) According to E.M.Bernstein : "The r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n investment i n 
an underdeveloped country must i n v o l v e some r i s e i n p r i c e s and 
wages i n the i n d u s t r i e s most a f f e c t e d by the development 
programme". 
F i n a n c i a l Problems of underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , General Problems 
of f i n a n c i n g development programmes, The J o u r n a l of F i n a n c e , 
V o l . X I I , 1957. The American F i n a n c e A s s o c i a t i o n . 
(147) 
The o r d i n a r y methods of r a i s i n g such an amount would 
be :- net amount of tax revenue ( a f t e r a l l o w i n g f o r o r d i n a r y 
e x p e n d i t u r e ) , net domestic s a v i n g s ( a f t e r a l l o w i n g f o r h o a r d i n g ) , net 
v a l u e of exports over imports, and f o r e i g n loans and g r a n t s . A 
f i f t h method which may be a p p l i e d i n case of n e c e s s i t y , i s 
borrowing from the C e n t r a l Bank, i . e . expansion of bank c r e d i t . The 
p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s , xn ( E r a ) , knowing t h e i r economy, have thought 
t h a t the f o l l o w i n g f i g u r e s may r e p r e s e n t amounts of c a p i t a l funds whxch 
could be provided through the four methods mentioned above. 
(1 ) T a x a t i o n : revenue w i t h i n the next f i v e y e a r s i s e s t i m a t e d to 
be (910 mn.) i n money terms. They considered t h i s f i g u r e as a 
reasonable one which could not be i n c r e a s e d without the r i s k of 
harmful e f f e c t s on the economy. I n other words the f i g u r e could 
be c o n s i d e r e d as a maximum t a x a b l e c a p a c i t y . T h i s phrase, as 
H.Dalton has s a i d xs, "a common phrase but a dxm and confused 
conception". ^ N e v e r t h e l e s s the xmportant p o i n t here xs t h a t 
(910 mn.) i n money terms i s the maximum amount which the p l a n n i n g 
a u t h o r i t i e s expect the t a x revenue to amount t o w i t h i n the 
next f i v e y e a r s . As P r o f e s s o r Higgins p o i n t s out, "For any country 
a t each p o i n t of time t h e r e i s some maximum t a x a b l e capacxty, a 
r a t x o of t a x c o l l e c t i o n to n a t i o n a l income, t h a t w i l l maxxmise the 
( 2 ) 
growth of natxonal xncome over some planning p e r i o d " . 
The planning a u t h o r x t i e s recognised t h a t , out of the 
(910 mn.) i n money terms, (587 mn.) i s expected to be a l l o c a t e d f o r 
normal publxc expendxture, and (323 mn.) could be a l l o c a t e d to 
contrxbute towards the f i n a n c i n g of the development programme. 
(1 ) Dalton, H., P r i n c i p l e s of P u b l i c F i n a n c e , 23rd Impression, 
Routledge and Kegan P a u l L t d . , 1961, P.17 
(2 ) Higgins, B., Government Finance and Economic Development. 
E d i t e d by A.T. Peacock, and G.Hauser, O.E.C. P a r i s , 1965, 
PP. 25-26. 
(148) 
Furthermore, the planning a u t h o r i t i e s expect t a x revenue to i n c r e a s e 
as a r e s u l t of spending a d d i t i o n a l amounts on investment which l e a d s 
to an i n c r e a s e m d i s t r i b u t e d incomes and p r o f i t s , other t h i n g s 
remaining the same. I t f o l l o w s t h a t even i f t he e x i s t i n g t a x a t i o n 
system i s maintained tax revenues w i l l tend to r i s e . Consequently, 
i n the f i r s t y e a r (60 mn.) i n money terms i s the estimated 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of tax revenue to the development programme, (61 mn.) 
i n the second, (64 mn.) i n the t h i r d , (66 mn.) i n the f o u r t h , and 
(72 mn.) i n the f i f t h / 1 ^ 
( 1) T a x a t i o n m underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d e s the revenue 
from c o n c e s s i o n s of f o r e i g n companies regarding the 
u t i l i z a t i o n of n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s i n the s e c o u n t r i e s . Antonin Basch, 
f o r example, i n d i s c u s s i n g revenue from petroleum i n 
o i l - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s maintains t h a t , "Such revenues have been 
r e c e i v e d i n v a r i o u s forms - r o y a l t i e s , p r o f i t s h a r i n g , income 
tax and s p e c i a l exchange p r o f i t s (buying f o r e i g n exchange from 
o i l companies a t a lower r a t e than the s e l l i n g r a t e " ) . 
Basch, A,, F i n a n c i n g Economic Development, The Macmillan 
Co., New York, 1964, PP. 80-81. 
Our a n a l y s i s i s not, a t the moment, confined to any p a r t i c u l a r 
group of underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , but r e f e r s to 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n g e n e r a l : i t may however a l s o be 
borne m mind t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l l a t e r have to be giv e n 
to the p o s i t i o n of I r a q and i t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t t h i s 
r e f e r e n c e may perhaps be regarded as a l l o w a b l e . 
(149) 
( 2 ) Domestic Savings :- On the b a s i s of the assumption of an average 
and marginal p r o p e n s i t y to save of 1/10, the planning a u t h o r i t i e s 
c a l c u l a t e domestic savings to be : 800 x 1 = (80 mn.) i n money 
terms, a t the end of year (n-1) i . e . the year which precedes the 
beginning of the development programme. But as the n a t i o n a l income i s 
expected to r i s e , as a r e s u l t of the e x e c u t i o n of the development 
programme, other things being the same, the planning a u t h o r i t i e s a llow 
f o r an i n c r e a s e i n s a v i n g s . Furthermore, i t i s e stimated t h a t something 
l i k e (35 mn.) i n monetary terms i s expected to be hoarded by income 
r e c e i v e r s each year throughout the development programme.^^Consequently, 
i t i s expected t h a t the net amount of s a v i n g s a v a i l a b l e to be c h a n n e l l e d 
i n t o p r oductive investment w i l l tend t o be (45 mn.) i n money terms i n 
t h e f i r s t y e ar, (47 mn.) i n the second, (51 mn.) i n the t h i r d , (54 mn.) 
( 2 ) 
i n the f o u r t h , and (593 mn.) m the f i f t h y e a r . I n other words net 
domestic savings are expected to provide a t o t a l amount of (256 mn.) m 
money terms during the f i v e y e a r s of the programme. 
( 3 ) Net Value of exports over imports :- A n a l y s i n g the average l e v e l of 
exports during the l a s t f i v e y e a r s , and t a k i n g i n t o account the p o s s i b l e 
changes i n the amount and s t r u c t u r e of exports during the next f i v e years, 
t h e planning a u t h o r i t i e s e s t i m a t e t h a t the s u r p l u s v a l u e of exports over 
imports other than c a p i t a l items may provide an average amount of 
(22 mn.) i n money terms a y e a r , or a t o t a l of (110 mn.) m the next f i v e 
y e a r s , 
( 4 ) F o r e i g n Loans and grants :- Taking i n t o account a l l the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of o b t a i n i n g grants and l o a n s , from f o r e i g n , p r i v a t e 
i n v e s t o r s , governments, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , the planning 
a u t h o r i t i e s come to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , a reasonable f i g u r e of (70 mn.) 
i n money terms may be obtained through t h i s method during the next f i v e 
y e a r s ; i n other words an average of (14 mn.) per y e a r . 
( 1 ) The assumption concerning hoarding i s based upon the commonly 
accepted view t h a t i n an undeveloped country t h e r e w i l l tend not 
o n l y to be a s t r o n g l y i n g r a i n e d p r o p e n s i t y to hoard but a l s o t h a t 
the percentage of hoarding of any new income t h a t may become 
a v a i l a b l e to income-receivers might tend to be h i g h . 
( 2 ) The i n c r e a s e i n net s a v i n g s i s not to be i n t e r p r e t e d as due to a 
d e c l i n e i n the amounts hoarded but to an i n c r e a s e i n the t o t a l sums 
withdrawn from the income flow out of which, of course. With 
hoardings remaining the same, as the n a t i o n a l income i n c r e a s e s . 
(150) 
Consequently, on these c a l c u l a t i o n s the p o s i t i o n i s t h a t , the t o t a l 
estimated amount to be provided by o r d i n a r y methods i s (759 ! mn.) i n 
money terms during the next f i v e y e a r s , out of a t o t a l amount of 
(980 mn.) which should be provided as a minimum, to f i n a n c e the 
development programme. T h i s means t h a t t h e r e i s a gap of (221 mn.) 
i n money terms between the estimated revenue to f i n a n c e the programme 
and the a c t u a l minimum amount needed. 
I f , t h e r e f o r e , as has been assumed, the programme of 
development which has been envisaged i s not, f o r whatever reason, 
e a s i l y reduced f i n a n c i a l l y without s e r i o u s damage to the whole, then 
the planning a u t h o r i t i e s w i l l f i n d themselves compelled to chose 
between two t h i n g s :-
( a ) Put a s i d e f o r the time being a l l i d e a of economic development 
on the grounds t h a t : 
( i ) a l l the o r d i n a r y and u s u a l methods of r a i s i n g c a p i t a l funds to 
f i n a n c e the development programme have been e x p l o i t e d to t h e i r 
maximum l i m i t . 
( i i ) No s c a l i n g down t o s m a l l e r proportion i s p o s s i b l e , the p l a n 
being regarded as r e p r e s e n t i n g minimum requirements, anything l e s s 
being r u l e d out as i n o p e r a b l e . 
( 2 ) 
(b) Use d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g w h i l e r e c o g n i s i n g q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t 
t h i s d e v i c e i s l i k e l y t o have i n f l a t i o n a r y consequences. For t h i s 
r eason i t i s a l s o r e cognised t h a t t h i s way of r a i s i n g c a p i t a l funds 
( 1 ) That i s i f we assume t h a t the purchasing power of domestic currency 
w i l l tend to d e p r e c i a t e by only 1% a y e a r , as indeed i s assumed e a r l i e r , 
but as the planning a u t h o r i t i e s have decided to use d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , 
as mentioned s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s , i t i s expected t h a t the g e n e r a l p r i c e 
l e v e l may r i s e by more than t h a t : f o r a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s 
p o i n t see (PP. 190 - 191 ) . 
( 2 ) The term d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i n t h i s study i s used t o mean : 
"Net a d d i t i o n a l c r e d i t made a v a i l a b l e to the planning a u t h o r i t i e s by 
a c e n t r a l bank i n a country, being the i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t should be 
used f o r the purpose of p r o v i d i n g p a r t of the c a p i t a l funds needed to 
c a r r y out a development programme". 
T h i s i s not the only sense i n which the term can be used: indeed 
d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s have used the term i n d i f f e r e n t ways: some d i s c u s s i o n 
of these d i f f e r e n c e s i n usage i s g iven i n Appendix ( 3 ) . 
(151) 
i n v o l v e s a c e r t a i n element of r i s k . How r i s k y i n f a c t i t w i l l prove 
to be, w i l l depend on the circumstances of the country which has 
decided to adopt the d e v i c e of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . Here we w i l l 
assume t h a t the plan n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s of E r a , knowing the 
circumstances of t h e i r economy, w i l l shape some notions of what the 
consequences of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g might be : we w i l l assume t h a t 
having analysed, as best they can, the p u b l i c ' s confidence i n the 
domestic currency, the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e i g n exchange, and the 
ti m e - l a g between an i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r and the supply of domestic 
and imported goods and s e r v i c e s , they have reached the c o n c l u s i o n 
t h a t an i n c r e a s e of 10% a year i n money i n c i r c u l a t i o n would not 
i n v o l v e great r i s k s . Thus, the planning a u t h o r i t i e s - e i t h e r the 
Government i t s e l f or a u t h o r i s e d i n t h i s a c t i o n by the government -
would request the c e n t r a l bank to hold i t s e l f ready to make 
a v a i l a b l e an i n c r e a s e i n drawing r i g h t s i n v o l v i n g , by the end of the 
pe r i o d , a year f o r example, an expected i n c r e a s e i n the aggregate 
money supply^of* the order of approximately 10% o v e r a l l . 
There are v a r i o u s ways i n which a c e n t r a l bank could i n c r e a s e the 
funds a t the d i s p o s a l of a spending a u t h o r i t y , they a r e :-
( a ) Through advances to the banking system. 
(b) Re-discount of government s e c u r i t i e s h e l d by commercial banks. 
( c ) A decrease m the minimum l e g a l r e s e r v e requirement of the 
commercial banks. 
(d) lending d i r e c t l y to the government. 
I n the s i t u a t i o n now considered, i t i s v i s u a l i s e d t h a t 
the c e n t r a l bank lends d i r e c t l y to the government, as the planning 
and spending a u t h o r i t y , and t h a t the funds provided by the c e n t r a l 
bank through c r e d i t expansion w i l l be d i f f u s e d through the system as 
the spending requirements of the p l a n a r e met-. Money i n c i r c u l a t i o n 
i s expected to r i s e , other t h i n g s being equal, as a r e s u l t of spending ar 
a d d i t i o n a l 10% a ye a r . T h e r e f o r e , the absolute amount of the 10% w i l l 
tend to r i s e . Consequently the planning and spending a u t h o r i t y i s 
allowed to draw :-
(1) By 'money supply' i s meant the t o t a l of cash, notes, and 
demand d e p o s i t s . 
(152) 
400 x 10 = (40 mn.) i n money terms from the c e n t r a l bank during 
100 
the f i r s t year of the programme, and 420 x 10 = 42 mn. during the 
100 
second, 44 mn. during the t h i r d , 46 mn. during the f o u r t h and 49 mn. 
during the f i f t h , as the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e shows. 
The f i g u r e s which have been entered i n t o the c a l c u l a t i o n s 
of the planning a u t h o r i t i e s would, i f assembled and t a b u l a t e d take the 
f o l l o w i n g form :- Table (P) 
F i n a n c i a l requirements and sources of funds of a f i v e year development programme m (Era/l. 
Year Net t a x a t i o n 
f o r 
Development 
Net domestic 
Savings 
Net exports 
over 
imports 
F o r e i g n 
loans 
and 
grants 
D e f i c i t 
F i n a n c i n g 
n 
n + 1 
n + 2 
n + 3 
n + 4 
60 
61 
64 
66 
72 
45 
47 
51 
54 
59 
22 
22 
22 
22 
22 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
40 
42 
44 
46 
49 
T o t a l 323 25'6 110 70 221 
I f t h i s amount of money i s spent during the year, demand 
fo r goods and s e r v i c e s , w i l l i n c r e a s e by the same amount, i . e . (40 mn.) 
i n money terms during the f i r s t year f o r example. I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
assuming t h a t production and imports were co n s t a n t , the marginal 
p r o p e n s i t y to consume were u n i t y , then the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l w i l l tend 
to r i s e from (100) to ; 
MV 440 x 2 
800 
880 
800 
= 110 (1 ) 
(1) T h i s i s expressed i n terms of the q u a n t i t y theory of the v a l u e of 
money, and the f i g u r e (2) r e p r e s e n t s the average v e l o c i t y of money i n 
our model, w i t h r e s p e c t to f i n a l income : f o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of 
t h i s procedure see P.P(l67-169). 
(153) 
Thxs xs not what a c t u a l l y w x l l tend to happen, because, 
when demand f o r domestic and xmported goods r x s e s , p r o f x t s w x l l tend 
to xncrease, and xf t h i s xncrease continues f o r an extended perxod, 
producers of domestxc goods and s e r v x c e s w x l l t r y t o get a l a r g e r 
s h a r e of p r o f x t s by tryxng to i n c r e a s e thexr productxon, to s a t x s f y 
p a r t or a l l of the xncrease xn demand. Another p a r t of the xncrease 
xn demand xs expected to be s a t x s f i e d by an xncrease xn xmports 
( a s f o r the proportxon of thxs p a r t , xt depends on the margxnal 
propensxty to xmport, and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e i g n exchange). 
A t h x r d p a r t xs expected to be saved by the income r e c e i v e r s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , the g e n e r a l prxce l e v e l may tend to r i s e i f only 
p a r t of the i n c r e a s e xn demand could be s a t i s f x e d . T h i s c a l l s f o r 
the c o n s i d e r a t x o n of s e v e r a l questxons. F x r s t l y , w x l l the i n c r e a s e 
xn the g e n e r a l prxce l e v e l , xn so f a r as t h e r e xs any, a f f e c t the 
volume of exports, by weakenxng the competxtxve power of these 
exports xn the world market ? Agaxn w x l l c r e d x t o r c o u n t r i e s p r e f e r 
not to lend to underdeveloped country ( E r a ) , because of the p o s s i b l e 
weakness of the domestxc currency compared wxth other c u r r e n c i e s ? 
T h i r d l y , w x l l the o r i g x n a l i n c r e a s e xn the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l , xn so 
f a r as t h e r e xs any, xnduce a f u r t h e r xncrease xn p r x c e s , x.e. 
engender a cumulative x n f l a t x o n ? F o u r t h l y : xs the r e a l natxonal 
income l i k e l y to i n c r e a s e as a r e s u l t of spendxng these funds ? 
F x n a l l y , a f t e r a r x s e i n the g e n e r a l prxce l e v e l , w x l l the plannxng 
authorxtxes have to pay higher prxces f o r the f a c t o r s of productxon 
whxch a r e needed to c a r r y out the development programme ? These, and 
other questxons, w x l l be looked a t throughout the a n a l y s i s ; f o r the 
txme being xt xs assumed t h a t t h e r e w x l l be no, or a neglxgxble, e f f e c t 
of the r i s e i n the g e n e r a l prxce l e v e l on exports, forexgn l o a n s , and 
the c o s t of c a r r y i n g out the development programme; xf a d x f f e r e n t 
vxew i s h e l d a t any poxnt xt w x l l be mentxoned. 
(1) Thxs behavxour of the producers xs explaxned on P (157) 
(154) 
The main purpose of t h i s a n a l y s i s i s to d i s c u s s the p o s s i b i l i t y of an 
i n c r e a s e m production and n a t i o n a l income of an underdeveloped 
country, by an expansion of bank c r e d i t according to a c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d 
p l a n , and under the s t r i c t c o n t r o l of the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s . The 
d i s c u s s i o n w i l l t h e r e f o r e be confined to the e f f e c t s of spending the 
funds which a r e to be r a i s e d through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , and not to the 
spending of the whole amount of funds which a r e to be spent each year 
under the programme. The planning a u t h o r i t i e s decided to spend funds 
provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g on s e t t i n g up such p r o j e c t s as might 
tend to r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e i n the production of goods f o r which the 
demand i s l a r g e and expected even to i n c r e a s e i n the f u t u r e , and not 
being s a t i s f i e d a t the moment by domestic production. T h e r e f o r e , a f t e r 
a n a l y s i n g the supply of, and the demand f o r , c l o t h i n g i n the domestic 
market, the planning a u t h o r i t i e s , make the assumption t h a t demand f o r 
c l o t h i n g a t the end of the f o u r t h year of the programme (n + 3) may be 
(80 mn.) worth i n money terms a t the expected market p r i c e s of t h a t 
time. 
Operating a t t h e i r maximum c a p a c i t y the e x i s t i n g c l o t h i n g 
f a c t o r i e s a r e c a l c u l a t e d to be capable of su p p l y i n g only (17 mn.) worth 
of the expected t o t a l demand : the remainder (63 m i l l i o n worth) would 
have to be s a t i s f i e d by imported c l o t h i n g . T h e r e f o r e , the planning 
a u t h o r i t i e s decided to s e t up (10) c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s , w i t h a t o t a l 
( 2 ) 
annual production of (63 mn.) worth of c l o t h i n g . 
( 1 ) The va l u e i s expressed i n terms of the p r i c e s which a r e expected to 
have been c r e a t e d by the d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g by the end of the planning 
p e r i o d . 
( 2 ) I t i s assumed here t h a t the planning a u t h o r i t i e s i n underdeveloped 
country ( E r a ) ( m our model) decided to spend the c a p i t a l funds 
provided by d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g on the s e t t i n g up of c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s . 
The ground f o r t h i s i s t h a t according to the United Nations e x p e r t s , the 
c o t t o n t e x t i l e i s :- "a l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r y w i t h f a i r l y modest 
c a p i t a l requirements, s t a n d a r d i z e d machinery and r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e raw 
m a t e r i a l s , s e r v i n g a demand t h a t i s urgent and g e n e r a l l y i n e l a s t i c , o f t e n 
a pioneer i n the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s " . 
United Nations, P r o c e s s e s and Problems of I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , Department of Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s , 
New York, 1955. P.141 
(155) 
The process of s e t t i n g up these f a c t o r i e s i s to be f i n a n c e d by the 
funds r a i s e d through expansion of bank c r e d i t , i . e . d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g . The planning and spending a u t h o r i t i e s , i t has been 
arranged, are to r e c e i v e a (10%) of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n from the 
c e n t r a l bank at the beginning of each year of the development 
programme, by making a v a i l a b l e an i n c r e a s e i n drawing r i g h t s 
c o v e r i n g t h i s amount. T h i s amount, i t was decided, i s to be spent 
on three c a t e g o r i e s :-
( 1 ) The c o n s t r u c t i o n of b u i l d i n g s f o r the f a c t o r i e s , houses f o r the 
workers, to be, i n the f a c t o r i e s , and the r e q u i r e d roads, i n order 
to connect these f a c t o r i e s w i t h the sources of raw m a t e r i a l s , and 
market c e n t r e s , w i t h estimated t o t a l c o s t of (100 mn.) i n money terms. 
The process of c o n s t r u c t i o n of these f a c t o r i e s and 
other b u i l d i n g s , i t was planned, w i l l s t a r t at the beginning of the 
f i r s t year of the programme,and be die to be completed by the end of 
the f o u r t h y e a r . The t o t a l c o s t i . e . the (100 mn.) i s to be spent 
during a four year p e r i o d , i . e . (25 mn.) a y e a r . 
( 2 ) The importation of c a p i t a l goods (weaving machines) w i t h a 
t o t a l c o s t of (72 mn.) i n money terms. The p l a n n i n g and spending 
a u t h o r i t i e s agreed to pay to the c a p i t a l e x p o r t i n g country t h i s 
amount i n the f o l l o w i n g way : (15 inn.) a t the beginning of year ( n ) , 
(17 mn.) at the beginning of year (n + 1 ) , (19 mn.) a t the beginning 
of year (n + 2 ) , and (21 m n) a t the beginning of year (n + 3 ) . 
I n r e t u r n , the c a p i t a l e x p o rting country has agreed to the supply 
d e l i v e r y , and i n s t a l l a t i o n of a s p e c i f i e d number of a c e r t a i n type 
and s i z e of weaving machine. 
( 3 ) Working c a p i t a l of (49 mn.) i n money terms ( i . e . an average 
of (4.9 inn.) f o r each f a c t o r y , which i s to be provided at the 
beginning of the f i f t h year of the programme. By t h i s time, the 
b u i l d i n g s are expected to have been completed, the machines d e l i v e r e d 
and i n s t a l l e d , and workers and managers t r a i n e d and ready to run 
these f a c t o r i e s . 
(156) 
L e t us assume t h a t the c o n s t r u c t i o n f i r m estimated t h a t out of 
the (25 mn.) i n money terms which i s to be spent on b u i l d i n g the 
f a c t o r i e s and other b u i l d i n g s (15 mn.) i s to be p a i d as wages 
during each year, and the r e s t , i . e . (10 mn.) i s to be p a i d f o r the 
b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s producers. Thus the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n 
d i s t r i b u t e d incomes w i l l be (25 mn.) i n money terms, a y e a r . At the 
end of the f i r s t week, i f the workers are p a i d weekly, the newly 
employed workers w i l l r e c e i v e t h e i r wages and s t a r t to spend them, 
on consumer's goods and s e r v i c e s , domestic and imported. 
Consequently, demand f o r consumers goods w i l l tend to r i s e . The 
r e t a i l e r s i n the consumption s e c t o r f a c e t h i s i n c r e a s e i n the f i r s t 
two or t h r e e weeks by a l l o w i n g t h e i r s t o c k of consumer's goods to 
run down. 
When t h i s i n c r e a s e i n demand continues, the r e t a i l e r s 
i n c r e a s e the q u a n t i t i e s which they u s u a l l y order from the 
w h o l e s a l e r s , i n order to r e p l e n i s h t h e i r s t o c k , on the one hand, and 
to meet the contin u i n g i n c r e a s e i n demand on the other. The 
w h o l e s a l e r s f a c e t h i s i n c r e a s e m demand from r e t a i l e r s by running 
down t h e i r s t o c k of consumer's goods at f i r s t . But as t h i s i n c r e a s e 
continues f o r s e v e r a l weeks, the w h o l e s a l e r s i n c r e a s e t h e i r u s u a l 
orders f o r the producers of consumer's goods f o r the domestic market. 
Thus demand p r e s s u r e s w i l l be developed i n the domestic market which , 
under c e r t a i n c ircumstances, could have the a f f e c t of induc i n g a r i s e 
i n p r i c e s i n the consumer's goods s e c t o r . The consumers goods 
producers s a t i s f y the i n c r e a s e i n demand by the w h o l e s a l e r s a t the 
beginning, by running down t h e i r s t o c k of consumer's goods. As the 
i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r consumer's goods continues f o r an extended 
p e r i o d , producers, as t h e i r s t o c k s of these goods are running down, 
s t a r t to t h i n k about expanding t h e i r p r oductive c a p a c i t y . 
Meanwhile, as a r e s u l t of the c o n t i n u i n g r i s e i n demand, turnover 
tends to i n c r e a s e . I t f o l l o w s t h a t other t h i n g s being equal, 
p r o f i t s per u n i t of c a p i t a l employed w i l l tend to r i s e , simply 
because of the i n c r e a s e i n the r a t e of use of the f i x e d c a p i t a l . 
Consequently, producers of consumer's goods s t a r t to gam hig h e r 
than the normal r a t e of p r o f i t s which has been r u l i n g before the 
(157) 
i n c r e a s e xn demand took p l a c e . Consumers w i l l b i d a g a i n s t each 
other f o r s h o r t s u p p l i e s , w h i l e s e l l e r s w i l l be induced to charge 
more per u n i t . E v e n t u a l l y , consumer's goods producers w i l l t r y to 
i n c r e a s e t h e i r production i n order to s a t i s f y the i n c r e a s i n g demand 
and get a l a r g e r s h a r e of p r o f i t s . 
( 1 ) I n the above a n a l y s i s i t i s i n d i c a t e d t h a t , producers of 
consumers goods i n underdeveloped country " ( E r a ) w i l l t r y 
to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production i n order to s a t i s f y p a r t or 
a l l of the r i s e i n demand, and get a l a r g e r s h a r e of 
p r o f i t s and not only to s e l l t h e i r products a t higher 
p r i c e s . T h i s i s due to two reasons : 
(1) Competition among themselves. 
( i i ) Competition of imported goods, i n so f a r as these may be 
good s u b s t i t u t e s f o r domestic goods. 
However, i t may be d i f f i c u l t f o r producers i n an underdeveloped 
country to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production, e s p e c i a l l y i n a s h o r t 
p e r i o d , because, t h e r e may be " b o t t l e n e c k s " such a s , 
the t r a i n i n g of the r e q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l number of workers 
needed f o r expansion and they may have to f a c e the problem of 
a p o s s i b l e shortage of f o r e i g n exchange needed f o r importation 
of c a p i t a l f o r expansion. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s by no means 
imp o s s i b l e to i n c r e a s e the production of consumer's goods i n 
an underdeveloped country to a l i m i t e d e x t ent m the s h o r t 
term and to a l a r g e r extent i n the long-term as the a n a l y s i s 
w i l l attempt to show. To support t h i s view an example of 
what a c t u a l l y happened i n an underdeveloped country i . e . 
I r a q i i s g i v e n here "The I r a q i Spinning and T e x t i l e 
F a t t a h Pasha and J u t e ( n a t i o n a l i s e d ) companies, together w i t h 
the Medical Cotton A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , expanded t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e 
c a p a c i t i e s by adding new production u n i t s , other concerns i n 
the p r i v a t e s e c t o r a l s o followed s u i t during the y e a r " . 
The C e n t r a l Bank of I r a q , Annual Report, 1964, Zahra P r e s s , Baghdad, 
p.21. 
However, t h e r e a r e economists who do not agree w i t h t h i s 
view, such a s , P r o f e s s o r A. Lewis, Theory of Economic Growth, Unwin 
U n i v e r s i t y Books, 6th Impression, 1963, P.218 
(158) 
Now, before d i s c u s s i n g how the producers i n c r e a s e t h e i r production, 
i t may be u s e f u l to d i s c u s s the p o s s i b l e consequences of spending 
an a d d i t i o n a l amount of (25 mn.) i n money terms i n t h i s underdeveloped 
country ( E r a ) , and what a r e the channels through which t h i s 
expenditure w i l l tend to go ? 
The c o n s t r u c t i n g f i r m i s expected to spend (25 mn.) i n 
money terms during each year and f o r four y e a r s , on the c o n s t r u c t i n g 
of b u i l d i n g s f o r _ t h e f a c t o r i e s , the n e c e s s a r y roads to-connect these 
f a c t o r i e s w i t h the near-by markets, and on houses f o r workers and 
managers to be i n these f a c t o r i e s . 
T h e r e f o r e , d i s t r i b u t e d incomes w i l l tend t o r i s e by 
(25 mn.) i n money terms m the f i r s t s tage; assuming t h a t other t h i n g s 
remain the same, and th a t the p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t r u c t i n g f i r m i n ( E r a ) i s 
state-owned, and, by p o l i c y makes no p r o f i t s . As i t i s assumed t h a t the 
marginal p r o p e n s i t y to consume ( E r a ) i s 9/10,and the marginal p r o p e n s i t y 
to save i s 1/10, i t f o l l o w s t h a t (2.5 mn.) i n money terms, i . e . : 
(25 x 1/10 = 2.5) i s expected to be saved and the remaining (22.5 mn.) 
w i l l be spent on domestic and imported consumer's g o o d s . T h e marginal 
p r o p e n s i t y to import ( f o r consumer's goods) i s assumed to be 1/5, 
t h e r e f o r e : 22.5 x 1/5 = (4.5 mn.) i n money terms i s the expected 
i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r imports, and the r e s t , i . e . (18 mn.) to i n c r e a s e 
(2) 
demand f o r domestic consumer s goods m the f i r s t s t a g e . The average 
(1 ) The M u l t i p l i e r , i n our model w i l l be (under our assumption) :-
1 1 
1 - 9 1 x 10 = 10 
1 0 1 0 
where ( 1 ) above the l i n e r e p r e s e n t s an i n c r e a s e i n d i s t r i b u t e d income 
and demand, d i v i d e d by the i n c r e a s e i n income minus the MPC. When leakages are taken i n t o account the f i n a l ( n e t ) value i s , o f course, much l e s s . 
( 2 ) T h i s could be i l l u s t r a t e d m t h i s way :-
The f i r s t stage 
25 ( Y) 2.5 (As) out of which ( 1 . 1 mn.) i s hoarded 
The second stagfe--^ _ , A , . 
B ^ 22.5 (Ac) ,_— 1 8 (AD D C G ) 
out of which 0 . 8 i s hoarded 4.5 1 ™ 
1 8 1 , 8 « = — 1 3 ( A D . D . C . G ) 
1 6 (AC) 3 & ± M 
(159) 
v e l o c i t y of money xn c i r c u l a t i o n i s assumed to be 2. T h i s i s intended 
to i n d i c a t e t h a t money i n c i r c u l a t i o n e n t e r s i n t o the t r a n s a c t i o n s 
sequences of the economy i n such a way t h a t f i n a l income i s i n c r e a s e d 
to the extent of tw i c e the amount of money t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e and used. 
T h i s may be f u r t h e r expressed as meaning th a t the volume and frequency 
of t r a n s a c t i o n s i n t o which money e n t e r s maintain t h a t constancy which 
w i l l keep the income v e l o c i t y of money a t 2, p r e c i s e l y . T h i s of course 
i n v o l v e s — a - v e r y — s i m p l i f y i n g — a s s u m p t i o n - a b o u t — t h e — t r a n s a c t i o n s — v e l o c i t y — 
of money but i t i s n e c e s s a r y i f the f i g u r e of 2 f o r the income v e l o c i t y 
of money i s to be accepted as a c o r r e c t f i g u r e f o r i n c l u s i o n i n the 
model. Therefore i t seems l o g i c a l t o say t h a t only two st a g e s of the 
m u l t i p l i e r a r e expected to operate during the ye a r . Consequently, i f 
the m u l t i p l i e r i s to have i t s f u l l e f f e c t s on the economy, the 
a d d i t i o n a l amount of i n c r e a s e i n money i n c i r c u l a t i o n should change 
hands (10) times, and m our model i t w i l l have taken t e n s t a g e s , i . e . 
f i v e y e a r s f o r the process to r e g i s t e r i t s f u l l e f f e c t s . I n the second 
stage (1.8 mn.) i n money terms w i l l tend to be saved ( i . e . 1/10 of the 
18 mn.) and (3.2 mn.) (16.2 x 1/5) w i l l tend to be spent on imported 
consumers goods. The r e s t , i . e . (13 mn.) i n money terms i s expected 
to be spent on domestic consumer's goods. T h e r e f o r e , the t o t a l 
i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r domestic consumers goods 18 mn. i n the f i r s t 
s t a ge + 13 mn. i n the second stage = (31 mn.) i n money terms. 
The i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r imported consumer's goods 
w i l l tend to be = 4.5 + 3.0 = 7.5 i n money terms. 
As f o r s a v i n g s , the i n c r e a s e i n sav i n g s w i l l tend to be 
2.5 + 1.8 = 4.3 mn. i n money terms. 
T h i s much f o r the changes on the demand s i d e : now what may be 
supposed to be l i k e l y to happen w i t h regard to the supply of 
domestic goods during the f i r s t year of the development 
programme 9 
(160) 
I t i s suggested t h a t we can envisage producers of domestic consumer's 
goods m ( E r a ) as being d i v i d e d i n t o two groups, from the point of 
view of t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production. 
Group A ;-
Producers i n t h i s group a r e assumed to be a b l e to 
i n c r e a s e t h e i r production i n the s h o r t run, t h a t i s during the 
f i r s t y e a r of the development programme i n our model, merely by 
u s i n g t h e i r e x i s t i n g f i x e d c a p i t a l , e.g. by employing more of the 
v a r i a b l e f a c t o r , i . e . labour. We assume f u r t h e r t h a t t h i s group 
c o n t r o l s 50% of the t o t a l production of consumer's goods i n ( E r a ) ^ 1 ^ . 
( 1 ) I t may be s a f e to say t h a t i n any underdeveloped country where 
l i t t l e i n d u s t r y i s i n e x i s t e n c e , as i s the case i n most i f not a l l 
of underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , some of the producers, a t a g i v e n time, 
a r e not producing at t h e i r maximum c a p a c i t y f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s , 
such as the l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t e f f e c t i v e demand f o r t h e i r products, or 
a temporary breakdown of a number of machines, or simply because 
production of a c e r t a i n commodity has j u s t s t a r t e d , and time i s needed 
before production reaches i t s maximum l i m i t . The l a s t case may be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g example ;- A c l o t h i n g f a c t o r y i n I r a q 
(Mosul Liwa) s t a r t e d o p e r a t i o n i n 1957-58, a t a t o t a l production i n 
the weaving department of(S,b'»473.102). The f i g u r e r o s e to a t o t a l amount 
of 4.948.043 i n four y e a r s time i . e . i n 1961-62, i n the c l o t h i n g 
department t o t a l production m 1957-58 was (5.848.215 sq. y a r d s ) r i s i n g 
to (19.917.876) i n 1961-62. Other examples could be found i n v a r i o u s 
i s s u e s of the " I n d u s t r i a l i s t " , a q u a r t e r l y review i s s u e d by the I r a q i 
F e d e r a t i o n of I n d u s t r i e s . The above example was taken from i s s u e No.(4), 
S i x t h Year, Dec, 1965, P.66 ( t h e A r a b i c s e c t i o n ) . 
T h e r e f o r e i t may be s a f e to assume t h a t producers m 
t h i s category a r e a b l e to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production i n the s h o r t run, 
without n e c e s s a r i l y i n c u r r i n g p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n c r e a s e s i n c o s t s . On the 
other hand, some of the producers may not be a b l e to i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
production, u n l e s s they i n c r e a s e both t h e i r f i x e d and v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l . 
I n some underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i t may be the c a s e t h a t a number of 
producers c o n t r o l l i n g 60% of t o t a l p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y of consumer's 
goods can i n c r e a s e t h e i r production, and the group c o n t r o l l i n g 40% 
cannot, and i t might j u s t be the opposite i n another country. The 
f i g u r e 50% t h e r e f o r e , has been chosen f o r the sake of s i m p l i c i t y only, 
as i n d i c a t i n g the normal r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two groups. 
(161) 
Group B :-
I n order to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production, producers i n 
t h i s group have to i n c r e a s e both t h e i r f i x e d and v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l , ' 
t h a t i s they can i n c r e a s e t h e i r production only i n the long-run, 
s i n c e changes i n f i x e d c a p i t a l a r e n e c e s s a r y to i n c r e a s e production. 
I t f o l l o w s t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h i s group c o n t r o l the remaining 50% of 
the p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y of consumer's goods m (Era) T 
Thus producers i n group (A) r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t they 
are running out of s t o c k r e c o g n i s e a t the same time t h a t they 
can meet the i n c r e a s i n g demand by u t i l i s i n g t h e i r e x i s t i n g 
equipment more i n t e n s i v e l y and need only employ the a p p r o p r i a t e 
a d d i t i o n a l q u a n t i t i e s of s k i l l e d and u n s k i l l e d labour. As the supply 
of s k i l l e d labour m underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i s l i m i t e d , i t 
f o l l o w s t h a t higher wages might have to be o f f e r e d to a t t r a c t s k i l l e d 
l a b o u r e r s from other s e c t o r s of the economy on the one hand, and 
some r e s o u r c e s devoted to the t r a i n i n g of u n s k i l l e d workers on the other.The 
supply of u n s k i l l e d labour i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s tends to 
exceed the demand t o a l a r g e e x t e n t , because of the r e l a t i v e l y h i gh 
percentage of unemployed and under-employed persons i n such 
c o u n t r i e s . T h e r e f o r e , producers i n group (A) a r e expected to be 
ab l e to s a t i s f y t h e i r need f o r u n s k i l l e d labour a t the going r a t e 
( 1 ) 
of wages. 
Now what w i l l tend to happen to c o s t of production 
of group ( A ) , when they t r y t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r production by 
employing more labour ? 
The importance of t r y i n g to f i n d out what w i l l happen 
to the c o s t of production i s t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y to attempt to know 
(1) Lewis, W. A., Economics Development With U n l i m i t e d Supply of 
Labour, Manchester School of Economics and S o c i a l S t u d i e s , 
V o l . X X I I , 1954, PP.91-139, and V o l . XXVI, 1958, P 1-32. 
(162) 
more p r e c i s e l y how u n i t c o s t may be l i k e l y to vary as output i s 
i n c r e a s e d . T h i s i s because, the g e n e r a l l y accepted theory i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t r e l a t i v e to a given s c a l e of f i x e d investment i n b u i l d i n g s , 
warehouses and the l i k e , i n c r e a s i n g output can be obtained up to a 
c e r t a i n volume of output a t d i m i n i s h i n g u n i t c o s t but t h a t beyond 
t h a t point u n i t c o s t w i l l tend to r i s e . The orthodox and g e n e r a l l y 
"accepted p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h i s p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s h i p i s as f o l l o w s 
1 < MC 
\ ATUC U n i t 
Cost 
AVC \ 
/ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
AFC 
0 
Q/0 
F i g u r e 3 
Average and marginal c o s t curves 
(163) 
A more r e c e n t and, as y e t , perhaps not g e n e r a l l y accepted p r e s e n t a t i o n 
i s t h a t of Andrews'. He p r e s e n t s the r e l a t i o n s h i p s as f o l l o w s : - ^ 1 ^ 
L i m i t of planned. L i m i t of 
per u n i t Output P l a n t C a p a c i t y 
of output 
I Average T o t a l 
C o s t s 
Average 
Overhead 
Costs 
I 
I 
'Average D i r e c t 
J C o s t s 
T o t a l Output 
per production 
p e r i o d . 
F i g u r e 4 
V a r i a t i o n of U n i t Cost under assumed l i m i t s of p l a n t c a p a c i t y . 
The diagram i s taken from an a r t i c l e by P.W.S. Andrews t i t l e d , "The 
theory of the i n d i v i d u a l b u s i n e s s " . I n Oxford Economic Papers, New 
S e r i e s , Volume 1, 1949, Clarendon P r e s s , P.61 
( 1 ) I n the above mentioned a r t i c l e , Andrews g i v e s more s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
diagrams, but s i n c e the diagram drawn here s e r v e s our purpose, 
t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e was no need to draw a more complicated one. 
The f i r s t s t a g e . „ . , . 
/ footnote continued on next page. 
(164) 
There i s something to be s a i d f o r both these models of p r e s e n t a t i o n and 
both enable the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the v a r i o u s f o r c e s to be understood but 
i t i s perhaps the case t h a t the more r e c e n t treatment of what i s 
happening i n manufacturing s i t u a t i o n s enables our understanding to be a 
l i t t l e deeper. Both approaches to the s i t u a t i o n w i l l be a p p l i e d to the 
p o s i t i o n i n which our two groups of producers (A) and (B) are presented 
as f i n d i n g themselves but the a n a l y s i s w i l l end by working more i n 
terms of the Andrews model than i n t h a t of the conventional text-book* 
footnote continued from previous page : 
The f i r s t stage i n e l a b o r a t i o n of the diagram might be, 
f o r example, to show how u n i t c o s t might i n c r e a s e i f output 
was i n c r e a s e d between the two l i m i t s of planned output 
and p l a n t c a p a c i t y . The amount of such i n c r e a s e s would 
depend upon the p a r t i c u l a r p r o d u c t i v e circumstances i n 
which the producers were p l a c e d . A g e n e r a l i n d i c a t i o n of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of such i n c r e a s e s o c c u r r i n g has been given 
i n the d e s c r i p t i o n of the p o s i t i o n of the producers i n 
group ( A ) . The e s s e n t i a l p oint which Andrews intends to 
convey i s t h a t a t a c e r t a i n l e v e l of output a point i s reached 
beyond which the f i r m cannot go, even a t any c o s t : a 
pr o d u c t i v e b a r r i e r , so to say, has been reached which imposes 
an a b s o l u t e and f i n a l c o n s t r a i n t upon the f i r m . 
(165) 
I n f i g u r e No. ( 3 ) , the d i f f e r e n t curves show the course of d i f f e r e n t 
s o r t s of u n i t c o s t s as output, c o n d i t i o n s of technique remaining the same, 
i s v a r i e d . The average f i x e d c o s t per u n i t of output i s shown as 
approximating to a constant value a f t e r a c e r t a i n amount of output has been 
reached : t h i s i s e x p l a i n e d by the spreading of a f i x e d t o t a l of 
c a p i t a l c o s t over an i n c r e a s i n g number of u n i t s of output. Average 
v a r i a b l e c o s t per u n i t of output i s not capable of t h i s order of 
v a r i a t i o n though i t may be expected t h a t as a g r e a t e r number of 
u n i t s i s turned out, some economies i n production may be r e a l i s e d , 
though i t may be expected t h a t i f the output were taken beyond a broadly 
d e f i n a b l e zone d i f f i c u l t i e s of o r g a n i s a t i o n and c o n t r o l might w e l l 
r e s u l t i n average v a r i a b l e c o s t s r i s i n g . Average v a r i a b l e c o s t s can 
be l e g i t i m a t e l y d e p i c t e d then by a l i n e which p r e s e n t s a s l i g h t 
g r a d i e n t on e i t h e r s i d e of a minimum c o s t p o i n t or zone. Average 
t o t a l u n i t c o s t i s thus seen as the r e s u l t of a simple v e r t i c a l 
a d d i t i o n of the (AFC) and the (AVC) c u r v e s . I t i s perhaps not 
ne c e s s a r y , s i n c e t h i s i s not a t h e o r e t i c a l treatment of c o s t s , to seek 
t o add comment about the movement of marginal c o s t , beyond s a y i n g , 
simply, t h a t a marginal c o s t curve, i f i ntroduced, would be thought of 
a s , f i r s t f a l l i n g s h a r p l y and then r i s i n g p o s s i b l y q u i t e s h a r p l y f o r 
l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of output, and p a s s i n g through the minimum p o i n t s of 
the (AVC) and (ATC) c u r v e s . 
L e t us assume t h a t producers i n group (A) i n our model 
a r e producing t h a t q u a n t i t y of output f o r which (AVC) i s a minimum. I t 
f o l l o w s t h a t the v a r i a b l e c o s t of producing a d d i t i o n a l output beyond 
poi n t (C) w i l l r i s e . Average v a r i a b l e c o s t w i l l tend to r i s e because 
the marginal c o s t of f u r t h e r output w i l l be g r e a t e r though u n t i l the 
minimum t o t a l u n i t c o s t of output has been reached u n i t c o s t w i l l 
s t i l l be below t o t a l average u n i t c o s t because ( A f c ) continues to 
(166) 
f a l l , even though only by a l i t t l e . F u r t h e r assumptions a r e f i r s t l y 
t h a t producers i n t h i s group encounter no d i f f i c u l t i e s i n connection 
w i t h t h e i r c a p i t a l requirements - which w i l l , i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
c l e a r l y only be i n r e s p e c t of c i r c u l a t i n g or working c a p i t a l , - and 
secondly t h a t t h i s group i s a b l e to i n c r e a s e i t s production i n the 
s h o r t run s u f f i c i e n t l y to meet 50% of the i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r 
consumer's g o o d s . T h e reason f o r t h i s i n a b i l i t y to go beyond 
50% i s t h a f t h e y meet operating d i f f i c u l t i e s - a s they i n c r e a s e the 
i n t a k e of labour and m a t e r i a l s i n t o t h e i r e x i s t i n g f i x e d investment: 
the l i m i t of 50% i s taken c h i e f l y f o r s i m p l i c i t y and convenience 
and not because i t i s assumed t h a t any such l i m i t a r i s e s p r e c i s e l y 
from the r e l a t i o n between c a p i t a l i n p u t s and t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e . 
I f c o s t s and p r i c e s a r e assumed to remain constant during the 
f i r s t year of the programme, then we have only the simple c a l c u l a t i o n 
31 x 50 = 15.5 to do to a r r i v e a t the enlarged output 
100 
f o r which, i n money terms, producers i n group (A) would be r e s p o n s i b l e . 
But e v i d e n t l y the average c o s t of production f o r group (A) w i l l 
tend to r i s e : l e t us suppose t h a t the i n c r e a s e i s by 5%. 
The market p r e v i o u s l y consuming ( X ) , would, i f p r i c e s remained c o n s t a n t , 
be prepared to i n c r e a s e t h e i r requirements by X ( i . e . 5 0 % ) , so a s k i n g 
2 
f o r X + X = l | X. But s i n c e p r i c e s have r i s e n they w i l l not be 
2 
prepared to i n c r e a s e t h e i r requirements by the f u l l amount X but only 
by something l e s s than X . T h i s may be taken as i n d i c a t i n g t h a t w h i l e 
2 
a t constant p r i c e s they would have been prepared to take l j X, a t 
r i s i n g p r i c e s they would be damped back, so to say, and cease a s k i n g f o r 
more a t something l e s s than l j X. I t f o l l o w s t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i f the 
( 1 ) T h i s i s because we assume t h a t producers i n group (B) a r e notable 
to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production during the f i r s t y e a r : t h e r e f o r e we 
only concern o u r s e l v e s w i t h i n c r e a s e of production as f a r as group 
(A) i s concerned during the f i r s t year of the development programme. 
(167) 
i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s i s in c o r p o r a t e d i n the new p r i c e of output then the 
50% of the i n c r e a s e i n demand can be met by a r i s e i n production equal 
to : 
15.5 - (15.5 x 5 ) = 15.5 - 0.8 = 14.7 
100 
expressed i n aggregate money terms. T h i s r e p r e s e n t s 
the s a l e s v a l u e of the a c t u a l i n c r e a s e i n production which has been 
induced. Producers i n the consumption s e c t o r may now be envisaged as 
t r y i n g to get a l a r g e r - q u a n t i t y of f a c t o r s of production i n t h e i r 
attempt to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production, by o f f e r i n g higher wages f o r 
s k i l l e d and s e m i - s k i l l e d workers, and probably, higher p r i c e s f o r raw 
m a t e r i a l s . I n t h i s way the i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s m the consumption s e c t o r 
may, dependent on s e c t o r p r o p o r t i o n s , be expected to induce a r i s e i n the 
ge n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l , because each s e c t o r w i l l tend to t r y to b i d up the 
p r i c e s m order e i t h e r to get a l a r g e r s h a r e of the l i m i t e d f a c t o r s of 
production, or maintain the e x i s t i n g i n t a k e . I t f o l l o w s t h a t , i f t h i s 
a n a l y s i s i s to be conducted any f u r t h e r , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to c a l c u l a t e 
the change i n the general p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of each year of the 
development programme. I n doing t h i s use w i l l be made, w i t h c e r t a i n 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s , of what i s b a s i c a l l y a simple v e r s i o n of the Quantity 
Theory of the v a l u e of Money. I n the note which i s added as Appendix 
four on t h i s procedure i t i s suggested t h a t the Quantity Theory may 
perhaps be accepted as an e x p o s i t o r y d e v i c e . But w h i l e i t may have 
p r o p e r t i e s which enable i t to s e r v e i n tBiis way i t has a l s o to be 
remembered t h a t i t may a l s o have disadvantages. I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a 
s t a t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n : i t i s t h i s a s p e c t of i t t h a t G i l p i n i s r e f e r r i n g 
to when he draws a t t e n t i o n to the way i n which the symbols i n the 
n o t a t i o n s t a nd f o r f i x e d parameters. I n the a n a l y s i s which f o l l o w s t h e r e 
i s a departure from a s t r i c t l y s t a t i c d e s c r i p t i o n of the p a t t e r n of 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . An attempt i s made to i n c l u d e v a r i o u s changes which might 
be expected to a r i s e i n the course of events as people observed what was 
happening and made d e c i s i o n s i n the l i g h t of t h e i r o b s e r v a t i o n s which 
a l t e r e d the outcome i n the p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s h i p s from t h a t which 
would have come about i f a p u r e l y s t a t i c r e l a t i o n had been maintained. 
The model i s e s s e n t i a l l y s t a t i c : i t then s e e k s , i n a way intended to 
be r e a l i s t i c , t o in t r o d u c e these changes which o b s e r v a t i o n of human 
(168) 
beings i n t h e i r s o c i a l and b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s might be reasonably 
expected to be i n i t i a t e d , and f i n a l l y to c a l c u l a t e the consequences 
q u a n t i t a t i v e l y . The model i s thus made to c o n t a i n dynamic elements. As a 
r e s u l t the c a l c u l a t i o n s i n v o l v e d become more complicated, and, more 
important, perhaps, numerical e q u a l i t i e s between v a r i o u s magnitudes which 
might have been expected on a s t a t i c view do not r e a c h e q u a l l y w i t h i n the 
l i m i t s of the model. Not only a r e changes introduced which, i n e f f e c t , 
a l t e r the parameters,but t h e r e i s a l a g b u i l t i n t o the model as w e l l . ^ 1 ^ 
I t i s assumed, f o r example, t h a t t h e - m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t s of d e f i c i t ~ 
spending w i l l work themselves out m (10) st a g e s over a f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d . 
I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t only the spending i n j e c t i o n s of the f i r s t y e a r 
work out t h e i r f u l l e f f e c t s . O v e r - a l l , t h e r e i s a lagged d e f i c i e n c y equal 
to about 40% of the f u l l i n f l u e n c e of the d e f i c i t spending. There a r e 
other ways i n which f e a t u r e s a r e introduced i n t o the model which have 
dynamic i m p l i c a t i o n s . F o r example ( 1 ) the i n c r e a s e i n demand which 
occurs i s expected to be met p a r t l y by i n c r e a s e d domestic production and 
p a r t l y by i n c r e a s e d imports ( 2 ) i t i s assumed t h a t some p a r t of the f u l l 
i n c r e a s e i n demand cannot be s a t i s f i e d w i t h goods because of b o t t l e n e c k s 
i n domestic production and shortage of f o r e i g n exchange f o r imports 
( 3 ) changes i n p r i c e s and b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t y a r e expected to induce changes 
i n e x p e c t a t i o n s which themselves induce changes i n i n t e r e s t r a t e s and the 
w i l l i n g n e s s to hold money as compared w i t h goods. The equation used i s the 
f a m i l i a r F i s h e r equation, MV = FT and each symbol i s used i n the F i s h e r 
sense except t h a t T i s i n t e r p r e t e d as always b e a r i n g t h a t r e l a t i o n to 
othe r components and to N a t i o n a l Income t h a t i t may be taken as the 
shadow, so to say, of N a t i o n a l Income i t s e l f and, V i s regarded as 
(2 ) 
i n d i c a t i n g the inc o m e - v e l o c i t y of money . The income-velocity of money 
( 1 ) At f i r s t s i g h t i t might seem n e c e s s a r y to d e a l w i t h the funds taken up 
from the current-income flow by t a x a t i o n as a "leakage" i n t h i s build-up 
of income. However, s i n c e a government o b t a i n s i t s revenue to spend, the 
s i m p l i f y i n g assumption i s adopted here t h a t over a s u c c e s s i o n of peri o d s 
what i s taken up ( i . e . a b s t r a c t e d ) w i l l be balanced by what i s spent ( i . e . 
put b a c k ) . There a r e s e v e r a l reasons f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t the match might not 
be p r e c i s e l y complete (through r i s i n g p r i c e s f o r example),but, e q u a l l y , 
t h e r e i s reason to t h i n k t h a t i n an underdeveloped country the d i f f e r e n c e s 
might be very s l i g h t and may be ne g l e c t e d so as to avoid c o m p l i c a t i n g 
f u r t h e r a model which i s a l r e a d y f a i r l y complicated. 
( 2 ) Here the aggregate money value r e a l i s e d i n the t o t a l flow of 
t r a n s a c t i o n s ( T ) i s b u i l t i n t o the equation " n e t " and not " g r o s s " . What i s 
i n d i c a t e d by the "net " aggregate i s the income r e a l i s e d by the v a r i o u s 
a g e n c i e s through whose a c t i v i t i e s the t r a n s a c t i o n s have been c a r r i e d 
through. 
( 1 6 9 ) 
i s taken as 2 and T i s t h e r e f o r e i n t e r p r e t e d as always having 
t h a t s i z e which w i l l , i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s , y i e l d a N a t i o n a l 
Income equal to t w i c e the volume of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n . T h i s 
i s an e x t e n t i o n of the F i s h e r form but t h e r e i s a need to f i n d 
a means of c a l c u l a t i n g not only the l e v e l of p r i c e s but a l s o 
the s i z e of N a t i o n a l Income expressed i n p r i c e s . T h i s 
assumption about T seems to y i e l d t h e s e r e s u l t s . Thus, p a r t of 
the i n c r e a s e i n demand which i s assumed to be s a t i s f i e d by an 
i n c r e a s e m domestic production of consumer's goods, and p a r t , 
dependent on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e i g n exchange, by an 
i n c r e a s e m imports : a t h i r d p a r t i s expected to be saved. I f 
i n c r e a s e s i n domestic production, imports and s a v i n g s a r e not, 
c o l l e c t i v e l y , b i g enough to absorb the i n i t i a l i n c r e a s e m 
spending power then, other t h i n g s remaining the same, the p r i c e s 
of "some" consumer's goods w i l l tend to r i s e . I f the equation 
i s extended to provide room f o r these a d d i t i o n s then i t i s 
suggested i t should take the form :-
P = MV 
T + ( G + 1 + ) 
where (G +) i s the i n c r e a s e i n domestic production of consumer 
. m . 
goods and ( I +) i s the i n c r e a s e i n imports of consumer goods. 
As a r e s u l t of these v a r i o u s assumptions the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l , 
where a net a d d i t i o n a l amount of (25 i n ) , provided through cfeficit f i n a i c i n g 
(170) 
spent by the planning and spending a u t h o r i t y , i s expected to become 
( p r o v i s i o n a l l y ) : 
p = MV 
T + ( G + + 1+ ) 
( 1 ) 
P = 421 x 2 
800 + (14,7 + 7.5) 
842 1.0243 822.2 
The g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l index i s thus assumed to be (100) at the 
beginning of the f i r s t year of the programme, t h e r e f o r e : 
1.024 x 100 = 102.4 T h i s i n c r e a s e m the ge n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l may 
not of course be the only change t a k i n g p l a c e : th e r e canj be a number 
of a s s o c i a t e d e f f e c t s undergoing change at the same time. 
T h i s i s because, when p r i c e s s t a r t to r i s e and are 
expected to continue f o r an extended p e r i o d , people mayistaijt to borrow 
money more than they would i f p r i c e s a r e not expected to keep t h e i r 
upward movement. T h i s could be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t t h a t i t i s 
p r o f i t a b l e to borrow money at the o r d i n a r y r u l i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e , and 
when at the end of the p e r i o d the p r i n c i p l e i s p a i d , i t s p urchasing 
power has become l e s s than i t was a t the beginning of the p e r i o d as 
p r i c e s i n c r e a s e . T h e r e f o r e , i f the r u l i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e i s ( 5 % ) a t the 
beginning of a period, and the ge n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l i n c r e a s e s by ( 2 % ) 
during the period, the r e a l i n t e r e s t r a t e w i l l be only ( 3 % ) . I t 
fo l l o w s t h a t , as more money i s borrowed and spent demand i n c r e a s e s and 
the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l w i l l tend to r i s e . The o r i g i n a l i n c r e a s e i n 
( 1 ) I f t h e r e were no savings (and hoardings) money m c i r c u l a t i o n 
would have become 400 + 25 = 425 mn., but (4.3 mn.) i s 
saved (marginal p r o p e n s i t y to save 1/10, and the above f i g u r e 
r e p r e s e n t s t o t a l s a v i n g s t a k i n g p l a c e as a r e s u l t of two stages 
of the m u l t i p l i e r ) . Consequently money i n c i r c u l a t i o n i s 
expected to become 420.7 or f o r s i m p l i c i t y (421 mn.), (1.9 mn.) 
i s expected to be hoarded, i . e . withdrawn from c i r c u l a t i o n , and 
(2.3 mn.) i s expected to be spent on investment during the next 
time p e r i o d , i . e . w i t h a l a g . 
(171) 
t h e g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l was c a l c u l a t e d to be (2.4) by the end of the 
f i r s t year of the programme, but as a r e s u l t of the a d d i t i o n a l r i s e i n 
demand which i s expected to be induced by the o r i g i n a l r i s e demand may 
tend to i n c r e a s e f u r t h e r by, say, a t h i r d of the i n i t i a t i n g demand, 
i . e . 2.4 x 1^  = O.^^. The g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of the f i r s t 
3 
y e a r , on the a n a l y s i s so f a r , could p o s s i b l y be 2.4 + 0.8 = 3.2% 
A q u e s t i o n might be r a i s e d here, t h a t i s , : why we 
assumed t h a t the a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e w i l l be a t h i r d of the o r i g i n a l 
i n c r e a s e , and not equal, or even more than t h a t ? To answer t h i s q uestion, 
i t i s n e c e s s a r y to d i s c u s s the expected behaviour of money l e n d e r s and 
money borrowers when the gen e r a l p r i c e l e v e l s t a r t s to r i s e and i s 
expected to continue m i t s upward movement f o r an extended p e r i o d . 
At f i r s t , money l e n d e r s may t h i n k t h a t the i n c r e a s e i n 
the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l w i l l not continue f o r an extended p e r i o d i n 
the f u t u r e ; t h e r e f o r e , they charge the normal going r a t e of i n t e r e s t . 
When they begin to hold the view t h a t p r i c e s may be l i k e l y t o continue 
m t h e i r upward movement f o r an extended p e r i o d of time, they w i l l 
tend to r e - a d j u s t the r a t e s of i n t e r e s t they charge. They w i l l be 
l i k e l y t o do so to an extent which w i l l y i e l d t o them the same l e v e l 
of i n t e r e s t r a t e , m r e a l terms, as would have been r e a l i s e d i f p r i c e s 
had remained c o n s t a n t . T h e r e f o r e , there a r e no w i n d f a l l p r o f i t s to be 
obtained by seeki n g to buy a t one (lower) l e v e l of p r i c e s and s e l l 
a t another ( h i g h e r ) l e v e l of p r i c e s , and the s p e c u l a t i v e demand f o r 
funds i s e l i m i n a t e d from the t o t a l p a t t e r n of demand which i s p r e s e n t . 
( 1 ) The a n a l y s i s w i l l attempt to show t h a t i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r the 
a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e i n demand to equal the o r i g i n a l i n c r e a s e . 
Consequently, an a r b i t a r y d e c i s i o n may be made as to the s i z e of the 
f r a c t i o n provided t h a t i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s than u n i t y . But i t i s 
expected t h a t the a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e w i l l be moderate i . e . a t h i r d of 
the o r i g i n a l i n c r e a s e , f o r example, because the o r i g i n a l i n c r e a s e i s by 
only (2.4%) which i s by no means a high i n c r e a s e . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t 
no a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e a t a l l should a r i s e , but s i n c e the case of the 
use of d e f i e i t f i n a n c i n g i s t o be presented i n i t s s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e 
terms, an allowance i s made as f o r a p o s s i b l e a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e m 
demand. I n t h i s way i t i s thought t h a t the danger of minimising the 
disadvantages of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g w i l l be avoided. 
(172) 
An opposing argument a g a i n s t t h i s , of course, i s t h a t i n times of 
i n f l a t i o n i t may be p o s s i b l e to make p r o f i t s , merely by borrowing 
a t c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t r a t e s , buying s t o c k s of goods and/or raw m a t e r i a l s 
w i t h the funds so borrowed and s e l l i n g them a t higher p r i c e s a t the end 
taf a-brief period of hoarding. The argument a g a i n s t t h i s way of 
reasoning i s t h a t as money l e n d e r s f o r e s e e the i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r 
money on the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t i n f l a t i o n i s l i k e l y to continue f o r an 
extended p e r i o d of time, they tend to r a i s e the money r a t e s - a t which 
they a r e prepared to le n d u n t i l a point i s reached where the r e a l 
i n t e r e s t r a t e i m p l i e d by the t r a n s a c t i o n s i s such t h a t the r a t e of 
p r o f i t to be obtained i s no g r e a t e r than could have been obtained i f 
the i n f l a t i o n had not h a p p e n e d . T h e other point which could have 
an e f f e c t on the demand f o r goods i s people's d e s i r e to hold c a s h . 
When people hold cash they a r e l o s i n g the i n t e r e s t which could have 
been made, i f they had l e n t t h e i r money. But people hold cash because 
i t i s n e c e s s a r y to hold a c e r t a i n amount of cash i n order to 
f a c i l i t a t e t r a n s a c t i o n s on the one hand, and to use i t f o r 
s p e c u l a t i v e purposes on the other. 
I n a p e r i o d of s t a b l e p r i c e s , i f the i n t e r e s t r a t e 
i s ( 5 ) per cen t , then the c o s t of holding cash i s ( 5 ) per cent as 
w e l l . I f p r i c e s i n c r e a s e by ( 4 ) per cent during the p e r i o d , then the 
co s t of hol d i n g cash w i l l be 5+ 4 = 9 per cent, i f and only i f the 
i n t e r e s t r a t e remains constant during the p e r i o d . But i f i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s i n c r e a s e during a p e r i o d from 5% to 9%, w h i l e p r i c e s remain 
constant during the p e r i o d , then the co s t of hol d i n g cash w i l l be 9%; 
even i f p r i c e s were c o n s t a n t . Consequently, an i n c r e a s e i n the c o s t 
of holding c a s h could be brought about merely by an i n c r e a s e i n r a t e s 
( 2 ) 
of i n t e r e s t and not only by an i n c r e a s e m the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l . 
The i n c r e a s e i n the c o s t of holding cash might cause, to a l i m i t e d 
e x t e n t , a r e d u c t i o n i n peoples' holdings of cash, but t h i s might not 
( 1 ) R.G.Lipsey, I s I n f l a t i o n E x p l o s i v e "> The Banker, E d i t e d by 
W i l f r e d King, V o l . CXI, 1961, October, PP. 673-674. 
(2 ) I b i d , P.675 
(173) 
cause a f l x g h t from cash on a l a r g e s c a l e ; as P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y has 
s a i d , "but few people would expect xt to cause a cumulative f l i g h t 
from ca s h of the s o r t t h a t might spark o f f a h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n ; i f 
t h i s i s accepted then i t must s u r e l y a l s o be conceded t h a t the 
movement from a s t a b l e p r i c e l e v e l to a steady i n f l a t i o n i s u n l i k e l y 
to cause such a cumulative f l i g h t from c a s h " . ^ ^ 
The a b o v e - a n a l y s i s has shown t h a t t h e - g e n e r a l - p r i c e - -
l e v e l w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e by (3.2%) which i s , i t may not be 
unreasonable to say, a moderate i n c r e a s e . T h e r e f o r e , i t i s not 
expected to cause a sharp r e d u c t i o n i n people's d e s i r e to hold cash 
and to t r y t o hold p a r t of t h e i r w e a l t h i n the form of goods, among 
other a s s e t s , i n s t e a d of c a s h . T h i s p a r t i a l s h i f t from h o l d i n g cash 
to h olding goods, l i m i t e d as i t may b e , w i l l tend to cause a f u r t h e r 
i n c r e a s e i n demand, which l e a d s to a f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e i n the g e n e r a l 
p r i c e l e v e l i n the magnitude of say, ( 5 % ) of the o r i g i n a l i n c r e a s e . 
I t f o l l o w s t h a t the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t the 
(2) 
end of the f i r s t year of the development, i s expected to be : 
3.2 + ( 3.2 x 5 ) = 3.2 + 0.16 = 3.36 or f o r s i m p l i c i t y , 3.4 . 
100 
T h i s f i g u r e r e p r e s e n t s the expected i n c r e a s e i n the g e n e r a l p r i c e 
l e v e l which i s assumed to have been 100 at the end of year ( n - 1 ) , and 
i t thus becomes 100 + 3.4 = 103.4. The t o t a l amount of money i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n w i l l tend to become (421 mn.) The N a t i o n a l Income w i l l 
(3) 
tend to i n c r e a s e by a t o t a l amount of (22 mn.) and becomes (822 mn.). 
I f the i n c r e a s e i s to be c a l c u l a t e d i n r e a l terms which would be 
e q u i v a l e n t to t h i n k i n g of i t i n constant p r i c e s , an allowance should 
be made f o r the i n c r e a s e i n the general p r i c e l e v e l which has taken 
p l a c e . 
( 1 ) I b i d j PP. 675-676. 
Though whether the s p e c u l a t i v e motive f o r holding money w i l l 
be s t r o n g i n a country, such as I r a q , may be doubted. 
(2 ) On the b a s i s , t h a t i s , of the assumptions and e x p e c t a t i o n s which 
have been induced i n the e x p o s i t i o n of the model so f a r . 
(3) For a g e n e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n of why i t i s not 842 mn. see p.(189) 
(174) 
During the second year of the programme, the planning and spending 
a u t h o r i t y w i l l pay another (25 mn.) i n money terms to the c o n s t r u c t i n g 
f i r m , and the f i r m w i l l continue to spend on the b u i l d i n g of the 
f a c t o r i e s and other a s s o c i a t e d b u i l d i n g s , as assumed e a r l i e r . The 
spending of the new (25 mn.) w i l l tend." , other t h i n g s remaining the 
same,to i n c r e a s e d i s t r i b u t e d incomes. I n other words, demand f o r 
consumer's goods (domestic and -imported)-will tend-to r i s e . T h i s 
i n c r e a s e i n demand w i l l tend to i n i t i a t e an i n c r e a s e i n the production 
of the consumer's goods ( w i t h i n the l i m i t s of the productive c a p a c i t y 
of producers) on the one hand, and m the importation of t h e s e goods 
on the other. As f o r the demand s i d e , i t i s assumed t h a t the average 
p r o p e n s i t i e s and marginal p r o p e n s t i t i e s to save, consume, and import 
(1) 
w i l l remain constant throughout the f i v e y e a r s of the programme. 
The a d d i t i o n a l amount which was spent during the f i r s t year has passed 
through two s t a g e s of the m u l t i p l i e r , and i t i s expected t h a t i t w i l l 
go through a t h i r d and f o u r t h stage during the second y e a r . T h e r e f o r e , 
t h i s amount should be taken i n t o account when the i n c r e a s e i n demand 
during the second year i s c a l c u l a t e d . Consequently, the t o t a l i n c r e a s e 
i n demand inthe second year should be c a l c u l a t e d as f o l l o w s :-
1 8 mn. i n the f i r s t stage + 13 mn. m the second stage = 31 mn. m 
money terms ( w i t h 7.5 mn. i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r imported goods and 
4.3 mn. m sav i n g s out of which 1.9 i s hoarded). 
The t h i r d and f o u r t h stages of the amount spent during the 
f i r s t year :-
9.4 mn. + 6.8 = 16.2 mn. ( w i t h 4 mn. i n c r e a s e i n imports and 
2.2 mn. i n c r e a s e i n s a v i n g s , out of which 1 ran. i s hoarded). 
The t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r domestic consumer's goods i s 
expected to be : — 
31 + 16.2 = 47.2 or (47 mn.) i n money terms. 
(1) The marginal propensity to import i s assumed to s h i f t from 1/5 to 
1/6 during the f i f t h year of the programme, as a r e s u l t of the 
i n c r e a s e i n the production of domestic consumer's goods,which i s 
expected to take p l a c e during the f i f t h year of the programme. 
(175) 
Now what about the supply sxde ? As i t may be r e c a l l e d , we have 
allowed f o r the i n c r e a s e m imports, and t h e r e f o r e the f i g u r e (47 mn.) 
r e p r e s e n t s the net i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r domestic consumer's goods. 
Producers i n group ( A ) , we assume, are s t i l l a b l e to i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
production, during the second year,by employing more of the v a r i a b l e 
f a c t o r , i . e . labour, but a t a higher c o s t per u n i t . T h i s i s because, 
as the a n a l y s i s has shown the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of the 
f i r s t year has i n c r e a s e d by ( 3 . 4 % ) . I t f o l l o w s t h a t f a c t o r s of 
production w i l l tend to c o s t more than they d i d during the f i r s t y e a r . 
We assume f u r t h e r t h a t group (A) w i l l tend to reach i t s maximum 
c a p a c i t y of production by the end of the second year which means t h a t 
i f producers i n t h i s group want to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production they have 
to i n c r e a s e t h e i r f i x e d c a p i t a l as w e l l as t h e i r v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l . 
As we have assumed e a r l i e r t h a t t h i s group c o n t r o l s 50% of t o t a l 
p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y of domestic consumer's goods, we may c a r r y the 
assumptions c o n s i s t e n t l y through and say t h a t they w i l l t r y to i n c r e a s e 
t h e i r production p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y . We assume average t o t a l c o s t per 
u n i t to r i s e by ( 1 0 % ) . I f t h i s i n c r e a s e m cos t of production i s 
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the new p r i c e s of the output, then the demand as f a r as 
group (A's) share i s concerned can be met by an i n c r e a s e i n production 
equal to 47 x 50 = 23.5 mn. the demand which group (A) i s 
100 
t r y i n g to s a t i s f y . 
23.5 - (23.5 x 10 ) = 23.5 - 2.4 = 21.1 or f o r s i m p l i c i t y 21 mn;Thi 
100 
f i g u r e r e p r e s e n t s the s e l l i n g value of the a c t u a l i n c r e a s e i n 
production f o r group (A) a t r e l e v a n t p r i c e s , Now, we assume t h a t 
producers i n group (B) have ordered c a p i t a l goods from a c a p i t a l goods 
( 1 ) I t i s assumed, f o r s i m p l i c i t y , t h a t the i n c r e a s e i n money c o s t s i s 
e venly and uniformly d i f f u s e d through the system and t h a t no 
a l t e r a t i o n s i n the u n d e r l y i n g r e a l r e l a t i o n s between r e s o u r c e s and 
t h e i r uses takes p l a c e . 
(176) 
e x p o r t i n g country, durxng the f i r s t y e ar, when the demand f o r 
consumer's goods began to take p l a c e . I t f o l l o w s t h a t , as f a r as the 
c a p i t a l goods a r e concerned, the e f f e c t s of o r d e r i n g these goods w i l l 
be f e l t by the c a p i t a l e x p o rting country, and w i l l i n c r e a s e exports of 
these goods, other t h i n g s being equal. 
As f o r the supply of other f a c t o r s of production i n " E r a " 
the a n a l y s i s has shown t h a t t h e r e i s u n l i m i t e d supply of u n s k i l l e d workers 
who could be t r a i n e d on the j o b . We assume t h a t raw m a t e r i a l s a r e 
a v a i l a b l e d o m e s t i c a l l y , and t h a t producers i n group (B) are a b l e 
e i t h e r to borrow the r e q u i r e d funds f o r expansion, or they can provide 
t h e s e out of t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s . 
When producers i n group (B) expand t h e i r production, during the 
second year a f t e r the i n c r e a s e i n demand took p l a c e i n our model, t h e r e 
are t h r e e p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n r e l a t i o n to c o s t s of production per u n i t 
( 1 ) r i s i n g long run c o s t s , which means t h a t as output expands c o s t s 
per u n i t i n c r e a s e . 
(2) f a l l i n g long run c o s t s ; as output expands c o s t s per u n i t f a l l . 
( 3 ) constant long run c o s t s , as output expands c o s t s per u n i t remain 
c o n s t a n t . 
I f t h e s e v a r i a t i o n s a r e d e s c r i b e d i n terms of what i s 
known as 'economies of s c a l e ' , then the s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t , i f a f i r m 
i n c r e a s e s i t s input by X amount of f a c t o r s of p r o d u c t ion then output 
might i n c r e a s e l e s s than p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y , or more than p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y 
or i n the same p r o p o r t i o n r e l a t i v e to the i n p u t s . Now, the f i r m s i n 
our model are expected to pay higher p r i c e s f o r f a c t o r s of production 
than they d i d i n the p r e v i o u s p e r i o d , as a r e s u l t of the i n c r e a s e 
m the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l . We w i l l assume however t h a t c o s t s per u n i t 
f o r group (B) i n the longer run w i l l tend to r i s e on the one hand, and 
t h a t on the other as f a r as the "economies of s c a l e " a r e concerned, an 
i n c r e a s e i n input by (X) w i l l tend to y i e l d an (X) i n c r e a s e i . e . a 
p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n c r e a s e , i n production. 
(177) 
We w i l l assume t h a t c o s t s per u n i t f o r group (B) w i l l tend to r i s e by 
( 1 5 % ) . I f p r i c e s remained c o n s t a n t , the pr o p o r t i o n a t e i n c r e a s e i n 
production, f o r group ( B ) , would be : ( b e a r i n g i n mind t h a t the t o t a l 
i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r consumer's goods during the second year i s (47 mn.) 
:- 47 - 23.5 = (23.5 mn.) the demand m money terms which group (B) 
i s t r y i n g to s a t i s f y . Cost of production per u n i t f o r group (B) i s 
expected to r i s e i n the beginning, because of the expansion i n the 
c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d which was r e q u i r e d f o r importation of c a p i t a l goods 
and perhaps, a l a r g e r working c a p i t a l . T h i s i n c r e a s e i s assumed to 
be by ( 1 5 % ) . Consequently, producers i n t h i s group a r e expected to 
i n c r e a s e t h e i r production by :- (v a l u e d a t the new, i . e . h i g h e r , s e l l i n g 
p r i c e s ) : 
23.5 - (23.5 x 15 ) = 23.5 - 3.5 = (20 mn.) m the relevant money 
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terms. T h i s i s because, i t i s expected t h a t the i n c r e r s e i n c o s t of 
production w i l l be in c o r p o r a t e d i n the new p r i c e s of output. I t f o l l o w s 
t h a t the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n production of domestic consumer's goods f o r 
both groups during the second y e a r of the development programme w i l l tend 
to be : 21 + 20 = (41 mn.) i n money terms, and valued a t the new, i . e . 
h i g h e r , s e l l i n g p r i c e s which i s induced by the change i n demand and c o s t 
of production. Consequently, the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of the 
second year (n + 1) w i l l tend to be :-
P = MV P = 443.4 x 2 
T + ( G + + 1?) 8 2 3 + 4 1 + U - 5 
O / O . O 
The g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of the f i r s t y e a r was 103.4, t h e r e f o r e 
i t becomes ( p r o v i s i o n a l l y ) 1.013 x 103.4 = 104.78 or 104.8. 
The o r i g i n a l i n c r e a s e i n the ge n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l by the 
end of the second year w i l l thus emerge as 4.8%. By t h i s time, i t may be 
s a f e to say t h a t money l e n d e r s may have came to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , 
(178) 
the tendency f o r p r i c e s to r i s e i s going to continue f o r an extended 
p e r i o d , depending on t h e i r o b s e r v a t i o n during the f i r s t year of the 
p l a n , and t h e r e f o r e , they tend to r a i s e the r a t e s a t which they are 
prepared to lend, up to a point flfia*e £hereal i n t e r e s t r a t e i s equal to 
t h a t which was r u l i n g before i n f l a t i o n took p l a c e . I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
the s p e c u l a t i v e motive which encouraged people to borrow money at 
a low l e v e l of r e a l i n t e r e s t r a t e and buy goods and/or raw m a t e r i a l s 
and s e l l them at higher p r i c e s a f t e r a s h o r t p e r i o d and make w i n d f a l l 
p r o f i t s during the f i r s t year, and cause a f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e i n demand 
and p r i c e s during the f i r s t year, i s no longer i n e x i s t e n c e during 
the second year. 
T h e r e f o r e , the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e i n 
demand and p r i c e s , as f a r as the s p e c u l a t i v e motive i s concerned, during 
the remaining p e r i o d of the development programme, w i l l tend to be 
n e g l i g i b l e . Now we are l e f t w i t h another f a c t o r which might cause a 
f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e i n demand and p r i c e s , namely, people's d e s i r e to s h i f t 
p a r t of t h e i r cash holding i n t o other forms of wealth, i n periods of 
r i s i n g p r i c e s . T h i s motive i s expected to e x i s t as long as p r i c e s 
continue i n t h e i r tendency to r i s e . Furthermore, i t i s expected t h a t 
t h i s motive i s encouraged by people's e x p e c t a t i o n s of the l e n g t h of 
the p e r i o d over which p r i c e s w i l l tend to continue i n t h e i r upward 
movement, and whether t h i s movement i s expected to become a sharp or 
steady one. I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h i s motive w i l l not tend to cause a 
r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s as a r e s u l t of an i n c r e a s e i n demand, 
i f the general p r i c e l e v e l i s r i s i n g s t e a d i l y . With these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
i n mind we w i l l assume t h a t people's d e s i r e to change p a r t of t h e i r 
c a s h holdings i n t o goods and other forms of wealth i n ( E r a ) during the 
second year of the programme w i l l tend to cause a f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e i n 
the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l by ( 5 % ) of the o r i g i n a l i n c r e a s e , t h a t i s 
4.8 x 5 = 0.24 or 0.2 Therefore, the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n the 
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g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l w i l l thus be :-
104.8 + 0.2 = l O S ^ 1 ^ Money i n c i r c u l a t i o n becomes 443.4 or foi 
( 1 ) The i n c r e a s e i n the g e n e r a l p r i c e i s c a l c u l a t e d to i n c l u d e 
accumulated i n c r e a s e s during the p e r i o d of the programme and not 
each y e a r by i t s e l f . 
(179) 
s i m p l i c i t y (443 mn.) and n a t i o n a l income ( i n monetary terms) : 
822 + (41 + 11.5) = 874 . 5 or (875 mn.) 
At the end of t h i s year producers i n group (A) are 
expected to order c a p i t a l equipments because they have reached t h e i r 
maximum productive c a p a c i t y on the one hand, and they expect t h a t the 
demand f o r domestic consumer's goods w i l l tend to continue i n i t s 
upward movement f o r a f u t u r e p e r i o d on the other. Furthermore, we assume 
t h a t i t w i l l take a year f o r d e l i v e r y and i n s t a l l a t i o n of the c a p i t a l 
equipment, and t h e r e f o r e producers i n group (A) w i l l be able to 
i n c r e a s e t h e i r production only a t the beginning of the f o u r t h year of 
the programme. 
During the t h i r d year of the programme, the c o n s t r u c t i n g f i r m w i l l 
spend another (25 mn.) i n money terms. Consequently, demand f o r 
consumer's goods (domestic and imported) w i l l tend to r i s e , other 
t h i n g s remaining constant, by a t o t a l of :-
( 1 ) The f i r s t and second s t a g e s of the amount which was spent during 
the t h i r d year :- (18 + 13 = 31 mn.) 
( 2 ) The t h i r d and f o u r t h s t a g e s of the amount spent during the second 
y e a r :- 9.4 + 6.8 = 16.2 mn. 
( 3 ) The f i f t h and s i x t h s t ages of the amount spent during the " ' f i r s t 
y e a r :- 4.9 + 3.6 = 8.5 mn.^^ and the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n demand 
f o r domestic consumer's goods during the t h i r d year of the programme 
i s expected to be 31 + 16.2 + 8.5 = 55.7 mn. or (56 mn.) i n 
money terms and, so we account f o r the demand s i d e . As f o r the supply 
s i d e , producers i n group (A) i t i s assumed, are not expected to be 
a b l e to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production because they have reached t h e i r 
maximum pro d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y a t the end of the second y e a r , and have 
ordered c a p i t a l equipment . T h e r e f o r e , only producers i n group (B) 
a r e expected to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y w i t h t h e i r 
p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y . 
( 1 ) A l l stages are shown on the diagram opposite to page 48. 
(180) 
We have seen t h a t the t o t a l i n c r e a s e xn demand f o r domestic consumer's 
goods w x l l tend to be (56 mn.) xn money terms a t the goxng p r x c e s , out 
of whxch 50% x.e. (28 mn.) xs expected to be s a t x s f x e d by xncrease xn 
productxon of group ( B ) . Producers xn group (A) w x l l t r y to xncrease 
t h e i r productxon proportxonately w i t h t h e x r productxve capacxty as 
demand f o r domestxc consumer's goods r x s e s . Average t o t a l c o s t of 
productxon per unxt f o r thxs group w i l l tend to xncrease by say 10%. 
T h i s i n c r e a s e i n c o s t of productxon xs expected to be xncorporated xn 
the new s e l l x n g prxce, because demand i s x n c r e a s i n g and t h e r e xs a 
shortage xn the supply of domestic consumer's goods. T h e r e f o r e , 
producers xn thxs group w x l l t r y to xncrease t h e x r productxon by 
28 - (28 x 10 ) = 28 - 2.8 = 25.2 or (25 mn.) xn money terms 
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worth of consumer's goods valued a t the new s e l l x n g prxce xnduced by 
changes t a k i n g p l a c e . The g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of the thxrd 
year of the development programme xs expected to become : 
P = MV P = 467.3 x 2 
T + ( G + + i f ) 875 + (25 + 1 4 ( 1 ) ) 
934.6 — = 1.021 As the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t 91a 
the end of the second year i s 105, t h e r e f o r e i t becomes 
1.021 x 105 = 107.205 or f o r sxmplxcxty 107.2 
I t may not be u n r e a l x s t x c to hold t h a t by thxs txme 
the people i n ( E r a ) have formed a f a x r l y fxrm vxew about the course of 
p r i c e s and have observed t h a t the xncrease xn prxces has not been sharp. 
They may w e l l hold t h a t t h i s i s l i k e l y to be the t r e n d , a t any r a t e i n 
the xmmediate f u t u r e . For t h a t reason xt may be s a f e to assume t h a t p r i c e s 
w x l l not be pushed up to a hxgher l e v e l merely because of the d e s i r e 
of people to s h i f t p a r t of t h e x r wealth from cash to goods. Money i n 
c i r c u l a t x o n then becomes (467 mn.) and natxonal income i n money terms 
(914 mn.) 
( 1 ) See dxagram on PP.(19S-4) where, xncreases xn xmports f o r 
d x f f e r e n t s tages a r e shown. 
(181) 
Durxng the f o u r t h year of the development programme, the planning and 
spending a u t h o r i t y , w i l l pay the c o n s t r u c t i n g f i r m the l a s t 
i n s t a l l m e n t , and the l a t t e r w i l l spend i t during the y e a r . Under the 
agreement between the planning a u t h o r i t y and the c o n s t r u c t i n g f i r m , 
the l a t t e r should complete the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the b u i l d i n g s f o r the 
f a c t o r i e s , and a s s o c i a t e d b u i l d i n g s . T h e r e f o r e , the c o n s t r u c t i n g f i r m 
w i l l spend another (25 mn.) during the f o u r t h year f o r f u l f i l l i n g t h i s 
purpose. ~ " " 
As a r e s u l t of spending of the (25 mn.) during the 
f o u r t h year and the lagged e f f e c t s of the amounts spent during the 
previous t h r e e y e a r s demand w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e by :-
( 1 ) the f i r s t and second stages of the amount spent during the f o u r t h 
year (n + 3) : 
18 + 13 = 31 mn. 
( 2 ) the t h i r d and f o u r t h stages of the amount spent during the t h i r d 
year (n + 2) : 
9.4 + 6.8 = 16.2 mn. 
( 3 ) the f i f t h and s i x t h s t ages of the amount spent during the second 
year (n + 1) : 
4.9 + 3.6 = 8.5 mn. 
( 4 ) the seventh and e i g h t h stages of the amount spent during the f i r s t 
year :-
2.6 + 1.9 = 4.5 mn. 
T h e r e f o r e , the t o t a l i n c r e a s e m demand f o r domestic goods w i l l tend 
to be ;-
31 + 16.2 + 8.5 + 4.5 = 60.2 or (60 mn.) i n money 
terms. Producers i n group (A) are assumed to have f i n i s h e d the p r o c e s s 
of importing, i n s t a l l i n g of new c a p i t a l equipment , and the t r a i n i n g 
of the r e q u i r e d number of new workers needed f o r expansion. 
( 1 ) I t may be r e c a l l e d t h a t producers i n group (A) are assumed to 
have reached t h e i r maximum c a p a c i t y a t the end of the second 
year of the programme, and ordered c a p i t a l equipment a t t h a t 
time because they have expected t h a t the i n c r e a s e i n demand w i l l 
continue f o r an extended p e r i o d i n the f u t u r e . 
(182) 
Producers i n t h i s group, a r e expected to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production 
p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y w i t h t h e i r p r oductive c a p a c i t y i . e . by 
60 x 50 = 30 mn. worth of consumer's goods valued a t the p r i c e s 
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p r e v a i l i n g a t the end of the t h i r d y e a r . We assume t h a t c o s t of 
production f o r t h i s group w i l l tend to r i s e by 15%, and the average 
c o s t per u n i t by 1 0 % ^ ^ which means t h a t the a c t u a l i n c r e a s e i n 
production valued a t the new s e l l i n g p r i c e , a f t e r the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of 
the i n c r e a s e i n c o s t of production, w i l l tend to be :-
30 x 10 = 3 0 - 3 = (27 mn. m m oney terms a t the new p r i c e ) . 
100 
As f o r group ( B ) , we assume t h a t , producers i n t h i s group a r e not 
a b l e to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production, because they have reached t h e i r 
maximum productive c a p a c i t y . The i n c r e a s e i n production of 
consumer's goods during the f o u r t h year of the programme i s expected 
to be :-
27.0 m money terms and a t the new s e l l i n g p r i c e s . 
( 1 ) I f we were d e a l i n g w i t h a developed country which has not reached 
f u l l employment, c o s t of production, i n such a c a s e as the one 
mentioned above, may be expected to go down or at l e a s t remain 
constant, but as we are d e a l i n g w i t h an underdeveloped country, 
b o t t l e n e c k s should be taken i n t o account. Even i f we were d e a l i n g 
w i t h a developed economy, however, b o t t l e n e c k s or other i n f l u e n c e s 
might w e l l engender r i s e s i n u n i t c o s t s i f aggregate output was 
at a l e v e l f a i r l y c l o s e to a l e v e l which might approximately be 
d e s c r i b e d as " f u l l employment". 
(183) 
As f o r the other p a r t of the i n c r e a s e i n supply, i . e . imported 
consumer's goods, the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r imported consumer's 
goods w i l l tend to be : (15 mn.). But, we assume t h a t during the 
f o u r t h y e a r , due to a shortage i n f o r e i g n exchange, the a c t u a l i n c r e a s e 
i n i m p o r t a t i o n of consumer's goods w i l l not be by (15 mn.) but by 
(9 mn.) only. The general p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of the f o u r t h year of 
the programme w i l l tend to be : 
P MV 
T + ( G + + 1 + ) 
491.6 x 
914 + (27 + 9) 
983.2 
950 1.0338 
The g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of the t h i r d year was 107.2 
t h e r e f o r e i t becomes : 107.2 x 1.0338 = 110.82 or f o r s i m p l i c i t y 110.8. 
Money i n c i r c u l a t i o n becomes (491,6 mn.) and n a t i o n a l income ( i n money 
terms (950 mn.). During the f o u r t h y ear we assume t h a t t h e r e w i l l be no, 
or n e g l i g i b l e a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e i n demand and i n t u r n on p r i c e s as a 
r e s u l t of people's d e s i r e to s h i f t p a r t of t h e i r cash holding i n t o other 
forms of wealt h , because they have f e l t confirmed i n t h e i r view t h a t 
p r i c e s w i l l not tend t o r i s e s h a r p l y . 
At the beginning of the f i f t h y ear, the planning and spending a u t h o r i t y 
r e c e i v e s (49 mn.) i n money terms from the c e n t r a l bank i n the form of 
drawing r i g h t s on the bank. We assume t h a t , the payments f o r c a p i t a l 
goods have been f i n i s h e d and the c a p i t a l equipment has been d e l i v e r e d 
and i n s t a l l e d on time, and the n e c e s s a r y near-by roads have been 
completed. The r e f o r e , the whole (49 mn.) i n money terms w i l l be 
a l l o c a t e d as working c a p i t a l f o r the new e s t a b l i s h e d c l o t h i n g 
f a c t o r i e s , as was o r i g i n a l l y planned. 
( 1 ) Some underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , such as I r a q , a r e not expected to 
f a c e a s e r i o u s shortage of f o r e i g n exchange i n o r d i n a r y 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , but others may f a c e such a shortage. 
(184) 
The planning a u t h o r i t y should have f i n i s h e d the t r a i n i n g of the 
r e q u i r e d workers and managers needed to run these f a c t o r i e s . The 
d i s t r i b u t e d income during the f i f t h year i s expected to i n c r e a s e by 
(49 mn.) i n money terms which i s expected to be paid as wages, as a 
r e s u l t of the spending of working c a p i t a l , and f o r the s u p p l i e r s of 
_*aw m a t e r i a l s , f u e l and other requirements f o r the production p r o c e s s . 
The i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r domestic consumer's goods as a r e s u l t of 
the remaining stages of the amounts spent during four "years of the 
programme w i l l tend to be 
the t h i r d and f o u r t h stages of the amount which has been spent during 
the f o u r t h year t h a t i s :- 9 . 4 + 6 . 8 = 16.2 mn. The f i f t h and 
s i x t h stages of the amount which has been spent during the t h i r d year 
t h a t i s : 4.9 + 3.6 = 8.5 mn. The seventh and e i g h t h stage of the 
amount spent during the second year :- 2.6 + 1.9 = 4.5 mn. And the 
n i n t h and t e n t h stage of the amount spent during the f i r s t y e a r :-
1.4 + 1 = 2.4 mn. 
The t o t a l i n c r e a s e m demand f o r domestic consumer's 
goods during the f i f t h year (n + 4) of the programme i s expected to 
be ( a s f a r the lagged e f f e c t of amounts spent during the f i r s t four 
(2) 
y e a r s of the programme are concerned). 
16.2 + 8.5 + 4.5 + 2.4 = 31.6 or (32 mn.) i n money terms. 
( 1 ) The new i n e r e m a i i t a l p r o p e n s i t y to import iSs assumed to s h i f t from 
1/5 to 1/6 t h i s i s because when c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s s t a r t production 
during the f i f t h year a t t h e i r f u l l c a p a c i t y t h e r e w i l l be no need 
to import c l o t h i n g anymore, because i t i s p o s s i b l e to s a t i s f y 
demand f o r c l o t h i n g by domestic production. T h e r e f o r e , the stages of 
the amounts which have been spent during the four y e a r s of the 
programme w i l l be c a l c u l a t e d by u s i n g the new ^z^f marginal 
p r o p e n s i t y to import, t h a t i s 1/6 i n s t e a d of 1/5. 
( 2 ) I t may be r e c a l l e d t h a t marginal p r o p e n s i t y to import has changed 
and s h i f t e d from 1/5 to 1/6 during the f i f t h year (n + 5) and 
c a l c u l a t i o n has been done according to the new p r o p e n s i t y . 
(185) 
I n a ddition, the spending of the (49 mn.) i n money terms, as a working 
c a p i t a l during the f i f t h year of the programme i s expected to cause an 
i n c r e a s e i n demand fo r consumer's goods. Therefore, d i s t r i b u t e d 
incomes w i l l tend to r i s e by (49 mn.), i n a d d i t i o n to the r i s e as the 
r e s u l t of the lagged e f f e c t s of the amount spent during the previous 
four years of the programme. Therefore, (4.9 mn.), i . e . (49 x 1 ) 
w i l l tend to be saved by income r e c e i v e r s , and (44.1 mn.) to 1 0 
be spent on consumer's goods (domestic and imported). The newly 
e s t a b l i s h e d c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s a re not expected to operate at t h e i r 
maximum ca p a c i t y during the f i r s t year of t h e i r establishment. 
Therefore, i t may be s a f e to assume th a t the newly e s t a b l i s h e d c l o t h i n g 
f a c t o r i e s w i l l not operate a t t h e i r maximum c a p a c i t y immediately a f t e r 
they s t a r t production, but say 76% of t h e i r maximum c a p a c i t y , which 
i s 63 x 76 = 47.58 or (48 mn.) m money terms worth of c l o t h i n g 
1 0 0 ( 1 ) 
during year (n + 4 ) . As production of domestic consumer's goods 
( i . e . c l o t h i n g ) i n c r e a s e s , imports of c l o t h i n g are expected to f a l l , 
other things remaining the same.( Consequently, we assume that demand 
fo r imported consumer's goods i s expected to s h i f t from 1/5 to 1/6^ 
St&pting>-w±th £©ar n.+rg-j. ,„-l i n c y e a r _ -p -fc'4 r t h e . - t o t a l amount of 
(15.5 mn.) i s expected to be spent on imports (out of the 49 mn.)»(3) 
Savings w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e by (8.4 mn.) out of the (49 mn.) 
out of which (3.7 mn.) i s hoarded, and an i n c r e a s e of 35.3 + 25.5 = 
60.8 or (61 mn.) i n demand fo r domestic consumer's goods i n the two 
stages during the year i s expected to be m i t i a t e d A ^ 
( 1 ) Assuming that everything goes a c t u a l l y as i t was o r i g i n a l l y planned, 
which i s not always the case as the next chapter w i l l attempt to 
show. 
(2) F i r s t stage : 
49 4.9 mn. &S out of which 2.1 i s hoarded. 
AY 
(44.1 AC) ^  35.3 ( AD.D.C.G.) 
m 
Second stage ^ 8 , 8 mn 1 
&Y ( A S ) 3.5 1.6 i s hoarded 
31.8 ^- 25.5 mn. (AD.D.C.G. ) 
For footnote 3 % . 3 mn. & l m 
see page 186. 
(186) 
The t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r domestic consumer's goods during 
the f i f t h year of the programme i s expected to be:-
32 + 61 = 93 mn. i n money terms, and the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n 
demand f o r imported consumer's goods of (23 mn.). 
This much f o r the demand s i d e ; what now of the supply s i d e ? The 
a n a l y s i s has shown th a t the newly e s t a b l i s h e d c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s are 
expected to i n c r e a s e the supply of domestic consumer's goods by (50.4 mn. 
i n money terms worth of c l o t h i n g during year (n+4). Producers i n group 
(A) are assumed to be able to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y 
w i t h t h e i r productive c a p a c i t y i . e . by : 
32 x 50 
J^QQ = 16 mn. i f c o s t of production and p r i c e s remain 
constant. But i t may perhaps be more r e a l i s t i c to say t h a t as a r e s u l t 
of shortage of s k i l l e d labour, and/or c a p i t a l , c o s t of production may 
i n c r e a s e , say, by 10%, and t h i s i n c r e a s e w i l l be incorporated i n p r i c e . 
Therefore, producers i n group (A) w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
production by :-
16 - (16 - 10 ) = 16 - 1.6 = 14.4 mn. i n money terms of 
100 
goods valued a t the new p r i c e . Producers i n group (B) are assumed to 
have f i n i s h e d the process of t r a i n i n g of new workers, importing and 
i n s t a l l i n g of new c a p i t a l equipment needed f o r expansion, and are abl e to 
i n c r e a s e t h e i r production p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y , but a t a higher c o s t , say 5%. 
When the i n c r e a s e i n cost i s i n corporated i n the new p r i c e , then 
producers i n group (B) w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production by : 
16 - (16 - 5 ) = 1 6 — 0 . 8 = 15.2 mn. i n money terms 
100 
of goods valued a t the new p r i c e . T o t a l i n c r e a s e i n production of 
consumer's goods during the f i f t h year i s expected to be : 
|§ + 14.4 + 15.2 = 78 mn. i n money terms a t (n + 4) p r i c e s . The 
general p r i c e l e v e l w i l l tend to r i s e by : 
P = MV 
T + ( G + + 1*+ ) 
531.6 x 2 
951 + ( 7g + 23 ) 
17063.2 1.0104 
(3) Problems of exoess supply w i l l be l i k e l y but i t i s expested they w i l l be 
solved i n the s i x t h and subsequent years. 
The g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l a t the end of the f o u r t h year (n + 3) 
was (110.8) thus 110.8 x 1.0104 = 111.95 or approximately 
(112) a t the end of year (n + 4 ) . Money i n c i r c u l a t i o n i s 
expected to become (531 mn,) n a t i o n a l income (1052 mn.) i n 
money t erms.^ *^ 
Now t h a t the sequence of each of the f i v e y e a r s 
of the programme have been d e a l t w i t h one by one i t may be 
u s e f u l to c o l l e c t together a l l the changes which have taken p l a c e 
i n t o one comprehensive t a b l e . T h i s not only provides an 
opportunity of showing a t one glance what the t o t a l e f f e c t has 
been but a l s o of i n c l u d i n g such a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the f i g u r e s of the v a r i o u s columns as may 
be n e c e s s a r y f o r the sake of completeness i n e x p l a n a t i o n . The 
t a b l e r e v e a l s t h a t a t the end of year (n - 1) money i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n i s (400 mn.), the n a t i o n a l income (800 mn.), and 
the economy i s xn e q u i l i b r i u m i . e . S = I . 
(1 ) I t i s expected t h a t t h e r e w i l l be f u t u r e i n c r e a s e s i n 
n a t i o n a l income during the next four y e a r s , other t h i n g s 
remaining the same, as a r e s u l t of the i n c r e a s e m 
expenditure which has taken p l a c e during the p e r i o d of 
the programme. T h i s i n c r e a s e w i l l tend to become l e s s 
and l e s s , u n t i l i t works i t s e l f out. Furthermore, i t 
may be s a f e to say t h a t the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l w i l l 
tend to f a l l during the next y e a r , other t h i n g s remaining 
equal. 
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(189) 
A f t e r the spending of (25 mn.) provided through d e f x c i t f i n a n c i n g , demand 
f o r domestic and imported consumer's goods i n c r e a s e s , other things 
remaining the same. S i n c e the model i s b u i l t m a way to r e p r e s e n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s and circumstances p r e v a i l i n g i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n 
g e n e r a l , t h e r e f o r e i t may be reasonable to expect t h a t some producers a r e 
a b l e to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production i n the s h o r t run (group A i n the model) 
to meet a l l or p a r t of the i n c r e a s e i n demand, and some producers a r e a b l e 
to do so only i n the long-run (group B m the model). I t i s f u r t h e r 
expected, t h a t the i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r imported consumer's goods could 
be m e t ^ \ Now the t a b l e shows th a t money i n c i r c u l a t i o n a t the end of 
y e ar ( a ) becomes (421 mn.). I f t h i s i s m u l t i p l i e d by ( 2 ) , then the 
n a t i o n a l income should have become (842 mn.) but the t a b l e shows t h a t , i t 
became (. 822mn.) i n s t e a d . The reason i s t h a t the i n c r e a s e i n the n a t i o n a l 
income, i n our model, has been c a l c u l a t e d to i n c l u d e the i n c r e a s e i n the 
production of domestic consumer's goods on the one hand, and the i n c r e a s e 
i n the i m p o r t a t i o n of t h e s e goods on the other. The u n s a t i s f i e d demand w i l l 
tend to cause an i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s i n the consumption s e c t o r a t f i r s t , 
which le a d s to an i n c r e a s e i n the index of the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l . The 
same way of r e asoning may be followed to e x p l a i n the d i f f e r e n c e between 
l a r g e r i n c r e a s e s i n money i n c i r c u l a t i o n and the s m a l l e r i n c r e a s e s i n 
n a t i o n a l income f o r the second, t h i r d , and f o u r t h y ear of the programme. 
However, during the f i f t h y ear, the new e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t o r i e s s t a r t 
production, though not a t t h e i r maximum c a p a c i t y , and t h i s i n c r e a s e i n 
production w i l l meet the i n c r e a s e i n demand which i s expected to be 
i n i t i a t e d as a r e s u l t of the spending of (49 mn.) as a working c a p i t a l f o r 
t h e s e f a c t o r i e s , together w i t h the lagged e f f e c t of the amounts spent 
during the f i r s t four y e a r s of the programme. T h e r e f o r e , on the b a s i s of 
the e x p e c t a t i o n and assumptions which have been i n c l u d e d i n the b u i l d i n g 
of the model, the t a b l e d i s c l o s e s t h a t , at the end of the f i f t h y e a r of 
the programme, p r i c e s w i l l tend to r i s e by a s m a l l e r amount i t , and i t 
may be reasonable to expect t h a t they w i l l tend to f a l l during the next 
ye a r , other t h i n g s remaining the same. 
( 1 ) I n our model, we assume t h a t due to a shortage of f o r e i g n exchange 
m the f o u r t h year of the programme, i t i s p o s s i b l e to s a t i s f y p a r t aity 
of the i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r imported consumer's goods. 
(190) 
The a n a l y s i s i n our model has shown t h a t the ge n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l w i l l 
tend to r i s e g r a d u a l l y during the p e r i o d of the execution of the f i v e 
y e a r development programme. T h i s i n c r e a s e i n the general p r i c e l e v e l , 
i t may be r i g h t l y argued, w i l l tend to r a i s e the amount of c a p i t a l funds, 
i n money terms, to command the o r i g i n a l l y planned amount of r e a l r e s o u r c e s 
needed f o r the execution of the development programme as a whole, other 
t h i n g s remaining the same. 
T h i s argument may be v a l i d , but only to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , 
as the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s may be taken i n t o account 
( 1 ) the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l i s expected to r i s e g r a d u a l l y during any year 
of the programme as a r e s u l t of the spending of c a p i t a l funds provided by 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , other t h i n g s being e q u a l . T h e r e f o r e , i f the g e n e r a l p r i c e 
l e v e l a t the beginning of year (n) of a development programme was (100) then 
the expected i n c r e a s e w i l l tend to take p l a c e g r a d u a l l y during the year and 
becomes (103.4) a t the end of the y e a r . The planning a u t h o r i t i e s a r e 
expected to be a b l e to command f a c t o r s of production a t p r i c e s p r e v a i l i n g 
a t the end of the previous year. I t may be s a f e to say, t h a t the 
planning a u t h o r i t i e s a r e expected to i n c r e a s e t h e i r spending m money 
terms i n our model during year ( n ) by : 
3.4 f 2 = 1.7% i n order to command the same amount of 
r e a l r e s o u r c e s , and the same i s t r u e f o r the other y e a r s of the 
development programme. 
(191) 
( 2 ) I t xs expected t h a t the planning a u t h o r i t i e s are going to e n t e r i n t o 
c o n t r a c t s w i t h domestic and/or f o r e i g n f i r m s concerning s e t t i n g up 
d i f f e r e n t p r o j e c t s under the development programme. The c o n t r a c t i n g f i r m s 
a r e expected to undertake the s e t t i n g up of p r o j e c t s a f t e r e s t i m a t i n g 
the expected d e p r e c i a t i o n i n the purchasing power of the domestic currency, 
depending i n t h a t on the average i n c r e a s e i n the l a s t few y e a r s on the one 
hand, and t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the p o s s i b l e changes i n p r i c e s a f t e r 
the e x e c u t i o n of p a r t of the development programme on the o t h e r . 
T h e r e f o r e , i t may be s a f e to assume t h a t the planning 
a u t h o r i t i e s w i l l not tend to bear the f u l l i n c r e a s e m p r i c e s , during the 
p lanning p e r i o d , because c o n t r a c t s to s e t up p r o j e c t s would have been 
agreed upon a t the beginning of the p e r i o d , though i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to 
t h i n k of c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which the outcome would be d i f f e r e n t . 
(3) I t i s expected t h a t , as d i s t r i b u t e d incomes i n c r e a s e as a r e s u l t of 
spending net a d d i t i o n a l funds, tax revenues, other t h i n g s remaining the 
same, w i l l tend to r i s e , even i f the e x i s t i n g t a x a t i o n r a t e s remain the 
same. T h i s expected i n c r e a s e i n t a x revenues may meet p a r t of the funds 
needed to enable the planning a u t h o r i t i e s to command the same amount of the 
o r i g i n a l l y planned f a c t o r s of production. I t has a l r e a d y been mentioned 
t h a t an i n c r e a s e i n s a v i n g s w i l l take p l a c e . 
The above a n a l y s i s has shown t h a t a t the end of the f i f t h 
y ear the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l w i l l tend to become approximately Cll2i) i . e . 
an i n c r e a s e of (15%) i n f i v e y e a r s or "2^4% a year, as a r e s u l t of 
the spending of c a p i t a l funds provided by the c e n t r a l bank i n our 
model, other t h i n g s remain the same. T h i s i n c r e a s e i n the g e n e r a l 
p r i c e l e v e l may be w e l l considered as moderate i f not modest. The 
above a n a l y s i s has shown t h a t under the assumptions and c o n d i t i o n s 
given i n our model, the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l d i d not tend to r i s e much 
during the f i f t h y e a r , i . e . when the newly e s t a b l i s h e d c l o t h i n g 
f a c t o r i e s s t a r t e d production, even when they a r e not working a t t h e i r 
maximum c a p a c i t y . Furthermore, the a n a l y s i s has shown t h a t the degree 
of i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s depends upon many f a c t o r s such a s , the 
percentage of i n c r e a s e i n money i n c i r c u l a t i o n , f l e x i b i l i t y of the 
( 1 ) T a b l e ( P ) P. ( 152) 
(192) 
p r o d u c t i v e apparatus to i n c r e a s e production, the average p r o p e n s i t y and 
marginal p r o p e n s i t y to save, and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e i g n exchange 
t o f i n a n c e the i n c r e a s e i n imports. Therefore, we have a mild degree 
of i n f l a t i o n i n our model on the one hand, and a net a d d i t i o n i n 
r e a l terms to the n a t i o n a l income on the other, 
Furthermore, the above a n a l y s i s has shown t h a t the 
i n c r e a s e i n expenditure beyond the r e a l s avings i n a country where 
n a t u r a l and human r e s o u r c e s a r e not f u l l y u t i l i z e d has induced 
producers to expand t h e i r s c a l e of production to meet the expanding 
demand. I n order to expand t h e i r production, producers of consumer's 
goods employed more u n s k i l l e d labour and t r a i n e d them on the 
j o b . Therefore, the l e v e l of employment w i l l tend to r i s e , and more 
u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r e r s become s k i l l e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , producers have to 
f a c e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t r y i n g to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production, or as they 
a r e u s u a l l y c a l l e d " b o t t l e n e c k s " , such as the shortage of s k i l l e d 
labour, and the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n importation of c a p i t a l equipment . 
I t might be d i f f i c u l t to overcome these d i f f i c u l t i e s but 
i t i s not i n any case i m p o s s i b l e to t r a i n u n s k i l l e d workers, or borrow 
p a r t or a l l of the r e q u i r e d funds f o r the expansionary p r o c e s s . Then 
during the f i f t h year, and i f e v e r y t h i n g goes according to the programme 
the c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s w i l l s t a r t to s a t i s f y a l l domestic need f o r 
c l o t h i n g , and t h e r e w i l l be an i n c r e a s e i n the productive c a p a c i t y , and 
employment. A c e r t a i n amount of f o r e i g n exchange w i l l be saved and 
spent on importation of c a p i t a l equipments needed f o r other p r o j e c t s 
i n s t e a d of spending i t on i m p o r t a t i o n of consumer's goods. 
I n r e a l i t y , sometimes e v e r y t h i n g goes as i t was o r i g i n a l l y 
planned, but sometimes i t does not. 
Now, what a r e the p o s s i b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s or " b o t t l e n e c k s " which might 
a r i s e i n our model, and what are t h e i r p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s on the 
production and the general p r i c e l e v e l ? 
T h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the next s e c t i o n of 
t h i s chapter. 
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The above a n a l y s i s has d e a l t w i t h u s i n g the funds obtained through 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g by expansion of bank c r e d i t to f i n a n c e the s e t t i n g 
up of (10) c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s w i t h i n the f i v e y e ar development 
programme's p e r i o d . T h i s p r o c e s s , as the a n a l y s i s has shown, r e s u l t e d 
among other t h i n g s , m net a d d i t i o n to the n a t i o n a l income. I t was 
assumed t h a t the s e t t i n g up of t h e s e f a c t o r i e s would be c a r r i e d out 
according to the p l a n ; and no allowances have been made f o r the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g . Perhaps t h i s might be assumed 
c r i t i c i s e d as being u n r e a l i s t i c , f o r d i f f i c u l t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
an i n e x p e rienced country e n t e r i n g i n t o a phase of experimental 
development, should perhaps be regarded as more, r a t h e r than l e s s , 
l i k e l y , to a r i s e . The absence of allowance f o r p o s s i b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s 
however i s adopted d e l i b e r a t e l y i n order to keep the model as simple 
as p o s s i b l e , without attempting to b u i l d i n t o i t every s m a l l 
v a r i a t i o n t h a t i t might be more r e a l i s t i c to e n v i s a g e . There a r e many 
such s m a l l q u a n t i t a t i v e v a r i a b l e s t h a t might have been b u i l t i n t o 
the model i f a v e r y c l o s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of r e a l - l i f e s i t u a t i o n s was 
intended. 
I n our model, f o r example, i n the process of s e t t i n g up 
(10) c l o t h i n g f a c t o r i e s , d i f f i c u l t i e s might a r i s e from the c a p i t a l 
goods exporting country's s i d e , or from the c a p i t a l importing country's 
s i d e . 
(196) 
There are v a r i o u s ways i n which d i f f i c u l t i e s might a r i s e i n the 
c a p i t a l exporting country; some of them a r e 
( 1 ) The workers i n the p a r t i c u l a r weaving machine f i r m s , or i n 
the p a r t i c u l a r s e c t o r , t h a t i s the weaving machines manufacturing f i r m s , 
might have a s t r i k e during the four y e a r s ' p e r i o d of the agreement. The 
s t r i k e i f i t d i d happen, would tend to l e a d to a delay i n the d e l i v e r y 
of the machines to the c a p i t a l importing country, f o r a p e r i o d of one 
month, or s e v e r a l m o n t h s , d e p e n d i n g on how many s t r i k e s , and f o r how 
long each s t r i k e l a s t e d . Consequently, ( E r a ) might r e c e i v e the machines 
months a f t e r the agreed date of d e l i v e r y , which means t h a t the c l o t h i n g 
f a c t o r i e s would s t a r t production months a f t e r the planned date, even 
i f e v e r y t h i n g e l s e went as i t had been planned. 
( i i ) Another p o s s i b l e delay could occur, as a r e s u l t of a 
shortage i n the supply of labour, and/or raw m a t e r i a l s i n the c a p i t a l 
e x p o r ting country. 
T h i s might be more l i k e l y to happen i f the l a t t e r had reached 
or was about to r e a c h a f u l l employment stage, e i t h e r i n a l l s e c t o r s 
of i t s economy, or i n the manufacturing s e c t o r only. I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
i t might become d i f f i c u l t f o r the weaving machines manufacturing f i r m 
to get the r e q u i r e d raw m a t e r i a l s , and/or labour, and t h i s could l e a d 
(2) 
to a delay i n production which could be a month, or s e v e r a l months, 
depending on how s e v e r e t h i s shortage was. 
I n a s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s i t might be d i f f i c u l t f o r the f i r m 
manufacturing weaving machines to r e p l a c e i t s own s o r t of equipment 
from the c a p i t a l goods f i r m s , which supply i t , because these l a t t e r 
f i r m s might themselves be e x p e r i e n c i n g an abnormally s e v e r e p r e s s u r e 
of work. 
(111) A f t e r the weaving machines have been completed, the 
manufacturing f i r m has to d e l i v e r them to the c a p i t a l importing country. 
Sometimes i t i s d i f f i c u l t to make the arrangements to c a r r y and d e l i v e r 
the goods, because of shortage of s h i p s normally a v a i l a b l e f o r such 
(3) 
b u s i n e s s . T h i s d i f f i c u l t y could delay the d e l i v e r y , a month , or again 
a few months depending on how d i f f i c u l t i t i s to d e l i v e r t h e s e machines. 
( 1 ) "or l e s s " , of course : the words are not intended to imply t h a t 
d e l a y s of l e s s than a month could not occur: or other labour t r o u b l e s 
e.g. go-slow. 
(2 ) s i m i l a r l y as i n ( 1 ) . ( 3 ) As i n ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) . 
(197) 
D i f f i c u l t i e s which might a r i s e from the c a p i t a l importing country's 
s i d e : -
A f t e r the order f o r a c e r t a i n type of weaving machine has 
been p l a c e d by the planning a u t h o r i t i e s i n ( E r a ) the weaving machine 
manufacturers may be expected to get down to the t a s k of f u l f i l l i n g 
t he order. Suppose, however, t h a t the planning a u t h o r i t i e s i n ( E r a ) 
decide, a f t e r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t i t might be more 
advantageous to order a d i f f e r e n t type of weaving machine, e i t h e r , 
perhaps, w i t h l a r g e r c a p a c i t y or a t some lower p r i c e s . T h i s could 
l e a d to d e l a y s of a month or few months, a g a i n dependent on 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . D i f f i c u l t i e s might a r i s e out of changed p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s 
between the c o u n t r i e s concerned : i t might be t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s 
would have to be opened w i t h another country as s u p p l i e r : thus 
whether the new n e g o t i a t i o n s would be w i t h the same or w i t h another 
country would depend upon the nature of the p o l i t i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
T h i s would tend t o delay the d e l i v e r y of the machines f o r a month or 
s e v e r a l months, dependent on the d i f f i c u l t y to which the exporting 
country was s u b j e c t e d . 
( l i ) Under the agreement between the c a p i t a l goods e x p o r t i n g 
and c a p i t a l goods importing c o u n t r i e s , the l a t t e r has agreed to pay 
(15 mn.) i n money terms a year, and f o r four y e a r s . 
Payments could be made i n a v a r i e t y of ways : i t might be 
s p e c i f i e d t h a t payment should be made i n a p a r t i c u l a r type of f o r e i g n 
exchange, e.g. d o l l a r s or pounds s t e r l i n g : payments might have been 
agreed i n the domestic currency of the importing country : i t could 
even be the case t h a t the c a p i t a l e x p o r t i n g country had agreed t h a t 
some p a r t of the debt due might be covered by the p r o v i s i o n of a 
s p e c i f i e d q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of a g r i c u l t u r a l or m i n e r a l product. 
I f , however, crop f a i l u r e s occur then, i n the event t h a t payments 
had been p r o v i s i o n a l l y accepted i n terms of a g r i c u l t u r a l products, the 
machine - importing country might f i n d i t s e l f i n the p o s i t i o n of 
(198) 
not bexng ab l e to meet i t s o b l i g a t i o n s . S i n c e we have a l r e a d y assumed 
a t the o u t s e t of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n t h a t ( E r a ) i s not abl e to o b t a i n any 
a d d i t i o n a l loans from any source, ever and above those which i t has 
a l r e a d y obtained, t h e r e would be bound to be d i f f i c u l t y i n the 
r e l a t i o n s between the importing and the supplying c o u n t r i e s . 
U n c e r t a i n t y as to the a b i l i t y of the importing country to meet i t s 
o b l i g a t i o n s might w e l l l e a d to the supplying country checking 
d e l i v e r i e s f o r a time. 
Such a check i n the flow of machines d e l i v e r y would 
n e c e s s a r i l y cause delay i n the p u t t i n g of the machines i n t o use, as 
planned, i n the importing country. 
(111) The planning a u t h o r i t i e s , would and indeed should, 
seek to t r a i n the r e q u i r e d workers and managers to take over the 
f a c t o r i e s , when they a r e completed. Owing to the f a c t t h a t some or 
a l l the new workers and managers have had no previous e x p e r i e n c e i n 
such l i n e s of production, t o t a l production, i n the f i r s t few months, 
might be expected to be lower than the planned one. I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
p a r t of the demand w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y continue to be dependent on 
imported c l o t h i n g ; e i t h e r t h i s , or some p a r t of the demand f o r 
c l o t h i n g w i l l have to go u n s a t i s f i e d . 
( I V ) I f the newly e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t o r i e s are to depend on 
domestic raw m a t e r i a l s , f u e l and energy, the flow of th e s e , might not 
be kept going, and production might s u f f e r as a r e s u l t of shortage of 
any of these t h i n g s . 
( v ) The c o n s t r u c t i o n of b u i l d i n g s f o r these f a c t o r i e s might 
not be completed a t the planned date even i f the machines have been 
d e l i v e r e d a t the due time ac c o r d i n g to the pl a n . 
Now what are the consequences of such a delay ? 
The consequences of such a delay might be :-
( a ) That the workers and managers who have been t r a i n e d i n the 
prev i o u s period and a r e ready, by the end of the f o u r t h year of the 
pl a n , to take over the f a c t o r i e s , w i l l be, i n case of delay which i s 
due to one or more of the above d i f f i c u l t i e s , unemployed, u n t i l the 
f a c t o r i e s s t a r t production. 
(199) 
(b) Importation of c l o t h i n g w i l l continue as u s u a l , and the f o r e i g n 
exchange which was planned to be p a i d f o r i m p o r t a t i o n of c a p i t a l 
goods f o r other p r o j e c t s , w i l l have to be p a i d f o r importation of 
c l o t h i n g i n s t e a d . E i t h e r t h i s , or consumers would be put to the no 
doubt r e s e n t e d c o n s t r a i n t of not having as g r e a t a supply of 
c l o t h i n g as u s u a l to meet t h e i r needs. A d e f i c i e n t supply of c l o t h i n g 
would probably introduce r a t i o n i n g , or high p r i c e s , or both : and 
both would tend to be unwelcome to the consuming p u b l i c , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i f they had been l e d to b e l i e v e t h a t the programme was aimed at 
s u p p l y i n g t h e i r needs a t the customary l e v e l from domestic production. 
( c ) The working c a p i t a l of (48 mn.) w i l l remain i d l e as long as the 
f a c t o r i e s have not s t a r t e d production. T h i s i s because, i t i s 
supposed to be provided at the beginning of the f i f t h year, and spent 
on new m a t e r i a l s which are needed f o r workers and managers who w i l l 
run the f a c t o r i e s . 
The above a n a l y s i s has been conducted i n g e n e r a l terms to 
be a p p l i e d to underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n g e n e r a l . I t i s not 
unreasonable to suggest t h a t our model could be a d j u s t e d to p a r t i c u l a r 
circumstances of any underdeveloped country, the f i g u r e s which have 
been given i n the a n a l y s i s being r e p l a c e d by the a c t u a l f i g u r e s , or 
by f i g u r e s which are more r e a l i s t i c i n the l i g h t of the circumstances 
of any one p a r t i c u l a r country. At any r a t e the same way of a n a l y s i s 
and reasoning which has been used throughout t h i s a n a l y s i s as so f a r 
developed could be a p p l i e d w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e m o d i f i c a t i o n s to any 
a c t u a l c o u n t r i e s t h a t might be s e l e c t e d f o r examination. 
I f i t was found t h a t underdeveloped country (A) could provide 
only a l i m i t e d amount of f o r e i g n exchange each year, a l a r g e r p a r t of 
c a p i t a l funds provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g would have t o be 
spent d o m e s t i c a l l y . 
(200) 
I n underdeveloped country (B) i t might be found t h a t , consumers goods 
production could be i n c r e a s e d e a s i l y and i n a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t p e r i o d , 
w h i l e i t might take a longer p e r i o d to do t h a t i n country ( A ) . I t 
f o l l o w s t h a t country (A) might have to import consumer's goods i n a 
higher p r o p o r t i o n than country (B) when, other t h i n g s being equal, 
the demand f o r t h e s e goods r i s e s . Consequently, adjustments could 
be made to our model i n order to b r i n g i t as near as p o s s i b l e to the 
a c t u a l circumstances of any p a r t i c u l a r underdeveloped country,. However 
one of the main o b j e c t s of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s to d i s c u s s the p o s s i b l e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of the banking system i n I r a q to the promotion of 
economic development -in t h a t country. T h e r e f o r e , the p o s s i b l e 
consequences of u s i n g funds provided by the C e n t r a l Bank of I r a q , 
to cover p a r t of the c a p i t a l requirements of a development programme 
w i l l be d i s c u s s e d m the next chapter. 
(201) 
CHAPTER F I V E 
DEFICIT FINANCING FOR THE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ECONOMIC 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN IRAQ 
L e t us assume t h a t , the planning a u t h o r i t i e s i n 
I r a q have decided to introduce the method of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
to provide p a r t of the f i n a n c i a l requirements of a f i v e year 
development programme. I f i t should be thought t h a t t h i s i m p l i e s 
t r e a t i n g a course of a c t i o n as something new when i n f a c t i t might 
be thought i t had a l r e a d y been adopted, i t i s perhaps s u f f i c i e n t 
to p o i n t out by way of defence t h a t w h i l e the I r a q i Government has 
indeed used d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i n one sense, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1958, 
the procedure then adopted was very d i f f e r e n t from t h a t employed 
i n the model. The method of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g a c t u a l l y used by the 
I r a q i Government, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1958, has i n a s p e c i a l way, been 
by a l l o w i n g the estimated expenditure i n a c e r t a i n f i n a n c i a l y e ar 
to surpass the estimated revenue f o r t h a t y e a r . The o r d i n a r y 
expenditure of the government i n c l u d e s expenditure on defence, 
education, h e a l t h , ... i . e . o r d i n a r y spending: as M. Haq p o i n t s 
out, " I n some c o u n t r i e s budget d e f i c i t s a r e taken to mean d e f i c i t 
on c u r r e n t (or "revenue") account . . , " ^ \ I n the p r e s e n t study, 
i t i s suggested t h a t I r a q may use the method of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
i n a c a r e f u l l y planned way, w i t h i n l i m i t s , and under c e r t a i n con-
d i t i o n s , f o r the purpose of p r o v i d i n g p a r t of the c a p i t a l requirements 
of a development programme, through the p r o v i s i o n of bank c r e d i t . 
( 1 ) Haq, M., D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g I n P a k i s t a n , 1951-60, m c o l l a b o r a t i o n 
w i t h K. Khanam, Monographs i n Economics of Development. The 
I n s t i t u t e of Development Economics, Old Sind Assembly B u i l d i n g , 
Binder Road, K a r a c h i , Feb. 1961, P.2. 
(202) 
One method whxch may be followed when a government wants to 
borrow from the c e n t r a l bank i s to ask the l a t t e r to accept 
government s e c u r i t i e s on the backing of which i n c r e a s e s i n 
paper money could be made. T h i s method, according to 
K u l k a r n i ^ " ^ , i s more s u i t a b l e f o r underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 
where the u s i n g of cheques i s l i m i t e d and most t r a n s a c t i o n s 
a r e performed by means of paper currency. I f the degree of 
development i s very s m a l l t h i s may w e l l be t r u e : but i f 
t h e r e i s a c e n t r a l bank i n being, w i t h an assortment of 
commercial banks around i t then i t s v a l i d i t y may be s m a l l e r : 
t h i s s o r t of banking s t r u c t u r e w i l l tend to i n d i c a t e a more 
than merely rudimentary degree of development. I f t h i s 
r e s e r v a t i o n i s accepted then the mechanism which may be 
thought both the more ap p r o p r i a t e and the more l i k e l y w i l l 
be the p r o v i s i o n by the C e n t r a l Bank of o v e r d r a f t f a c i l i t i e s 
f o r the Government of which the l a t t e r w i l l then make use f o r 
the purpose of paying the b i l l s which a r i s e i n the normal 
course of c a r r y i n g the development programme through. T h i s 
i s the sequence of events which i s envisaged i n t h i s 
d i s s e r t a t i o n : i t i s a process which i s regarded as beginning 
by the Government ( i . e . the Planning A u t h o r i t y ) n e g o t i a t i n g 
w i t h the C e n t r a l Bank such a d d i t i o n a l o v e r d r a f t f a c i l i t i e s ( o r 
drawing r i g h t s ) as a r e thought n e c e s s a r y f o r the f u l f i l m e n t 
of the development programme. I t i s a l s o envisaged t h a t d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g w i l l tend to induce i n f l a t i o n : i t i s not argued, t h a t 
( 1 ) K u l k a r n i , R. G., D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g and Economic Development, 
w i t h s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e to I n d i a n Economic Development, A s i a 
P u b l i s h i n g House, London, 1966, PP. 14-15. 
(203) 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y and always induce i n f l a t i o n . 
There may be circumstances when d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g can be used 
without i n f l a t i o n p r e s e n t i n g i t s e l f as a r e l a t e d outcome. I f , 
f o r example, t h e r e a r e labour and other r e s o u r c e s which can be 
r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y a p p l i e d to pr o d u c t i v e uses then i t may be 
p o s s i b l e f o r output to expand p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y w i t h the 
i n c r e a s e d funds. T h i s would seem to be a p o s i t i o n accepted 
even by L e w i s ^ ^ , which i s the more remarkable i n t h a t he 
seems to wish to d e f i n e d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g and i n f l a t i o n i n 
o v e r l a p p i n g terms. I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g to note j t h a t t h i s 
would seem to mean t h a t Lewis i s , e x p l i c i t l y or not, committing 
h i m s e l f to some form of the Quantity theory of the v a l u e of 
money as an ex p l a n a t i o n , s u i t a b l y q u a l i f i e d of course, of the 
way i n which p r i c e s tend to be formed. S u i t a b l y q u a l i f i e d , 
t h e r e f o r e , i t i s accepted t h a t as p r i c e s r i s e because of t h i s , 
the money-using p u b l i c w i l l request more notes f o r c a r r y i n g 
through i t s normal t r a n s a c t i o n s : the process by which such 
i n c r e a s e s i n the note c i r c u l a t i o n a r e brought about i s not 
followed up i n d e t a i l i n the d i s s e r t a t i o n . I t i s assumed 
t h a t the procedure adopted by the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s f o r 
p r o v i d i n g the a d d i t i o n a l notes w i l l conform to the p r a c t i c e s 
which a r e accepted as normal m t h e i r country. There i s 
another aspect of " d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g " which should be noted. 
U n t i l r e c e n t l y , the term d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g was used t o 
d e s c r i b e a s i t u a t i o n i n which a government spends more than 
i t s c u r r e n t revenue during a c e r t a i n p e r i o d , r e g a r d l e s s of the 
( 1 ) L ewis, W.A., Development Planning, the e s s e n t i a l s of economic 
p o l i c y , London, George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1966, PP.130-131 
(204) 
way i n whxch the funds were spent. I n the post Keynesian 
period, however, more a t t e n t i o n has been paxd to the 
x n f l a t i o n a r y e f f e c t s of government budget d e f x c x t s . The 
c e n t r a l requxrement has been to examxne the xmpact of o v e r a l l 
xmbalance between ex-ante natxonal income and ex-ante 
natxonal expendxture i n a country durxng a c e r t a x n p e r i o d . 
Thxs xmplxes t h a t xn r e c e n t y e a r s , a budget defxcxt has been 
regarded as includxng the defxcxt on both the c a p x t a l and 
the revenue accounts: m short the r e f e r e n c e has been to 
the o v e r a l l d e f x c x t ( o r s u r p l u s ) . 
Funds provxded through defxcxt fxnancxng 
could be used f o r d x f f e r e n t purposes. R.G. Kulkarnx, f o r 
example, r e f e r s to t h r e e sxtuatxons where defxcxt financxng 
may be used: 
(1 ) durxng a depressxon perxod, 
( 2 ) durxng a war p e r i o d , 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) f o r economxc development. 
The use of defxcxt fxnancxng durxng a 
depressxon perxod may be confxned t o developed c o u n t r i e s . 
T h i s xs because during a busxness c y c l e or a major depressxon, 
whxch occur from txme to txme i n developed countrxes, a not 
xnsxgnxfxcant p a r t of the productxve c a p a c i t y xs xdle, due to 
l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t e f f e c t x v e demand f o r c e r t a x n goods. The 
government i n a sxtuatxon l i k e thxs mxght t r y to promote 
( 1 ) Haq, M., Defxcxt Fxnancing i n P a k i s t a n , 1951-60, The I n s t i t u t e 
of Development Economics, Binder Road, K a r a c h i , Feb. 1961, P.2 
(2 ) K u l k a r n i , R.G., D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g and Economic Development, 
A s i a P u b l i s h i n g House, London, 1966, PP.30-33 
economic a c t i v i t y by f o l l o w i n g a cheap c r e d i t p o l i c y . I f 
t h i s p o l i c y f a i l s , t h e n d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g may be used n o t 
o n l y t o r e s t o r e a h i g h e r l e v e l o f economic a c t i v i t y d u r i n g 
a b u s i n e s s c y c l e , b u t a l s o t o m o d i f y h a r m f u l e f f e c t s o f a 
d e p r e s s i o n . 
D u r i n g a war p e r i o d governments o f d e v e l o p e d 
as w e l l as u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , use d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
t o meet p a r t o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g e x p e n d i t u r e on war e f f o r t s 
w h i c h c o u l d n o t be met by o r d i n a r y methods o f r a i s i n g 
revenues such as, t a x a t i o n , l o a n s , f e e s , and t h e l i k e . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , governments i n a war p e r i o d o f f e r h i g h e r 
p r i c e s f o r f a c t o r s o f p r o d u c t i o n . 
D e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g f o r economic development 
may be used by b o t h d eveloped and u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s . 
But i f i t i s t h o u g h t t h a t d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s a r e , g e n e r a l l y 
s p e a k i n g , c a p i t a l e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s , and t h e i r main 
c o n c e r n i s economic s t a b i l i t y , t h o u g h more r e c e n t l y t h e r e 
has been i n c r e a s i n g emphasis on a t t a i n i n g some d e s i r e d r a t e 
o f g r o w t h , t h e n i t may be s a f e t o say t h a t t h e use o f t h i s 
d e v i c e may be c o n f i n e d t o u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , as i s 
i n d e e d b e i n g s u g g e s t e d i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
( 2 0 6 ) 
The concept o f d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g used m 
t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s t h u s d e l i b e r a t e l y narrow and 
s p e c i f i c : an i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e i n t e n t i o n t o make i t so 
was g i v e n e a r l i e r . S o f a r as t h e s p e n d i n g o f funds 
p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h t h e d e v i c e o f d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s 
c o n c e rned, t h e t e r m i s used t o i n d i c a t e t h e s e c u r i n g , 
by a s p e n d i n g ( D e v e l o p i n g ) A u t h o r i t y , o f some p a r t o f 
t h e f unds needed f o r i t s development programme, f r o m 
i t s C e n t r a l Bank. T h i s usage matches t h e s i t u a t i o n 
( 2 ) 
w h i c h i s d e s c r i b e d by " K u l k a r n i " as h i s " t h i r d " s i t u a t i o n . 
I t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s and r e l a t i o n -
s h i p s between t h e q u a n t i t y o f money i n c i r c u l a t i o n and 
t h e q u a n t i t y o f a v a i l a b l e goods and s e r v i c e s a t a g i v e n 
t i m e , a degree o f i n f l a t i o n may be i n i t i a t e d . The a n a l y s i s 
i n e a r l i e r p a r t s o f t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n has shown t h a t 
i n f l a t i o n can be k e p t w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s and need n o t , 
n e c e s s a r i l y , t u r n i n t o h i g h e r degrees o f , o r c u m u l a t i v e f 
i n f l a t i o n . Now l e t us assume t h a t , one o f t h e consequences 
o f u s i n g d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i n I r a q i s e x p e c t e d t o be an 
average a n n u a l i n c r e a s e m t h e g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l o f t h e o r d e r 
( 1 ) See P. (150) 
( 2 ) See PP.(204-205). 
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o f 4% - 5% p e r annum, a n d , f u r t h e r t h a n t h i s , x t xs e x p e c t e d t h a t t h x s 
degree o f i n f l a t i o n can be k e p t w i t h i n t h e s e l i m i t s . 
The q u e s t i o n s now a r e :~ 
( 1 ) What a r e t h e e x p e c t e d e f f e c t s on t h e I r a q i e x p o r t s , and t h e 
b a l a n c e o f payments, and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f f o r e i g n exchange ? 
( 2 ) To what e x t e n t w i l l p r o d u c e r s o f d o m e s t i c consumer's goods a r e 
a b l e t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n when demand r i s e s ? 
( 3 ) I s t h e r e any i n d i c a t i o n f r o m t h e p a s t e x p e r i e n c e , as f a r as 
a v a i l a b l e d a t a and p u b l i c a t i o n s show, s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e I r a q i 
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s a r e n o t a b l e t o h a n d l e such a s i t u a t i o n ? 
The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n w i l l a t t e m p t t o answer t h e s e and s i m i l a r 
q u e s t i o n s by d i s c u s s i n g t h e e x p e c t e d i m p a c t on each o f t h e above 
i t e m s , i n t u r n . 
( 1 ) E x p o r t s : The main i t e m s i n t h e I r a q i e x p o r t s a r e :-
crud e o i l , wheat and b a r l e y , and cement. 
( a ) The Crude O i l : cr u d e o i l i s p r oduced, t r a n s p o r t e d , and s o l d 
by f o r e i g n companies o p e r a t i n g i n I r a q under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . The 
crud e o i l p r i c e s a r e d e c i d e d by o i l companies i n accordance w i t h t h e 
c o s t o f p r o d u c t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t o i l - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s on t h e one 
hand, and t h e t o t a l s u p p l y and demand f o r o i l i n t h e w o r l d m a r k e t , 
on t h e o t h e r . I n o t h e r w ords, t h e q u a n t i t y and p r i c e s o f o i l 
e x p o r t e d have l i t t l e o r n o t h i n g t o do w i t h d o m e s t i c p r i c e s m an o i l 
e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r y , m t h i s case I r a q . T h i s p o i n t may be i l l u s t r a t e d 
by t h e f o l l o w i n g example. 
I f d o m e s t i c p r i c e s i n I r a q r o s e by 5% f o r i n s t a n c e as a 
r e s u l t o f t h e use o f d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g t o p r o v i d e p a r t o f fu n d s 
needed f o r a development programme, t h e r e m i g h t be a p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
t h e employees o f t h e o i l companies o p e r a t i n g i n I r a q demanding 
h i g h e r wages. L e t us assume f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e employees o f t h e o i l 
companies demand an i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r wages by 5% t o keep t h e i r r e a l 
wages unchanged and t h a t t h e companies w i l l agree t o t h a t p r o m p t l y . 
Now, t h e q u e s t i o n i s how w o u l d t h i s a f f e c t t h e e x p o r t s o f I r a q i o i l ? 
(208) 
I n o r d e r t o answer t h i s q u e s t i o n , i t may be n e c e ssary t o know t h e 
number o f w o r k e r s i n t h e o i l companies and t h e i r t o t a l wages. I n « 
1962 f o r example t h e number o f persons employed by t h e o i l companies 
was ( 1 2 . 1 3 8 ) , and t h e i r annual wages amounted t o ( I . D 8 . 0 9 6 . 9 9 2 ) . ^ ^ 
The s e l l i n g p r i c e o f t h e o i l e x p o r t e d i n t h a t y e a r was 
( 2 ) 
( I . D 225.378.000). Consequently, i f t h e employees o f t h e o i l 
companies were g i v e n a 5% r i s e i n t h e i r wages, c o s t o f p r o d u c t i o n 
w o u l d have r i s e n by : 
5% o f t h e i r t o t a l a n n u a l wages i n 1962 
The s e l l i n g p r i c e o f o i l p roduced i n 1962 
That i s : 
0.404.849 
225.378.000 
= 0.002 o r 2 
= 0.0018. 
1000 500 w h i c h may be 
c o n s i d e r e d as a n e g l i g i b l e i n c r e a s e i n c o s t o f p r o d u c t i o n o f e x p o r t e d 
o i l . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i t may be s a f e t o say, t h a t a moderate i n c r e a s e i n 
d o m e s t i c p r i c e s i n I r a q w h i c h i s e x p e c t e d t o cause an i n c r e a s e i n 
wages o f employees by o i l companies, o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , w i l l 
t e n d t o have a n e g l i g i b l e o r no e f f e c t on t h e e x p o r t a t i o n o f crude 
o i l . The i m p o r t a n c e o f crude o i l e x p o r t s t o t o t a l e x p o r t s may be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t i n 1962, c r u d e o i l e x p o r t s c o n t r i b u t e d 
( 3 ) 
9 2 . 1 % o f t o t a l e x p o r t s , and r o s e t o 94% i n 1963. 
( b ) Dates and B a r l e y :-
A p a r t f r o m crude o i l and cement, t h e I r a q i e x p o r t s a r e 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s , w h i c h depend h e a v i l y on t h e c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s 
and t h e amount and r e g u l a r i t y o f r a m - f a l l , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e r a i n -
f e d a r e a i n t h e n o r t h . As t h e t a b l e ( 3 ) App,(6) shows, t o t a l e x p o r t 
( 1 ) C e n t r a l Bureau o f S t a t i s t i c s , M i n i s t r y o f P l a n n i n g , A n n u a l 
A b s t r a c t , Government Press 1964, P.77 
( 2 ) C e n t r a l Bank o f I r a q , Q u a r t e r l y B u l l e t i n , A p r i l - J u n e 1963, 
No.46. P.52 
( 3 ) The ( C . B . I . ) Annual R e p o r t 1963, ( i n A r a b i c ) Baghdad, 1965. P.64 
(209) 
f l u c t u a t e s f r o m y e a r t o y e a r . I n 1963, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e v a l u e o f 
e x p o r t e d b a r l e y f e l l f r o m ( I . D 6.07 mn.) t o ( I . D 0.83 mn.) as a 
r e s u l t o f i r r e g u l a r r a m - f a l l . I n o t h e r w o r d s , even i f we suppose 
t h a t b a r l e y p r i c e s i n t h e w o r l d market have r i s e n d u r i n g 1963, i t 
s t i l l r emains t h e case t h a t I r a q i b a r l e y w o u l d have been c o n t r o l l e d 
much more e m p h a t i c a l l y ' and f o r c i b l y by n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s : t h e y 
c o u l d n o t have c o n t r o l l e d t h e r a m - f a l l : c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e o n l y t h i n g 
t h e y c o u l d have done i f w o r l d p r i c e s had r i s e n w o u l d have been t o 
draw upon t h e i r s t o c k s o f b a r l e y , assuming t h a t t h e y had any, i n 
r e s e r v e t o draw upon. The o t h e r i m p o r t a n t i t e m i s t h e e x p o r t o f 
d a t e s . The e x p o r t s o f d a t e s a r e o r g a n i s e d and c o n t r o l l e d by t h e 
" I r a q i Dates A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ". T h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n , u s u a l l y , buys 
da t e s f r o m i n d i v i d u a l d a t e s ' p r o d u c e r s and t r i e s t o s e l l t h e p r o d u c t 
i n b u l k q u a n t i t i e s t o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s a t n e g o t i a t e d p r i c e s . T h i s 
o r g a n i s a t i o n makes r e d u c t i o n s i n p r i c e s when i t i s n e c e s s a r y . I n 1963, 
f o r example t h e average p r i c e p e r t o n was 14% l o w e r t h a n t h a t o f 1962. 
T h i s was due t o :-
( 1 ) The e x i s t e n c e o f l a r g e s t o c k s i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and o t h e r 
Western European c o u n t r i e s f r o m t h e 1962/63 season. 
( 2 ) The r e d u c t i o n i n t h e p r i c e o f I r a q i d a t e s i n m arkets where t h e r e 
i s a c o m p e t i t i o n by o t h e r d a t e - p r o d u c e r s l i k e I r a n f o r example. 
(C) Cement The government t h r o u g h t h e "Cement M a r k e t i n g Board" 
o r g a n i s e s t h e q u a n t i t i e s and, t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , p r i c e s o f t h e 
e x p o r t e d cement. I t does so i n accordance w i t h t h e markets o f t h e 
i m p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s . I t does n o t always f o l l o w , as f a r as t h e 
e x p o r t s o f I r a q i cement a r e concerned t h a t h i g h e r p r i c e s w i l l t e n d t o 
have l i m i t i n g e f f e c t s on e x p o r t . T h i s p o i n t may be i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e 
f a c t t h a t i n 1962, (142.700 t o n s o f cement were e x p o r t e d a t a t o t a l 
v a l u e o f ( I . D 0.624 mn.) o r ( I . D 43 p e r t o n ) . I n 1963, t h e amount o f 
cement e x p o r t e d was d o u b l e d i . e . (289.400 t o n s ) , a t a t o t a l v a l u e o f 
( I . D 1.4 mn.) i . e . ( I . D . 48.4) p e r t o n . 
( 1 ) The C e n t r a l Bank o f I r a q A n nual R e p o r t 1963, Baghdad 1965 ( i n 
A r a b i c ) , P.65. 
( 2 ) I b i d P.65 f i g u r e s f o r I r a q i D i n a r p e r t o n were c a l c u l a t e d by t h e 
w i i t e r . 
(210) 
Thxs b r i e f a n a l y s i s o f t h e p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s o f an i n c r e a s e i n t h e 
g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l on I r a q i e x p o r t s has shown t h a t , t h e p o s s i b l e 
e f f e c t s on crude o i l and cement a r e n e g l i g i b l e , and t h a t I r a q i 
a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s a r e more dependent on c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s , t h a n 
on moderate i n c r e a s e s i n d o m e s t i c p r i c e s . 
( 2 ) The a v a i l a b i l i t y o f f o r e i g n exchange, and t h e e f f e c t s on t h e 
b a l a n c e o f payments :-
The a n a l y s i s i n e a r l i e r p a r t s o f t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n has shown 
t h a t , as a r e s u l t o f t h e s p e n d i n g o f c a p i t a l f u n d s p r o v i d e d by 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , demand f o r do m e s t i c and i m p o r t e d consumers goods 
i s e x p e c t e d t o i n c r e a s e . I n a d d i t i o n demand f o r i m p o r t e d c a p i t a l 
goods i s e x p e c t e d t o i n c r e a s e as w e l l , when p r o d u c e r s o f d o m e s t i c 
consumer's goods t r y t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y by 
i m p o r t i n g c a p i t a l equipments. T h e r e f o r e , i t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t , t h e 
combined e f f e c t o f an i n c r e a s e m demand f o r i m p o r t e d consumer and 
c a p i t a l goods w i l l t e n d t o i n c r e a s e t h e need f o r f o r e i g n exchange. 
The I r a q i Government r e c e i v e s i t s s h a r e o f o i l - r e v e n u e s i n f o r e i g n 
exchange, e.g. S t e r l i n g . T h i s s o u r c e o f f o r e i g n exchange i s , t o a 
l a r g e e x t e n t , s t e a d y , c o n t i n u o u s , and i n c r e a s i n g . C o n s e q u e n t l y , 
i t may be s a f e t o say, t h a t , on a l l normal r e c k o n i n g s ^ I r a q s h o u l d n o t 
be e x p e c t e d t o f a c e a s e r i o u s s h o r t a g e o f f o r e i g n exchange and an 
u n f a v o u r a b l e b a l a n c e o f payments, as a consequence o f an i n c r e a s e m 
t h e r a t e o f i m p o r t a t i o n o f consumer's and c a p i t a l goods. 
(3J The I r a q i Government c o n t r o l s t h e r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l 
f i r m s i n I r a q . 
T h e r e f o r e , t h e p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s a r e i n a p o s i t i o n w h i c h 
enables them t o p l a n t h e e x p a n s i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n o f consumer's goods 
( 1 ) The s e c u r i t y o f t h i s i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e o f revenue and f o r e i g n 
exchange t o I r a q i s d i s c u s s e d on PP.( 3 1 - 3 4 ) . I t may be 
w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g h e r e , t h a t i f t h e f l o w o f e x p o r t e d I r a q i o i l 
was s t o p p e d f o r one r e a s o n o r a n o t h e r , t h i s w o u l d be l i k e l y t o 
have f o r r e a c h i n g damaging e f f e c t s on t h e I r a q i economy, w i t h o r 
w i t h o u t t h e use o f d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . 
(211) 
b e f o r e h a n d . Thus when demand i n c r e a s e s as a r e s u l t o f t h e s p e n d i n g 
o f t h e funds p r o v i d e d by t h e C e n t r a l Bank, i t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e t o 
s a t i s f y p a r t o r a l l o f t h e i n c r e a s e m demand. T h i s p o i n t may be 
i l l u s t r a t e d by what a c t u a l l y happened i n 1964. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
C e n t r a l Bank o f I r a q ' s r e p o r t : many o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i a l 
e n t e r p r i s e s had been o p e r a t i n g , p r i o r t o n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , below t h e i r 
f u l l p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y - "But when t h e s e f i r m s were n a t i o n a l i s e d 
t h e Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n w h i c h c o n t r o l s them, managed t o make 
s e v e r a l f a c t o r i e s , e.g. cement, o i l seeds and d e t e r g e n t s f a c t o r i e s -
r e a c h a p o i n t o f f u l l p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y and t h u s l o w e r e d u n i t 
p r o d u c t i o n c o s t s and r a i s e d p r o f i t a b i l i t y . " ^ 1 ^ 
( 4 ) The b a n k i n g system i n I r a q i s s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d . 
A l l t h e f o r e i g n and non-government owned banks were 
n a t i o n a l i s e d m J u l y 1964. An o r g a n i s a t i o n c a l l e d t h e "General 
O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Banks" was e s t a b l i s h e d , changed i n 1965 t o "Publuc 
E s t a b l i s h m e n t f o r Banks" t o c o n t r o l t h e commercial banks. T h i s 
E s t a b l i s h m e n t , i s under t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e C e n t r a l Bank. As was 
m e n tioned e a r l i e r t h e C e n t r a l Bank o f I r a q i s i n a p o s i t i o n w h i c h 
( 2 ) 
enables i t t o e x e r c i s e e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l on t h e b a n k i n g system. 
As f o r t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e monetary a u t h o r i t i e s m I r a q a r e 
e f f i c i e n t and r e s p o n s i b l e o r n o t , t h e r e i s no c o m p l e t e answer f o r 
t h i s q u e s t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e f o l l o w i n g i n d i c a t o r s may s e r v e as 
r o u g h measures i n t r y i n g t o r e a c h a judgement. 
( 1 ) The s t a b i l i t y o f t h e d o m e s t i c c u r r e n c y i n t e r n a l l y and e x t e r n a l l y . 
( a ) I n t e r n a l l y t h i s p o i n t may be i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g 
t a b l e w h i c h shows changes i n p r i c e i n d i c e s f o r t h e l a s t f i v e y e a r s . 
( 1 ) The C e n t r a l Bank o f I r a q Annual Report 1964, Zahra P r e s s , 
Baghdad ( i n E n g l i s h ) P.19. 
( 2 ) See PP ( 1 3 1 - 1 3 3 ) . 
( 2 1 2 ) 
T h i s t a b l e shows t h a t , t a k i n g 1958 as a base y e a r , c o s t o f 
l i v i n g i n Baghdad f o r a l l i t e m s r o s e f r o m ( 1 0 4 ) m 1961 t o ( 1 0 9 ) 
i n 1965, i . e . an average i n c r e a s e o f 1 p o i n t a y e a r . The f o o d 
i n d e x r o s e f r o m 109 i n 1961, t o 116 m 1965, i . e . an average 
i n c r e a s e o f l e s s t h a n 1.5 p o i n t a y e a r : t h e w h o l e s a l e 
( g e n e r a l ) i n d e x r o s e f r o m 113 i n 1961 t o 115 i n 1965, i . e . 
l e s s t h a n 0.5 p o i n t a y e a r . These f i g u r e s show t h a t t h e r e 
was no s h a r p i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s i n I r a q f o r t h e s e f i v e y e a r s . 
Some c r e d i t may be g i v e n t o t h e monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i n I r a q 
f o r t h a t . 
T a b l e "R" 
* 
P r i c e I n d i c e s 
m o n t h l y averages 1958 = 100 
Cost o f l i v i n g : Baghdad 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
A l l i t e m s 104 104 108 108 109 
f o o d 109 109 116 117 116 
W h o l e s a l e : g e n e r a l 113 111 115 121 115 
Source: t h e Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, 
1966, P.30 
* As f o r t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e s e f i g u r e s , t h e y a r e used by 
t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and t h e Economist 
I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t ; i t may t h e r e f o r e be s a f e t o say t h a t 
t h e y m i g h t be c o n s i d e r e d as a c c e p t a b l y r e l i a b l e o r a t any 
r a t e n o t so u n - r e l i a b l e t h a t i t w o u l d be s a f e r n o t t o use 
them a t a l l . 
(213) 
( b ) E x t e r n a l l y : I n o r d e r t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t , i t may be 
s u f f i c i e n t t o q u o t e t h e "Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t " as s t a t i n g : 
" I r a q l e f t t h e s t e r l i n g a r ea on June 2 3 r d , 1959, b u t t h e d i n a r i s 
a t p a r w i t h t h e pound s t e r l i n g I.D 1 - U $ 2.80) and has v e r y 
s i m i l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r e e r a t e s " . ( u n d e r l i n i n g n o t i n t h e o r i g i n ) . 
( i i ) The f o r e i g n banks and o t h e r f i r m s n a t i o n a l i s e d i n mid 1964, were 
( 2 ) 
f u l l y compensated, w i t h i n a y e a r o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . T h i s may 
r e f l e c t t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n g e n e r a l and monetary 
a u t h o r i t i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r had a c t e d m a r e s p o n s i b l e way. 
Oil) F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e has been no i n d i c a t i o n as fax as t h e p r e s e n t 
w r i t e r knows f r o m h i s r e a d i n g s i n a v a i l a b l e p u b l i c a t i o n s , t h a t t h e 
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i n I r a q have t a k e n an i r r e s p o n s i b l e c o u r s e o f 
a c t i o n , o r a c t e d i n a way w h i c h r e f l e c t s t h e i r i n e f f i c i e n c y . F i n a l l y , 
i t may perhaps be a c c e p t e d as a r e a s o n a b l y s a f e c o n c l u s i o n f r o m t h e s e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t , i f d e f i c i t i s t o be used a t a l l t o p r o v i d e p a r t 
o f t h e t o t a l o f funds needed f o r a development programme t h e n t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e v a i l i n g i n I r a q a r e a t any r a t e n o t 
m i m i c a l t o such a p r a c t i c e and may even i n d e e d , be r e g a r d e d as 
m i l d l y f a v o u r a b l e . I f t h i s i s so, t h e n p r o v i d e d t h e e x t e n t t o 
w h i c h d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s used i s k e p t w i t h i n modest l i m i t s and 
p r o v i d e d v a r i o u s n e c e s s a r y p r e c a u t i o n s a r e t a k e n , d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
c o u l d be employed i n I r a q , w i t h o u t , n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v i n g t h e I r a q 
economy i n any g r e a t t h r e a t o f i n s t a b i l i t y o r danger. I n e x p r e s s i n g 
t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i t i s r e c o g n i s e d t h a t c a r e f u l n o t e s h o u l d be t a k e n 
o f t h e shock t o t h e I r a q i economy w h i c h m i g h t be a d m i n i s t e r e d by a 
( 1 ) The Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t , Annual Supplement, 1966. P.28 
( 2 ) R e p o r t ( i n A r a b i c ) s u b m i t t e d by Dr. K. Haseeb, Deputy P r e s i d e n t 
o f t h e Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n i n J u l y 1965, under t h e t i t l e : 
" R e s u l t s o f a p p l i c a t i o n o f S o c i a l D e c i s i o n s i n t h e f i r s t y e a r " . 
P.16 
( 2 1 4 ) 
l o s s o f o i l revenues such as o c c u r r e d , f o r a b r i e f w h i l e 
t h i s y e a r , as a r e s u l t o f t h e a c t i o n o f t h e S y r i a n 
Government i n s t o p p i n g t h e f l o w o f o i l f r o m K i r k u k t o 
B a n i a s . Some f a i r l y d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h i s i s s u e 
i s g i v e n on PP. ( 3 1 - 3 4 ) , and i t i s perhaps un-necessary 
t o r e p e a t t h e argument h e r e . I f i t were n o t f o r t h e 
e x c e e d i n g l y g r e a t dependence o f t h e I r a q i economy on t h e 
maintenance o f t h e o i l f l o w s o f i t s o i l i n t o w o r l d 
m a r k e t s , and i t s dependence, t h e r e f o r e , on t h e maintenance 
o f o r d e r e d and r e a s o n a b l e s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s ,one 
w o u l d have l i t t l e o r no h e s i t a t i o n i n a g r e e i n g w i t h 
K u l k a r n i t h a t " d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g may be r e g a r d e d as a 
p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t f o r p r o m o t i n g development on a p l a n n e d 
b a s i s " , a n d , f u r t h e r , t h a t o f t h e v a r i o u s u n d e r d e v e l o p e d 
c o u n t r i e s I r a q was p r o b a b l y i n a s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n t h a n 
most i n b e i n g a b l e t o make use o f i t . 
( 1 ) K u l k a r n i , R.G., D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g and Economic Development, 
A s i a P u b l i s h i n g House, London, 1966. 
(215) 
CHAPTER SIX 
DEFICIT FINANCING AND THE 
DEGREE OF INFLATION 
I n t h e p r e s e n t s t u d y , x t i s r e g a r d e d as a 
p e r m i s s i b l e p r a c t i s e t h a t u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s s h o u l d r a i s e p a r t 
o f t h e r e q u i r e d funds f o r economic development t h r o u g h an e x p a n s i o n 
o f bank c r e d i t , even t h o u g h t h i s m i g h t t e n d t o i n i t i a t e a degree o f 
i n f l a t i o n . The q u a n t i t y o f new p u r c h a s i n g power r e l e a s e d w i t h i n t h e 
system by t h e e x p a n s i o n o f bank c r e d i t s h o u l d however, be c l o s e l y 
l i m i t e d . I t i s s uggested t h a t , u n l e s s t h e r e a r e s t r o n g reasons f o r 
s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t , t h e e x p a n s i o n o f bank c r e d i t s h o u l d n o t be by 
( 1 ) 
more t h a n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10% o f t h e money m c i r c u l a t i o n . I t i s 
a c c e p t e d t h a t t h e r e w i l l be consequences o f t h i s a c t i o n . We 
r e c o g n i s e t h e danger o f o v e r s i m p l i f y i n g a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e , d u r i n g a 
c e r t a i n p e r i o d i n w h i c h t h e s e funds a r e s p e n t , t h e g e n e r a l p r i c e 
l e v e l w i l l t e n d t o i n c r e a s e . We a r e n o t s u g g e s t i n g i n t h e l e a s t t h a t 
t h i s c o n s t a n c y on t h e p a r t o f o t h e r v a r i a b l e s i s l i k e l y t o happen i n 
r e a l w o r l d s i t u a t i o n s : t h i s s i m p l y t a k e s t h e r e l a t i o n as t h e o n l y 
one w h i c h can be c a r e f u l l y i n d i c a t e d . I n r e a l w o r l d s i t u a t i o n s , 
however, v a r i a b l e s w i l l n o t s t a y impounded, and c o n s t a n t i n t h i s way. 
O t h e r v a r i a b l e s w i l l r e s p o n d . As t h e a n a l y s i s i n t h e e a r l i e r p a r t s 
o f t h i s s t u d y has shown p r o d u c t i o n w i l l t e n d t o i n c r e a s e t o meet p a r t 
o f t h e i n c r e a s e i n demand w h i c h mgy be i n d u c e d by t h e i n c r e a s e i n 
money i n c i r c u l a t i o n . An i n c r e a s e i n i m p o r t s w i l l meet a n o t h e r p a r t 
o f t h e i n c r e a s e i n demand, and a t h i r d p a r t o f t h e i n c r e a s e i n demand 
w h i c h has n o t been met w i l l t e n d t o i n d u c e an i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s . 
( 1 ) The f i g u r e ( 1 0 % ) o f t h e money i n c i r c u l a t i o n has been chosen, 
because i f i t i s l e s s t h a n ( 1 0 % ) say, 5% i t w i l l n o t have a 
s i g n i f i c a n c e i m p o r t a n c e as a c o n t r i b u t o r i n f i n a n c i n g development 
programmes, and i f i t i s more t h a n ( 1 0 % ) , say ( 1 5 % ) , i t m i g h t 
t e n d t o i n i t i a t e a h i g h degree i n s t e a d o f a moderate degree o f 
i n f l a t i o n . 
(216) 
A q u e s t i o n m i g h t be r a i s e d h e r e : Why i s i t n o t p o s s i b l e t o meet t h e 
i n c r e a s e i n demand t o t h e f u l l e x t e n t by an i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i o n ? 
The answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s t h a t :- p r o d u c t i o n i n 
u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s c o u l d be i n c r e a s e d o n l y t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t 
when demand i n c r e a s e s , because o f t h e " b o t t l e n e c k s " i n t h e s e 
economies, such as, t h e l a c k o f s k i l l e d and s e m i - s k i l l e d l a b o u r , 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i m p o r t a t i o n o f c a p i t a l goods and t h e l i k e . These a r e 
p o i n t s w h i c h have been p r e s e n t e d and d i s c u s s e d m e a r l i e r p a r t s o f 
t h i s s t u d y . 
Thus p a r t o f t h e i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r consumer's 
goods, w h i c h i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o s a t i s f y , w i l l t e n d t o l e a d t o an 
i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r i c e s o f consumer's goods. 
I n t h i s way an e f f e c t i n terms o f a r i s e i n p r i c e s w i l l t e n d t o be 
e x p e r i e n c e d i n t h e consumer c good's s e c t o r . I f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n 
o u r model a r e c o n s i d e r e d i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e i n c r e a s e i n 
p r i c e s d i d n o t exceed 3% p e r annum even t h o u g h t h e i n i t i a t i n g 
e x p a n s i o n i n bank c r e d i t had been o f t h e o r d e r o f 1 0 % o f money i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n . I t may be remembered t h a t some e c o n o m i s t s , such as 
B . H i g g i n s , c o n s i d e r c o u n t r i e s w h i c h have had an average i n c r e a s e i n 
t h e g e n e r a l p r i c e i n d e x o f between 3 and 7 p e r c e n t p e r annum t o be 
c l a s s i f i a b l e as c o u n t r i e s w i t h a r e c o r d o f "moderate" i n f l a t i o n . 
The p e r c e n t a g e mentioned above as a p p l y i n g t o our model e v i d e n t l y 
f a l l s w i t h i n t h i s c l a s s . I t i s e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t however, and t h i s i s 
a c e n t r a l p o i n t i n t h e argument d e v e l o p e d i n t h i s t h e s i s , t h a t 
i n f l a t i o n w h i c h b e g i n s by b e i n g "moderate" s h o u l d keep moderate and 
t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n t i n u o u s cheekyimposed on 
t h e q u a n t i t y o f monetary f l o w s by t h e monetary a u t h o r i t i e s . I t i s 
i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be a c h i e v e d f o r , i f moderate i n f l a t i o n 
( 1 ) B. H i g g i n s , Government F i n a n c e and Economic Development, 
E d i t e d by A.T.Peacock and G.Hauser, O.E.C.D., P a r i s 1965, P.42 
( 2 ) I n t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s , o f c o u r s e , t h e check t h a t needs t o be 
embodied i s upon t h e t o t a l f l o w o f s p e n d i n g w i t h i n t h e economy and 
t h i s i n f a c t , however, i n K eynesian t e r m s , i n v o l v e a w a t c h upon t h e 
s t r e n g t h o f t h e f l o w o f s p e n d i n g f o r c o n s u m p t i o n p u r p o s e s . 
(217) 
t u r n s i n t o h i g h o r h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n t h e n t h e b a l a n c e o f advantage t h a t 
may be t h o u g h t open t o und e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s i n f i n a n c i n g t h e i r 
development programmes w i l l be l o s t . An underdeveloped c o u n t r y i s 
l i k e l y t o be i n need o f a l l p o s s i b l e means o f g o i n g ahead w i t h i t s 
development programme and i f t h e r e i s any advantage i n u s i n g t h e 
d e v i c e o f d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i t w o u l d be a p i t y i f t h i s s h o u l d be t h r o w n 
away because t h e degree o f i n f l a t i o n was n o t k e p t s u f f i c i e n t l y 
r e s t r i c t e d . 
As may be'seen f r o m what E i n z i g has w r i t t e n on i n f l a t i o n 
and i n f l a t i o n i s t s , t h i s i s a r e a l and n o t an i m a g i n a r y p o s s i b i l i t y : 
q u i t e d i v e r s e movements cannot be r u l e d o u t : "They a r e v a g u e l y aware, 
however, t h a t a slow and w e l l - r e g u l a t e d i n c r e a s e o f p r i c e s t h r o u g h 
i n f l a t i o n c o u l d n o t c o n t i n u e f o r e v e r . I t m i g h t e a s i l y d e g e n e r a t e 
i n t o a run-away i n f l a t i o n o r i t m i g h t provoke r e a c t i o n i n t h e f o r m 
o f d e f l a t i o n " ^ ^ \ F u r t h e r m o r e , p a r t o f t h e purpose o f t h e p r e s e n t 
s t u d y i s t o examine t h e use o f d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , w i t h a p o s s i b l e 
moderate degree o f i n f l a t i o n o n l y , b e i n g b r o u g h t about as an 
i n s t r u m e n t i n economic development. I t has t o be r e c o g n i s e d t h a t , 
i n s o f a r as t h e c o u n t r i e s concerned a r e e x c l u s i v e l y u n d e r d e v e l o p e d 
c o u n t r i e s , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f moderate i n f l a t i o n t u r n i n g i n t o hyper 
i n f l a t i o n may be g r e a t ; g r e a t e r a t any r a t e t h a n i f t h e argument was 
concerned w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n o f a mixed a s s o r t m e n t o f c o u n t r i e s , some 
o f w h i c h were matured and d e v e l o p e d . T h i s i s because o f t h e l i m i t e d 
c a p a c i t y o f t h e p r o d u c t i v e a p p a r a t u s , and t h e p o s s i b l e i n e f f i c i e n c y 
o f monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i n u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , w h i c h i s 
( 2 ) 
g e n e r a l l y agreed upon. 
( 1 ) I n f l a t i o n , Paul E i n z i g , Chato and Wmdus, London, 1952, P.141. 
( 2 ) U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Department o f Economic A f f a i r s , Methods o f 
F i n a n c i n g Economic Development i n Underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , 
Lake Success, New York, 1949, P.19. 
( 2 1 8 ) 
Thxs argument i g n o r e s t h e f a c t t h a t , i f 
moderate i n f l a t i o n i s t o t u r n i n t o a hyper i n f l a t i o n , an 
i n c r e a s i n g and c o n t i n u i n g f l o w o f money w o u l d have t o be 
p r o v i d e d . T h i s i s because,as P r o f e s s o r A. Day s t a t e s : "An 
i n f l a t i o n can always be b r o u g h t t o an end i f t h e s u p p l y o f 
money i s l i m i t e d " . T h i s i n c r e a s i n g and c o n t i n u i n g f l o w 
o f money i s n e c e s s a r y t o e n a b l e p r o d u c e r s t o pay h i g h e r and 
s t i l l i n c r e a s i n g p r i c e s o f f a c t o r s o f p r o d u c t i o n , and 
consumer's t o buy goods and s e r v i c e s a t p r i c e s w h i c h a l s o a r e 
h i g h e r and s t i l l i n c r e a s i n g . E x a m i n a t i o n w i l l now be made o f 
t h e ways i n w h i c h money s u p p l y and/or t h e v e l o c i t y o f money i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n c o u l d be i n c r e a s e d . The two ways i n w h i c h t h i s may 
be done a r e :-
(A) Expansion o f bank c r e d i t , by t h e i s s u e o f more n o t e s o r by 
t h e c r e a t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l bank l o a n s by t h e b a n k i n g system. 
( B ) I n c r e a s e i n t h e v e l o c i t y o f money i n c i r c u l a t i o n , and t o a 
s m a l l e x t e n t d i s - h o a r d m g o f c u r r e n c y . 
As f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n c r e a s i n g money by 
e x p a n s i o n o f bank c r e d i t , w h i c h i s i n f a c t o u r case, governments 
i n most o f t h e und e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s a r e t h e b o d i e s w h i c h c a r r y 
o u t development programmes. I n most such c o u n t r i e s t o o , t h e 
c e n t r a l bank w i l l e i t h e r be a n a t i o n a l bank o r , i f n o t , t h e n w o r k i n g 
v e r y c l o s e l y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e government. The Government w i l l be 
l i k e l y a l s o t o have had some p a r t i n s h a p i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s between 
t h e C e n t r a l Bank and o t h e r banks i n t h e c o u n t r y . Through t h e c o n t r o l s 
e x e r c i s e d by t h e C e n t r a l Bank, t h e government i s t h u s p r o v i d e d w i t h a 
means o f c o n t r o l l i n g t h e c r e a t i o n o f bank c r e d i t by t h e n o n - C e n t r a l 
Bank p a r t o f t h e system. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e i n c r e a s e i n money m c i r -
c u l a t i o n i s o r s h o u l d be under t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e monetary a u t h o r i t i e s and 
i t s i n c r e a s e s h o u l d n o t go, o r go by v e r y much, above t h e l i m i t w h i c h was 
( 1 ) Day, A.C.L., O u t l i n e o f Monetary Economics, C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 
O x f o r d , 1958, P.252 
(219) 
d e f i n e d by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . Dependent on t h e i r f o r e -
s i g h t r a n d t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e i r i n s t r u m e n t s o f c o n t r o l , t h e 
p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s s h o u l d t h u s t h r o u g h t h e i r C e n t r a l Bank be a b l e 
t o impose on t h e b a n k i n g system b r o a d l y t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p e r c e n t a g e 
o f e x p a n s i o n m bank c r e d i t w h i c h has been p l a n n e d , f o r t h e outcome 
o f t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t , i n t h e o r y a t any r a t e ,the u n l i m i t e d s u p p l y 
o f money w h i c h i s n e c e s s a r y t o t u r n "moderate" i n f l a t i o n i n t o h y p e r -
i n f l a t i o n s h o u l d n o t come a b o u t , f o r i f i t does, t h e n i t w o u l d be 
p l a i n t h a t t h e monetary a u t h o r i t i e s had a c t e d e i t h e r i r r e s p o n s i b l y o r 
i n e f f i c i e n t l y . 
( B) As f o r t h e changes i n v e l o c i t y o f money i n c i r c u l a t i o n and 
d i s h o a r d m g o f c u r r e n c y , t h e s e depend on t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c ' s 
c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e government and i n t h e d o m e s t i c c u r r e n c y , a s a l s o on 
t h e demand f o r money f o r t r a n s a c t i o n s and s p e c u l a t i v e p u r p o s e s . I f 
p r o d u c t i o n , d u r i n g a c e r t a i n p e r i o d , a y e a r f o r example, was c o n s t a n t , 
o t h e r t h i n g s r e m a i n t h e same, t h e volume o f t r a n s a c t i o n s w i l l n o t 
e f f e c t t h e v e l o c i t y o f money. I f p r o d u c t i o n i n c r e a s e s however, 
d u r i n g a c e r t a i n p e r i o d , t h e n assuming t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e 
v a r i a b l e s remains c o n s t a n t , t h e volume o f t r a n s a c t i o n s w i l l t e n d t o 
i n c r e a s e , and t h i s i n c r e a s e w i l l r e q u i r e e i t h e r an i n c r e a s e t n t h e 
q u a n t i t y o f money i n c i r c u l a t i o n , o r i n t h e v e l o c i t y o f t h e money 
w h i c h i s a l r e a d y i n c i r c u l a t i o n , o r a c e r t a i n p e r c e n t a g e o f i n c r e a s e 
i n b o t h . When t h e p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s , i n o ur model, s t a r t t o 
spend t h e funds w h i c h a r e r a i s e d t h r o u g h e x p a n s i o n o f bank c r e d i t , 
t h e g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l w i l l t e n d t o i n c r e a s e l e s s t h a n 
p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y . The r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h a t , as t h e a n a l y s i s i n t h e 
p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r has shown, p r o d u c t i o n o f consumer's goods w i l l t e n d 
t o be i n c r e a s e d and so p a r t o f t h e i n c r e a s e i n demand w i l l be met by 
an i n c r e a s e m p r o d u c t i o n . I t i s p o s s i b l e a l s o t h a t t h e r i s e i n 
p r i c e s w i l l i n d u c e t h e r e l e a s e o f f o r c e s w h i c h w i l l t e n d t o o p e r a t e 
t o keep t h e r i s e i n p r i c e s i n check. For example as m t h e b e g i n n i n g 
( 1 ) l i m i t i n t h e model as n o t ex c e e d i n g 10% o f t h e money m 
c i r c u l a t i o n . 
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o f t h e p r o c e s s , p r i c e s s t a r t t o r i s e and c r e a t e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h 
p r o d u c e r s and money b o r r o w e r s add t o t h e i r b o r r o w i n g s so, as money 
l e n d e r s b e g i n t o r e a l i s e t h a t t h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r i c e l e v e l i s con-
t i n u o u s and l i k e l y t o re m a i n so t h e y w i l l t e n d t o r a i s e i n t e r e s t r a t e s 
and so check t h e p r o c e s s . One e f f e c t o f t h e i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s , w i l l , 
o t h e r t h i n g s r e m a i n i n g t h e same, be a tend e n c y f o r p r o f i t s t o i n c r e a s e 
and, as t h i s i s seen, i n v e s t o r s w i l l seek t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e expan-
s i o n o f e x i s t i n g i n v e s t m e n t s and t h e c r e a t i o n o f new ones. I n one way 
o r a n o t h e r t h e f o r c e s o f e x p a n s i o n w i l l t e n d t o p r e s s on e x i s t i n g 
l a b o u r s u p p l i e s and, as f a r as may be p o s s i b l e t h e l e v e l o f employment 
w i l l t e n d t o r i s e , o r , i f n o t t h i s , t h e n t h e number o f e x i s t i n g 
employees w i l l be worked more i n t e n s i v e l y . I n a. s i t u a t i o n , where 
employment i s i n c r e a s i n g , more income i s b e i n g d i s t r i b u t e d , p r o d u c t i o n 
i s e x p a n d i n g , and t h e i n f l a t i o n e x p e r i e n c e d i s n o t a c u t e , n o r showing 
s i g n s o f becoming so, i t i s n o t t o be e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c 
w i l l l o s e i t s c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e d o m e s t i c c u r r e n c y . The g e n e r a l p u b l i c 
m i g h t w e l l b e g i n t o l o s e i t s c o n f i d e n c e i f t h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e g e n e r a l 
p r i c e l e v e l i s v e r y r a p i d , i . e . a case o f h i g h o r h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n , b u t 
n o t i n a case o f a moderate and s t e a d y i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s . 
The same r e a s o n i n g c o u l d be a p p l i e d t o d i s h o a r d i n g o f 
c u r r e n c y . Hoarders a r e n o t i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g a u t o m a t i c h o a r d e r s 
and c o m p l e t e l y i n s e n s i t i v e t o t h e e f f e c t o f p r i c e i n c r e a s e s on t h e 
v a l u e o f t h e i r hoards though i t may w e l l be t h e case t h a t some o f t h e 
h o a r d e r s do d i s p l a y t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c : 
i t may a l s o w e l l be t h e case t h a t h o a r d e r s b e g i n t o r e c o g n i s e t h e 
d i s a d v a n t a g e t o themselves o f a d d i n g f u r t h e r t o t h e i r hoards o n l y a f t e r 
some degree o f t i m e l a g . As f o r t h e d i v e r s e movements, such as 
d e f l a t i o n s f o r example, i t i s t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t governments w i l l 
o n l y be d i s p o s e d t o use a d e l i b e r a t e l y d e f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c y when t h e i r 
f e a r t h a t i n f l a t i o n i s p r o c e e d i n g so v i g o u r o u s l y as t o suggest t h e 
t h r e a t t h a t i t may, u n l e s s something d r a s t i c i s done, g e t o u t o f 
c o n t r o l . Hence i f i n f l a t i o n remains moderate, t h e r e i s no need t o 
use d e f l a t i o n a r y methods, and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e r e i s n o t much f e a r 
(221) 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t x n f l a t i o n might provoke the s o r t of 
d e f l a t i o n which E i n z i g suggests. The c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , moderate 
i n f l a t i o n might c o n c e i v a b l y be kept from developing i n t o a 
high degree of i n f l a t i o n could be strengthened by drawing upon 
a study which P r o f e s s o r R.G. L i p s e y has made. P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y 
argues a g a i n s t an e x p l o s i v e theory of i n f l a t i o n . T h i s theory 
suggests t h a t above a c r i t i c a l r a t e of i n f l a t i o n , i n f l a t i o n tends 
to become cumulative. But P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y i s a t p a i n s to argue 
t h a t i n f l a t i o n s do not n e c e s s a r i l y tend to become hyper ones. 
P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y ' s argument a g a i n s t the e x p l o s i v e theory of 
i n f l a t i o n i s i n two p a r t s : m the f i r s t one he a n a l y s e s the r o l e 
of i n t e r e s t r a t e s i n an economy which i s moving from a steady 
p r i c e l e v e l s i t u a t i o n to a s i t u a t i o n where the g e n e r a l p r i c e 
l e v e l i s i n c r e a s i n g , and where the impact of i n f l a t i o n on cash 
b a l a n c e s i s r e l e v a n t . T h e n he concludes t h a t , "... provided the 
governments' a c t i o n s a r e such as to cause only a steady i n f l a t i o n , 
t h e r e i s no reason to expect t h a t the a c t i o n s of p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s , 
who a n t i c i p a t e t h i s i n f l a t i o n , w i l l convert i t i n t o an e x p l o s i v e 
( 2 ) 
one . 
I n the second p a r t of h i s argument a g a i n s t the e x p l o s i v e 
theory of i n f l a t i o n , P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y a n a l y s e s h i s t o r i c a l f a c t s 
concerning twenty c o u n t r i e s and c o v e r i n g 40 y e a r s . 
The l i s t of these c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d e s ten of the South 
American c o u n t r i e s where a s i t u a t i o n of high or hyper i n f l a t i o n has 
( 3 ) 
e x i s t e d , I n a d d i t i o n to these c o u n t r i e s , the United S t a t e s , United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, Fra n c e , Sweden, Denmark, Greece, 
F i n l a n d , and I n d i a , a re i n c l u d e d as w e l l . 
( 1 ) See pp. (172-173). 
( 2 ) L i p s e y , R.G., I s I n f l a t i o n e x p l o s i v e t The Banker, Vol.CXI. 1961. 
Oct. P.667 
( 3 ) The South American Countries which a r e i n c l u d e d are 
Argentina, B r a z i l , C h i l e , B o l i v i a , Colombia, Equador, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
I b i d , P.679 
(222) 
T h i s l i s t of c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d e s underdeveloped, as w e l l as 
developed c o u n t r i e s ; i t i n c l u d e s t h a t i s , c o u n t r i e s a t d i f f e r e n t 
l e v e l s of economic development. 
P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y concludes>after a n a l y s i n g the f i g u r e s of 
r a t e s of i n f l a t i o n s i n these c o u n t r i e s , and d i s p l a y i n g 
o b s e r v a t i o n s i n two c h a r t s t h a t , 
"... the evidence f o r the 20 c o u n t r i e s s t u d i e d i s d e f i n i t e l y a g a i n s t 
the e x p l o s i v e theory. No g e n e r a l tendency f o r i n f l a t i o n s to explode 
i s apparent i n the experience of these c o u n t r i e s - d e s p i t e the f a c t 
t h a t many of them, the South American ones i n p a r t i c u l a r , have 
experienced s u s t a i n e d major i n f l a t i o n s of the order of 20 per cent 
or more per annum.^ The a c t u a l r e c o r d of the l a s t (40) y e a r s 
lends no support to the t h e s i s t h a t beyond a c e r t a i n c r i t i c a l l e v e l 
" ( 2 ) 
i n f l a t i o n s , n e c e s s a r i l y tend to become cumulative. One of the 
important p o i n t s i n the p r e s e n t study i s t h a t , when governments i n 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s decide to use d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g as a 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i n f i n a n c i n g economic development, the g e n e r a t i n g of 
a c e r t a i n degree of i n f l a t i o n must be accepted. The important t h i n g 
i s to ensure as f a r as p o s s i b l e t h a t moderate i n f l a t i o n w i l l go on 
being moderate i n f l a t i o n . The c o n s i d e r a t i o n s j u s t presented, together 
w i t h the arguments o f f e r e d by P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y show c l e a r l y enough, 
i t may be thought, t h a t t h i s can be done. As P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y h i m s e l f 
s a y s :- "...We must not argue a g a i n s t a p o l i c y of X per cent i n f l a t i o n 
on the grounds t h a t i t w i l l not s t a y at X per cent, because our 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the a c t u a l , r e a l world evidence i s t h a t i t i s q u i t e 
p o s s i b l e f o r Governments to keep i n f l a t i o n a t X per cent i f they so 
( 3 ) 
d e s i r e " . P r o f e s s o r L i p s e y ' s a n a l y s i s and the e m p i r i c a l study of 
( 1 ) B.Higgins c l a s s i f i e s , A r gentina, B r a z i l , C h i l e , B o l i v i a , 
Paraguay, Uruguay, as c o u n t r i e s i n hyper i n f l a t i o n a r y i . e . over 
15 per cent per annum group f o r the p e r i o d between 1950-1961, 
and B o l i v i a , Colombia, Peru m high i n f l a t i o n a r y groups i . e . 7-10 
per cent per annum and only Venezuela i n the NO s u s t a i n e d 
i n f l a t i o n a r y group f o r the same pe r i o d . B.Higgins Government 
Fin a n c e and Economic development, E d i t e d by A.T. Peacock and 
G.Hauser, O.E.C.D. P a r i s 1965. PP.41-43. 
( 2 ) I b i d P.681 
( 3 ) I b i d P.681 
(223) 
the a c t u a l f a c t s l e a d to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t i s not o u t s i d e the 
bounds of p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t governments i n developed or underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s should be found capable of m a i n t a i n i n g , a t any r a t e 
approximately so, the degree of i n f l a t i o n which has been decided i n 
advance by the planning a u t h o r i t i e s . 
The above a n a l y s i s does not suggest t h a t e x p l o s i v e i n f l a t i o n s 
a r e i m p o s s i b l e , because e x p l o s i v e i n f l a t i o n s could be brought about 
i n a country i f the government followed a p o l i c y of ever i n c r e a s i n g 
supply of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n to f i n a n c e i t s d e f i c i t spending. 
I n f l a t i o n could be kept moderate only i f the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s 
followed a p o l i c y of keeping t h i s i n f l a t i o n m o d e r a t e . A n 
argument i n favour of u s i n g d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g as a c o n t r i b u t o r i n 
promotion of economic development i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , which 
i s our case, i s t h a t these c o u n t r i e s i n g e n e r a l have a high 
proportion of unemployed or under-employed labour and n a t u r a l 
r e s o u r c e s . I f a d d i t i o n a l jobs and new forms of e n t e r p r i s e a re to be 
c r e a t e d i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s then more c a p i t a l funds need to 
be r a i s e d and i n v e s t e d . The amount of c a p i t a l to be r a i s e d w i l l 
depend upon the p r o j e c t which i s envisaged. Much the same requirement 
e x i s t s i f n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s a re to be e x p l o i t e d . But most i f not a l l 
of the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s a re not capable of r a i s i n g enough 
c a p i t a l funds f o r t h i s purpose. Despite the r i s k s of u s i n g f i n a n c i n g 
methods which introduce i n f l a t i o n i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s one p o s s i b l e way 
i n which p a r t of the funds needed to u t i l i s e i d l e n a t u r a l and human 
re s o u r c e s may be r a i s e d . Another p o s s i b l e argument which could be 
o f f e r e d i n favour of d e v i c e s which introduce a moderate i n f l a t i o n i s 
t h a t during a p e r i o d of moderate i n f l a t i o n , r i s k s tend to be low, 
f a i l u r e s few, and almost e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s produced can be s o l d a t 
( 2 ) 
a reasonable p r o f i t . Producers a r e able e i t h e r to accumulate funds 
needed f o r expanding t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , or they may f i n d i t p o s s i b l e 
( 1 ) I b i d P.677 
(2) I n f l a t i o n , Paul E i n z i g , Chatto and Windus, London, 1952, P.139 
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to borrow them from the banking system, on advantageous terms. 
Thus production and d i s t r i b u t e d incomes w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e , and 
t h i s i n c r e a s e w i l l continue s t e a d i l y as long as demand continues to 
i n c r e a s e . As the p r o f i t s i n c r e a s e , more funds which could be 
c a n a l i s e d to investment w i l l tend to be c r e a t e d . P r o f e s s o r 
Bronfenbrenner says : "A slow i n f l a t i o n or even a r a p i d one i n i t s 
e a r l y s t ages induces l a b o u r e r s to work more i n t e n s i v e l y f o r r e a l 
incomes which are no higher and which may be lower than t h e i r 
p r evious l e v e l . To a l e s s e r extent owners of land and c a p i t a l may 
be induced to put t h e i r property to work i n t e n s i v e l y m the same way 
when money incomes rxse"Underlying t h i s process i s e v i d e n t l y 
a s h i f t i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of t o t a l income i n favour of those whose 
incomes a r i s e mainly or wholly as p r o f i t . 
As always^one must look f o r arguments on the other s i d e . 
One argument which could be d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the preceding a n a l y s i s 
i s t h a t , during an i n f l a t i o n a r y p e r i o d the o r g a n i s a t i o n of production 
tends to become l e s s e f f i c i e n t because of the ease w i t h which the 
i n c r e a s e i n c o s t of,production can be t r a n s f e r r e d to the consumers, 
by r a i s i n g p r i c e s . Producers may be tempted to be l e s s w a t c h f u l i n 
t h e i r use of labour, machines, and raw m a t e r i a l s , and thus p a r t of 
these r e s o u r c e s w i l l be wasted, and p o s s i b l y concern about the 
(2) 
q u a l i t y of production may become l e s s r e s p o n s i b l e and l e s s keen. 
There i s a f u r t h e r point which could be made to support the 
argument th a t during an i n f l a t i o n a r y p e r i o d , production may be l e s s 
e f f i c i e n t l y organised. I t i s t h a t producers may tend to s t a r t new 
investments, which would not have been p r o f i t a b l e i f i n f l a t i o n had 
not been i n e x i s t e n c e ; i n other words t h e r e may be a tendency towards 
the m i s a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s . T h i s argument might be considered, to 
a c e r t a i n e xtent, v a l i d only i n high and h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n a r y periods 
( 1 ) Government Fi n a n c e and Economic Development, E d i t e d by 
A.T.Peacock, and G. Hauser O.E.C.D. P a r i s 1965, P.23 
(2 ) I n f l a t i o n , P . Emzig, Chatto and Windus, London, 1952, P.142 
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and not i n a moderate i n f l a t i o n p e r i o d . T h i s i s because i n a 
moderate i n f l a t i o n where the i n c r e a s e i n the general p r i c e l e v e l 
i s m the region of 3% to 7% per annum, p r o f i t s a r e i n c r e a s i n g 
c e r t a i n l y , but only to a s m a l l e x t e n t . When p r i c e s a r e i n c r e a s i n g 
c o s t of production w i l l tend to r i s e a t the same time, or w i t h 
some l a g , f o r w h i l e t h e r e may be a w i n d - f a l l element i n p r o f i t s , 
producers have to pay higher wages, higher p r i c e s of raw m a t e r i a l s , 
and t h e i r p r o f i t s would not be expected to be high enough to allow 
them to be as w a s t e f u l m u s i n g f a c t o r s of production as the above 
argument might suggest, because i f they do so t h e i r p r o f i t s w i l l 
tend to decrease. Furthermore, competition among producers of 
s i m i l a r goods w i l l tend to p l a y i t s p a r t i n f o r c i n g a c e r t a i n 
producer or producers to reduce c o s t of production, or otherwise 
he or they w i l l l o s e t h e i r c o m p e t i t i v e power i n favour of other 
producers w i t h lower c o s t and hence lower p r i c e s . The same reasoning 
could be a p p l i e d to the new investments, where producers must compete 
w i t h , e i t h e r , o l d producers of the same goods or w i t h imports. 
A f o u r t h argument i n favour of moderate i n f l a t i o n i s 
t h a t moderate i n f l a t i o n i s b e n e f i c i a l f o r productive c l a s s e s , such 
as b u s i n e s s men and i n v e s t o r s ( e x c e p t , p o s s i b l y where the l a t t e r 
a r e concerned w i t h f i x e d i n t e r e s t b e a r i n g s e c u r i t i e s ) upon whom 
production of goods and s e r v i c e s depends. T h i s i s because when 
p r i c e s r i s e a s h i f t i n r e a l income from consumers m ge n e r a l 
i n c l u d i n g wage e a r n e r s , to r e c i p i e n t s of p r o f i t s takes p l a c e . T h i s 
s h i f t i n income i s an advantage and s t i m u l u s i n i nducing b u s i n e s s 
men to expand t h e i r e x i s t i n g investment, or s t a r t new o n e s . ^ ^ 
( 1 ) I n f l a t i o n I n R e l a t i o n to Economic Development, E.M.Bernstein 
and I.G. P a t e l , I.M.F. S t a f f papers, Vol.2., 1952, Washington 
D.C., P.380 
(226) 
Consequently, moderate x n f l a t x o n , a f t e r i t xs xnxtxated xn our 
model by expansxon of bank credxt mxght have, xn addxtxon to 
r a x s i n g funds to fxnance economic development, a posxtxve 
e f f e c t on xnvestment; as Dr. H.S.Odeh concluded from hxs study of 
the xmpact of x n f l a t x o n on the l e v e l of economic a c t x v i t y , "... 
x n f l a t x o n had a negatxve e f f e c t on xnvestment xn C h i l e , whxle the 
more moderate i n f l a t x o n xn B r a z x l between 1939 and 1956 had a 
favourable e f f e c t on x n v e s t m e n t " . ( u n d e r l x n x n g not xn the orxgxn) 
( 1 ) Odeh, H.S., The Impact of I n f l a t x o n on the l e v e l of Economxc 
Actxvxty, Rotterdam, 1963 : quoted xn these words xn :— 
Government Fxnance and Economxc Development, Edxted by 
A.T.Peacock, and G. Hauser, O.E.C.D., Parxs 1965. P.21 
(227) 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main problem presented i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s the 
s c a r c i t y of c a p i t a l funds needed to f i n a n c e economic development 
i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n g e n e r a l , and i n I r a q i n p a r t i c u l a r . 
One of the mechanisms through which p a r t of the funds needed f o r 
development might be provided i s the banking system. The banking 
system i n I r a q c o n s i s t s of thr e e p a r t s , v i z : the commercial banks, 
the s p e c i a l i s e d banks, and the c e n t r a l bank. The c o n t r i b u t i o n of 
each p a r t i n f i n a n c i n g economic development i s d i s c u s s e d . The 
commercial banks a r e the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s which a r e used by 
(1 ) 
s m a l l s a v e r s as p l a c e s where they can keep t h e i r s a v i n g s . Small 
s a v e r s i n I r a q , as i n most other, i f not a l l underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 
do not g e n e r a l l y i n v e s t t h e i r s a v i n g s i n i n d u s t r i a l or a g r i c u l t u r a l 
investments : e i t h e r t h e i r r e s o u r c e s a r e too s m a l l , or they a r e not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y t r u s t f u l of such investment forms, or some blend of 
both : m any case such c o u n t r i e s do not have a developed and 
organ i s e d c a p i t a l market : and t h i s i s t r u e of I r a q i n p a r t i c u l a r . 
The commercial banks i n I r a q , and most of the underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s , provide,normally, loans on a short-term b a s i s , a g a i n s t 
a c c e p t a b l e c o l l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y , t o businessmen and other s u i t a b l e 
customers : such loans might be used both i n f o r e i g n and domestic 
trade dependent upon the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of the borrowers. 
I n so f a r as t h i s i n d i c a t e s the normal a c t i v i t y of the commercial 
banks the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s whether they should not engage i n loa n 
making a c t i v i t i e s going beyond t h e s e u s u a l l i m i t s by p r o v i d i n g medium 
or even long-term loans to a g r i c u l t u r e and i n d u s t r y . 
T h i s r a i s e s complex and d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s . I f i t should be 
suggested t h a t they should take banking p r a c t i c e i n the Unit e d Kingdom 
as t h e i r guide then t h i s model would i n d i c a t e t h a t they were a c t i n g 
( 1 ) Over the f u l l range of s a v i n g some s m a l l s a v e r s w i l l of course use 
other f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s e.g. sa v i n g s banks, and ot h e r s may 
probably not use banks a t a l l . 
(228) 
c o r r e c t l y xn r e f r a i n i n g from becoming committed to medium and long-term 
t r a n s a c t i o n s . I f , on the other hand, i t should be suggested t h a t they 
should take banking p r a c t i c e as i t has been developed m Germany as 
t h e i r guide then t h e i r model would not warn them a g a i n s t these longer 
term commitments : i t would indeed encourage the p r a c t i c e of longer-term 
l e n d i n g . A q u e s t i o n of wider s i g n i f i c a n c e , however, i s whether i t i s 
w i s e f o r a government, p a r t i c u l a r l y one a c t i n g under c o n d i t i o n s of 
r e l a t i v e l y low economic development, to take the p r a c t i c e of other 
c o u n t r i e s , probably w i t h q u i t e d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n s of economic e v o l u t i o n , 
as a guide i n i t s own policy-making. I t may be w i s e r f o r a country to 
take note of p r a c t i c e s elsewhere only m the most general senses and 
then to make i t s p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s i n the l i g h t of i t s knowledge of the 
s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n i t s own borders and what seemed to be the l o c a l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n I r a q f o r example i t would need to be r e c o g n i s e d t h a t 
t h e r e a r e a l r e a d y i n e x i s t e n c e s p e c i a l i s e d banks which have been charged 
w i t h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of p r o v i d i n g long-term f i n a n c e to a g r i c u l t u r e 
and i n d u s t r y . I t would need c a r e to avoid unnecessary d u p l i c a t i o n of 
f u n c t i o n . I f the s p e c i a l i s e d banks have been e s t a b l i s h e d s p e c i a l l y to 
f u l f i l t h i s f u n c t i o n , then t h e r e would seem to be l i t t l e need to gi v e 
d u t i e s to the commercial banks f o r which they were not o r i g i n a l l y 
designed and i n the e x e r c i s e of which they have l i t t l e or no e x p e r i e n c e . 
I n a d d i t i o n i t would be e s s e n t i a l t h a t the commercial banks, i f they 
d i d i n v o l v e themselves i n long-term commitments, should e x e r c i s e the 
g r e a t e s t c a u t i o n a g a i n s t i n v e s t i n g an unduly l a r g e p a r t s of the funds 
f o r which they are r e s p o n s i b l e to t h e i r d e p o s i t o r s and s h a r e h o l d e r s 
i n unsecured or u n s u f f i c i e n t l y s ecured long-term loans which might 
endanger the s a f e t y of t h e i r funds, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r d e p o s i t s . 
( 1 ) V i z : The I n d u s t r i a l Bank and the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank. There a r e 
other s p e c i a l i s e d banks i t i s t r u e : but i t i s doubtful whether 
we should regard these l a t t e r banks as being connected s u f f i c i e n t l y 
c l o s e l y and d i r e c t l y to the t a s k s of economic development as t h i s 
term i s d e f i n e d g e n e r a l l y , f o r i n c l u s i o n i n the argument presented 
here. The s e c t i o n above t h e r e f o r e i s concerned s o l e l y w i t h the 
I n d u s t r i a l Bank and the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank. 
(229) 
C o n s i d e r a t i o n s whxch would have c o n s i d e r a b l e weight i n r e a c h i n g a 
judgement on the q u e s t i o n of the d e s i r a b i l i t y or otherwise of the 
commercial banks i n v o l v i n g themselves i n long-term l e n d i n g 
t r a n s a c t i o n s would be : 
(A) The a t t i t u d e of the managers of the commercial banks w i t h regard 
to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the funds they can deploy. 
(B) The extent to which the s p e c i a l i s e d banks mentioned above a r e 
p r o v i d i n g a f u l l and adequate cover of the need which they were 
designed to meet. As to the f i r s t , i n so f a r as the banks are p a r t 
of a n a t i o n a l i s e d banking s t r u c t u r e i t may be suggested t h a t they w i l l 
be r e a d i e r to a s s i s t the development of t h e i r n a t i o n a l economy than 
perhaps they might be i f t h e i r mam i n t e n t i o n was t h a t of maximising 
bank p r o f i t s . The s a c r i f i c e of p r o f i t s might not however be a very 
c o n s i d e r a b l e one. I f the s p e c i a l i s e d banks, p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank, do not make co n t a c t as y e t , w i t h more than a s m a l l 
f r a c t i o n of the t o t a l p o t e n t i a l f i e l d of u s e r s of funds, and i f the 
commercial banks through t h e i r branches have a c o n t a c t at more p o i n t s 
w i t h the p o t e n t i a l u s e r of funds then, provided reasonable c a u t i o n i s 
e x e r c i s e d i n the g r a n t i n g of the l o a n s , the outcome might be such a 
more e f f i c i e n t use of farm r e s o u r c e s i n p a r t i c u l a r as would enable the 
a g r i c u l t u r i s t to pay a r a t e of i n t e r e s t to the bank which would be a 
g r e a t e r c o n t r i b u t i o n to bank p r o f i t s , p o s s i b l y , than could be obtained 
from other ways of l e n d i n g . 
T h i s i s e v i d e n t l y a comment which i s r e l e v a n t to (B) above as 
w e l l as to ( A ) . I f the a c t i o n of the commercial banks i n extending 
t h e i r loans to a g r i c u l t u r i s t s r e s u l t s i n bringing'more c u l t i v a t o r s 
w i t h i n the b e n e f i t s of bank a i d and i f the s p e c i a l i s e d banks, as i s 
thought to be the case, do not,as yet; b r i n g i n more than a s m a l l 
f r a c t i o n of p o t e n t i a l borrowers, then i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r an improvement 
i n bank p r o f i t s to take p l a c e a t the same time as an improvement i n 
the commercial banks might be used i n t h i s way to supplement not only 
the a c t i v i t y of the A g r i c u l t u r a l Bank i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h farmers but 
a l s o to supplement the a c t i v i t y of the I n d u s t r i a l Bank i n i t s r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
(230) 
The commercial banks would be expected, of course, to 
continue p r o v i d i n g short-term c r e d i t to farmers and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s i n 
order t h a t the n e c e s s a r y supply of c i r c u l a t i n g c a p i t a l might be 
maintained. 
I n t h i s way the commercial banks might c o n c e i v a b l y make a 
more e f f e c t i v e and p r o f i t a b l e use of the funds p l a c e d a t t h e i r 
d i s p o s a l and the s p e c i a l i s e d banks would have t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s 
supplemented i n ways which, i n g e n e r a l , might be l i k e l y to l e a d to an 
improvement i n the use of r e s o u r c e s i n the economy g e n e r a l l y . There 
i s no reason why t h i s supplementation of the work of the s p e c i a l i s e d 
banks by the commercial banks should l e a d to a c u r t a i l m e n t of the 
freedom of a c t i o n f o r the s p e c i a l i s e d banks. 
The supplementation by the commercial banks might indeed 
provide the s p e c i a l i s e d banks w i t h a r e l a x a t i o n of p r e s s u r e s and the 
opportunity to develope t h e i r s p e c i a l f u n c t i o n s more e f f e c t i v e l y . 
(231) 
The d e v i c e of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s however one which c a l l s f o r cool 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and s e l f c o n t r o l . Other th i n g s being equal, funds made 
a v a i l a b l e through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g w i l l tend to have i n f l a t i o n a r y 
consequences and i n f l a t i o n , as i s w e l l known, can be l i k e a f i r e , a 
h i g h l y dangerous master. I t needs to be used w i t h c a u t i o n , w i t h 
c a r e f u l regard to the circumstances i n which i t s e f f e c t s w i l l be f e l t , 
and a l s o w i t h an eye to the moderate l i m i t s to which i n f l a t i o n might be 
permitted to go. I t was w i t h t h i s need f o r c a u t i o n i n mind t h a t a model 
employing the d e v i c e of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g and i n v o l v i n g a c e r t a i n amount 
of i n f l a t i o n was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the main body of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . ^ ^ 
I t i s not n e c e s s a r y to d e s c r i b e again, i n d e t a i l , the f e a t u r e s of the 
model but i t may perhaps be accepted as n e c e s s a r y t h a t the i m p l i c a t i o n 
of what was presented i n the model should be made e x p l i c i t . T h i s i s a 
t a s k to be undertaken w i t h regard to underdeveloped t e r r i t o r i e s i n 
g e n e r a l and I r a q m p a r t i c u l a r . The g e n e r a l case may perhaps be d e a l t 
w i t h r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f l y . I t i s r e c o gnised t h a t i n f l a t i o n has proved a 
scourge i n many c o u n t r i e s and a t many times. I t i s r ecognised t h a t 
r e s p o n s i b l e a u t h o r i t i e s i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s should keep themselves 
a l i v e to i t s dangers and spend time and e f f o r t i n t h i n k i n g out ways i n 
which i n f l a t i o n can be h e l d i n check. We cannot w i t h o l d sympathy even 
from those who l i k e Governor Horowitz, express themselves i n terms 
almost of p a s s i o n on the s u b j e c t of i n f l a t i o n f o r they have l i v e d 
through i n f l a t i o n a r y experiences t h a t have d i s r u p t e d once s t a b l e 
economies. 
A l l the same we need not take f r i g h t a t the phenomenon of 
i n f l a t i o n : we may take encouragement from the views expressed by L i p s e y 
on the s u b j e c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y as h i s g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s are based on s t u d i e s 
of c o u n t r i e s where monetary expansion might w e l l have been expected to 
( 1 ) I t should be noted t h a t the model w h i l e an imaginary c o n s t r u c t i o n , was 
n e v e r t h e l e s s so c o n s t r u c t e d as not to d i f f e r very much from the 
c o n d i t i o n s which would be l i k e l y to be encountered, considered g e n e r a l 
l y , m underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . The s i z e s of the s i g n i f i c a n t 
v a r i a b l e s were s e l e c t e d w i t h an eye to the s i z e which these 
components i n an economy tend to have i n a c t u a l c o u n t r i e s . Such 
v a r i a b l e s as t o the r a t e of growth of population, the c a p i t a l / o u t 
r a t i o , and the p r o p e n s i t i e s or to hoard were given a q u a n t i t a t i v e 
e x p r e s s i o n which, i t was hoped, would be a reasonably c l o s e 
e x p r e s s i o n of what might be found i n such c o u n t r i e s , even though 
never q u i t e p r e c i s e l y a match of the c o n d i t i o n s of any p a r t i c u l a r 
one of them. 
(232) 
erupt i n t o h y p e r - m f l a t i o n , y e t d i d not. With L i p s e y we may hold t h a t 
i n f l a t i o n , beginning by being moderate need not i n e v i t a b l y explode i n t o 
h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n . Given the appropriate c o n t r o l s and coolness of p o l i c y , 
i n f l a t i o n which begins by being moderate may end by remaining moderate. 
I t may not be without s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t some of the arguments presented 
by "Day" on the s u b j e c t of i n f l a t i o n can be brought i n to supplement 
the views expressed by L i p s e y . P r o f e s s o r Day suggests t h a t i t i s always 
p o s s i b l e to end i n f l a t i o n i f the supply of money i s l i m i t e d . I n our 
model, the pla n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s add to the flow of spending by 
a d d i t i o n a l c r e d i t drawing f a c i l i t i e s w i t h the c e n t r a l bank equal to 
10% of the money i n c i r c u l a t i o n each y e a r . I f the planning a u t h o r i t i e s 
ceased to use such a d d i t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s , as i s indeed suggested i n the 
model, then new i n f l a t i o n a r y impetus i s reduced to ze r o . I n t h i s 
way what i s suggested as happening i n the model complies w i t h 
P r o f e s s o r Day's c o n d i t i o n s f o r the ending of i n f l a t i o n . 
I t may be reasonable to argue, i n the l i g h t of arguments 
presented e a r l i e r , t h a t , i f the I r a q i p lanning a u t h o r i t i e s decided to 
use the d e v i c e of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g to provide p a r t of the f i n a n c i a l 
requirements to f i n a n c e a development programme t h e r e a r e more 
favourable circumstances i n I r a q than i n many other underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s . When demand i n c r e a s e s as a r e s u l t of the spending of funds 
provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g t h r e e p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s may 
be envisaged;-
( 1 ) That the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n the production of domestic and the 
impo r t a t i o n of consumer's goods tends to su r p a s s the i n c r e a s e i n demand 
f o r these goods, so t h a t , other t h i n g s being equal p r i c e s w i l l tend 
to f a l l . 
( 2 ) That the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n the production of domestic, and the 
impo r t a t i o n of consumer's goods, tends to equal, approximately, the 
i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r th e s e goods, and other t h i n g s remaining the same, 
t h e r e w i l l be no tendency f o r p r i c e s to change. 
( 1 ) Or any net i n c r e a s e i n spending during a c e r t a i n p e r i o d compared 
w i t h a p r e v i o u s p e r i o d . But we a r e concerned here w i t h the e f f e c t s 
of spending funds provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . 
(233) 
( 3 ) That the t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n the production of domestic and the 
importation of consumer's goods w i l l be l e s s than the i n c r e a s e i n demand 
f o r t h e s e goods. I n an underdeveloped country l i k e I r a q the t h i r d 
s i t u a t i o n i s the more probable one, because of the e x i s t e n c e of 
" b o t t l e n e c k s " ^ 1 ^ . T h i s case was adopted throughout our model, where we 
assume t h a t only 50% of the producers i n the consumption s e c t o r a r e 
expected to be able to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y when 
demand i n c r e a s e s . Consequently, s i n c e i t i s not p o s s i b l e to meet the 
t o t a l net i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r consumer's goods, p r i c e s , other things 
being equal, w i l l tend to r i s e i n the consumption s e c t o r a t f i r s t , and 
t h i s w i l l tend to l e a d to an i n c r e a s e , though a s m a l l e r one, i n the 
ge n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l . 
How l a r g e t h i s i n c r e a s e w i l l be, w i l l depend on :-
( a ) The degree of i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s i n the consumption s e c t o r . 
( b ) How many goods and how important these goods are w i t h i n the 
consumption s e c t o r . 
( c ) The s e c t o r proportions ; i . e . how l a r g e the consumption s e c t o r i s , 
compared w i t h other s e c t o r s i n the economy. Now, i f we assume t h a t , the 
f i n a l outcome was t h a t , the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l m I r a q r ose by 3% 
a year i . e . a moderate degree of i n f l a t i o n , during a f i v e y e ar 
development programme, what a r e the p o s s i b l e consequences of such an 
i n c r e a s e on exports, balance of payments, the f o r e i g n exchange s i t u a t i o n , 
and domestic currency. Furthermore, a r e the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i n 
I r a q , reasonably capable of handling such a s i t u a t i o n i n a way t h a t may 
be l i k e l y to keep moderate i n f l a t i o n moderate. 
( 1 ) T h i s of course w i l l depend on the s i z e of the net i n c r e a s e i n 
spending and demand during a p e r i o d . I f the r e q u i r e d i n c r e a s e 
i s only 2% or 3%, then i t may not be d i f f i c u l t to meet t h i s 
i n c r e a s e . Producers of consumer's goods may have to f a c e 
" b o t t l e n e c k s " when they want to i n c r e a s e t h e i r production by 
sa y (10%) or (15%) i n a s h o r t p e r i o d . 
(234) 
The most important item i n the I r a q exports i s o i l ; i t 
r e p r e s e n t s 92% - 94% of t o t a l e xports. The a n a l y s i s i n e a r l i e r p a r t s 
has shown t h a t a moderate i n c r e a s e i n domestic p r i c e s w i l l tend to 
have no, or a n e g l i g i b l e , e f f e c t on o i l e x p o r t s . The remaining items 
of the I r a q i exports are a g r i c u l t u r a l products, except, cement. Again 
the a n a l y s i s has shown t h a t the I r a q a g r i c u l t u r a l exports depend more 
on c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s than on p r i c e s i n the World market. As f o r 
cement, i t s p r i c e i s decided by the "Cement Marketing Board" i n 
accordance w i t h the supply of, and the demand for, cement i n the 
domestic market and the market provided by importing c o u n t r i e s . I n the 
l i g h t of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i t may be reasonable to say t h a t a 
moderate i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s w i l l tend to have no or a n e g l i g i b l e e f f e c t 
on the I r a q i e x p o r t s . Now, as a r e s u l t of the i n c r e a s e i n 
d i s t r i b u t e d income, demand f o r domestic and imported goods i n c r e a s e s . 
S i n c e i t i s not expected t h a t I r a q , l i k e many underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , 
i s able to produce c a p i t a l goods, t h e r e f o r e , demand f o r domestic goods 
w i l l tend to be confined to consumer's goods only. Demand f o r 
imported goods w i l l tend to take two forms :-
( 1 ) i n c r e a s e i n the importation of consumer's goods. 
( 2 ) i n c r e a s e i n the importation of c a p i t a l goods i n order to be able 
to meet the i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r domestic consumer's goods by an 
i n c r e a s e i n production. 
I n g e n e r a l terms i t would seem to f o l l o w from the g e n e r a l l y 
accepted l o g i c of economic theory t h a t , i f n a t i o n a l income r i s e s , then, 
other t h i n g s remaining the same, imports w i l l tend to i n c r e a s e a l s o , 
though not n e c e s s a r i l y i n the same pr o p o r t i o n . Indeed such a l i n k a g e 
between income v a r i a t i o n and v a r i a t i o n i n the volume of imports i s a t 
the core of Keynesian t h e o r i s i n g about the p r o p e n s i t y to import. I t i s 
important, however, t h a t a f i n a l view should be based on the evidence 
which can be brought together to show the a c t u a l r e l a t i o n between 
n a t i o n a l income and imports f o r a p a r t i c u l a r country over a p a r t i c u l a r 
p e r i o d . T h i s i s to t r y to reach a c o n c l u s i o n on the e m p i r i c a l 
e v i d e n c e t h a t can be found. The t a b l e which f o l l o w s aims to do 
(235) 
p r e c i s e l y t h i s f o r I r a q over the p e r i o d 1959 to 1963 i n c l u s i v e . I t shows 
the a b s o l u t e and percentage changes i n n a t i o n a l income and imports of 
consumer's goods, and t o t a l imports f o r the p e r i o d mentioned. From i t , 
i t can be seen t h a t , changes i n imports of consumer's goods do not 
appear to have any r e g u l a r and i d e n t i f i a b l e c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h changes i n 
the n a t i o n a l income. T h i s may be e x p l a i n e d by the f o l l o w i n g reasons :-
( 1 ) Large s t o c k s of imported consumer's goods i n one year, may cause a 
d e c l i n e i n the importation of consumer's goods during a f o l l o w i n g y e a r . 
T h i s i s because demand i n a f o l l o w i n g year could be met by d e c r e a s i n g 
s t o c k s of a p r e v i o u s year. T h e r e f o r e , i f n a t i o n a l income i n c r e a s e s at 
the end of a year by 9%, f o r example, imports of consumer's goods may 
not i n c r e a s e a t the same r a t e , or may even f a l l , as i s the case i n 
1962, shown i n the t a b l e . 
( 2 ) The other reason may be, of course, t h a t more consumer's goods are 
produced d o m e s t i c a l l y , e i t h e r by expanding e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r y or 
s t a r t i n g new ones. I n such c a s e s more demand can be met by domestic 
consumer's goods, which l e a d s , other t h i n g s being equal, to a decrease 
i n imports of consumer's goods even i f demand f o r consumer's goods i n 
g e n e r a l , i . e . imported and domestic, i n c r e a s e s . 
( 3 ) An i n c r e a s e i n the n a t i o n a l income may be brought about as a r e s u l t 
of an i n c r e a s e m other s e c t o r s , or g r e a t e r i n c r e a s e i n other s e c t o r s 
compared w i t h the consumption s e c t o r . T h i s means t h a t n a t i o n a l income 
as a whole i n a country can i n c r e a s e by say, (10%) w h i l e the 
consumption s e c t o r by, say, ( 4 % ) . 
( 4 ) Imports of f o o d s t u f f s and the l i k e may i n c r e a s e i n a c e r t a i n year 
because of a crop f a i l u r e , which l e a d s m t u r n to an i n c r e a s e i n imports 
w h i l e the n a t i o n a l income as a whole may decrease a t the end of t h a t 
y e a r . 
( 5 ) I f the economic a f f a i r s of the community are c l o s e l y c o n t r o l l e d by 
the government under some form of c e n t r a l economic planning, then 
v a r i a t i o n s i n imports can e a s i l y occur f o r which the reasons l i e i n 
p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n making. There i s no reason a t a l l to suppose t h a t 
t h e r e w i l l be a c l o s e c o r r e l a t i o n between n a t i o n a l income and imports 
w i t h i n the context of a system a d m i n i s t e r e d i n t h i s way. 
(236) 
I n the l i g h t of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s presented above, i t may perhaps, be 
s a f e to say, t h a t , t h e r e i s no st r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between changes i n 
n a t i o n a l income and changes i n imports of consumer's goods. T h i s may 
not be t r u e i f changes i n t o t a l imports are considered i n r e l a t i o n to 
changes m n a t i o n a l income. 
The t a b l e a l s o d i s c l o s e s t h a t the i n c r e a s e s m n a t i o n a l 
income were accompanied by i n c r e a s e s i n t o t a l imports though not a t the 
same percentage, f o r the years 1959, 1960 and 1961. I n 1962 i n s p i t e of 
an (8.7%) i n c r e a s e i n the n a t i o n a l income of t h a t year, t o t a l imports 
f e l l i n a bsolute and percentage terms. 
However, the decrease i n the n a t i o n a l income of 1963 was 
accompanied by a decrease i n t o t a l imports, again not by the same 
percentage. Consequently, i t may be s a f e to say t h a t , there may be a 
st r o n g e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between changes i n n a t i o n a l income m I r a q , and 
changes i n t o t a l imports, than between n a t i o n a l income and imports of 
consumer's goods, though even then, i t i s not by i t s e l f a s t r o n g 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
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(238) 
The combined e f f e c t of an i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r the importation of 
c a p i t a l and consumer's goods, to the extent i t d i d occur, would tend 
to i n c r e a s e the need f o r f o r e i g n exchange. 
The a n a l y s i s of the I r a q balance of payments has shown 
t h a t the net exports i n the o i l s e c t o r cover a major p a r t i n some y e a r s 
and more than cover i n other y e a r s , the d e f i c i t i n other export/import 
r e l a t i o n s . The o i l revenues i n the l a s t decade were continuous and, 
g e n e r a l l y speaking, i n c r e a s i n g . They rose from (U.$ 223.37 mn.) i n 1955, 
to (U.$ 368.5 inn.) i n 1965. However, th e r e was a s l i g h t f a l l i n 1956, 
followed by a sharp decrease m 1957, due to the Suez c r i s i s , and the 
d e s t r u c t i o n of the p i p e l i n e p a s s i n g through S y r i a . The safeguard a g a i n s t 
a f u t u r e stoppage of the I r a q o i l exports, which a c t u a l l y took p l a c e 
t w i c e , i n 1956 and 1966, would be the c o n s t r u c t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e 
p i p e l i n e which would run from the o i l f i e l d s i n the North to the I r a q i 
port "Basrah" i n the South as suggested e a r l i e r . A l l t h i n g s considered, 
I r a q should not be expected, i n o r d i n a r y and normal circumstances, to 
f a c e a l a r g e shortage of f o r e i g n exchange, and i n t u r n a s e r i o u s d e f i c i t 
i n i t s balance of payments, when d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s used, w i t h i n f l a t i o n 
as i t s expected outcome. 
I n e a r l i e r p a r t s of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , the d i s c u s s i o n of the 
experience of the I r a q i monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i n c l u d i n g the d e c i s i o n s these 
a u t h o r i t i e s have taken i n the l a s t t h r e e decades, has shown t h a t these 
a u t h o r i t i e s have handled the s i t u a t i o n s c o n f r o n t i n g them i n a reasonably 
r e s p o n s i b l e and knowledgeable way. Furthermore, the a n a l y s i s has shown 
(1 ) See PP.( 3 1 - 3 4 ) of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
Disturbances to o i l revenues could, of course, a r i s e f o r v a r i o u s r e a s o n s : 
any major d i s t u r b a n c e to the normal economic l i f e of the community could 
be damaging. I f , f o r example, t h e r e should be any p r o t r a c t e d or s e v e r e 
d i s t u r b a n c e a r i s i n g from the r e l a t i o n s between the Government and any 
d i s a f f e c t e d elements i n the s t a t e then i n s t a b i l i t i e s could h a r d l y ber 
avoided. S i n c e , however, the scope of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s regarded as 
e x c l u d i n g the d i s c u s s i o n of p o l i t i c a l problems i n I r a q , which would, i n any 
c a s e , need a knowledge of p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s , p o s s i b l e d i s t u r b a n c e s , such 
a s , f o r example the K u r d i s h problem, a r e not d i s c u s s e d . 
(239) 
t h a t i n the l a s t f i v e y e a r s between 1961-1965, such i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s as 
t h e r e was, was very moderate. To some extent t h i s may be a t t r i b u t e d to 
the a c t i o n s of the a u t h o r i t i e s . I n 1963, f o r example, the government 
decreed a 25% r e d u c t i o n i n the then e x i s t i n g r a t e of r e n t . I n 1964 t h i s 
was followed by decrees by the "Economic O r g a n i s a t i o n " reducing the 
p r i c e s of e s s e n t i a l consumer's goods such as foot wear, vegetable o i l , 
soap and the l i k e , c o n s e q u e n t i a l upon i n c r e a s e s i n production a f t e r 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . With regard to exchange r a t e s the general tendency has 
been f o r the value of the I r a q i d i n a r i n the d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e s 
to l i e c l o s e to the d o l l a r value of the pound s t e r l i n g . 
T h e r e f o r e , i f i t can be expected t h a t the I r a q i e xports, 
balance of payments, and a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e i g n exchange, w i l l be 
a f f e c t e d only i n a s m a l l or a n e g l i g i b l e way as a r e s u l t of a moderate 
i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s , then i t may be s a f e to say t h a t t h e r e i s no s t r o n g 
reason to suppose t h a t the p u b l i c ' s confidence i n the domestic currency 
i s l i k e l y to be weakened as a r e s u l t of the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . 
I n e a r l i e r p a r t s of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , the arguments show t h a t the 
state-owned C e n t r a l Bank of I r a q , has a reasonably e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l over 
the state-owned banking system. I t may be perhaps s a f e to say t h a t the 
( C . B . I . ' s ) power over the n a t i o n a l i s e d banks i s e f f e c t i v e enough to 
d i r e c t t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n a way which does not c o n t r a d i c t the p o l i c y 
which the ( C . B . I . ) i s t r y i n g to f o l l o w . I t may t h e r e f o r e , perhaps, be 
concluded t h a t i f the I r a q i planning a u t h o r i t i e s decided to use d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g to provide p a r t of the f i n a n c i a l requirements f o r a 
development programme, and provided t h a t t h i s d e v i c e i s used w i t h 
extreme c a u t i o n , and w i t h i n d e f i n a b l e l i m i t s , then the circumstances and 
c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g i n I r a q a re not unfavourable; as a matter of f a c t 
they a r e to a reasonable extent f a v o u r a b l e , and i t would seem to be a 
g r e a t waste i f , a f t e r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e I r a q i a u t h o r i t i e s d i d not 
e x p l o i t the use of t h i s d e v i c e s i n c e , I r a q , l i k e a l l underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s needs to use every p o s s i b l e way to f i n a n c e i t s development 
programmes. 
( 1 ) See Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t r e p o r t as quoted e a r l i e r . 
(2/,0) 
Recommendations : 
I n the lx g h t of the p o i n t s d i s c u s s e d and the arguments 
presented i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n the f o l l o w i n g recommendations may be 
made :-
(1 ) That the commercial banks i n I r a q should g i v e favourable c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
to a l l medium and long-term loans to a g r i c u l t u r e and i n d u s t r y , w i t h i n 
c a u t i o u s l i m i t s and f o l l o w i n g sound banking p r a c t i c e s , such as keeping 
t h e i r l i q u i d i t y a t a l e v e l which enables them to meet any cash withdrawal 
i n normal c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
( 2 ) That the s p e c i a l i s e d banks should extend t h e i r s e r v i c e s to cover a 
l a r g e r number of p r o s p e c t i v e borrowers. I n a d d i t i o n , a "Board of D i r e c t o r s 
c o n s i s t i n g of the General D i r e c t o r s of the s p e c i a l i s e d banks should be 
s e t up. T h i s Board ought to meet r e g u l a r l y , say, once a month, to d i s c u s s 
the general p o l i c y which should be followed by these banks. I t would a c t 
as an instrument both f o r the c o - o r d i n a t i o n of a l l r e l e v a n t information 
and f o r the b e t t e r c o - o r d i n a t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s . Furthermore, the ( C . B . I . ) 
should be given a more d i r e c t and e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l over the s p e c i a l i s e d 
banks, and the s e t t i n g up of such a Board f o r the s p e c i a l i s e d banks 
would f a c i l i t a t e such a s t e p . 
( 3 ) That the I r a q i monetary a u t h o r i t i e s should study very c a r e f u l l y the -
p o s s i b i l i t y of the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g to provide p a r t of the c a p i t a l 
funds needed to f i n a n c e development programmes i n I r a q , and t h a t they 
should not n e c e s s a r i l y take the r i g i d and un-yielding, view t h a t t h ^ s method 
f i n a n c i n g w i t h i t s tendency to induce i n f l a t i o n , should be regarded as 
one which no c a r e f u l a u t h o r i t y would t h i n k of employing. 
( 4 ) S i n c e o i l revenues r e p r e s e n t the major source of revenue and f o r e i g n 
exchange, t h e r e f o r e i t i s n e c e s s a r y to safeguard t h i s source a g a i n s t any 
p o s s i b l e d i s t u r b a n c e . T h i s could be accomplished by c o n s t r u c t i n g an 
a l t e r n a t i v e which would run through an I r a q i t e r r i t o r y i n s t e a d of running 
through a S y r i a n t e r r i t o r y , as i s the case a t the moment. 
(241) 
( 5 ) That one important r e q u i s i t e i n the conduct of monetary p o l i c i e s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i f d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g on a moderate s c a l e should be adopted 
i s an adequate supply of t r a i n e d and knowledgable p e r s o n n e l . The I r a q i 
a u t h o r i t i e s should t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r whether i t might not be to t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s to c o n s t r u c t and maintain a programme f o r the t r a i n i n g of such 
p e r s o n n e l . Such a programme would i n v o l v e the s e l e c t i n g and sending of a 
number of s u i t a b l e young persons each year to approved c e n t r e s of 
s p e c i a l i s e d l e a r n i n g , i . e . to p l a c e s w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n f o r l e a r n i n g i n 
monetary a f f a i r s and the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s and p r a c t i c e of c e n t r a l 
economic planning, and a l s o f o r sending s e l e c t e d bank employees, from a l l 
types of bank, f o r r e f r e s h e r and s p e c i a l courses from time to time. I n 
t h i s way not only might the knowledge and s k i l l s of I r a q i personnel be 
i n c r e a s e d but they would have an enlarged opportunity to meet banking 
personnel i n other c o u n t r i e s . Such c o n t a c t s once e s t a b l i s h e d , could 
c o n c e i v a b l y be extremely u s e f u l to I r a q m times of f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n s . 
APPENDIX NUMBER ONE 
THE AUGUST 1947 ANGLO-IRAQI AGREEMENT. 
(243) 
Appendix No.(1) 
The August 1947 A n g l o - I r a q i Agreement. 
According to A r t i c l e ( 1 ) of t h i s agreement the 
Number (2 ) Account should be c r e d i t e d w i t h •-
(1) A l l holdings of s t e r l i n g a s s e t s of the Government of I r a q , the 
I r a q Currency Board, and each o f f i c e i n I r a q of any other bank, 
a t the c l o s e of b u s i n e s s on J u l y 14th, 1947. 
( 2 ) I n t e r e s t r e c e i v e d by the I r a q Currency Board on i t s S t e r l i n g 
a s s e t s a f t e r J u l y 15th, 1947. 
( 3 ) T r a n s f e r from other No.(2) accounts. 
( 4 ) Any sums paid to the I r a q i Government by the B r i t i s h Government, 
on or a f t e r J u l y 15th, 1947. 
( 5 ) The proceeds a t m a t u r i t y or on r e a l i s a t i o n of any investment 
purchased i n accordance w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d customs w i t h funds 
standing to the c r e d i t of a number ( 2 ) account. 
( 6 ) The net c a p i t a l movement from the c o u n t r i e s of the s t e r l i n g 
a r e a to I r a q . 
( 7 ) Such other t r a n s f e r s , as might be agreed upon by the 
c o n t r a c t i n g Governments. 
Then S e c t i o n ( 4 ) (b) of t h i s A r t i c l e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s account, 
i . e . No.(2) account, should be debited ( c r e d i t e d ) to N o . ( l ) account, 
w i t h the f o l l o w i n g balances :-
( 1 ) To each bank i n I r a q , the r e l e a s e of an amount equal to the 
outstanding l i a b i l i t y as a t the c l o s e of b u s i n e s s on J u l y 14th, 
1947, provided t h a t t h i s account d i d not exceed the amount of 
the s t e r l i n g a s s e t s h e l d by t h a t bank as of the above date. 
( 2 ) The r e l e a s e of the f o l l o w i n g amounts to the I r a q Currency 
Board; 
( a ) The sum of f i f t e e n m i l l i o n pounds over a f i v e year p e r i o d . 
( b ) The e q u i v a l e n t of any p o r t i o n of the s c a r c e currency provided 
i n the S c a r c e Currency Agreement of May, 1945 j ( a s f i n a l l y 
extended i n February, 1947) which was not spent before J u l y 15, 
1947. 
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(c) The sum of f i v e m i l l i o n pounds as a s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n to 
f a c i l i t a t e f o r the Government of I r a q the t r a n s a c t i o n to the 
new c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
(d) The sum of two m i l l i o n pounds as a working balance to meet any 
temporary shortage i n the means of payment. 
( e ) A sum e q u i v a l e n t to a s p e c i a l p r oportion of the i n t e r e s t earned 
on the s t e r l i n g a s s e t s . 
( 3 ) The r e l e a s e of other sums to meet v a r i o u s o b l i g a t i o n s , the most 
important of which were :-
.... the repayment of advances made to the Government of I r a q by 
the o i l companies, the repayment of the debt of the port of 
Basrah, the f u l f i l m e n t of o b l i g a t i o n s entered i n t o w i t h the 
Government of I r a q before J u l y 15, 1947, and the c o s t of s u r p l u s 
m i l i t a r y s t o r e s , equipment or f i x e d a s s e t s disposed of by the 
Government of the U n i t e d Kingdom to the Government of I r a q before 
t h a t date and of these which w i l l be disposed of to the 
Government of I r a q or the p u b l i c a f t e r t h a t d a t e . ^ 1 ^ 
( 4 ) The r e l e a s e of amounts e q u i v a l e n t to the net c a p i t a l movement 
(2) 
from I r a q to other c o u n t r i e s of the s t e r l i n g a r e a . 
( 1 ) N a t i o n a l Bank of I r a q , Annual Report, J u l y 1947 - December 1950, 
Baghdad : The Times P r i n t i n g and P u b l i s h i n g Co., L t d . P.43 
And : -
( 2 ) E l K a i s s i , C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s of C e n t r a l Banking i n I r a q , 
unpublished Ph.D. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , 1957 
PP.151 - 153. 
APPENDIX NUMBER TWO. 
CHANGES IN THE VOLUME AND COMPOSITION OF 
IRAQI CURRENCY RESERVES 1947/1960. 
(246) 
Appendix No. ( 2 ) 
Changes i n the volume and composition of I r a q i Currency 
r e s e r v e s 1947/1960. 
The t a b l e on P.(86) shows t h a t on J u l y 14th, 1947 t o t a l 
f o r e i g n a s s e t s ( s t e r l i n g ) h e l d by the I r a q i Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s 
was (£57.904 mn.). Between J u l y 15th, and December of 1947, t h i s 
amount f e l l by 2%. At the end of 1948, the balance decreased 
s h a r p l y from (£57.194 mn.) to (£44.292 mn.) i . e . by 23% below end of 
1947. 
T h i s sharp decrease may be e x p l a i n e d by many reasons, 
v i z :-
( 1 ) The outbreak of the A r a b - I s r a e l i war i n t h a t year. 
( 2 ) The crop f a i l u r e . 
( 3 ) The embargo on exports of wheat and b a r l e y , and 
( 4 ) The i n c r e a s i n g imports of t h a t y e a r . 
At the end of 1949, the holdings of s t e r l i n g a s s e t s 
r o s e by 14%. T h i s i n c r e a s e was due to the c e s s a t i o n of the Arab-
I s r a e l i war, r e s t r i c t i o n s on imports, and good h a r v e s t . I n 1951, 
the t o t a l balance of s t e r l i n g h e l d by the N a t i o n a l Bank of I r a q and 
the commercial banks was (£48.783 inn.) and f o r the f i r s t time other 
f o r e i g n exchange holdings were introduced and amounted to 
( I . D 1.687 mn.) I n 1952, the s t e r l i n g a s s e t s r o s e by ( 2 1 . 5 % ) , 
w h i l e other f o r e i g n exchange r o s e by ( 1 6 . 2 % ) . I n 1953, owing to 
the new o i l agreement and i n c r e a s i n g o i l r o y a l t i e s s t e r l i n g a s s e t s 
i n c r e a s e d by about (35.2%) other f o r e i g n exchange by ( 1 1 . 2 % ) . I n 
1954, the i n c r e a s e i n s t e r l i n g a s s e t s continued, to reaoh (£100 mn,) 
i . e . an i n c r e a s e of (24.7%) over 1953, w h i l e other f o r e i g n exchange 
f e l l by ( 8 . 7 % ) . I n 1955, s t e r l i n g a s s e t s rose by ( 1 5 . 4 % ) , other 
f o r e i g n exchange by ( 7 4 % ) . I t i s worth mentioning here, t h a t f o r 
the f i r s t time a gold r e s e r v e of (3 mn.) was h e l d . 
(247) 
T h i s was the outcome of agreement between the 
N a t i o n a l Bank of I r a q , and the B r i t i s h Monetary A u t h o r i t i e s . 
Under t h i s agreement the N a t i o n a l Bank of I r a q was allowed to 
buy (5 mn.) worth of gold over two y e a r s ; to be h e l d as p a r t of 
i t s currency r e s e r v e s . I n 1956, t h e r e was an i n c r e a s e of (6.6%) 
i n the s t e r l i n g a s s e t s , ( 40%) i n other f o r e i g n exchange, and (66%) 
i n gold h o l d i n g s . I n 1957, t h e r e was a sharp decrease i n the 
h o l d i n g of s t e r l i n g a s s e t s i . e . by ( 2 4 % ) , w h i l e other f o r e i g n 
exchange holdings continued to r i s e ( i t r o s e by 40%) and so the 
gold i . e . ( 4 0 % t o o ) . The decrease i n the holdings of s t e r l i n g 
a s s e t s was due to the Suez c r i s i s and the sharp decrease of o i l 
exports from (31.1 mn. tons) i n 1956 to only (21.7 mn. tons) m 
1957. The decrease i n the holdings of s t e r l i n g a s s e t s continued 
i n 1958, ( t h e y f e l l by a l i t t l e more than 9 % ) ; w h i l e h o l d i n g of 
other f o r e i g n exchange continued to r i s e ( i t r o s e by 13% and the 
gold by 7 1 % ) . S t e r l i n g a s s e t s h e l d by the I r a q Monetary 
A u t h o r i t i e s f e l l from (£84.03 mn.) m 1958, i . e . before the 
withdrawal to only (£39.4 mn.) a f t e r the withdrawal, i . e . a decrease 
of 53%. I r a q ' s holdings of other f o r e i g n exchange rose by about 
(122%) and gold r e s e r v e s by 150% i n 1959, over 1958. The I r a q i 
Government continued to run down her s t e r l i n g a s s e t s on the one hand 
and i n c r e a s e gold and other f o r e i g n exchange on the other. 
Consequently, i n 1960, I r a q ' s s t e r l i n g a s s e t s f e l l to no more than 
(£22.1 mn.), i . e . by 44% on the preceding year. But i n 1960, I r a q ' s 
h o l d i n g of other f o r e i g n exchange f e l l by 29%, and only the gold 
r e s e r v e s r o s e by (11%) over the preceding y e a r . The f a l l i n I r a q ' s 
h oldings of other f o r e i g n exchange i n 1960, apart from the decrease 
i n the s t e r l i n g a s s e t s which was based on government' p o l i c y , 
was due to crop f a i l u r e m t h a t y e a r , and a d e f i c i t i n the 
balance of payments. 
(248) 
APPENDIX NUMBER THREE 
THE CONCEPT OF "DEFICIT FINANCING" AS I T 
APPEARS TO BE INTERPRETED BY 
DIFFERENT ECONOMISTS. 
(249) 
Appendix No. ( 3 ) 
The Concept of " d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g " as i t 
appears to be i n t e r p r e t e d by 
d i f f e r e n t economists. 
The l i t e r a t u r e on f i n a n c i n g economic development i n 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s and the use of the d e v i c e of d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g i n developed as w e l l as underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i s 
c o n s i d e r a b l e , t h e r e f o r e we cannot i n an appendix such as t h i s 
one review s y s t e m a t i c a l l y the whole range of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e . 
T h i s appendix aims only a t i n d i c a t i n g the concept of d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g as used by some economists. Of t h e s e , some, 
however, use the term d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g without d e f i n i n g m 
what sense they a r e u s i n g the concept, as i s shown l a t e r . I n 
my view, i t i s indeed important f o r a w r i t e r to d e f i n e i n what 
sense he i s u s i n g any term to which more than one meaning 
could be a t t r i b u t e d . However, t h e r e a r e other economists who 
do d e f i n e t h e i r use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g when they mention the 
concept. P r o f e s s o r W.A. Lewis i n h i s book "Development P l a n n i n g " 
seems to use the term i n f l a t i o n as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g . He compares t a x a t i o n with., not d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , but 
i n f l a t i o n , as a source of f i n a n c e : he p o i n t s out t h a t , "though 
t a x a t i o n may a l s o r a i s e p r i c e s , i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s from the 
economic point of view g r e a t l y s u p e r i o r to i n f l a t i o n as a source 
( 2 ) 
of f i n a n c e f o r c a p i t a l formation". P r o f e s s o r Lewis does not 
( 1 ) Lewis, W.A., Development Planning, The e s s e n t i a l s of 
economic p o l i c y , George A l l e n and Unwin, London, 1966. 
( 2 ) I b i d , P.136 
P r o f e s s o r Lewis may have wanted to r e f e r to " f o r c e d s a v i n g s " 
r e a l i s e d through i n f l a t i o n , but i f t h a t was h i s aim 
t h e r e i s no c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t was t h i s t h a t was i n 
h i s mind. 
(250) 
seem to keep c l e a r enough the d i s t i n c t i o n between the devxce of 
d e f x c x t fxnancxng whxch provxdes the n e c e s s a r y monetary 
command over r e s o u r c e s and the i n f l a t i o n , whxch under c e r t a i n 
condxtxons xs the possxble outcome of the use of thxs devxce. 
P r o f e s s o r Lewis seems to hold the vxew t h a t xt would be 
unwxse f o r most underdeveloped countrxes "to launch upon an 
x n f l a t x o n a r y course because they could not c o n t r o l l t " . ^ ' 1 ' ^ The 
arguments i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , however, show t h a t x n f l a t x o n s 
do not n e c e s s a r i l y , get out of c o n t r o l but i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r 
a moderate degree of i n f l a t x o n to be kept moderate. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , P r o f e s s o r Lewxs s t x l l thxnks t h a t , 
"... one cannot r u l e out the p o s s x b i l i t y t h a t some of the 
b e t t e r organised s o c i e t x e s can s a f e l y f i n a n c e some c a p i t a l 
(3) 
formation by the c r e a t i o n of money". P.T.Bauer, and 
B.S. Yamey i n t h e i r book "The Economics of Underdeveloped 
( 4 ) 
C o u n t r i e s , " do not d e f i n e d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i n a s p e c i f i c 
way. N e v e r t h e l e s s , they r e f e r to "budget d e f i c i t s as a 
( 5 ) 
means of r a i s i n g the r a t e of c a p i t a l formation" . They seem 
to hold the view t h a t the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i n 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s tends to i n i t i a t e i n f l a t i o n a r y 
p r e s s u r e s . I t may be t h a t they are c o r r e c t enough i n the l i g h t 
of a good d e a l t h a t has happened i n the monetary experiences 
of c o u n t r i e s , whether developed or underdeveloped, but from 
( 1 ) I b i d P.136 
( 2 ) See PP. (218-223 ) of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
( 3 ) L e wis, W.A., Development Planning, The e s s e n t i a l s of 
economic p o l i c y , George A l l e n and Unwin, London, 1966, 
P. 136 
( 4 ) Bauer, P.T., and B.S., Yamey, The Economics of 
Underdeveloped C o u n t r i e s , Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 
1959. 
( 5 ) I b i d P . ( 2 0 4 ) . 
(251) 
the stand poxnt of theory t h e r e i s perhaps a need f o r more 
ca u t i o u s p h r a s i n g . The use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g might or 
might not i n i t i a t e i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s . T h i s depends on 
many f a c t o r s , such a s , how l a r g e i s the amount of funds 
provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g as a percentage of t o t a l 
funds spent by the government during a p e r i o d , how o f t e n 
t h i s d e v i c e i s used, i . e . i s i t used m p e r i o d (A) and not 
m (B) but (C) or i s i t used throughout the p e r i o d s A,B, and 
C, to what extent i s i t p o s s i b l e to i n c r e a s e the production 
of domestic and imported goods and s e r v i c e s to meet p a r t or 
a l l of the i n c r e a s e i n demand caused by the spending of funds 
provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , and so on. Then P.T. Bauer 
and B.S. Yamey, pr e s e n t arguments i n favour of and a g a i n s t 
i n f l a t i o n . F i n a l l y , they express the view t h a t ; "the scope f o r 
i n f l a t i o n a r y f i n a n c e as a source of c a p i t a l formation i n 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i s s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d " . 
H. Myint i n h i s book "The Economics of the Developing 
( 2 ) 
C o u n t r i e s " , d i s c u s s e s the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , and 
t r i e s to p r e s e n t a c a s e where d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g may be used. 
He p o i n t s out t h a t , i n order to have a f a s t e r o v e r a l l r a t e 
of growth, the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r (being the s l o w e s t moviag 
s e c t o r ) should be s t i m u l a t e d . I n a s i t u a t i o n l i k e t h i s t h e r e 
a r e two ways he suggests which could be followed; Myint c a l l s 
t h e s e , n e g a t i v e and p o s i t i v e i n c e n t i v e s : n e g a tive i n c e n t i v e s 
a r e e.g. f o r c i n g the farmers to s e l l t h e i r products to the 
a u t h o r i t i e s , or imposing a p p r o p r i a t e t a x a t i o n . The p o s i t i v e 
economic i n c e n t i v e s would i n v o l v e a d i v e r s i o n of a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
p a r t of r e s o u r c e s from the c a p i t a l goods s e c t o r to the 
( 1 ) I b i d P.207 
( 2 ) Myint, H., The Economics of the Developing C o u n t r i e s , 
Hutchinson, London, 1964. 
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consumer's goods s e c t o r , w i t h the i n e v i t a b l e consequence of 
having a slower r a t e of growth f o r the economy as a whole. 
I n a s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s , Myint goes on, many economists 
considered the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g to be an instrument 
f o r t r a n s f e r i n g the " d i s g u i s e d unemployment" from the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r to more productive employment such as 
b u i l d i n g of roads or c a r r y i n g out i r r i g a t i o n schemes. Myint 
then p o i n t s out t h a t these economists argue t h a t , the 
i n f l a t i o n which i s i n i t i a t e d by the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g 
i s s e l f - d e s t r o y i n g because production i n a g r i c u l t u r e and 
other s e c t o r s w i l l i n c r e a s e when the c a p i t a l p r o j e c t s f i n a n c e d 
i n t h i s way are completed. However, i n order to have a s e l f -
d e s t r o y i n g i n f l a t i o n i t i s much s a f e r , i n my view, to spend 
funds provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g on a c a r e f u l l y 
s e l e c t e d type of p r o j e c t which would use domestic raw 
m a t e r i a l s , a v a i l a b l e s k i l l s , and c a p i t a l goods i f p o s s i b l e , 
and go i n t o production i n a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t time. P o s s i b l e 
examples a r e , footwear, c l o t h i n g , and the l i k e . However,if 
the aim was to spend these funds m the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , 
they could be spent on p r o j e c t s w i t h quick r e t u r n s such a s , 
improving the q u a l i t y of the seeds, s m a l l i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s , 
and s i m i l a r means f o r i n c r e a s i n g output. 
B.Higgms, i n an a r t i c l e m a book t i t l e d , "Government 
F i n a n c e and Economic Development,"^"1"^ argues t h a t the problem 
of f i n a n c i n g a development programme i s t h a t "of u s i n g the 
f i s c a l system, on both the expenditure and tax s i d e , to 
capture r e s o u r c e s f o r the purposes of the development 
programme: to d i v e r t them from production of consumer's goods 
other than those i m p l i c i t i n the growth path s e l e c t e d and 
( 1 ) Higgms, B., Government F i n a n c e and Economic Development, 
E d i t e d by A.T. Peacock, and G. Hauser, O.E.C.D., P a r i s 
1965. 
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p r x o r i t x e s assigned; and a l s o to d i v e r t them from investment 
p r o j e c t s , publxc or p r x v a t e , w i t h lower p r x o r i t x e s than 
those xncluded xn the p l a n . " He then goes on to argue 
t h a t xt xs always possxble to obtaxn domestxc fx n a n c x a l 
r e s o u r c e s as long as the c e n t r a l bank xn the country xs 
state-owned. But the problem xs t h a t a t some poxnt the r a t e 
of growth of the money supply w x l l tend to exceed the r a t e 
a t whxch goods a r e bexng made a v a i l a b l e , and t h i s l e a d s to a 
r i s e xn prxces i n a way whxch may not be h e a l t h y f o r carryxng 
out a development programme. P r o f e s s o r Higgxns then goes on 
to present arguments i n favour of and agaxnst x n f l a t x o n , 
whxch are not our concern xn t h i s appendix. 
A.R. P r e s t , xn hxs book " P u b l i c F i n a n c e xn 
( 2 ) 
Underdeveloped Countrxes" poxnts out t h a t as long as the 
natxonal xncome of a country keeps i n c r e a s i n g t h e r e w x l l be 
i n c r e a s e s xn tax revenues more than proportxonately even i f 
the e x i s t i n g taxatxon system xs maintained. Thus the 
government w x l l be a b l e to fxnance x t s xncreasxng long-run 
expenditure oblxgatxons. But i f as a r e s u l t of a crop f a x l u r e 
or a r e d u c t i o n xn demand f o r exports, natxonal xncome 
decreases more than proportxonately, and the government cannot 
reduce x t s expenditure by the same percentage of decrease i n 
x t s revenues, then t h e r e w x l l be a budget d e f x c i t . I f a 
government uses i n t e r n a l borrowing to f i n a n c e a d e f x c x t , then 
t h e r e w i l l be a r x s k of i n x t x a t x n g balance of payment 
dx s e q u i l x b r x a or x n f l a t x o n a r y p r e s s u r e s or both. P r e s t then 
argues t h a t "a moderate degree of x n f l a t x o n may do more good 
( 1 ) Ibxd P.18. 
( 2 ) P r e s t , A.R., P u b l i c Fxnance i n Underdeveloped Countrxes, 
Weidenfeld And Nxcholson, 1962. 
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than harm by s t i m u l a t i n g investment, r e d i s t r i b u t i n g incomes e t c . , 
and balance of payments t r o u b l e s may be cured by exchange r a t e 
adjustments, d i r e c t c o n t r o l etc."^' 1"^ The foregoing d e s c r i p t i o n 
of P r e s t ' s arguments shows t h a t he was t h i n k i n g of d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g to be used to bridge a gap between revenues and 
expen d i t u r e s . These expenditures a r e o r d i n a r y expenditures i . e . 
on o r d i n a r y government s e r v i c e s . I n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n the use 
of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , s u i t a b l y q u a l i f i e d , i s advocated to be 
used to provide p a r t of the funds needed f o r c a r r y i n g out a 
development programme and not f o r o r d i n a r y government expenditure. 
The other aspect of the s u b j e c t which P r e s t d i s c u s s e s i s the 
a b i l i t y of governments i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s to borrow 
from the banking system. P r e s t maintains t h a t the important 
f a c t o r i s not the making of arrangements between the 
government/the c e n t r a l bank, and the commercial banks. I f we 
assume t h a t a government does have a t i g h t c o n t r o l over the 
banking system, the d e c i s i v e f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g money supply may 
s t i l l be the balance of payments. 
T h i s c a s e i s e s p e c i a l l y obvious i n c o u n t r i e s where a 
l a r g e p a r t of gro s s n a t i o n a l product i s generated through 
e x p o r t s , and the s e exports f l u c t u a t e w i t h i n a wide range from 
one year to another. The second important f a c t o r i s the 
a b i l i t y of commercial banks to have a c c e s s to e x t e r n a l funds -
(2) 
"as i s so o f t e n the c a s e " . P r e s t seems to make a r a t h e r 
d i s c o u r a g i n g judgement when he concludes h i s argument by 
sa y i n g ; "... i t seems as s a f e a bet as can be made on these 
matters to wager t h a t i t w i l l s t i l l be a long time before 
governments of underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s can have the ready 
( 1 ) I b i d PP. 109-110 
(2 ) I b i d P. 104 
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f a c i l i t i e s f o r s h o r t - or long-term borrowing which we take 
f o r g r a n t e d i n Western c o u n t r i e s " . T h i s , i n my view, i s a 
h a r s h judgement, e s p e c i a l l y when P r e s t h i m s e l f admits t h a t 
many underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s have more developed banking 
systems, when he s a y s ; "Although t h e r e a r e many underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y m L a t i n America, A s i a and the Middle 
E a s t w i t h more h i g h l y developed monetary and banking systems 
( 2 ) 
than those we have been c o n s i d e r i n g , ... . However P r e s t 
m o d i f i e s h i s h a r s h judgement when he i n d i c a t e s t h a t " t h e r e a r e 
some c o u n t r i e s m the underdeveloped c l a s s where the monetary 
system i s f i r m l y under Government c o n t r o l . A good example i s 
I n d i a , Mrs.Hicks i n her book "Development F i n a n c e " ^ ^ 
r e f e r s to the use of d e f i c i t f i n a n c e f o r a d i f f e r e n t purpose. 
She argues t h a t s a v i n g s i n development c o u n t r i e s should not be 
t r e a t e d as n e g l i g i b l e by a s s e r t i n g t h a t people i n these 
c o u n t r i e s a r e too poor to save; "Even poor I n d i a n peasants 
have been found to save a s u b s t a n t i a l p r oportion of t h e i r 
meagre incomings, v o l u n t a r i l y reducing t h e i r l i v i n g standards 
almost below s u b s i s t e n c e l e v e l i n order to keep a r e s e r v e . 
West A f r i c a n cocoa farmers were a l s o found to have a high 
( 5 ) 
p r o p e n s i t y to save". The important f a c t o r i s how to i n c r e a s e 
the amount of these s a v i n g s , and even more important i s how to 
make them a v a i l a b l e f o r investment. One of the methods of 
making these s a v i n g s a v a i l a b l e f o r investment,Mrs.Hicks suggests, 
i s by means of d e f i c i t f i n a n c e . I n t h i s case the government 
( 1 ) I b i d P.105 
( 2 ) I b i d P.103-104 
( 3 ) i b i d P.104 
( 4 ) H i c k s , U.K., Development F i n a n c e , Planning and C o n t r o l . 
Clarendon P r e s s , Oxford, 1965. 
( 5 ) I b i d PP. 47-48. 
(256) 
e i t h e r borrows from the c e n t r a l bank or p r i n t s notes xn order 
to be a b l e to spend more t h a t x t s revenues would a l l o w . 
I f the government borrows from the c e n t r a l bank x t , 
u s u a l l y , pays a very low x n t e r e s t r a t e , and when i t prxnts 
notes, xt even pays no i n t e r e s t a t a l l . However, t h e r e a r e 
r e s t r i c t i o n s concernxng the repayment and amount of loans 
provxded by c e n t r a l banks to governments i n underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s . As a r e s u l t of the spendxng of funds provxded 
through defxcxt fxnance, d x s t r i b u t e d xncomes and xn t u r n 
demand r x s e , other thxngs bexng the same. Those recexvxng new 
money w x l l have command over economxc r e s o u r c e s . Thxs r x s e xn 
spendxng w x l l r e s u l t xn a p r e s s u r e on goods and s e r v x c e s , and 
t h i s l e a d s , probably, to some degree of xncrease xn p r x c e s . 
People whose xncomes dxd not r x s e w i l l fxnd themselves gettxng 
a s m a l l e r amount of goods and s e r v x c e s than they could 
prevxously get, and thxs xs f o r c e d savxng. I t i s expected, 
however, t h a t i n the process of t r a n s f e r x n g command over economxc 
r e s o u r c e s , those recexvxng the command over economxc r e s o u r c e s 
w x l l use them i n more p r o d u c t i v e ways than those who are no 
longer command t h e r e r e s o u r c e s . Mrs.Hicks goes on to poxnt out 
t h a t i n p r x n c i p l e thxs p r o c e s s takes p l a c e to a c e r t a x n degree 
xn any economy. " I t xs even probable t h a t xn most 
circumst a n c e s a c e r t a i n amount of new investment w i l l r e s u l t 
from the d e f i c i t f i n a n c e , over and above what would have taken 
p l a c e xn x t s absence. "^"^ Mrs.Hxcks then goes on to d i s c u s s 
the e f f e c t s of the use of defxcxt fxnance on, what she c a l l s , 
development economxcs whxch xs not our concern xn thxs appendxx. 
P.Hasan i n hxs book; " D e f x c i t Fxnancxng and Capxtal 
( 1 ) Ibxd P.48 - 49. 
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F o r m a t i o n " , d e f i n e s d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g f o r the purposes 
of h i s study a s ; "net c r e a t i o n of c r e d i t i n the government 
( 2 ) 
s e c t o r " . He p o i n t s out t h a t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s more l i m i t e d 
than one u s u a l l y used i n d e s c r i b i n g the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
c o u n t r i e s where the term d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g means the s i z e of 
the t o t a l budget d e f i c i t s . Hasan goes on to i n d i c a t e t h a t 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s an important v a r i a b l e i n underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s because, of the f a c t that"most of the p u b l i c debt 
i n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s i s h e l d by the banking system and the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of borrowing from the non-bank s e c t o r a r e o f t e n 
" ( 3 ) 
l i m i t e d . I f Hasan i s t r y i n g to say t h a t i f i t i s p o s s i b l e 
f o r the government to borrow from the non-bank s e c t o r , then 
i t can s t i l l be c o n s i d e r e d as d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , he i s open 
to c h a l l e n g e : i n my view, i f the government borrows from the 
non-bank s e c t o r i t i s not p o s s i b l e to c o n s i d e r t h a t as 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . T h i s i s because, i f the government borrows 
from, say, i n d i v i d u a l s or companies, then i t w i l l be a 
pro c e s s of t r a n s f e r r i n g command over economic r e s o u r c e s from 
the p r i v a t e s e c t o r to the government. Hasan, then i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g " i n c l u d e s government 
borrowing from the c e n t r a l bank ( i n c l u d i n g d e c l i n e i n 
(4) 
government cash b a l a n c e s ) as w e l l as from commercial banks". 
Hasan does not c l a r i f y the pointi t h a t he makes, t h a t i f the 
government spends i t s own cash balances i t i s a d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g . T h i s , m my view, i s not v a l i d ; because i f a 
government spends i n p e r i o d (B) what i t has accumulated out of 
( 1 ) Hasan, P., D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g and C a p i t a l Formation, the 
P a k i s t a n E x p e r i e n c e 1951-59, The I n s t i t u t e of Development 
Economics, BUnder Road, K a r a c h i , 3, 1963. 
( 2 ) I b i d . P.3 
( 3 ) I b i d . P.4 
(4) I b i d . P.4 
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x t s revenues xn the form of cash balances xn perxod ( A ) , then 
i t xs not d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . But i f the government during any 
p e r i o d p r i n t s more notes than the u s u a l requirements of 
o r d i n a r y i n c r e a s e s i n money i n c i r c u l a t i o n , and without a 
s i m i l a r i n c r e a s e i n currency r e s e r v e s , then i t i s d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g . T h i s i s because money i n c i r c u l a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s 
governments* ( o r the c e n t r a l bank's) l i a b i l i t i e s towards 
the p u b l i c . However, he covers h i m s e l f as f a r as borrowing 
from the commercial banks i s concerned by i n d i c a t i n g t h a t 
"the supply of c r e d i t by the commercial banks to the government 
i s assumed not to i n v o l v e a c u r t a i l m e n t of t h e i r c r e d i t to the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r " . M . Haq, m hxs book "Defxcxt F i n a n c i n g I n 
(2 ) 
P a k i s t a n " , p o i n t s out t h a t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to s i n g l e out 
one d e f i n i t i o n of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g as a g e n e r a l l y accepted 
one. The important requirement, however, he goes on, i s t h a t 
when t h i s term i s used m a p a r t i c u l a r study, i t should be 
c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d i n what sense the concept i s used and the 
reason or reasons f o r t h a t . I n h i s study he chose two concepts. 
The f i r s t concept i s t h a t " d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s the net 
borrowing of the government from the banking system". He 
i n c l u d e s i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n government's borrowing from the 
c e n t r a l bank as w e l l as commercial banks. I n h i s second 
d e f i n i t i o n , Haq c o n f i n e s the borrowing of the government from 
the S t a t e Bank alone, " d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s the net borrowing 
( 4 ) 
of the government from the S t a t e Bank alone". Haq,then 
c l a i m s t h a t these d e f i n i t i o n s have an important advantage; 
( 1 ) I b i d P.4 
(2 ) Haq, M., and K. Khanam, D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g m P a k i s t a n , 
1951-60, The I n s t i t u t e of Development Economics, 
Bunder Road, K a r a c h i , 1961. 
(3 ) I b i d P.2 
(4 ) I b i d P.3 
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"The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s l i e s i n l i n k i n g 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g d i r e c t l y w i t h the money - c r e a t i n g e f f e c t s 
of government o p e r a t i o n s " . H o w e v e r , Haq, does not d e f i n e 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g xn a way which i n d i c a t e s the use of the 
funds obtained through t h i s devxce, and i n my view he should 
have done so. T h i s i s because, i t i s as important t o i n d i c a t e 
the use of funds provided through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g as to 
i n d i c a t e the methods which a government can use to get the s e 
funds. G.Patterson i n an a r t i c l e i n the "J o u r n a l of 
(2) 
F i n a n c e " d e f i n e s d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g f o r the purpose of h i s 
a r t i c l e a s ; "a net i n c r e a s e i n the amount of money i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n , such i n c r e a s e being the r e s u l t of conscious 
governmental p o l i c y designed to b r i n g about economic 
a c t i v i t i e s t h a t the o f f i c i a l s b e l i e v e d e s i r a b l e and t h a t 
o therwise would not have taken p l a c e . (Thus, i t i s assumed 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s not o f f s e t by t a x a t i o n , t i g h t e r bank 
(3) 
c r e d i t , e t c . ) ..." T h i s d e f i n i t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t a 
government plans t o i n c r e a s e money i n c i r c u l a t i o n aiming a t a 
high e r l e v e l of economic a c t i v i t y . However, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n 
does"not c l a r i f y the way i n which t h i s i n c r e a s e i n money i n 
c i r c u l a t i o n i s expected to be brought about. P a t t e r s o n goes 
on and e x p l a i n s what he means by underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 
and (which i s not our concern i n t h i s appendix) the purpose of 
u s i n g d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i n these c o u n t r i e s ; "... the purpose 
of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s to sec u r e a r a p i d economic development; 
( 1 ) Haq, M., and K. Khaman, D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g i n P a k i s t a n , 
1951-60, Bunder Road, K a r a c h i , 1961, P.3 
( 2 ) P a t t e r s o n , G., The J o u r n a l of Fi n a n c e , E d i t e d by 
H.G. F r a i n , and C.A. Dauten, The American F i n a n c e 
A s s o c i a t i o n , V o l . X I I , 1957. 
( 3 ) I b i d P.178 
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t h a t i s , d r a s t x c a l l y and q u i c k l y to a l t e r the economic 
s t r u c t u r e " . 
There i s a f a i r l y extended account of what the term 
( 2 ) 
may be thought to cover i n K u l k a r n i . Some use has a l r e a d y 
been made i n the main body of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n of h i s point 
( 3 ) 
of view: i t may t h e r e f o r e be s u f f i c i e n t here to i n d i c a t e 
the broad range of s i t u a t i o n s which h i s term c o v e r s . I n a 
s t r i c t l y academic sense h i s d e s c r i p t i o n may be thought 
a p p r o p r i a t e . D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g has indeed over a long p e r i o d 
of time been used to r e f e r to such s i t u a t i o n s as he d e s c r i b e s . 
There i s a c l o s e s i m i l a r i t y m f a c t between the s i t u a t i o n s 
which K u l k a r n i d e s c r i b e s m some d e t a i l and the s i t u a t i o n s 
which r a t h e r more broadly a re presented by A . G i l p i n i n h i s 
D i c t i o n a r y of Economic Terms; " D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g The 
f i n a n c i n g of a budget d e f i c i t by the Government by means of 
borrowing a g a i n s t the i s s u e of Government s e c u r i t i e s , t h a t i s 
by i n c r e a s i n g the N a t i o n a l Debt ( q . v . ) . A budget d e f i c i t i s 
i n c u r r e d as a means of s t i m u l a t i n g the economy through 
( 4 ) 
i n c r e a s e d Government expenditure". Whatever the form, 
however, i n which the change may be made, by i s s u i n g more 
money m the form of notes or simply by governmental spending 
which exceeds the c u r r e n t i n f l o w of revenue, made p o s s i b l e 
by the p r o v i s i o n of bank c r e d i t , t h e e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e of the 
s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t an imbalance has been s e t which has, as i t s 
( 1 ) I b i d . P.178 
(2) K u l k a r n i , R.G. , D e f i c i t F i n a n c i n g and Economic Development, 
A s i a P u b l i s h i n g House, London, 1966. 
( 3 ) See P.(202, and PP.204-206) of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
( 4 ) G i l p i n , A., D i c t i o n a r y of Economic Terms, Butterworths, 
London, 1966, P.47. 
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u l t i m a t e e f f e c t an i n c r e a s e , c u r r e n t l y , m the r a t e of flow 
of expenditures a g a i n s t the c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e supply of 
goods and s e r v i c e s . The important t h i n g i s t h a t when a 
term i s used which has many meanings or a p p l i c a t i o n s , a 
c l e a r statement should be made of the sense i n which i t i s 
intended t o use the term and t h i s sense should be 
c o n s i s t e n t l y maintained. I n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n the d e v i c e of 
d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s l i n k e d narrowly and s p e c i f i c a l l y t o 
the f i n a n c i n g of a development programme, though t h i s i s 
not to be understood as implying the b e l i e f t h a t the wider 
range of r e f e r e n c e of the concept i s n e c e s s a r i l y i n v a l i d . 
APPENDIX NUMBER FOUR 
A NOTE ON THE USE OF THE QUANTITY THEORY 
OF MONEY IN THE MODEL. 
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Appendix No. ( 4 ) 
A note on the Use of the Quantity Theory 
of Money i n the Model. 
The Q u a n t i t y Theory of Money i s adequately d e s c r i b e d 
by G i l p i n ( i n c l u d i n g h i s r e f e r e n c e to the deduction t h a t may be 
made) a s , "A theory developed by the American economist 
I r v i n g F i s h e r (1867-1947), the e s s e n t i a l s of which a r e contained 
i n the equation: 
MV = PT 
where M = the amount of money (bank notes, e t c . p l u s bank 
d e p o s i t s ) ; V = the v e l o c i t y of c i r c u l a t i o n ; T = t o t a l number of 
t r a d e t r a n s a c t i o n s ; and P = general p r i c e l e v e l . 
From t h i s equation i t may be deduced t h a t w i t h V 
and T constant, an i n c r e a s e m M must r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e i n P. 
With V and P c o n s t a n t , an i n c r e a s e i n M could be o f f s e t by an 
i n c r e a s e i n T. With both P and T constant, a decrease i n M could 
be o f f s e t by an i n c r e a s e i n V. I f T i s c onstant, an i n c r e a s e i n 
P may be due to an i n c r e a s e i n M or V, or both. The equation i s 
u s e f u l i n i n d i c a t i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the four 
+ „ ( 1 ) parameters . 
A l l the same i t has to be recognised t h a t i n r e c e n t 
y e a r s a great d e a l of c r i t i c i s m has been l e v e l l e d a t the 
theorem;. so much t h a t i t would not be unreasonable a t a l l to 
form the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the theory had been d i s c r e d i t e d . For 
example, when Pen has d e s c r i b e d what he c a l l s the " n a i v e " 
( 1 ) G i l p i n , A., D i c t i o n a r y of Economic Tdrms, Butterworths, 
London, 1966, P.173 
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q u a n t i t y theory and s a i d of i t t h a t " t h i s " n a i v e " q u a n t i t y theory 
obviously does not give a proper p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y " , ^ ^ h e goes 
on to d e s c r i b e , b r i e f l y , "the new v a r i a n t of the q u a n t i t y 
theory ... which i s connected i n p a r t i c u l a r w i t h the name of the 
( 2 ) 
American I r v i n g F i s h e r ..." and the attempt, l a t e r , by 
M a r s h a l l and Robertson, a t Cambridge "to r e p l a c e the v e l o c i t y of 
c i r c u l a t i o n by the concept 'cash balance', i . e . money's time of 
(3) 
r e s t , so to speak". He i s prepared to agree t h a t a c e r t a i n 
v e r b a l e l u c i d a t i o n i s achieved, by t h i s Cambridge v e r s i o n but 
he i s , i n the end, no more prepared to accept i t than he i s the 
F i s h e r v e r s i o n which i t was intended to r e p l a c e : " I cannot see 
what t h e o r e t i c a l b e n e f i t i s gained from r e p l a c i n g a q u a n t i t y by 
( 4 ) 
i t s r e c i p r o c a l " : he s a y s ; and to him t h i s seems to be the f i n a l 
word t h a t need be s a i d . B u t i t i s a complex s u b j e c t and c r i t i c i s m 
of the Quantity Theory has a long h i s t o r y as indeed has 
acceptance of the l e g i t i m a c y of a good d e a l of the c r i t i c i s m even 
by those who would put forward some form of Quantity Theory 
themselves. For example, M a r s h a l l i n 'Money C r e d i t and Commerce' 
P.(48) s a y s " t h i s Quantity d o c t r i n e i s h e l p f u l as f a r as i t goes 
but i t does not i n d i c a t e what a r e the oth e r t h i n g s " ( i n h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way he has j u s t completed a statement of the 
Quantity Theory which was c a r e f u l l y guarded by the phrase 'other 
t h i n g s being e q u a l ' ) "which must be assumed to be equal i n order 
to f u r t h e r the p r o p o s i t i o n and i t does not e x p l a i n the causes 
which govern the r a p i d i t y of c i r c u l a t i o n " . L a t e r , he s a y s , " i t 
( 5 ) 
i s almost a t r u i s m " . 
( 1 ) Pen, J . , Modern Economics, Penguin Books, 1965, p.158 
( 2 ) I b i d p.158 
( 3 ) I b i d p.161 
( 4 ) I b i d p.162 
( 5 ) M a r s h a l l , A., Money, C r e d i t , and Commerce, Macmillan and 
Co., London 1923, P.48 
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D.H. Robertson i n hxs book "Money" exp r e s s e s a s i m i l a r 
guarded acceptance of the propositxons i n d i c a t e d by the Quantity Theory 
and concludes h i s chapter on the Theory w i t h the words: "The Quantity 
Theory of money remains as a dowdy but s e r v i c e a b l e p l a t i t u d e " ^ 1 ^ . On 
the o ther s i d e we may r e c a l l the views of Keynes t h a t "where t h e r e i s 
f u l l employment p r i c e s w i l l change i n the same pr o p o r t i o n as the q u a n t i t y 
(2) 
of money" (though he immediately produces a number of r e s e r v a t i o n s 
which weaken the f o r c e of h i s a s s e r t i o n ) , and a l s o the s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
defence of the theorem i n a s u i t a b l y e l a b o r a t e d form which has been put 
(3 ) 
forward by M. Friedman . C l e a r l y t h e r e i s a good d e a l of 
con t r o v e r s y concerning the v a l i d i t y ( r e s p e c t a b i l i t y almost) of the 
Quantity Theory and the r i v a l f o r m u l a t i o n which would express i t s e l f i n 
terms of Keynesian aggregates and use a flow of funds approach. Not only 
has the c o n t r o v e r s y been going on f o r a long time but, d e s p i t e the 
vigour w i t h which opponents of the Q u a n t i t y Theory express themselves 
i t i s not dead y e t . I n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n however, the aim has been 
to f i n d a convenient and acc e p t a b l y v a l i d e x p o s i t o r y d e v i c e through 
the use of which the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the v a r i a b l e s i n the 
model could be d i s p l a y e d . R e c a l l i n g the words of G i l p i n 
"The equation i s u s e f u l i n i n d i c a t i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the f o u r parameters". The parameters of G i l p i n ' s e x p r e s s i o n 
ar e the c a t e g o r i e s M, V, P, and T of the model, w i t h T s u i t a b l y 
d e f i n e d so as t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of V as 
the income v e l o c i t y of the money supply and not i t s 
t r a n s a c t i o n s v e l o c i t y . I n a l l models, whether they use the 
c a t e g o r i e s of the Quantity Theory or the symbols which denote 
(1 ) Robertson, D.H., Money, N i s b e t , Cambridge, At the U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , 1922. 
(2) Keynes, J.M., "The General Theory of Employment, I n t e r e s t 
and Money". Macmillan, 1936, P.296. 
(3 ) Friedman, M., S t u d i e s I n the Quantity Theory of Money, With 
E s s a y s by M i l t o n Friedman and o t h e r s , Chicago, 
U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1956. 
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the aggregates of the Keynesxan and post Keynesian approaches, 
xt xs n e c e s s a r y f o r assumptxons t o be made so t h a t the model 
can be s t a b i l x s e d . I t xs xn thxs manner t h a t the c a t e g o r i e s of 
the Quantity Theory have been used xn the model. I t i s 
accepted t h a t the varxous c a t e g o r i e s a r e interdependent and can 
xnfluence each other; as Pen has s a i d " I t i s not the accuracy 
of the equatxon of exchange t h a t i s a t t a c k e d , but the use made 
of x t . The equatxon suggests t h a t M,V,T, and P are independent 
of each other. T h i s suggestion xs mxsleading"^ 1^. There xs 
no xntentxon whatsoever of presentxng the monetary equatxon 
as though i t xndxcated a cause - and - e f f e c t r e l a t x o n between 
the v a r i a b l e s - c e r t a x n l y not a r i g i d c a u s a l connection 
between M and P. I t i s p resented and used simply as a 
convenient e x p o s i t o r y d e v i c e . I t has been s a i d the Quantxty 
equatxon can t e l l us no more than we o u r s e l v e s read xnto i t ; 
thxs vxew xs accepted u n - r e s e r v e d l y . Thxs xs p r e c i s e l y how the 
equatxon has been used xn the model and an xmportant p a r t of 
the e x e r c x s e was xndeed to f x t q u a n t x t i e s xnto the boxes 
xndxcated by the categorxes, so to say, on the b a s i s of 
assumptxons whxch had a l r e a d y been made. 
(1 ) Pen, J . , Modern Economxcs.Penguin Books, 1965, PP.(159-160), 
( t r a n s l a t e d from the Dutch by T.S. P r e s t o n ) . 
(267) 
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APPENDIX ( 5 ) 
"THE NATURE OF INFLATION, AND MAIN TYPES OF INFLATION DEFINED" 
The f i r s t concept of x n f l a t x o n , the o l d one, i s based on the 
quantxty theory of money. Under thxs concept of the theory of 
x n f l a t x o n , an xncrease xn the quantxty of money xs the c e n t r a l f a c t o r 
whxch le a d s to x n f l a t x o n . Under the cruder and e a r l x e r forms of the 
theory, the va r x a b l e s other than (M) and (P) were assumed to remaxn 
con s t a n t , thus (P) varxed d x r e c t l y and proportxonately wxth (M). 
In -the more sophxstxcated formulatxons of the theory some allowance 
was made f o r the p o s s x b i l x t x e s of varxatxons xn productxon and output 
but x t was s t x l l the basxc assumptxon th a t f o r i n f l a t x o n to be xnduced 
the varxatxons xn the other v a r x a b l e s should not be such as to o f f s e t 
the varxatxon xn (M). I f some measure of varxatxon i n these other 
v a r x a b l e s xs accepted then (P) w x l l tend to r x s e under the s t i m u l u s 
of an xncrease xn (M) but not p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y . P r o f e s s o r Pxgou, f o r 
example, regards the xncrease xn the quantxty of money as the most 
xmportant and a s u f f i c x e n t f a c t o r to xnduce x n f l a t x o n . As he xndxcates 
"aggregate money xncome w x l l be xncreased ... exther xf the s t o c k of 
money xs i n c r e a s e d ... or xf the proportxon of money income to s t o c k 
of money xs xncreased ... x n f l a t i o n can only come about as a 
concomxtant of one other or both of these types of change". 
Consequently, when the quantxty of money xnc r e a s e s , 
accordxng to thxs concept of x n f l a t x o n , the general<prxce l e v e l r x s e s , 
causxng x n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s . The posxtxon would be presented xn 
the form MV = PT, where : M = xs the quantxty of money xn c x r c u l a t x o n 
together wxth the a v a x l a b l e bank c r e d x t : V = v e l o c x t y of money xn 
c x r c u l a t x o n P = P r x c e s , T = volume of t r a n s a c t i o n s during a c e r t a x n 
perxod ( a year f o r example):xf V and T are -jtakeiu to be constant, 
(1 ) Quoted xn : Zawadskx, The Economxcs of I n f l a t x o n a r y P r o c e s s , 
Weidenfexd and Nxcholson, 1965, P.17 
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then an i n c r e a s e xn M l e a d s to a r i s e i n p r i c e ( P ) tha t i s : 
M V = P T 
Under t h i s concept of i n f l a t i o n , i f the monetary 
a u t h o r i t i e s i n a country i n c r e a s e the q u a n t i t y of money by spending 
c e n t r a l bank, or other bank c r e d i t s , during a depression then, 
provided a r i s e i n g e n e r a l p r i c e s i s induced, the a c t i o n and the 
ensuing s i t u a t i o n , would l o g i c a l l y , have to be c a l l e d " i n f l a t i o n a r y " -
from t h i s i t i s c l e a r t h a t the e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n to be s a t i s f i e d 
before a s i t u a t i o n may, s t r i c t l y , be c a l l e d " i n f l a t i o n a r y " i s t h a t 
t h e r e should be a r i s e i n g e n e r a l p r i c e s . I f t h e r e a r e unused r e s o u r c e s 
which the spending on the b a s i s of c r e d i t b r i n g s i n t o a c t i v e use then 
i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t p r i c e s must r i s e . Indeed i t i s 
an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of Keynesian d o c t r i n e i n the general theory t h a t , 
provided t h e r e i s not unduly c l o s e p r e s s u r e on a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s 
then the e f f e c t of the spending w i l l be observable i n an i n c r e a s e of 
output and employment and not an i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s . The more r i g i d and 
crude v e r s i o n of the Q u a n i t i t y Theory i s indeed, open to another 
o b j e c t i o n : namely, t h a t i f the v e l o c i t y of c i r c u l a t i o n of money 
i n c r e a s e s , M remaining the same, then i n f l a t i o n can be brought about. 
The Quantity Theory has been d e s c r i b e d , not without good reason, as a 
p l a t i t u d e and a tautology. Indeed i t i s , f o r m r e a l world s i t u a t i o n s 
the v a r i a b l e s tend to vary a l l together, though i t may w e l l be t h a t 
a l e a d i n g f a c t o r i n the engendering of i n f l a t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s i s the 
v a r i a t i o n i n the Q u a n t i t y of money, f o r t h i s can so e a s i l y be v a r i e d 
by the a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i v i t i e s of the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s themselves. 
I f i n f l a t i o n i s thought of as a r e l a t i v e r i s e i n g e neral p r i c e s then 
i t has to be admitted, odd though i t may seem, t h a t " i n f l a t i o n " can 
a r i s e even i f the q u a n t i t y and v e l o c i t y of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n remain 
the same: t h i s could happen i f , a t the same time, the supply of goods 
and s e r v i c e s d e c l i n e d . I n f l a t i o n has thus a r i s e n as a r e s u l t of a 
change i n i t i a t e d on the s i d e of goods and s e r v i c e s and not on the s i d e 
of money supply. I t i s p l a i n t h a t the p r i c e l e v e l i s to be seen, i n 
t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s , as the product or outcome of the other t h r e e f o r c e s 
which a r e given a p l a c e i n the " q u a n t i t y " e x p r e s s i o n . I t i s a t bottom, 
so f a r as a n a l y s i s i s concerned, z^k" a matter of d e c i d i n g which f o r 
(270) 
t h e purposes of a p a r t i c u l a r argument, s h a l l be regarded as constant and 
which not. 
The second treatment of the theory of i n f l a t i o n was presented by the 
Swedish economist "Knut W i c k s e l l " . Under t h i s approach, the ge n e r a l p r i c e 
l e v e l i s regarded as being determined by supply of, and demand f o r , goods 
and s e r v i c e s . Consequently any theory of i n f l a t i o n should d e a l w i t h the 
f a c t o r s which determine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the demand f o r and supply of 
goods and s e r v i c e s . T h i s approach uses the concept of "excess demand" to mean, 
assuming t h a t we are d e a l i n g w i t h a c e r t a i n commodity, "The d i f f e r e n c e between 
q u a n t i t y demanded and the q u a n t i t y s u p p l i e d a t a c e r t a i n given p r i c e " , And 
i n f l a t i o n means a c c o r d i n g l y a s i t u a t i o n where " e x t e n s i v e " excess demand i s 
p r e s e n t i n the market f o r a great v a r i e t y of goods. 
The t h i r d concept of the theory of i n f l a t i o n i s based on the d i f f e r e n c e 
between the attempted s a v i n g s and attempted investment. I t i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
i n f l a t i o n begins when attempted or ex-ante s a v i n g s both p r i v a t e and p u b l i c 
f a l l below attempted and ex-post investment. I n the Keynesian model, when 
e f f e c t i v e demand exceeds e f f e c t i v e supply, c a u s i n g an i n c r e a s e i n output and 
employment, and t h i s , provided the economy i s a t or near i t s f u l l employment 
p o i n t , l e a d s to r i s i n g p r i c e s , t h a t i s i n f l a t i o n . I t must be borne i n mind 
t h a t i n f l a t i o n c ould be experienced even i f the f u l l employment p o i n t had not 
been reached, as the diagram below i l l u s t r a t e s . There might e x i s t a shortage 
i n one or more of the f a c t o r s of production, such a s , raw m a t e r i a l s , and/or 
workers w i t h s p e c i a l s k i l l , needed i n c e r t a i n i n d u s t r i e s . 
( 1 ) | M d „ P.3 
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Another treatment of the theory of i n f l a t i o n i n a c l o s e d 
economy was conducted by Ralph Turvey; he d e f i n e s i n f l a t i o n as : 
a process r e s u l t i n g from competition i n attempting to maintain 
t o t a l r e a l income, t o t a l r e a l expenditure and/or t o t a l output a t a 
l e v e l which has become p h y s i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e , or i n attempting to 
i n c r e a s e any of them to a l e v e l which i s p h y s i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e " . 
F i n a l l y an attempt to touch upon the meaning of terms l i k e , d e f l a t i o n , 
d i s i n f l a t i o n and r e f l a t i o n , may not be out of p l a c e . The concept 
d e f l a t i o n could be considered, broadly, as opposite to i n f l a t i o n . 
D e f l a t i o n does not mean any f a l l i n the q u a n t i t y of money, or m the 
g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l , but, " d e f l a t i o n , i s p r e s e n t , however, when 
c o n t r a c t i o n r e s u l t s from a d e l i b e r a t e a c t of p o l i c y , o u t s i d e the 
( 2 ) 
normal course " . T h e r e f o r e , d e f l a t i o n could be brought about when 
the government wants to b r i n g i t about, u n l i k e i n f l a t i o n . D e f l a t i o n 
could be brought about to s e r v e a c e r t a i n purpose or c e r t a i n purposes, 
such a s , to r e s t o r e some p r e - e x i s t i n g r a t e of exchange w i t h other 
c u r r e n c i e s , w h i c h was the case when the Bank of England h e l d discount 
r a t e high, p r i o r to 1925, f o r the purpose of s t r e n g t h e n i n g the p o s i t i o n 
( 3 ) 
of the pound s t e r l i n g a g a i n s t the d o l l a r . As f o r the concept of 
d i s i n f l a t i o n , P . E i n z i g d e f i n e s " d i s i n f l a t i o n " a s, " e f f o r t s to check a 
r i s e i n p r i c e s or r e v e r s e an i n f l a t i o n a r y r i s e which has a l r e a d y 
( 4 ) 
taken p l a c e " . F i n a l l y , the t h i r d concept i s " r e f l a t i o n " which 
means, ", t»* a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e of i n f l a t i o n undertaken on c e r t a i n 
p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n s with a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t i o n and s u b j e c t to a 
( 5 ) 
predetermined l i m i t " . 
( 1 ) Quoted m : K.K.F. Zawadski, The Economics of the I n f l a t i o n a r y 
P r o c e s s , Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965, P.20 
( 2 ) A.C.Pigou, Economics i n P r a c t i s e , MacMillan and Co. L t d . , 
London, 1935, P.87 
( 3 ) I b i d , P.87. 
( 4 ) P . E i n z i g , I n f l a t i o n , Chatto and Wmdus, 1952. PP.22-23. 
( 5 ) A. Pigou, Economics and P r a c t i c e , MacMillan and Co. L t d . , 
London 1935, PP. 91-93. 
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The monetary a u t h o r i t i e s take t h i s course of a c t i o n i n 
a s i t u a t i o n where p r i c e s have f a l l e n below the t r e n d , due to a 
c y c l i c a l d e p r e s s i o n as i s shown m the diagram b e l o w S u c h a 
s i t u a t i o n has harmful e f f e c t s on the economy, these a r e :-
f i r s t l y , the i n c r e a s e i n the r e a l v alue of i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l , 
p u b l i c and p r i v a t e debt, i n terms of a p p r e c i a t e d money. Secondly, 
wages w i l l not tend to f a l l when p r i c e s f a l l , and t h e r e f o r e c o s t 
of production w i l l tend to r i s e , and i n t u r n w i l l tend to cause 
unemployment. T h i r d l y , the government w i l l be o b l i g e d to pay the 
same r a t e of wages and s a l a r i e s , and pensions as before the f u l l i n 
p r i c e has taken p l a c e , which means t h a t the government i s paying 
more than before i n r e a l terms. 
I t must be emphasised, however, t h a t i f the f a l l i n p r i c e s i s 
due to an improvement i n a g r i c u l t u r a l or i n d u s t r i a l technique, or, 
i f , w i t h a l l other t h i n g s remaining the same r e f l a t i o n i s 
i n t roduced to r e s t o r e a previous p r i c e l e v e l than t h e r e should not, 
n e c e s s a r i l y , b e harmful e f f e c t s on the economy indeed, considered 
g e n e r a l l y the e f f e c t s should be b e n e f i c i a l . 
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R e l a t i o n of r e f l a t i o n to v a r i a t i o n s from a t r e n d . 
(273) 
The Main Types of I n f l a t i o n : 
I n f l a t i o n i s a phenomenon which fundamentally a r i s e s as a 
r e s u l t of an a l t e r a t i o n i n the r a t e of flow of money r e l a t i v e to the 
r a t e of flow of goods and s e r v i c e s . The presence and course of i n f l a t i o n 
w i l l be seen i n the movement of p r i c e s . But s i n c e i t i s a phenomenon 
which depends upon the r e l a t i o n between the money flow and the goods 
flow, i t f o l l o w s t h a t the r i s i n g p r i c e s , by which i n f l a t i o n w i l l be 
made man i f e s t , may be the outcome of changes i n i t i a t e d from the s i d e 
of money or from the s i d e of goods and s e r v i c e s ( w i t h a s u i t a b l e 
assumption about the other so t h a t the a c t i v a t i n g o r i g i n of the 
i n f l a t i o n may be l o c a t e d ) or both, a c t i n g together. I n the l a s t a n a l y s i s 
i n f l a t i o n w i l l be the outcome of d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e changes on the one 
s i d e as compared w i t h the ot h e r . I t i s thus p o s s i b l e to r e c o g n i s e 
i n f l a t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t forms, but i n order to warrant the common 
a p p e l l a t i o n , a l l must have s p e c i a l f e a t u r e s i n common. I n a l l types of 
i n f l a t i o n , i n f l a t i o n ensues only because monetary expenditure can be 
r a i s e d , whether by an i n c r e a s e i n the money supply by expansion of 
bank c r e d i t and/or p r i n t i n g more paper money, or by an i n c r e a s e i n the 
v e l o c i t y of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n , or both, or by a decrease a b s o l u t e l y 
or r e l a t i v e l y i n the supply of goods and s e r v i c e s , even i f the q u a n t i t y 
and v e l o c i t y of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n remain constant, or i n c r e a s e d by 
more than the i n c r e a s e i n the i n c r e a s e i n the supply of goods and 
s e r v i c e s . The mam types of i n f l a t i o n a r e :-
(1 ) Hyper I n f l a t i o n . 
I n t h i s type of i n f l a t i o n p r i c e s r i s e a s t r o n o m i c a l l y mainly 
because people, depending on t h e i r p revious experience, expect p r i c e s 
i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s to r i s e and continue to do so f o r an extended 
a r e 
p e r i o d . These s i t u a t i o n s a r e such a s A c r e a t e d by a p o l i t i c a l upheaval, 
or war. Th e r e f o r e , i f people expect p r i c e s t o r i s e , they may s t a r t to 
purchase goods i n the immediate p r e s e n t , and keep them f o r consumption 
m the f u t u r e , or s h i f t p a r t of t h e i r c a s h holdings to f o r e i g n 
exchange, or p r e c i o u s metals. 
(274) 
The process could a l s o be s t a r t e d and s u s t a i n e d i f the general p u b l i c 
l o s e confidence i n a government and i t s monetary p o l i c i e s . However, 
demand f o r goods and s e r v i c e s w i l l tend to r i s e . As f o r the 
production, i . e . the supply s i d e , producers who expect i n c r e a s e s i n 
p r i c e w i l l tend to p r e f e r to s t o c k p a r t of t h e i r production than 
produce f o r the c u r r e n t needs of the market. I t f o l l o w s t h a t the 
l a r g e r the a n t i c i p a t e d r i s e i n p r i c e s , the higher and wider the gap 
between the q u a n t i t y of goods s u p p l i e d and goods demanded. 
Consequently, t h e r e w i l l be an excess demand, which w i l l tend to l e a d 
to a r i s e i n expected p r o f i t s , wages, and p r i c e s . I f t h i s r a t e of 
p r i c e r i s e i s to become a case of h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n , two c o n d i t i o n s 
must be f u l f i l l e d :-
F i r s t l y , people's e x p e c t a t i o n s of the i n c r e a s e i n the p r i c e l e v e l i n 
the f u t u r e , and the d i f f e r e n c e between the e x i s t i n g g eneral p r i c e 
l e v e l and the expected higher p r i c e l e v e l , ought to continue f o r a 
reasonably long p e r i o d . I t f o l l o w s t h a t consumers w i l l tend to buy 
and s t o r e goods f o r the f u t u r e , and producers w i l l tend to s t o r e p a r t 
of t h e i r c u r r e n t production, hoping to s e l l i t at higher p r i c e s 
s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s . 
Secondly, an i n c r e a s i n g and c o n t i n u i n g flow of money needs 
to be provided i n order to enable producers to pay higher p r i c e s f o r 
the 
f a c t o r s of production on^one hand, and consumers to pay higher p r i c e s 
f o r goods and s e r v i c e s on the other. 
T h i s flow of money could be s u p p l i e d by expansion of bank 
c r e d i t and/or i n c r e a s e i n the v e l o c i t y of money i n c i r c u l a t i o n . I t 
i s h i g h l y l i k e l y t h a t the needs of the community f o r currency w i l l 
b r i n g about an i n c r e a s e i n the volume of bank notes p r i n t e d and put 
i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n by the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s . T h e r e f o r e , h y p e r - i n f l a t i o r 
could be i n i t i a t e d e i t h e r as a r e s u l t of expansion i n bank c r e d i t , to 
a l a r g e e x t e n t , as a r e s u l t of a sharp change i n the e x p e c t a t i o n s of 
consumers and producers, or both. An extreme example of h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n 
i s the German one of 1922-1923. 
(275) 
I t i s t y p i c a l t h a t once i n i t i a t e d i t tended to i n c r e a s e a t an 
i n c r e a s i n g r a t e and t h a t i t s composition contained a l l t h r e e elements 
mentioned above, namely an i n c r e a s e i n p r i n t e d notes, an i n c r e a s e i n 
bank c r e d i t and an i n c r e a s e i n the v e l o c i t y of c i r c u l a t i o n . I t i s 
extreme, however, and so, i n a sense, u n t y p i c a l i n t h a t i t was moved , 
along by a complex of p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s engendered by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
d i s l o c a t i o n s of the immediate post war y e a r s , aggravated by an acute 
c y c l i c a l d e p r e s s i o n . 
( 2 ) Cost-push i n f l a t i o n : 
P r o f e s s o r R.G. L i p s e y d i s t i n g u i s h e s between two t h e o r i e s of 
i n f l a t i o n , cost-push and demand-pull, "Looking at the c a u s a l 
sequences involved, the cost-push theory sa y s t h a t i t i s i n c r e a s e i n 
f a c t o r p r i c e s t h a t causes i n c r e a s e s i n f i n a l goods p r i c e s , and t h a t 
these changes m f a c t o r p r i c e s can occur independently of the s t a t e of 
excess demand . Now i f we examine the production process we 
can r e c o g n i s e t h a t incomes r e c e i v e d by s u p p l i e r s of f a c t o r s of 
production, i n the form of wages, i n t e r e s t , r e n t and p r o f i t s , r e p r e s e n t 
c o s t of production on the one hand and purchasing power on the other. 
There a r e v a r i o u s c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n the s i t u a t i o n , however: i n the 
f i r s t p l a c e these incomes r e c e i v e d by s u p p l i e r s of f a c t o r s of 
production are not q u a n t i t a t i v e l y of equal importance i n the t o t a l 
make-up of aggregate income, f o r example, wages and s a l a r i e s form 
more than (60%) of d i r e c t c o s t i n manufacturing o p e r a t i o n . I n the 
second p l a c e t h e r e may be q u i t e a complex r e l a t i o n between the 
movement of payments to a f a c t o r or f a c t o r s and the movement of 
p r i c e s . F or example, H.G. Moulton shows t h a t i n the p e r i o d 1933-1957 
the r i s e m hourly wages i n the U.S.A. was more than double the r i s e 
( 2 ) 
i n w h o lesale p r i c e s . He e x p l a i n s why p r i c e s d i d not r i s e a t the 
( 1 ) L i p s e y , R.G., An I n t r o d u c t i o n to P o s i t i v e Economics, Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 1963, P.434. 
( 2 ) Moulton, H.G., Can I n f l a t i o n Be C o n t r o l l e d , George A l l e n and 
Unwin, 1958, PP.159-162. 
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same r a t e as wages; the reason l a y , he s a y s , i n "improvements i n 
o p e r a t i n g e f f i c i e n c y " . N e v e r t h e l e s s , when c o s t of production r i s e s 
as a r e s u l t of, say, an i n c r e a s e i n wages and s a l a r i e s above the 
i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i v i t y , producers i n order to maintain the same 
margin of p r o f i t s w i l l see no a l t e r n a t i v e but to r a i s e p r i c e s . Once 
s t a r t e d , t h i s movement w i l l tend to continue; an i n c r e a s e i n wages and 
s a l a r i e s w i l l tend to be followed, a r i s e i n c o s t of production; 
then p r i c e s w i l l tend to r i s e again and the f a m i l i a r c o s t / p r i c e 
s p i r a l w i l l be c l e a r l y seen. 
( 3 ) Demand-pull i n f l a t i o n : 
The demand-pull theory of i n f l a t i o n r e v e r s e s the order of 
c a u s a t i o n which i s f ollowed by the cost-push theory. The demand-pull 
theory maintains t h a t , "... i t i s i n c r e a s e s i n the demand f o r f i n a l 
goods (consumers goods or investment goods) t h a t cause i n c r e a s e s i n 
t h e i r p r i c e s , these p r i c e s i n c r e a s e s cause a r i s e i n the demand f o r 
f a c t o r s of production which, i n t u r n cause an i n c r e a s e i n f a c t o r 
p r i c e s , thus i t i s i n c r e a s e s i n the l e v e l of goods p r i c e s which cause 
i n c r e a s e s i n the l e v e l of f a c t o r p r i c e s " . N o w i n the Keynesian 
model, as mentioned e a r l i e r , when e f f e c t i v e demand exceeds e f f e c t i v e 
supply of goods and s e r v i c e s , then provided p r e v i o u s l y unused 
r e s o u r c e s are a v a i l a b l e , employment and output r i s e ; but i f f u l l 
employment has been reached, p r i c e s i n c r e a s e , or i n other words 
i n f l a t i o n w i l l be brought about. Furthermore, i n f l a t i o n could be 
brought about, even i f f u l l employment has not y e t been reached, as was 
shown e a r l i e r i n the diagram i n footnote on page ( 270. I n a country 
which has reached i t s f u l l employment po i n t , however, f o r p r a c t i c a l 
purposes tlais may be d e f i n e d , any i n c r e a s e i n investment by the 
government, other t h i n g s being the same, which i s f i n a n c e d by d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g , above attempted savings,must tend to l e a d to an i n c r e a s e 
i n the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l , i . e . i n f l a t i o n , and an i n f l a t i o n a r y gap 
( 1 ) L i p s e y , R.G., An I n t r o d u c t i o n to P o s i t i v e Economics, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1963, p.434 
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w i l l come to e x i s t e n c e . As to the nature of an i n f l a t i o n a r y gap the most 
i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n of i t would seem to be t h a t presented by 
P r o f e s s o r Bent Hansen. 
A f t e r d i s c u s s i n g d i f f e r e n t concepts and d e s c r i b i n g r e s e a r c h 
s t u d i e s by v a r i o u s American economists, and the i n v e s t i g a t i o n by "Konjunk 
t u r i n s t i t u t " , he a r r i v e s a t the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , the above i n v e s t i g a t o r s 
seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t the i n f l a t i o n a r y gap i n the commodity markets can 
b e s t be d e s c r i b e d i n the f o l l o w i n g terms : "the i n f l a t i o n a r y gap i n the 
commodity markets = The a c t i v e attempts to purchase commodities - the 
( 2 ) 
v a l u e of the a v a i l a b l e q u a n t i t y of commodities". There a r e means by 
which the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s might make an approximate measure of the 
i n f l a t i o n a r y gap, i n order to see the extent to which attempted 
investment exceeded attempted s a v i n g s . I n d i s c u s s i n g t h i s a numerical 
example may not be out of p l a c e . L e t us assume t h a t i n country (A) the 
n a t i o n a l income, when f u l l employment has been reached i s (600 mn.) i n 
money terms, which c o n s i s t s of consumption, and s a v i n g s or investment. L e t 
us assume f u r t h e r t h a t a t o t a l amount of (540 mn.) i n money terms has been 
spent on consumer's goods and s e r v i c e s . I t f o l l o w s t h a t the remaining p a r t , 
i . e . the (60 mn.) should be spent on investment p r i v a t e and p u b l i c , i f the 
economy i s to be i n an e q u i l i b r i u m , under the c o n d i t i o n s of f u l l 
employment. Now, l e t us assume t h a t the government needs more goods and 
s e r v i c e s and f i n a n c e s t h i s being met by d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , say, (10 mn.) 
monetary u n i t . Hence, the t o t a l investment w i l l be (70 mn.) monetary u n i t s 
which exceeds s a v i n g s , which i s expected to be (60 mn.) only a t t h i s g i v e n 
l e v e l of the n a t i o n a l income. I t f o l l o w s t h a t t o t a l monetary 
expenditure on consumption and investment, exceeds the c a p a c i t y of the 
n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s of country ( A ) : i n other words t o t a l e f f e c t i v e demand 
exceeds t o t a l supply, which i n t u r n , l e a d s to a r i s e i n the g e n e r a l p r i c e 
l e v e l , i . e . i n f l a t i o n . Now i f marginal p r o p e n s i t y to consume i s § the 
( 1 ) The concept of i n f l a t i o n a r y gap was used o r i g i n a l l y by J.M.Keynes i n 
h i s pamphlet, How to Pay f o r the War, Chapter IX, "Voluntary Saving and 
the Mechanism of I n f l a t i o n " . MacMillan and Co.Ltd., London 1940, as 
r e p o r t e d to by : 
Bent Hansen, The Theory of I n f l a t i o n , George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 
London, 1951. P.61 
(278) 
m u l t i p l i e r w i l l be : 1 = 1 = 1 x 4 ^ = 4 , and the 
1 - 1 i 1 
s i z e of the gap w i l l be 4 x 10 = 40 mn. I t f o l l o w s t h a t the spending of the 
e x t r a (10 mn.) i n money terms on investment, has l e d to a r i s e i n n a t i o n a l 
income i n money terms from (600 mn.) to (640 mn.), w h i l e the r e a l n a t i o n a l 
income has not changed a t a l l . Hence, the i n c r e a s e i n spending on investment 
above r e a l s a v i n g , i f f u l l employment has been reached, would tend to l e a d 
to nothing but an i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s . 
( 4 ) Open and Repressed I n f l a t i o n : 
I f t h e r e i s a tendency f o r the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l to r i s e f r e e l y i n a 
country and according to the supply of, and demand f o r , goods and s e r v i c e s , 
without an i n t e r v e n t i o n by the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s , then i n f l a t i o n i s 
c a l l e d , as such, an open i n f l a t i o n . I f the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s hold p r i c e s 
down, then i n f l a t i o n w i l l be c a l l e d r e p r e s s e d or supressed i n f l a t i o n . The 
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s can hold p r i c e s down i n d i f f e r e n t ways, such as by the 
i m p o s i t i o n of c o n t r o l s , the e f f e c t of which i s t h a t expenditure on c u r r e n t 
production i s h a l t e d t e m p o r a r i l y , thus preventing the i n i t i a l stage of the 
i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s from t a k i n g i t s course, or by d i v e r t i n g demand from one 
type of commodities or output to another. There i s no reason i n theory why 
these two methods should not be used together, and i n p r a c t i c e , i t would 
very probably be the case t h a t i n f a c t they were. Another method which could 
be used to r e p r e s s an i n f l a t i o n i n i t s f i r s t s t a ges i s the f i x i n g of an 
upper l i m i t f o r the p r i c e s of consumer's goods. N e v e r t h e l e s s , even i f 
monetary measures are s u c c e s s f u l m keeping the g e n e r a l p r i c e l e v e l down, 
t h i s s u c c e s s would tend to be temporary only: p r i c e s w i l l , sooner or l a t e r 
tend to r i s e / ^ 
Another method which could be used as an a l t e r n a t i v e to f i x i n g 
maximum p r i c e s might be to i n t r o d u c e r a t i o n i n g . Each consumer might be 
allowed to buy a c e r t a i n amount of a c e r t a i n commodity during a f i x e d p e r i o d 
a week, f o r example. Thus i n t h i s way the t o t a l demand f o r any commodity 
could be c o n t r o l l e d . I n l a t e r phases of i n f l a t i o n , p r i c e s could be h e l d down 
e i t h e r by imposing high t a x e s , o r , p r o v i d e d t h i s s u i t e d the government pl a n s 
i n other r e s p e c t s , by r e d u c t i o n i n government expenditure; but t h i s again 
would c l e a r l y only be p o s s i b l e w i t h i n a context of very c o n s i d e r a b l e c e n t r a l 
c o n t r o l . 
( 1 ) U n l e s s , o f c o u r s e , t h e r e i s an extremely r i g i d and s u c c e s s f u l 
a u t h o r i f a r i e n c o n t r o l over the economic movements of an economy. 
( 2 ) Day,A.C.L., O u t l i n e of Monetary Economics, Oxford, 1958, PP.257-261. 
(279) 
( 5 ) Moderate Or Mild I n f l a t i o n ; 
The above types of i n f l a t i o n a re not d e s i r a b l e , and 
g e n e r a l l y the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s t r y , u s i n g every p o s s i b l e way, to 
avoid measures which might i n i t i a t e i n f l a t i o n of one of these t y p e s . 
T h i s i s because i n r e l a t i o n to the types of i n f l a t i o n mentioned, the 
harmful consequences are l i k e l y to outweigh any p o s s i b l e g a i n t h a t 
might come from t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . Moderate i n f l a t i o n means, i n c o n t r a s t , 
a steady, slow, c o n t r o l l e d , and w e l l r e g u l a t e d i n c r e a s e of p r i c e s , 
and i t i s t h i s concept of i n f l a t i o n which i s used i n the p r e s e n t study. 
I t i s suggested t h a t monetary a u t h o r i t i e s i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 
should, s u b j e c t to c e r t a i n safeguards, be permitted to use d e f i c i t 
f i n a n c i n g as a means of f i n a n c i n g t h e i r n a t i o n a l development programmes. 
I t i s expected t h a t when d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g i s used, w i t h i n l i m i t s , 
p r i c e s w i l l tend to r i s e , but only to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , and i t i s 
assumed t h a t i t i s the i n t e n t i o n of the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s to keep 
t h i s i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e s moderate. 
How f a r the i n t e n t i o n to keep i n f l a t i o n moderate can be 
r e a l i s e d i n p r a c t i c e i s a matter on which no g e n e r a l statement can 
be made. Much w i l l c l e a r l y depend upon the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances 
of d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s . I n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n a t t e n t i o n has been 
d i r e c t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r to the economic circumstances i n I r a q . 
APPENDIX NUMBER SIX 
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TABLE NO.(4) 
Value added i n A g r i c u l t u r e , F o r e s t r y , and 
F i s h i n g 1953 - 1963 ( I . D '000). 
Year At Current P r i c e s At Constant 1956 P r i c e s . 
1953 70.610 85.700 
1954 83.750 113.820 
1955 64.350 68.400 
1956 88.070 88.070 
1957 110.320 116.510 
1958 91.450 89.160 
1959 80.730 66.480 
1960 96.520 76.250 
1961 115.510 96.900 
1962 138.560 113.350 
1963 106.540 
1 
80.410 
x Net of d e p r e c i a t i o n . 
Source : Haseeb, K., The N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1953-1961 
Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964, P.33 and h i s Mem, 
N a t i o n a l Income of I r a q , 1962 and 1963. PP. 15-16. 
F i g u r e s f o r 1962 and 1963 only were taken from 
Dr. Haseebs* Mem. 
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TABLE NO.(7) 
I n d u s t r i a l Censuses 1954 and 1962. 
De t a x l s U n i t s 1 9 5 4 ( 1 ) 1962 % of 
change 
Average number of 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . i No. 22.460 21.373 -4.8 
Average number of 
employees. No. 90.291 120.787 33.8 
Annual Wages I.D.'000 5.756 21.966 281.6 
Value of f u e l I.D. '000 771 2814 264.9 
Value of 
l u b r i c a t i n g o i l I.D.'000 n.a. 485 -
Value of 
e l e c t r i c i t y used 
i n production. I.D.'000 225 1011 349.3 
Value of m a t e r i a l 
used i n 
production. 
s 
I.D.'000 15.024 63.117 320.1 
T o t a l revenue I.D.'000 39.198 137.315 250.3 
Source : The t a b l e compiled from I r a q M i n i s t r y of Economics 
S t a t i s t i c a l A b s t r a c t 1955-56, Zahra P r e s s Baghdad 1956, P.100 
and P.105, I r a q M i n i s t r y of Planning, The Monthly I n d u s t r i a l 
Survey 1962, PP.7-10, and K.Haseeb, The N a t i o n a l Income of 
I r a q 1953-1961, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1964, P.91 
A l l percentages were c a l c u l a t e d by the w r i t e r . 
( 1 ) I t i s u s e f u l to point out t h a t f i g u r e s f o r 1954, do not 
re p r e s e n t averages, because the Census s t a r t e d on December 12th, 
1953 and f i n i s h e d before A p r i l i n a l l p r o v i n c e s except two. 
F i g u r e s f o r 1962 r e p r e s e n t averages based on 12 monthly r e t u r n s . 
The importance of t h i s f a c t i s t h a t , ice-making f a c t o r i e s do not 
work i n the w i n t e r and i c e f a c t o r i e s , t h e r e f o r e , c l o s e a t t h i s 
season. 
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